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Chapter 1: A review of Greek labor movement historiography 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relatively unknown territory of labour movement and 
working class communism in Greece as they developed in the years between the First and Second 
World Wars. Accordingly, it will put forward and examine previously unidentified aspects of 
communist politics, as they can be drawn from the experience of two main industrial centres of 
Greece with relatively large working class concentrations: that of Kokkinia in Piraeus and, that of 
Kavala in Northern Greece or Macedonia. In the literature review of labour and communist 
historiography we aim to identify and engage with widely held preconceptions concerning the 
reasons behind the emergence, growth and political orientation of the organized labour movement. 
Accordingly, we shall underline problems in the methodologies and explanations offered to interpret 
these social phenomena. This discussion will serve as a background against which the argument of 
the thesis will unfold, facilitating the development of an alternative approach to the study of working 
class communism. 
By labour movement we mean the praxis of workers coming to form unions and parties, part-time 
or full-time, based on economic or political aims, founded on their worker status. The labour 
movement has been, historically expressed through fraternities, trade unions, co-operatives, political 
parties, labour congresges and the working class press. ' But why do some sections of the working 
class organize 
, 
their economic or political demands in trade unions and political parties respectively, 
while otheq dq not? EP Thompson writes: 
"Experience anses spontaneously with social being, but it does not arise without thought; it 
arises because m en and women (and not only philosophers) are rational; and theythink about 
what is happening to themselves and their world ... Changes take place within social being, 
which give rise to changed experience: and this experience is determining, in the sense that it 
exerts pressures upon existent social consciousness and proposes new questions. i. P2 
These "pressures" appear to be essential in understanding the relation between 'experience I' 
(lived experience) and 'experience 11' (perceived experience). Thompson has tried to clarify the way 
Kouloules G (1994) p16 
2 Thompson EP (1978) p257 
1 
he saw that process, saying that history "shows that events within social being give rise to 'lived 
experience', which does not instantly break through as 'reflections' into experience H, but whose 
pressure upon consciousness cannot be indefinitely diverted, suppressed, or falsified by ideology.,, 3 
Therefore, a history of the labour movement could not exist outside social history, of which it is an 
organic and dialectical part. 4 
Accordingly, any approach to the history of the labour movement would have to take into 
consideration the social and economic structures of the given case study, as well as the political and 
economic conjunctures (national and international), the ideology(ies) of the movement, the role of 
the state in the various manifestations of social life, the specific cultural traditions, and the history of 
tsocial mentalities'. In other words, it will have to be polymorphous, incorporating the theoretical 
insights and methods provided by other social sciences (such as economic and sociology)5, 
examining the various factors that may lead or contribute to or indeed prevent a break with a 
life/mentality/ideology of conformity. Thus, a history of the labour movement would contribute to a 
deeper understanding of 'general history', since the former is set to examine the development of 
long-term expressions of worker resistance, which, aims to limit or to abolish exploitation. 
As far as the Greek case is concerned, there is a near consensus on the state of labour movement 
historiography: "Almost non-existent"r, writes Koukoules; at an "infant stage" notes LeontaritiS7 ;a 
"neglected area in the historiography of modem Greece", argues Mazowerg. Some writers have 
attributed the lack of literature on the subject to the particular form and place that the labour 
movement acquired within Greek society over the decades: its close association with the extreme left 
and its continuous struggle against the state marginalized it as a possible subject of academic 
research. 9 Others have traced the problem to a lack of reliable statistical data on the period 
concerned, as well as the lack of research in relevant areas of academic interest. 10 
3 Thompson EP (198 1) pp405-6 4 It should be noted here that Thompson's concept of 'experience' is not un-problematic. is it, for example, 
used as a medium between structure and consciousness, and how successful such a 'new concept/category' 
would be in an analysis of labor radicalisn-dconservatism? Anderson addresses the validity of Thompson's 
concept of experience in Anderson P (1980). 
5 For more on the argument concerning the interconnectedness of history and other disciplines see, for 
example, Evans RJ (1997) Ch. 1; Burke P (1980) 
6 Koukoules G (1994) p25 
7 Leontaritis G (1980) p4 
8 Mazower M (199 1) p3 
9 Koukoules G (1994) p25; The writer also points out as evidence for this argument, that most research on 
the Greek labor movement done by Greek academics has been done in foreign academic establishments. 10 Leontaritis G (1980) p4 
2 
As far as the existing literature is concerned, the following observations can be put forward. The 
initial attempts to record and interpret the history of the Greek labour movement (overwhelmingly 
Marxist-based literature)" have tended to identify the working class as a whole with the relatively 
smaller in size organized labour movement, its more militant members. However, such 
conceptualization of the working class from the point of view of the higher strata of its 
organizational structure, does not necessarily constitute the 'whole picture' of the processes that 
define the particularities of the emergence and growth of the organized labour movement, or that 
define the boundaries of political behaviour or social consciousness of the popular base of that 
movement. 12 
In addition, the existing Marxist literature (including Communist Party literature) also appears 
theoretically and analytically restricted. This is partly due to the existence of an extremely limited 
number of Marxist works available in Greek. 13 The rather mechanistic supposition that "it is the 
condition of the workers which is directly responsible for the rise of working class communism"14 
has been dominant throughout the literature. 
However, if such limited theoretical explanations of the working class are to be successful for 
analytical purposes, they would have to be examined through the framework of internal relationships 
of the social and economic structure that contribute to its existence and its re-production. 
Accordingly, it would not be possible to form a satisfactory view of the labour movement in its 
social framework, without an understanding of practical expressions of the theoretical and 
organizational contradictions and conflicts within the early labour industrial and political 
organizations and of new ideologies and theories in the light of traditional mentalities and 
manifestations of action. 
In addition, it would admittedly be an over-simplification to reduce a materialist conception of the 
labour movement to a mere 'side-effect' of the booms and busts of the economic condition of the 
labouring masses: "We must suppose the raw material of life-experience to be at one pole, and all 
the infinitely-complex human disciplines and systems, articulate and inarticulate, formalized in 
11 Such as Kordatos G (1956); Jecchinis C (1967); Benaroya A (192 1) and others. Later examples of similar 
historiography would be, for example: Livieratos D (1976), (1985), (1987), (1994) etc. 12 Although this approach has been a dominant characteristic of labor historiography in its early years, it is 
still quite far from overcome in the case of Greek literature. 
13 For example, Lenin's 'State and Revolution', the first to be translated in Greek, was published in 1923, 
followed by 'The Three Components of Marxism' (1924), 'What is to be Done' (1927) and 'Leftwing 
Communism: An Infantile Dissorder' (1934); all other works were published after World War II. t4 Engels F (1958) p3 
3 
institutions or dispersed in the least formal ways, which 'handle', transmit, or distort this raw 
material to be at the other. " In other words, any material historiography of the labour movement 
should indeed, focus at exactly this "active process- which is at the same time the process through 
which men make their own history. "15 
Similar criticism to that outlined in the beginning, applies to literature that is confined to or is 
dominated by an 'anthropological' view of Greek politics, and of the labour movement in particular. 
Accordingly, clientism and patronage are put forward as the key concepts, for an understanding of 
political allegiances and developments: characteristic examples of such literature would be 
Campbell's Honor, Family and Patronage (1964) and Mouzelis's Parliamentarism and 
Industrialization in the Semi-Periphery (1986)16. However, an examination of clientism and 
patronage as explanations of incorporation and conservatism within the working class is insufficient 
for understanding the factors behind labour radicalism. 
Accordingly, labour historians such as Mavrogordatos, Mouzelis, and Koukoules have focused on 
the 'official', i. e. the labour movement that enjoyed the approval of the authorities. However, it was 
the trade union movement that often bordered illegality, which managed to develop a more 
autonomous political framework of theory and action. Theoretical models based on high-level 
politics do not possess the tools to interpret movements that existed outside the official frameworks 
and channels of power. Accordingly the question of trade union legitimization is often overlooked. 
Their political and social challenge to the status quo, manifested in various ways, is treated as non- 
existent. 
Koukoules, further argued that state incorporation of the labour movement, through economic 
dependency and the manipulation of labour leaders, became an extension of the state bureaucracy 
that contributed to the 'preservation of the status quo', directly through the adoption and promotion 
of government politics, or indirectly by enhancing the fragmentation in the labour movement. 17 
Involvement in the political processes was held to be based on individualist motives. This is 
attributed either to the 'individualistic' character of the Greek's involvement in politics as it is 
facilitated in the vertical or horizontal modes of incorporation, manifested in various 'modes of 
15 Thompson EP (198 1) p3 98 
16 See also Legg KR (1969); Mouzelis N (1978) and (1980) 
17 See Koukoules GF (1984) & (1985). He went as far as suggesting that "a trade union movement 
organized on a confederational structure ... has never existed in Greece, whatever the arguments to the 
contrary. What did exist, was simply a few labour organizations and occasionally some groupings. " 
(Koukoules G F, 1984, pp I 1- 12) 
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domination' and in the patron-client systern. 
18 In relation to the development of the labour 
movement: "incorporation as used here refers to the de facto control that the state exercises on 
the 
associations which, whilst, on paper free from legal commitments to keep the 
'social peace', are 
weak and therefore easily subjected to state manipulation and control. "19 State corporatism 
is also 
put forward by Mavrogordatos in order to explain the 'failure' of the working class to organize 
its 
interests autonomously of clientist/party networks and government politics. 
20 
Accordingly, industrial action was seen as an example of spontaneity, rather than of conscious 
collective action, and as the result of extremist leftist groups, which operated as sects in the trade 
unions, occasionally exploiting the dissatisfaction of the workers, but never fully developing into a 
workers' movement. The 'individualism' of the Greek, institutional or not, prevented him or her 
from forming factory councils or developing class solidarity. 
In addition, there has been a body of literature that has emphasised the argument concerning the 
incorporation of the working class movement, by pointing to the take over of the General 
Confederation of Greek Workers by the reformists in 1926-7 (and the general low level of 
unionization) and the small membership of the Communist Party throughout the inter-war period. 
21 
Although, methods of state incorporation of the labour and socialist movements are indeed important 
in the examination of labour politics, it is often the case that the elements that lead to their 
radicalization are ignored, and the prospects or conditions whereby the working class is capable of 
creating its own 'world-visions' marginalized. 22 
However, the present literature stressing the element of incorporation appears incomplete. It 
ignores aspects of incorporation, such as state violence and the use of police and military to actively 
intimidate and suppress radical sections of labour. Such forms of intimidation include the daily work 
18 The former refers to the role of bureaucracy and the various social formations used to incorporate 
political theory and action, manifested in the "state's tendency to inhibit the formation of an autonomous 
civil society" Mouzelis N (1967) p74. See also Mouzelis N (1978) and (1986). For the role of the clientage 
s1stern in Greek politics see Mavrogordatos G (1983) 1 Mouzelis N (1986) p75 
20 "Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories, in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. " (Schmitter P C, 1979, p 13) 
2t See for example Mavrogordatos G (1983); Leon GB (1976); Apostolakou L (1997); Rigos A (1999) etc 
22 Michael Mann has argued that state incorporation strategies were crucial in the understanding of labor 
and socialist movements' politics: reformism was more likely to be adopted by such movements where 
successful incorporation took place of at least some sections of the working class; on the contrary, the 
writer suggests that movements that are not provided with any 'legitimate' channels to express their 
demands and are 'marginalized' tend to adopt more extremist politics. (Mann M, 1993, p629) 
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of trade unions, arresting left delegates to influence the composition of labour congresses, closing 
down papers and exiling labour leaders. On the other hand, government interference appears to be 
confined to the control of union representation and labour leadership through its extensive clientage 
networks. However, a number of state-created labour institutions are frequently neglected as 
contributors to the incorporation of labour, such as the Labour Home, or the Labour and Social 
Welfare Branch of the Ministry of Finance that intervened both economically and administratively in 
the operation of trade unions. 
In considering the above, both Marxist and non-Marxist literature have been largely empiricist in 
their analysis. In the first case, examination of labour movement politics is largely reduced to a mere 
account of Party resolutions, strikes, and state oppression, focusing mainly on its direct 
manifestations, such as bans on the press and violent suppression of demonstrations. Its indirect 
manifestations, such as trade union legislation, the cultivation of anti-communist ideology and 
labour incorporation through patronage, are often marginalized or, as it is generally the case, not 
mentioned at all. 
Furthermore, attempts to link growing working class radicalism or conservatism with crises or 
stabilization of the national and international economy have admittedly been too mechanistic to be 
able to offer much to the understanding of the development of Greek labour movement politics 
during the interwar years. Such exclusively economistic interpretations have been frequently adopted 
by both Marxist and non-Marxist related literature, which however does not deal with the actual 
consequences of such processes on the ground level, but merely accepts the formula of economic 
crisis + working class = communism, and moves from then onwards to build on further suppositions. 
In addition, an increasing focus on key institutions, individuals or groups that constitute major 
actors in holding or competing for power, has tended to ignore the potentially powerful and the 
processes through which their individual or collective conditions and experiences progressively led 
them, or not, to the realization of that power. Indeed, there is little reference to the experience of the 
industrialization process itself, or indeed of the development and role of community identities and 
solidarities, as significant factors in the forming of labour politics. There is little reference to the 
processes that operate within the movement as it tries to define itself. Accordingly, as H Blumer 
suggests it would be essential to bear in mind that "what seems to be so essential to social 
movements deliberately seeking change, namely, the intricate play of factors which must be skilfully 
6 
employed to forge and direct a movement, as well as the fortuitous circumstances that facilitate their 
,. )23 use. 
Finally, it should be noted that, for historical and political reasons having to do with the Greek 
Civil War (1945-1949) and the Cold War, Marxist and non-Marxist accounts have been largely 
reduced to pro-communist and anti-communist accounts respectively. Those in turn, either have 
glorified or condemned the communist party and the organized labour movement and identified 
them with each other, for their own political ends. Accordingly, Marxist historians tended to 
overemphasize the role of the Party in the labour movement, ignoring at the same time any potential 
weaknesses or limitations this may have presented in their account. On the other hand, non-Marxist 
historians tended to concentrate their analyses on 'why did the Communist Party fail', attribute the 
growth of communism to working class misery or naivety, or even deny that a radical labour 
movement ever existed. Hence, political historiography in Greece has been seriously limited by 
intense political attributions. 
Factory=industrial proletariat--working class movement? 
The mechanistic application of Western European models and experience to the Greek case, seen 
for example in comparison of the Greek Trade Union Movement with the British TUC, may not be 
useful in explaining Ahe development of the Greek case. 24 Working class organization and 
consciousness is not necessarily an exclusive prerogative of societies that experienced an intense 
degree of industrialization according to the western model; a view shared by Marxists of the time as 
well. 25 Writers such as Mouzelis attribute the 'weaknesses' of the Greek labour movement, as they 
23 H Blumer (1957) p 147. And th6 writer adds: "A consciously directed and organized movement cannot be 
explained merely in terms of the psychological disposition or motivation of people, or in terms of a 
diffusion of an ideology. Explanations of this sort have a deceptive plausibility, but overlook the fact that a 
movement has to be constructed and has to carve out a career in what is practically always an opposed, 
resistant, or at least indifferent world. Thus, conscious movements have to depend on effective agitation, 
the skillful fomentation and exploitation of restlessness and discontent, an effective procedure for the 
recruitment of members and followers, the formation of a well-knit and powerful organization, the 
development and maintenance of enthusiasm, conviction, and morale, the intelligent translation of ideology 
into homely and gripping form, the development of skillful strategy and tactics, and, finally leadership 
which can size up situations effectively, time actions, and act decisively. These are ingredients of 
successful movements. To ignore them through preoccupation with the 'causes' of movements leads to 
inadequate and distorted knowledge. " 
" As in the case of Jecchinis Ch (1984) pp54-7 
25 See Chatzopoulos, cited by Kordatos G (1972) p29; In What do we mean by 'socialist &rection, 
Yiannios Archives, Filel, ELIA 
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perceive it, to its failure to develop effective class organizations and autonomous politics, 
appropriate to the process of industrialization. 26 
However, to what extent can such models that have been applied to western societies with liberal 
regimes and long labour traditions be applicable to our study? In the Greek case, it was not only the 
extent of industrialization that played an important role in the emerging shape of working class 
politics, but also its timing. The lack of pre-existing strong labour traditions, in combination with 
rising ideological doctrines that did not exist in the nineteenth century but proved decisive in the 
beginning of the twentieth, that required further elaboration in any attempt to interpret labour politics 
in Greece during the interwar period. Timing of industrialization is an important factor in the Greek 
case for an additional reason. It largely coincided with an unresolved national question. As we 
examine the case studies, we shall come across the notion of national trauma and the importance of 
identity among the working class of refugee origin, as well as the complexities of the politics in 
newly annexed national territories, such as Kavala. These features will be examined in combination 
alongside the themes of development and regime change: the existence of a state that was not very 
representative, but possessed and extensively exercised a repressive capability. 
Greek Communist Party Historiography 
Having touched upon a number of considerations and issues regarding labour historiography, we 
now need to focus on the historiography of the Greek Communist Party, identifying and addressing 
potential limitations. Elefantis characteristically notes: 
"Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory history of the KKE ... On the contrary, the 
bibliography is congested with propagandist documents, where however, one would attempt 
in vain to find the real characteristics of the Party, and the elements that add up to the 
communist movement in Greece. , 27 
The overall picture that a reader would find throughout most of the non-communist literature on 
the history and politics of the Greek Communist Party in the inter-war period would be one of a 
26 Mouzelis N (1986), cspecially pp73-76 
27 Elefantis AG (1999) p27 
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44secf'28 within the labour movement, and a party "slavishly dependent on Moscow%29 mainly due to 
its "sentimental" enthusiasm and "inexperienc&" . 
30 
On the other hand, most of the existing respective communist literature draws a rathef different 
picture: The Communist Party is attributed a "primary role" within the domestic labour movement; 31 
it is portrayed as the "qualitative leap towards the unification of Marxism with the country's labour 
1 32 -)03 movement' , the "inspirational, organizational, guiding force of the working class. The'Party 
itself stands as the product of the "maturing of internal economic, social, and political 
developments". 34 
The Communist literature also puts forward an uncritical view of the Greek Communist Party's 
relationship with the Third or Communist International (Comintern), founded in March 1919.35 The 
Comintern is portrayed as the "connecting link between the national and international labour 
movement. 06 The affiliation and relation to the Comintern is described as "a historically justified 
political action that contributed to the Marxist-Leninist development of the Party.,, 37 However, it 
should be taken into account that many party 'histories' were meant as pedagogic advisory history 
manuals for new party members, and therefore are usually limited to a non-analytic, schematic 
description of the various 'phases' of the Communist Party development. 38 
In view of the above discussion, a number of considerations emerge. First of all, there should be a 
degree of scepticism regarding the literature that emerged from the ideological confrontation 
between the two superpowers in the twentieth century, and which admittedly was more preoccupied 
with justifying doctrines, rather than offering a contribution to the existing knowledge on 
Communist Parties and the labour movement. Anderson notes that "Cold War monographs -far the 
most numerous genres, [were] spawned by the specialized institutions and grants for communism- 
watching. Written in a frankly counter-revolutionary spirit for the most part, their quality too is most 
29 Mavrogordatos G (1983) p152; Apostolakou L (1997) p415 29 Mavrogordatos G (1983) p 147; Kousoulas DG (1965) pp 1-20 30 Kousoulas DG (1965) p2; Mavrogordatos G (1983) p147 31 Belogiannis N (1998) p249; See also Mavrikos GE (2001) pp27-117; Moskof K (1988) pp397474 32 KE tou KKE (1988) p34; KE tou KKE (1986) p7 33 KE tou KKE (1986) p7 
34 KE tou. KKE (1988) p7; The above points drawn from communist literature are, to a large extent 
reproduced in a variety of official Party documents and historiography, such as for example: KKE (1958), 
KKE (I 974a), KKE (I 974b), KKE (I 975a), KKE (I 975b), KKE (I 975c). 
35 On the founding of the Comintern see McDermott & Agnew J (1996) 
36 KE tou KKE (1988) p7 37 yE toU y y 
38 ýE 
(1988) pp40-1; See also Tsintzilonis Ch (1999) p32-33 
See for example KE tou KKE (1988); Zachariades N (1945) etc 
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uneven". Such examples of Cold War literature include Kousoulas (1965), 39 and Burks (1961), 
which admittedly offer a rather unbalanced and negative critique of the Greek Communist Party. 
The most frequent practice among researchers of Communist Party history was to use as the 
foundations of their analysis various structural/organizational elements (e. g. Party organization, 
leadership, internal opposition, policies etc), supported by a number of statistics (such as 
composition of membership, electoral successes and failures etc). Although these are crucial in any 
attempt to construct a Party profile, certain observations should be made. Most statistics and data 
concerning membership, internal organization and policy making are drawn from the limited 
information available in official party historiographies and published documents . 
40 Access to Party 
archives has been restricted, limiting the scope of any research. Official party documents, although 
quite useful, constitute a 'selective' source of party material that reflects the 'official' point of view 
of why and how party developments took place. Accordingly, records and documents from the lower 
and middle party hierarchical strata are not included, and hence, no evidence can be found on the 
relationship among the different levels of party organization. There are also no indications as to the 
relationship of the Party with the Communist International. Views of the various (and indeed 
numerous) opposition groups and fractions are excluded in their totality or, at best, distorted through 
the interpretation of their character and positions by the dominant fraction that went on to write the 
'official' history of the Party. The granting of access to the Greek Communist Party Archives for the 
requirements of this research in itself should constitute a significant contribution to Communist 
Party historiography. 
Statistics can be manipulated to produce the desired end-result. To take an example: the argument 
that the Communist Party was 'weak' and a 'sect' within the labour movement during the inter-war 
period, has frequently been based on the poor performance of the Communist Party in national 
elections and its low membershi P. 41 However, such conclusions can be misleading: electoral support 
for the Communist Party might have been low nation-wide, but it was significantly higher in 
industrial urban centres. 42 Elections were also frequently accompanied by state violence, the 
suppression of the press and the rigging of the ballot. Low membership was, to an extent, a product 
39 Anderson P (1981) p146. Similar views are to be found in Koukoules GF (1994) p184 40 Such as the ones mentioned previously 
41 Such literature would include: Elefantis AG (1999); Mavrogordatos G (1983); Apostolakou L (1997); 
Kousoulas DG (1983) 
42 Such pieces of information exist dispersed throughout the literature, such as Legg KR (1969) p212, 
Burks RV (1961) p58, Elefantis AG (1976) p336, but seem to be quite frequently 'lost' in the overall 
argument. 
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of internal party weakness (such as fractional struggles), but surely other factors should not be 
ignored. The frequent banning of the party and its press, the active persecution of its members and, 
to a certain extent, the party policy of insisting on 'quality' rather than 'quantity' of its membership 
should be taken into account in any analysis of Communist Party history. 
Sole reliance on archived material, such as state or governmental archives, as it is most frequently 
the case with the vast majority of Greek literature, also has an additional drawback. As Richard 
Evans points out "The traces left by the past... do not provide an even coverage of it. Archives are 
the product of the chance survival of some documents and the corresponding chance loss or 
deliberate destruction of others. They also are the product of the professional activities of archivists, 
which therefore shape the record of the past and with it the interpretations of historians. Archivists 
have often weeded out records they consider unimportant, while retaining those they consider of 
lasting value. This might mean for example destroying vast and therefore bulky personnel files on 
low-ranking state employees such as ordinary soldiers and seamen, manual workers and so on, while 
keeping room on the crowded selves for personnel files on high state officials. Yet such a policy 
would reflect a view that many historians would now find outmoded, a view which considered 
'history' only as the history of the elites. A3 This constitutes a theoretical approach that has not yet 
been overcome by the main bulk of Greek labour historiography, which tends, on the one hand, to 
over-concentrate on government policies, party structures and leadership, and, on the other, to ignore 
the processes that take place between workers and party members at the level of the community and 
the workplace. 
Partly as a consequence of the above, the means and processes of developing and forging 
communist identity and consciousness at the base or local level have been marginalized or even 
ignored, in favour of the decisions, resolutions and struggles that took place among the party 
leadership, at the Party Congresses and in other formal institutions. However, as Draper notes, 
Communists are made, not born: "The founding leaders are not bom Communists; they could not join 
an already fully formed and hardened movement. Most of them came out of other radical movements 
with different traditions; they were made Communists at the same time as the Communist movement 
itself was in the making. -A4 It has been argued by researchers of communism and working-class 
militancy in other countries, that touching upon "the consciousness that was fostered by a whole 
43 Evans RI (1997) p87 
44 Draper T (1963) p4 
11 
range of activities and emblemsý', such as "the banners, the bands, the evening socials and sport, the 
youth groups, the Friends of the Soviet Union and so off'. 45 is crucial in understanding the 
development of communist or radical consciousness. In addition this bottom-up approach contributes 
greatly to the understanding of the relationship between leadership and activists, who subject to a 
number of collectivities such as the family, the neighbourhood, and the workplace, have quite 
frequently found such allegiances at odds with the Party and/or the Comintern. 46 Also the attempts to 
'translate' national politics and rhetoric47 to practical agendas for struggle and forms of popular 
mobilization addressing the peculiarities of various local realities are important in any understanding 
of party successes or failures in particular working class communities. 48 
As far as the Communist Party's relationship to the Third International is concerned, Anderson's 
comments are characteristic: "The Comintern remains to date a sociologically unique phenomenon, 
as an organization which commands an absolute loyalty, a disciplined fidelity, amongst its 
constituent national sections ... On the other hand, 
it is also necessary not to bend the stick too far in 
the other direction, that of the characteristic Cold War histories, which tend to represent each 
national communist party as if it were just a puppet whose limbs were manipulated mechanically by 
strings pulled in MoscoWI49. Speculation and arbitrariness have dominated this particular aspect of 
Communist Party research for another, perhaps more practical and objective reason: the Comintcm 
Archives, centralized in Moscow were inaccessible to most researchers before 1990. However, this 
is no longer the case, and new research has already been introducing fresh contributions to the 
debate: the importance of the "language of control and dominatiorf', the "complexity and 
contestation" of a relationship that was never as linear and straight forward as represented in most 
literature, the processes of legitimization of the Comintern in Communist Party and party members' 
consciousness, are issues that have been ever more raised in recent literature. 50 
45 Macintyre S (1980) p 173 46 See Morgan K (1989) p13; Macintyre S (1980) ppl73&176; Drew A (2000) p3 47 For the importance of the 'language of labor' as a means of shaping consciousness and translating theory 
to day-to-day issues, or indeed as a tool of domination and control see Jones GS (1983), especially pp2l- 22, as well as Belchern J& Kirk N (1997) pp2-3 
4' See for example the work by Savage M (1987), and especially pp188-200 49 Anderson P (1981) p150; that proposition was certainly true in all non-communist literature (see for 
example, the respective literature mentioned in the beginning when dealing with the Party's relation to 
Moscow). 
5' See for example Thorpe A (2000), as well as the review of this book in Howell D (2001) pp916-7. Other issues would involve the role of the Comintern as a strengthening and legitimizing force for 'weak' 
movements in countries where the socialist tradition was a relatively recent phenomenon. In some cases a 
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A characteristic failing of the official Communist Party historiography and the literature 
sympathetic to CPs would be the marginalization of large sections of the non-communist working 
class. That would range from "a failure to take seriously, or weave into the picture adequately, what 
the non-communist sections of the national working class are feeling and doing"51 to a mystification 
of the labour movement, dividing it into "heroes and villains"52 . 
Various groups and fractions have been represented in official and un-official party (and 
'opposition') historiography 53 with a multiplicity of labels (the most utilized being the dichotomy 
between Stalinists versus Trotskyites), that have crystallized in the successive attempts to provide an 
analysis of the development of the politics of the wider left in general and the Communist Party in 
particular. However, these categorizations seem quite arbitrary and superficial, as explanatory tools. 
These rather simplified analytical dichotomies, do not take into account the fact that the reasons why 
they came about in the first place were as a product of much more complex processes. These often 
involved the creation of self-images and the moral self legitimization of opposing groups, as well as, 
of course, ideological and political (and personal) differences and conflicts. 54 
In terms of the working class's 'routes to communism' the vast majority of non-communist 
literature has focused on phenomenology rather than process, i. e., it has focused on the decisions of 
the leadership, the appeal or not of party policies and labour leaders and patrons. Little or no 
reference is to be found to the processes through which certain sections of the working class became 
'strongholds' of Communist Support. 55 The tobacco workers of Kavala constitute a good example: 
Rigos traced their sole cause for radicalization in the threat posed to workers' control of the labour 
process by the mechanization of the industry. 56 Most other literature where a reference can be found 
review of the responsibilities of the local Communists has been overshadowed by the overestimation of the Comintern. See Drew A (2000) p2-3 51 Anderson P (1981) p149. He later adds: "... they tend to ignore large sections of the working class, 
which, particularly in the inter-war period -were either apolitical or apathetic or else formed part of the 
electoral constituency of bourgeois parties... " (ibid). Similar concerns can be found in Savage M (1987) 
Ix 
However, as Burke mentions: "A history constructed round heroes and villains makes it impossible to 
understand how the past happened as it did". (Burke P, 198 1, p8) 
53 See inter-allia: For KKE, KE tou KKE (1945), (1946), (1947), (1952); for the 'opposition' see: Karliaftis 
L (1991), Asteriou E& Lampatos G (1995), Emmanouilides M (2002) 
54 A moral legitimization that often reached the point of 'mythology' (See article in Kommounistiki 
E itheorisi by Tsokopoulos v, 1990, p79) 
5'pMacintyre's 'Little Moscows' would be a good example for the usefulness of such an approach. 
cintyre S, 1980) 
gosA(1999)pl4l 
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has put forward the high concentration of workers in the warehouses. 57 The distinct cultural 
dimensions, the inner-class communication network which progressively forged their class identity, 
in other words, the processes through which experience is channelled into radicalism (or indeed, 
conservatism or apathy), is effectively marginalized. 
Finally, the history of the transition from the Socialist Worker Party of Greece to the Socialist 
Worker Party-Communist, to the Communist Party of Greece-Greek Section of the Communist 
International, is often viewed as a linear and unproblematic development. On the one hand, the 
Communist Party-based literature views the process as a more or less 'natural' process of 'maturity', 
whereas, on the other, the non-communist literature views the same process as a more or less 
'inevitable' and 'predictable' process of 'Stalinization' of the Party. However, the transition and 
further development of the Party seems to have involved a dialectical (although not equal) 
relationship between the Comintern, the Balkan Communist Federation, and the Greek Communist 
Party and its leaders, activists and sympathisers. This complex relationship was characterized by 
both ruptures and continuities that have to be examined in relation and contradiction to each other in 
order to provide a wider understanding of the development of communist politics in Greece. The 
interplay of formal party politics and what communists did in the community will constitute a central 
theme of this research. 
Sources, methodology and scope 
The identification and accessibility of sources undoubtedly pose a challenge for any researcher of 
Greek social history. Koukoules had characterized the situation of historical sources in Greece as a 
"kingdom of darkness and chaos. "58 That is partly due to the inadequate, incomplete or non existent 
citing of the material used by previous research, which creates serious obstacles in identifying and 
tracing a potential number of sources. It is also due, however, to the existence of a large number of 
small public or private archives and collections, which in most cases do not possess an efficient and 
organized cataloguing system, and to which the degree of accessibility varies considerably. Thus, 
Jocating and then granting access to the sources had been a most time and energy consuming 
57 Mavrogordatos G (1983) p146; Jecchinis H (1987) p6l; Mazower M (1991) pl2l 58 Koukoules G (1994) p7 
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process. Nevertheless, a significant variety of primary sources had been collected and used for the 
purposes of this study. 
The types of archives that have been used vary from national, to regional, to private ones; a 
detailed list of which is presented at the end of this study. Governmental papers were drawn in the 
Parliament Archives, the General State Archives as well as the Venizelos Archive that is hosted at 
the Benaki Museum. Special reference should be made to the Archives of the Communist Party of 
Greece, which offered the opportunity of examining a large number of previously unseen and 
unpublished materials. 59 
This research had also consulted a wide range of newspapers and j ournals published in the interwar 
period, numbering forty eight in total. Out of these, twenty one are mainstream popular newspapers 
with national circulation, whereas nine are local newspapers. Of the rest, eleven were published by 
the Communist Party of Greece (nationwide, locally, factory and youth papers) and another seven by 
various political groups opposing the Communist Party. Rizospastes newspaper constitutes the main 
official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece. 
In addition, a number of interviews have been used for this study, which as oral history sources, 
complement the printed or written archival material and provide an insight into the perceptions and 
viewpoints of local leaders and activists. These interviews were of people who have either been 
Communist Party members at the period concerned or continued to be at the time of the interview. 
There were also a number of people who have never been Party members, but have been activists or 
sympathisers. Finally there were a number of people who had never been either of the two, but 
nevertheless were active trade unionists, or have simply encountered the communists at their place 
of work. Apart from one interview, all the others have been conducted by other individuals. Despite 
that fact, however, these interviews had never been utilized in the past for the purposes of such 
research. 
As far as the scope of this study is concerned, the time frame is limited to the period between the 
end of the First World War in 1918, which is also the date when the General Confederation of 
Labour and the Socialist Labour Party of Greece were established, and the rise of the Metaxas' 
dictatorship in August 1936. The time frame is important in this study since in the Greek case the 
First World War came to a conclusion later, in 1922 with the Asia Minor disaster and the refugee 
59 Despite initial intentions I had not visited the Comintern Archives in Moscow, which continue to remain 
a challenging source for future research- 
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influx that had a most significant impact on the domestic social and political developments. In 
addition, the Popular Front policy came to an end rather early in Greece as a result of the Metaxas' 
regime oppressive anti-communist policies that left the Communist Party absolutely devastated on 
the eve of the Second World War. 
In terms of the geographic location of the two case studies, the first one, Kokkinia, is located west 
of Piraeus, the largest port of Greece, whereas the second, Kavala, that is also a large port, is situated 
at the province of Eastern Macedonia in Northern Greece. They both constituted important industrial 
centres, with a significant working class concentration that was overall uncommon in Greece, an 
overwhelmingly agricultural country. 
Finally, in a brief overview of the contents of this study, chapter I provides a background against 
which the argument of the thesis will unfold, facilitating the development of an alternative approach 
to the study of working class communism in the particular national context of interwar Greece. 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide the economic and political framework respectively for the development of 
the working class and the organized labour movement in Greece. In particular, chapter 2 will 
examine a number of assumptions and perspectives about what inhibited or favoured the emergence 
of radicalism. The various methods of incorporation of the labour movement that will be examined 
in chapter 3 will provide a backdrop for the following chapters where we shall examine the extent to 
which various sections of the working class managed, or not, to respond to and deal with them, and 
why was that so. Accordingly, chapters 4 and 5 will deal with the Communist Party at the national 
level and its relationship with the Communist international. Chapters 6 to 8 are case studies that deal 
vvith the development of labour and communist politics in the localities of Kokkinia and Kavala. 
Chapter 9 provides a summary and a set of conclusions to the study. 
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Chapter 2: The morphology of Greek industry and the Greek proletariaL 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the economic framework that facilitated the 
development of the working class in Greece during the inter-war years, and put forward the potential 
for and limits on radicalization. It will touch upon and expand on a number of assumptions and 
perspectives about what inhibited or favoured the emergence of radicalism. One of the key factors 
that is widely put forward in the literature as inhibiting working class radicalism in interwar Greece 
is the peasant background of the average Greek worker. Writers such as Mavrogordatos (1987) and 
Moskof (1988) have pointed to the subsequent transfer of personalistic relations of production that 
were dominant in the country side to the cities, -ties with land, as well as a 'peasant mentality'- in 
order to explain a lack of unionism and radical action among first or second generation workers of 
peasant background. 
Another important assumption about what inhibited collective action and the growth of working 
class radicalism concerns the size of industry and the dominance of small shops, artisanship and the 
particular relations between employer and employee that characterized them. This is traced back to 
the particularities in the development of capitalism in Greece, its position in the international 
capitalist system, its vulnerability to external pressures. 60 
On the other hand, there are a number of conditions that have been widely held to have facilitated 
the emergence of radical enclaves. Those include working and living conditions, decline in wages 
and the impact of international crises, such as war or the 1929 economic crisis, on Greece. 
Mavrogordatos points to the existence of a landless proletariat that came about with the influx of 
Asia Minor refugees in 1922, whereas Mazower notes that it was industrial and urban growth itself 
that "Produced new social forces into Greek life" which would pose a threat to the existing social 
and political fabriC. 61 
Accordingly, the argument in this chapter will unfold by presenting an overview of the 
morphology of the peasantry and the political economy of agriculture, followed by an outline of 
some general characteristics of the Greek political economy since independence was acquired by the 
See Mouzelis N (1980) and Elefantis AG (1999) 61 Mazower M (1991) p 295 and Mavrogordatos G (1987) ppl44-145 
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Ottoman Empire in 1821. The main bulk of the chapter will deal with issues concerning the growth 
of industry and the conditions under which the Greek working class developed, the emergence of an 
urban proletariat and an overview of their living and working conditions. 
The morphology of the peasantry and political economy of agriculture in Greece since 
independence 
A predominantly rural society: No study of the Greek labour movement would be sufficient 
without at least some reference to the peasantry or the political economy of agriculture, since "the 
rural space remains, from Independence to the end of the inter-war period, the dominant living 
framework of the Greek. -62 
Graph Iý Employment by sector (1928 CensuS)63 
MAgriculture 53.56% 
E Manufacturel7.8% 
OTransport & Communication 
4.42% 
OCommerce 7.68% 
M Stock rearing & hunting 6.93% 
El Others 9.61% 
Since Greece was a predominantly agricultural society, it is understandable why land reform 
64 became a key-political issue even as early as the War of Independence in 182 1. 
a. National Lands: Out of the 1,859,000 acres of arable land that existed within the national 
borders in 1830, more than 1,450,000, previously belonging to the Ottoman state or Muslim 
landowners, were declared 'National Land'. During the War of Independence, some 5 10,000 acres 
were illegally acquired by Christian peasants, and another 445,000 acres were given legally by the 
Greek state as compensation to the financiers of the revolutionary governments and to a number of 
62 Moskof K (1988) p 119 
63 Based on the 1928 census returns, cited in Matistiki AýPetiris ijs Ellados, 1938 
64 See Kordatos G (1925) Chapters 1-3. Kordatos G (1973) p2791 Zografos D (1923) pp 140-155 
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war veterans and victims. By 1870, however, there were still some 658,750 acres, some V4of the 
total arable land, that were owned by the state. The 'National Lands' have attracted various 
comments throughout the existing literature. Vergopoulos claims the existence of "a consistent 
policy of the Greek state that favoured small land-ownership" and remained suspicious of large land 
estates; the 'nationalization' of land was the first step in that PoliCY65. Moskof argues that the 
'National Lands' constituted the state itself as a landowner, acquiring 25-30% of the production, and 
keeping the peasants who cultivated those lands under a system of feudal economic relatione. 
However, Kordatos maintains that, although in the first instance it may have looked as though the 
Greek state had become a landowner, in practice it was merely a 'virtual' owner, since the majority 
of the former Ottoman owned land were acquired through various means by Greek landowners. 
67 
b. Land Reforms: Independently of the status and character of the 'National Lands', the issue that 
is of most relevance to this study is the fact that the so-called 'nationalization' of land did not 
automatically result in its redistribution, but only the possibility of this outcome. The subsequent 
legislative attempts to carry forward further reforms were either incomplete or, most frequently, 
remained on paper. 68 
Small ownership: Nevertheless, land reform in Greece in the early 1900s was early and widespread 
compared with its eastern European counterparts . 
69 The small holding sector had three further 
implications. Firstly, small plots of land rarely produced a surplus: most of the agricultural 
production was consumed by the producer almost in its entirety. This meant that the connection 
between the self-sustaining peasantry and the dominant classes or the 
, 
state was manifested directly, 
outside the market, in the form of tax or rent collection. Secondly, as Vergopoulos argues, "the state, 
due to the redistribution of land in small properties succeeded in stressing the impersonal character 
of the system, and therefore, fortified its position in the totality of the cconomy. "70 Finally, small 
holdings enhanced individualism: "Of all individualistic Greeks, the farm workers are the most 
notably so" Carey and Carey note. "They found little appeal in the idea of collective farming, 
65 Vergopoulos K (1975) pp 152-153; Vergopoulos K (1974) pp9l. onwards 
66 Moskof K (1988) p125 
67 Kordatos G (1973) p279 
'58 Such as the relevant Laws of 29/VI848, Law YAX of 1871, the relevant legislation of 1886 (Kordatos 
G, 1973, p280); See also Moskof K (1988)ppI25-6 
'69 By 1917, land reform in Greece involved some 49.8% of the land, compared to Rumania, 1920: 29.7%, 
Czechoslovakia, 1918: 14.1%, Yugoslavia 1919: 4.6%, Bulgaria, 1919: 21/o. See Stefanides D (1948) p396; 
Kitsikes D (1964) p 155 
70 Vergopoulos K (1975) pp 174-5 
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particularly as the land reform of that era had increased the small number of farmers deeply attached 
to their own bits of land, no matter how tiny. 01 
The town-countryside relationship: The function of the town during the pre-industrial era 
consisted mainly in the organization of village production, particularly to advance 
commercialization through the spread of specialization of production. The town was mainly a 
market, and its role was that of an intermediate between the various rural productive units. When 
peasants left their villages for the cities in search of employment they maintained strong links with 
the former: it was overwhelmingly the male population that migrated, leaving the family behind, 
only to rejoin them at the time of sowing and harvest. For a transitional period that sometimes lasted 
a generation the labourer of peasant origin who ended up in the town was still dependent on the 
village. Proletarianization in terms of the peasant's economic and ideological status was hence 
retarded for decades, dividing even more his social consciousness. 72 
Peasants'responses to oppressionldeprivation: Frequent piece-meal reforms (in 1836,1848,187 1, 
1886,1890,1907,1914 and 1917) that resulted in small private ownership of land (or at least the 
prospect of it), as well as the implications of small private ownership discussed above, meant that 
peasant radicalization never went beyond sporadic localized revolts that were easily suppressed by 
the state or the landlords. 73 On the contrary, without valid or obvious channels of escape from their 
ever-worsening position (such as the case of the currant crisis of 1892-1909), a frequent ending to 
social tension would be immigration or emigration. In the fifteen years of the crisis almost one third 
of the peasantry involved in currant production moved to the cities or across the Atlantic. 74 
71 Carey J& Carey A (1968) p 116 
72 See Zolotas X (1926) 
73 With the example perhaps of the Kileler revolt of 19 10, when the army had to be brought in. 4 peasants 
were killed and several others wounded (Triantafillos P, 2001, p62). There are of course other factors that 
contributed to the limitations of collective action in the peasantry, such as the particular nature of process 
of their political demands through the clientage system, which are going to be dealt in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
74 An index of such a development is the rising numbers of emigrants to US (Source: Zolotas X, 1926, 
nn25-26- DPIYinnRv7fivYiki. q Yniroviav 191)n-19151 
Year Avirage No Year Average No Year Average No 
1870-75 23 1885-90 75 1900-05 10,175 
1875-80 25 1890-95 313 1905-1910 32,100 
1880-85 23 1895-1900 1,105 
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General characteristics of Greek political economy since independence 
Greek political economy has shown a number of distinctive characteristics. These concern the 
nature of the bourgeoisie, uneven development, the vulnerability of Greek industry to international 
pressures due to the character of its initial development, and issues of economic dependency and 
control. 
Peculiarities of the Greek bourgeoisie: Following the formation of the Greek state (1830s), the 
main bulk of the Greek bourgeoisie found itself situated outside the national borders. This 
peculiarity can be explained from the fact that the Greek bourgeoisie was historically formed and 
developed without the existence of significant links with the domestic productive forces. Indeed the 
vast majority of the Greek bourgeoisie was developed abroad: in Turkey (mainly Asia Minor), South 
Russia, Rumania and Egypt. 75 
Several Greek entrepreneurs were connected to the international capitalist market. The main 
characteristics of this connection were, on the one hand, the export of raw materials from Eastern 
Europe and the Mediterranean towards Western Europe (commerce), and on the other, their 
involvement in the financial opportunities that were offered by the markets of Berlin, Paris and 
London (banking). Thus, the relationship of the Greek bourgeoisie with Greece itself was that of a 
representative of the international market or a direct partner of the European capitalist centre. This 
created another peculiarity: a fundamental dichotomy between a relatively 'underdeveloped' 
peripheral domestic society connected to an 'overdeveloped' bourgeois class, and the absence of a 
substantial intermediate class. 76 
Uneven development: Although a sequence of international events would eventually force the 
Greek bourgeoisie to seek local conditions for the reproduction of its capital, 77 the particularity of 
75 See Tsoukalas C (1974) 
76 See Vergopoulos K (1975) pp 12-13; Legg KR (1969) p82. While the bourgeoisie remained outside the 
Greek national borders, the majority of the petty-bourgeoisie who were to be found within, occupied 
themselves with the political decision-making process of the newly formed state: "Under these terms, and 
despite secondary disputes, these two sets of interests were not competitive with each other, but 
complementary: the petty-bourgeoisie acquired the effective act of power and the bourgeoisie was content 
with exercising supervision of 'the last instance'. As a direct result there was an overdevelopment of a state 
mechanism of civil servants and of a 'political' class. " (Vergopoulos Y., 1975, p 14) 
77 Such events would include the October Revolution and the subsequent Civil War that damaged the Greek 
merchant controlled wheat trade of South Russia (1917-1922), the emergence and success of the Young- 
Turk movement in the Ottoman Empire where the interests of Greek capital were highly concentrated 
(1909), the instability of the Northern Balkans (Balkan Wars I& II), the commercial crisis in Egypt where 
the Greek merchants controlled the import and export of cotton and textiles etc. 
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concentration of capital accumulation in the commercial (35%) and maritime sectors (16%). 78 would 
have a great impact on the industrialization of Greece. Indeed, it is no surprise that the first 
industrial centres were exclusively concentrated at commercial ports and in the -surrounding areas. 79 
Accordingly, communication infrastructures such as railways and roads were mainly limited to the 
service of those ports, hence restricting mobility and social communication, as well as the further 
spread of industry, industrial relations and ideas. 80 
The initial steps towards the establishment of industries and the vulnerability of Greek industry to 
international pressures: The first efforts to introduce industrial production units in Greece were 
short-lived due to the external influences of the international market. For example, the cotton factory 
in Patras, established in 1846 closed down during the 1860s due to a sudden increase in the price of 
raw material caused by the American Civil War, 81 and the economic crisis of 1883-8 meant that the 
leading industrial units in Syros lost almost half of their workforce. Finally, the Crimean War, as 
well as the increasing dominance of the steam-boat, meant that the Greek maritime industry declined 
sharply after the 1850s, from a tonnage of 255,233 in 1848, to 145,361 in 1901, to 101,459 by 1909. 
Reflecting the characteristics of a society and economy of peripheral capitalism, industrial 
development in Greece was largely dependent and uneven due to external pressures. 82 Hence the 
development of a working class was slow. In 1874 industry was still at an infant stage, employing 
78 Archives du Ministire des Affaires Etrangeres, Nouvelle S&ie, Gr&e, Vol 12,13 cited by Moskof K 
(1988) p146. At the same time the industrial sector would represent 18% of capital accumulation, whereas 
another 18% would represent investment in estates. The figures concern capital accumulation in the 
beginning of the 2& Century (1900-1910). 
79 "By 1922 Piraeus had outstripped Naples and Genoa, and run close to Marseilles in the volume of its 
total shipping (5,789 steam vessels, 5,792 sailing ships) handled annually. " (Dakin D, 1972, p247) Similar 
growth (but to a lesser extent) witnessed other main ports such as Salonica, Syros, Patras etc. '0 The first development was the 6 mile line between Athens and Piraeus (1867-1869). A Naval Intelligence 
report on the state of the railways (1944) mentions characteristically: "Greece, is of all the Balkan 
countries, the least well supplied with railways, with the exception of Albania, which has none at all. There 
are only about 1,653 miles, representing I mile of railway for every 30 sq. miles of territory (cf. Great 
Britain 4.4 sq. miles, France 5.5, Yugoslavia 13, Bulgaria 19), or I mile of railway to 4,261 inhabitants (cf, 
Great Britain 2,291, France 1,088, Yugoslavia 2,382, Bulgaria 2,855). Similar figures for the Balkan 
Peninsula as a whole are I mile to 19 sq. miles, and I mile to 2,877 inhabitants. " (Naval Intelligence 
Division. 1944b. 1)335) A COMDarative look at roads stives a similar nicture- 
Country Miles of road 
per sq mile 
No of inhabitants 
per mile of road 
Country Miles of road 
per sq mile 
No of inhabitants 
per mile of road 
Greece 0.17 830 
_ 
Italy 1.05 339 
En land-Wales 2.64 267 0.33 374 
France 1.84 107 Yugoslavia 0.27 591 
Ge many tO. 73 528 Bulgaria 0.49 328 
ziource: Naval Intelligence Division (1944b) p313 
81 Cotton Supply Register, 28/1/1864 
82 Vergopoulos K (1975) p 11, also see Mouzelis N (1987) 
22 
83 just 7,342 regular workers, and some 20-25,000 seasonal workers. By 1909 the number of regular 
workers increased to 60,114, out of which 37,174 lived in the capital and Piraeus. 84 
Economic dependency and control: Legg points out that "Greece was an impoverished state, and 
the question of foreign debts bedevilled Greek politics throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, influencing policies of internal development, taxation, and diplomatic alignment. By 
manipulating their financial demands, foreign powers could force abrupt changes in the allocation of 
Greek resources for domestic purposes .,,, 
85 In addition, foreign debt had another two-fold impact on 
the industrialization of Greece. Firstly, loans were generally not directed to productive purposes, 86 
and secondly, loan re-payments, absorbed a significant part of the national income. 87 
Greece's economic dependency on foreign powers is seen in the role played by the International 
Financial Commission (IFC). In 1898, the IFC deemed that the Greek government was unable to 
"manage their financial matters in a manner satisfactory to western tenets of fiscal administrative 
efficiency", 88 and it set up a Management Company of Greek State Monopoly Goods. The 
Company, representing all of Greece's ma or creditors (although, in paper, under the jurisdiction of 
the Greek state)89, effectively took over key sources of revenue re-assigned for the service of debt. 90 
The inter-war period-The legacy 
Throughout the interwar period small family businesses predominated in Greece's manufacturing 
sector and gave it a strongly petty-bourgeois character, not untypical of Greek society as a whole. 
According to existing indications, the majority of non-agricultural workers were employed 
93 SeeAcropolis 10/5/1998 
84 See Ekthesis Ergatikon Kentron, Athina, 1911 
85 Legg KR (1969) pp68-69 
86 Levandis JA (1944) p. ix; Pepelasis AA (1959) p173 
87 From 1830 to 1860 Great Britain and France received as part of their loan repayments some Mo of the 
Greek national income. By the end of the century the loans would have been repaid at a 3-fold of their real 
value. On the burden of foreign debt see Dertilis P (1956), Belogiannis N (1998) 
88 Levandis JA (1944) p. ix 
89 All major creditors were represented -LTK, France, Germany-(Moskof K, 1988, p 115). Greece's role, on 
the other hand, was reduced to one of a bystander, since it was not permitted to enact any law that 
overstepped on its sources of revenue (see Break G& Turvey R, 1964, p207) 90 These involved. 1) Government monopolies: salt, petroleum, matches, playing cards, cigarette paper, 
Naxos emery. 2) Duties: Stamp duties, tobacco dues. 3) Import duties collected at Piraeus. (See 
Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, 1921, p 163) 
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throughout this period in artisan workshops or other small businesses. 91 Accordingly, little economic 
or social distance separated them from their petty bourgeois employers, to whom they were very 
often, and in various degrees, tied through manifold personal or traditional bonds, such as family or 
of common rural origin. The prospect, realistic or otherwise, of eventually replacing their employer 
or becoming owners of a small shop themselves, was a common and widespread ambition. 
Furthermore, Greek workers commonly owned some land in their village of origin, maintaining 
strong family and economic ties with small property, and many workers were actually home 
owners. 92 Greek workers also carried with them the traditional 'guild' mentality and the complex 
network of personalistic politics and endemic factional conflicts, which constituted a problematic 
foundation for a growing and stable labour organization. 93 In addition, many workers joined unions 
out of imitation rather than due to the development of class consciousness. 94 
To a large extent the structure of Greek industry reflected its natural endowments. Heavy industry 
was confined to an engineering sector consisting mainly of mechanical-repair workshops and 
traditionally-run shipyards, and to a metallurgical sector involving mainly a refining arm of the 
Lavrion mines. The major industrial sectors were food and drink, soap refining, chemicals, furniture 
and leather working. The overall picture of Greek industry, therefore, could be described as one 
where a traditional manufacturing sector was dominant, with a few isolated examples of modem 
industrial practices. 
91 Coutsournaris, drawing from the 1930 Census of manufacturing mentions that out of a total of 65,811 
establishments, there were 61,336 (93.2%) employing less than 6 employees, or no hired labor at all, 3,751 
(5.7%) employing between 6 and 25, and only 724 (1.1%) employing 26 or more. Goutsoumaris G (1963) 
PP34&37 
Venizelos's Agrarian reforms of 1917 and 1918 (that were carried through throughout the inter-war 
period) "Gave the final blow to large-scale landed property in Greece. From the 1920s onwards, the small 
family plot has been the dominant form of land ownership in the Greek countryside. " (Mouzelis N, 1980, 
p245) The process of land re-distribution was accelerated with the arrival of refugees, reaching some 
425,000 hectares by 1936. So radical was the policy of agrarian reform at the time that it was attached by 
Venizelos's opponents as an example of 'bolshevism'. (Mouzelis N, 1986, pp84-5; Georgiki Enosis, 1922, 
p14) Carey and Carey suggested that industrial employees continued to maintain a dpeasant outlooV 
throughout the interwar period, "with no conception of what uniting the 'workers of the world' meant. " (Carey J& Carey A, 1968, p 116) 
93 Zolotas XE (1926) p65; Elefantis, AG (1976) pp3l9-324; Benaroya A (1975) pp223onwards. According 
to the latter, a guild mentality and organization persisted even in industrial enterprises throughout the interwar period. Small family enterprises and larger industries co-existed, without the former being 
swapped by the latter, at any rate close to the industrializing process experienced in the industrialized West. 94 See Benaroya A (1986) p220 
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The growth of industry and working class in the inter-war period 
However, despite its relatively backward character, manufacturing achieved an unprecedented 
prominence in terms of its overall importance within the Greek economy during the inter-war 
period. Indeed, as Mouzelis argues, "From the thirties onwards there is no doubt that the capitalist 
mode of production had become firmly established in the industrial sector, to function as the 
dynamic pivot of the Greek economy -where dynamism is meant to imply not only high rates of 
growth, but also the systematic transfer of resources from the simple-commodity sector (prevalent in 
agriculture and small industry) to the industrial capitalist sector. "95 
Manufacturing in Greece soon acquired greater importance in the Greek economy than in any of 
her Balkan neighbours, as the following table indicates: 
Table 1: Comparative Manufacturing/Agricultural Output among three Balkan states in millions of their national 
currency. 96 
Output Greece Bulgaria Rumania 
Gross Crop Output 1,719 2,378 3,978 
Gross Manufacturing 
Output 
1,077 761 2,328 
Crop/Manufacturing 
Output ratio 
1,60 3,12 1,71 
The growth of industry is indeed impressive: between 1923 and 1939 industrial production 
doubled in value and horse power, and tripled in volume. 97 In the decade between 1928 and 1938 
electricity production quadrupled, and, in the same period, Greece experienced one of the highest 
increases of industrial production (65%) in the world, surpassed only by the Soviet Union and 
Japan. 98 The growth of industry inevitably resulted in the expansion of the working class, which 
almost doubled in the decade between 1920 and 1930, as the following table illustrates: 
95 Mouzelis N (1980) p247 
96 Sources: Greece, Annual Statistics 1933, pp434-8, Bulgaria and Rumania, Table 10.5, Jackson M& 
Lampe J (1982). Data for Greece are for 1921. For Bulgaria and Rumania the data refer to 1922. The data 
are in millions of national currency units. 97 Gregoriadis S (1974) p48 98 Vergopoulos K (1977) p330. See also tables I and 2 in Appendices 
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Table 2: Growth of workforce in industry in the period 1920-193099 
1920 1930 1920 1930 
No of persons occu 
pied in industry 
154,633 280,331 Workers 103,777 181,512 
Employers- 
Managers 
45,475 87,196 Of which women 21,089 39,087 
I Clerks 5,381 11,623 T No of businesses ---- 33,811 76,591 
Nevertheless, although agriculture was declining in economic importance, it still employed the 
majority of the Greek workforce (although to a lesser degree than in other Balkan countries), as the 
tables below indicate: 
Table 3: Proportions of National Product by Sector of Origin (%)'00 
Period Agriculture Manufacturing, 
Mining, Construction 
Transport & 
Communications 
Commerce 
1935-9 40 21 6 12 
Table 4: Comparative Rural Population Density in 5 European Countries'" 
Country No of inhabitants per 
Sq. km. 
Rural Population per sq. 
Km. of arable land 
% of population depen- 
dent on agriculture 
Greece 48 86.7 60 
Bulgaria 59 95.4 80 
Yugoslavia 56 100.1 75 
Italy 133 53.4 44 
Germany 139 52.1 20 
England/Wales 264 33.8 5 
99 Source: StafisfX Epefifis fis Ellados 1930, pp, 177& 181 100 Source: Table J2 in Mitchell BR (1992) p914. The Figures are as proportions of NPD to 1949 101 Cited in Stavrianos L (1958) p596 
26 
A new urban proletariat? 
In addition to the growth of an urban workforce in response to industrial development, the 1922 
Asia Nfinor Disaster produced some 1,221,489 refugees 102 ('homeless people' 103) whose settlement 
gave a sudden boost to the growth of urban centres. The population of small villages increased from 
242,236 in 1907 to 571,735 in 1928, whereas the population of the cities increased from 627,973 to 
2,064,696 in the same period, especially around urban industrial centres such as Athens and 
Piraeus. 104 
Table 5: Population Increase in Refugee Settlements of Athens and Piraeus 105 
Athens 1920 1928 Piraeus 1920 1928 
Kaisariani I1 15,357 Nea Kokkinia 0 33,201 
Vyrona 0 7,723 Drapetsona 0 17,652 
Nea Ionia 79 16,382 Keratsini 0. 10,827 
Nea Philadelphia 110 6,337 Peristeri 123 7,268 
Kallithea 4,940 29 446 
Table 6: The distribution of population in Greece (1879-1928) according to the size of settlement 106 
Settlements (No 
Of Inhabitants) 
1879 
Pop. % 
1889 
Pop. % 
1896 
Pop. % 
1907 
Pop. % 
1920 
Pop. % 
1928 
Pop. % 
Over 5,000 292,997 18 464,658 21 525,886 22 627,973 
_ 
24 1,336,371 27 2,064,696 33 
2,000-5,000 161,707 10 189,504 9 235,471 9 242,236 9 486,383 10 57 ,I, 735 9 Under 2,000 1,199,063 1 72 
- 
1,533,046 70 1,672,469 69 
- - 
1,761,743 
- 
67 
- 
3 194135 ," 63 568,253 58 
Total 1,653,767 1 100 12,187,208 100 12,433,806 10 0 T2 ,631, 952. 100 5,016,889 100 4 6,204,684 100 1 
Of course, refugees did not immediately settle permanently in one place. Indeed, it was not until 
1928 that the Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) could observe that "after the successive 
fluctuations of the refugee population from one part of the territory to the other, the refugees have 
102 Sladstild Epefiris fis Elkidos, 193 0 
103 LeagUe OfNatjonS OffiCial jOUrWj 1/3/1924 
104 Statistiki Epefiris fis Ellalas, 193 0 
105 Source: Mschon R (1998) p4l 
106 Stafistiki Epefiris fis Ellados, 1932 pp47-8. The table shows that although there was a clear tendency 
towards urbanization before 1920, the influx of refugees accelerated the process significantly. In particular, 
the size of urban settlements has grown some 49.7% in the period between 1920 and 1928 (Livieratos D, 
1987, ppl76-7). It would be useful, when comparisons are made, to take under consideration that Greece 
acquired new territory in 1881,1913 and 1920. 
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finally settled down and the majority of towns in Greece are now inhabited by refugee families more 
or less in proportion to their capacity. " 107 
Refugees were overwhelmingly absorbed in industry and commerce. More specifically, the male 
workforce found employment in industry (49.45%) and commerce (23.41%), whereas the majority 
of the female workforce was employed in industry (71.73%) and as menial staff (15.52%). As a 
result, the morphology of industry changed significantly: the proportion of employees in small 
industries was reduced to 51% of the total; the proportion in middle-size businesses remained stable 
at 19%, while the share of employees in large businesses rose to 30%. 108 
Table 7: Occupation distribution of urban refugees, 1928109 
Occupation Total % Male % Female % 
Mining 979 0.46 936 0.59 43 0.09 
Industry 114,517 54.82 78,424 49.45 36,088 71.73 
Transport 18,742 8.97 18,607 11.73 135 0.3 
Lending 4,347 2.08 4,023 2.53 324 0.64 
Commerce 38,516 18.43 37,133 23.41 1,383 2.74 
Personal Services 13,864 6.63 6,056 3.81 7,808 15.52 
Free Occupations 13,023 6.23 9,114 5.74 3,909 7.77 
Public Services 4,903 2.34 4,286 2.7 617 1.2 
Total 208,881 158,579 50,307 
In addition to providing an extra anny of wage-labour in the urban industrial centres of the 
country, new industrial sectors were developed, such as the textile industry. As an NP noted in a 
parliamentary discussion in 1925: 1 
"... textiles ... which are exclusive to the refugee world from Asia Minor, have begun to expand: the 
labour involved a total of 4,000 working women; the output amounts to 10,000 square meters; their 
sales value in Greece amounts to 107,634 drachmas; while the value of carpets sold abroad during 
107 Twentieth Quarterly Report of the Refugee Settlement Commission, 16/11/1928, p 10 log GS77, Apografi ton katastimalon kai ton viomixanihon kai emporikon epixeiriseon energeithisa to Septembrio 1930,1934 
109 Source: GSYE, Statistiki Epetiris fis Ellados, 1930, p75 
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1924 was 18,722,609 drachmas. The refugee world, abandoned with only 100-150 million drachmas 
of occupational loan, has managed to perform miracles with this amount. "' 10 
However, "the dreadful housing conditions and the underpaid work ... echoed those in the novels of 
Victor Hugo and Charles Dickens in the 19'h century". "' The Chairman of the Refugee Settlement 
Committee (RSC) noted that the wages paid to the refugees "translated themselves, in practical 
terms, into half a loaf of bread per person per day, a handful of olives, a little olive oil, and meat or 
fish perhaps once or twice a month. "' 12 As Mavrogordatos notes, "lacking the support that small 
property, family ties, clientism, and unbroken traditions provided in the case of native workers" and 
with their ambitions for upward mobility destroyed, male refugees threatened the domestic social 
fabric with radical proletanization of labour. 113 
But it was not only the refugees who swelled the ranks of the new-born proletariat. As a weekly 
newspaper, critical of the Liberal Party leader Venizelos, writes: 
"The farmer in northern Greece is coming to believe that the cause of his misfortune is the 
insatiability of capitalism which all bourgeois governments serve, the present one especially. Both 
reality and the Press teach him this. He learns that in the towns live a mass of rich privileged people 
who enjoy cinemas, theatres, cars and a thousand other benefits while he works increasingly and 
goes hungry. Instead of this however the support of the RSC [the Refugee Settlement Commission] 
has ended, likewise the loans ... and in their place come failed harvests, the worldwide economic 
crisis and sheer poverty. What is he supposed to do? "' 14 
The answer to that question was seen in migration towards the urban centres. Indeed, in 1928, the 
composition of towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants was 35% indigenous Greeks, 33.35% rural 
migrants, and 31.7% refugees that had arrived in Greece following the Asia Minor disaster of 1922. 
Furthermore, almost one third (33%) of Athens's population were refugees, and a similar proportion 
110 Efimeris ton Sizifiseon fis Voulis, 29/5/1925 
111 Kritikos G (2000) p202 
112 Morgenthau H (1929) p249 
113 Mavrogordatos T (1989) p145 
114 peitharhia, 15/5/1931 
29 
were recent migrants from the countryside. 115 Indeed, the movement of labourers in search of 
employment was almost constant throughout the inter-war period, as the table below indicates: 
Table 8: Annual Nfigration Statistics (In thousands)' 16 
Year Emigration Immigration Year Emigration Immigration 
1919 ... 12.0 1928 1920 12.2 7.7 1929 ... ... 
1921 4.1 9.1 1930 
1922 ... 7.8 1931 23.4 19.6 
1923 15.3 9.5 1932 26.6 19.0 
1924 ... 10.3 1933 21.8 18.3 1925 3.6 1934 26.6 19.0 
1926 6.7 ... 1935 21.4 17.7 
1927 9.3 ... 1936 17.2 14.5 
Of course on their arrival in the urban centres, these people did not find the 'luxurious' life 
mentioned above; that unfortunately existed only in rural popular imagination. On the contrary, they 
faced harsh living conditions and unemployment: "The agricultural workers who go to the towns 
and cannot find employment in industry", a League of Nations report noted, "would inevitably go to 
swell the ranks of those who depend for their livelihood on parasitic trades or casual labour. This 
class is already numerous and its existence precarious, and there is a risk that its members may one 
day join the extremist elements. "' 17 
Urban working class living and working conditions 
Living conditions for urban workers were indeed bleak. To a delegate from the international 
Labour Office who stressed the bad working conditions and the widespread violations of 
international conventions concerning child labour, Venizelos responded: 
"The urgent necessity of securing work for the great mass of refugees, the small proportion among 
them of male workers, and finally the necessity of dedicating all the available resources to the most 
urgent task of resettlement, have not permitted the implementation of measures which would be 
115 Slatistiki Epetifis fis Ellados, 1931 
116 Source: Mitchell BR (1992) p130. Immigration statistics refer to immigrants from Greece only and not 
immigrants to Greece. 
117 League of Nations (193 1) p 189 
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useful but might prevent the creation of new industries -which were anyway often unstable- and halt 
the development of others. " 119 
Of course the problem of refugee resettlement and employment was significantly reinforced by the 
strong resistance and reaction of the business lobby to any form of labor protection or wages 
legislation, since the unprecedented growth of Greek industry (hence profits) was largely founded 
on ever-reducing labor costs. Mazower cites a characteristic example of the business world's 
reaction to any forrn of legislation threatening their profiteering. The Tsaldares government in 1935 
put forward a number of legislative measures to provide a degree of state control of the production 
costs of domestically produced goods. The reaction of the business lobby to the government plans 
was put forward as a move "against what it described as the 'party state"'. Furthermore, N 
Kanellopoulos argued that the MNE [Ministry of National Economy] was "continuing to restrict that 
entrepreneurial freedom which was always the basis of the bourgeois state and its new proposals 
would lead to an 'unprecedented bolshevism'. " 119 
As the following graph illustrates, wages decreased in real terms (gap between wages and 
inflation) throughout the inter-war period compared to the increase in living costs: 
Graph 2: The Development of the Average Male Daily Wage compared to Inflation, 1914-1934 (1914= 100)120 
1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 
11' Stefanou S (1969) p483 
119 Mazower M (199 1) p261 
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Accordingly, if the average wage in 1914 was 100 units, in 1934 it was 1500. However, the living 
costs rose even faster, climbing from an average of 100 units in 1914 to 2000 in 1934. And given the 
country's highly regressive tax structure, as well as the comparatively high taxation on essential 
goods (seen in the tables below) post-tax income disparities would have been greater even still: 
Table 9: Indirect Taxation and their impact across three different income groups 121 
Income Group Indirect Taxation Income/ Taxation in O/c 
1,500 Drl a month 549 Dr 36,5% 
1,500-2,500 Dr/ 
a month 
698 Dr 28-33% 
4,500-5,500 Dr/ 
a month 
1,195 Dr 26-21% 
Table 10: Taxation on 3 essential goods across 4 European countries 122 
Country Sugar Coffee Tobacco 
Greece 269% 92% 350% 
UK 72% 20% 343% 
Holland 50% 128% 172% 
France 72% 53% 180% 
According to the evidence brought to light by the annual report of the Labor Supervision Bureau, 
in 1920, the number of businesses where violations of protective labor legislation and occasions of 
bad working conditions were recorded amounted to 4,554 cases. In 1921 up to 50% of workers 
employed in industry were women and children. An investigation of two thousand working class 
homes in Athens and Piraeus showed that 81% of them consisted of only one room accommodating 
some 4-5 people under appalling hygienic conditions. Out of the one thousand houses sampled in 
Athens, 767 were of one bedroom, 206 of two, and 27 of three; only 125 had a kitchen, and just 165 
were considered 'hygienic'. Accordingly in Piraeus, 852 out of one thousand were one-bedroom 
homes, and only 194 were classified as 'hygienic' 123 
120 Source: Riginos M (1986) p 154 
121 Belogiannis N (1998) p353. The writer does not specify the exact date; however, it overall refers to the 
beginning of the 1930s. 
122 ibid. p349 
123 Ekthesis tou Prosopikou Eftheoriseos Ergasias epi fis Efarmogis ton Ergalikon Nomon: Etos 1920; 
Ekthesis tou Prosopikou Epitheoriseos Ergasias epi fis EfannoVs ton Frgatikon Nomon: Dos 1921 
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Taking into consideration the above data, it would come as no surprise that by 1936 Greece had 
the highest proportion of deaths from diseases such as typhoid, paratyphoid and malaria in 
Europe. 124An International Labor Office inspector reported in 1926 that "the general condition of the 
workers is bad... large numbers of employed children aged from 9-11 years old are used for the most 
harsh types of labor ... Those minors, of 
both sexes, become wedker, their growth stops ... and 
in the 
end [they] become tubercular. " In 1925 as many as 42% of the workers employed in the tobacco 
industry died of tuberculosis. 125 Child labor was indeed widely used throughout the various branches 
of industry, ranging from a quarter, to sometimes more than half the workforce as the following data 
show: 
Table 11: Distribution of the female workforce in the Piraeus textile factories according to age groups, 192 1126 
Age No of Workers % of total Age No of Workers % of total 
12 44 2.26 18-22 552 28,32 
12-14 149 7.64 22+ 448 22.99 
15-18 756 38.79 Total 1,949 100.00 
Table 12: Male under-aged employment in industry in Athens, 1926 127 
Branches of 
Industry 
No of enter- 
Prises 
Total of 
Workers 
Workersl2-13 
Years old 
% of total Workers 14-18 
Years old 
% of total 
Textiles 35 902 78 8.65 163 18.07 
Silk 12 295 67 22.71 74 25.08 
Carpets 55 201 - - - 
Hat-factofies 27 258 12 4.65 56 21.71 
Other 88 350 169 24.36 44 14.91 
Total 2 1Y7A 2,006 1226 11.27 337 16.80 
124 See League of Nations (1941) p72. In more detail, the death rate per 100,000 inhabitants (1936) for 
t whoid and paratyphoid fevers was 21.9, tuberculosis 103.9, malaria 75.2, pneumonias 207.4 etc. 
126 
Cited in Seferis K (1975) pp57-58 
Source: Ypourgio Ethnikis Oikonomias, Dieuthinsi Ergasias, Ektheseis tou prosopikou epitheoriseos 
2 
erfasias epi tis efarmogis ton ergatikon nomon. Etos 192 1, p82 
12 Source: Geniki Statistiki Ypiresia tis Ellados, Minidion Stafisfikon Deltion, 1930 
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Table 13: Female under-aged employment in industry in Athens, 1926 128 
Branches of 
Industry 
No of enter- 
Prises 
Total of 
Workers 
Workers 12-13 
Years old 
% of total Workers 14-18 
Years old 
% of total 
Textiles 35 3,977 504 12.67 
- 
1,314 33.04 
Silk 12 1,986 315 15.86 884 44.51 
Carpets 1 55 5,447 1 921 1 16.91 1 1,796 1 32.97 
Hat-factories 27 777 67 8.62 290 1 37.32 
Other 88 1,838 569 25.23 832 135.82 
Total 217 15,015 2,376 15.82 5,116 1 34.07 
In addition to the low wages paid to minors, employing child labor had another great advantage: 
they were not of an age to unionize, and, perhaps even more crucially, were not allowed to 
participate in the debates about voting for strike action. 129 Similarly, the female workforce, which 
constituted a significant portion of employees in industry, was also underpaid and had a low level of 
unionization: 
Table 14: Participation of women in various occupational categories in % (excluding peasantry and fisheries) 130 
Occupation 1920 1928 1928 (refugees) 
Industry 58,652 20.00% 99,712 23,201/o 
_ 
36,088 31.51% 
Transport 11140 1.46% 914 0.86% 135 0.72% 
Commerce 3,263 2.47% 4,958 2.67% 1,383 3.59% 
Personal Services 32,682 62.73% 37,377 64,92% 7.808 1 56.32% 
Free Occupations 10,789 17.47% 18.230 21.21% 3909 1 4 X 30.02% 
Public Services 
_ _2,332 
1 4.78% 1 2,421 1 5.44% 61 -7 12.58% 
129 ibid. 
129 Under-aged employment also had an impact in the high levels of drop-out from education. According to 
the statistics that are published in Rizospastes in 1936, out of the 120,622 boys and 112,891 girls (in total 233,513) that entered the I' grade of primary school during the school year 1926-1927, only 39,108 boys 
and 24,179 girls (a total of 63,287) made it to the 5 th Grade (193 1). Therefore some 170,226 abandoned 
education before even finishing primary school (almost 73% of the total). See Rizospastes 6/2/1936 130 Source: Statistiki Epetiris tis Ellados 1930, p75 
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Table 15: Average daily wages in various branches of industry, 1928 (min. wage required for the daily nutrition needs: 
10,80 Dr) 131 
Men 
Wine-making 11,50 Dr Soap-making 7,70-9,60 Dr Tanning 6,50-9 Dr 
Fertilizers 5-8 Dr Cement 5-8 Dr Tobacco 10,70-15,60 Dr 
Dye works 6-16 Dr Machines 10 Dr Paper 10-12 Dr 
Women 
Wine-making 3-5 Dr Tile Works 6-7 Dr Cloths 6,50-10 Dr 
Powder 4-8 Dr Tanning 3-5 Dr Paper 5-6 Dr 
Soap-making 4,60-7 Dr Cotton 6,90-10,70 Dr Hats 4-10 Dr 
The female workforce was particularly susceptible to exploitation and unlikely to unionize. 132 A 
large number of them were widows or orphans, placing them in a disadvantaged bargaining position 
when it came to demanding better working conditions or better pay: 
Table 16: Family status of female industry workers, 1926 133 
Branches of 
Industry 
Total Widows % of 
total 
Married % of 
total 
With 
Parents 
% of 
total 
No 
Parents 
% of 
total 
No 
Father 
% of 
total 
Textiles 3,997 384 9.63 464 11.67 953 23.96 963 24.21 1,214 30.53 
Silk 1,986 322 16.21 93 4.68 658 22.13 187 9,42 726 36.56 
Carpets 5,447 
1 
1,247 22.89 426 7.82 548 10-06 1,217 22.34 2,009 36.88 
Hats 777 60 7.72 45 5.79 276 35.52 81 -10.42 315 40.54 
Other 1,838 129 4.21 26 1.3 921 33.06 563 24.32 1,189 42.75 
Total 15,015 2,141 14.26 1,054 7.02 1 3,356 22.35 3,011 1 20.05 5,453 36.32 
In addition, as table 16 above indicates, women were mostly employed in personal services, which 
mainly involved short-term/part time employment. In many other cases female workers would be 
131 Riginos M (1987) p43-55 132 Accordingly they were utilized as a 'hanging threat' to prevent workers from unionizing or calling a 
strike. As a worker reported in an article in Rizospastes "if one even talked about a raise in wages, he 
would be thrown on the streets and immediately be replaced with girls. " (See Rizospastes 20/2/1927) 133 Source: GSYE, Minidion Statisliko Delfior4 Ianotaulos-Dekembfios 1930, p58 
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confined to their living quarters, where very often "the single room of the house was transformed 
, 434 into a workshop, doing laundry, making furniture, mending cloths etc. 
The impact of the 1929 international crisis 
Before we conclude this chapter it is important to make a separate reference to the 1929 
international economic crisis and how that affected Greece. Its impact on Greek economy was two- 
fold. Mazower argues that "a striking feature of Greece's economic experience in the early 1930s 
was the speed of her domestic recovery", achieving industrial growth rates that were only 
"surpassed by the Soviet Union and Japan". 135 That was, according to him, mainly because of the 
quick response of the Greek government and industrialists that entailed the reinforcement of 
domestic industries and the capitalization of former investments. Particularly impressive was the rise 
in profits in the textile industry. These rose from 5.1% in 1931 to 13.2% in 1933. This increase in 
profit was followed by a growth in the labor force that was "unparalleled in any other branch of 
manufacturing. A36 Note that the majority of textile manufacturing was concentrated in Athens and 
Piraeus, employing mainly a refugee labor force. 
On the other hand, the industries that suffered significantly from the international crisis were the 
export orientated industries, namely the tobacco and currant industries which comprised the bulk of 
the country's total exports. Tobacco exports in particular, which were directed to countries that were 
severely affected by the crisis (such as Germany and the United States), saw their earnings halved. 
This distinction between the impact of the 1929 international crisis in the domestic and export 
orientated industries and its implications will also emerge when we deal with the case studies of the 
growth of working class communism in interwar Greece. 
Conclusion 
The inter-war period industry and the working class inherited a pre-war legacy that did not seem to 
favour the growth of a labour movement. The small size of businesses, which in their vast majority 
134 Svolou M quoted by Riginos M (1997) p235 135 Mazower M (1991) p237 136 The output of the textile industry had risen by 20% in the period 1932-1933 and some 40% in the period 
1932-1934. The rise in the labor force employed in the industry rose some 20% in the same period. (See 
Mazower K 199 1, p254) 
36 
(90%+) employed less than 6 people, and sometimes none, meant that the relationship between 
employer and employee was rather one of the master and his apprentice, than one of class. 137 In 
some businesses the number of apprentices would be as much as a third of the total workforce, as 
tables 19 and 20 indicate: 
Table 17: Male apprentices (under 19 years) in various industries in Athens and Piraeus (193 0)139 
Industry Workers 
-19 
% of total 
workers 
Apprenti- 
ces 
% of -19 Workers % of -19 Total 
Foods 912 22.82 205 22.48 707 77.52 3,997 
Cement 635 31.59 92 26.67 642 73.33 1,092 
Engineering 2,242 39.45 1,374 61.28 868 38.72 5,683 
Wood 1,706 42.34 747 43.79 959 56.21 4,029 
Cloths 534 42.93 305 57.12 229 42.88 1,244 
Press 461 31.11 200 43.38 261 56.62 1,482 
Total Industries 8,176 31.00 3,198 39.11 4,978 60.89 26,370 
Table 18: Female apprentices (under 19 years) in various industries in Athens and Piraeus (193 0)139 
Industry Workers 
-19 
% of total 
workers 
Apprenti- 
ces 
% of -19 Workers % of -19 Total 
Textiles 3,237 76.69 42 1.30 3,195 98.70 5,590 
Cloths 1,071 66.99 504 47.06 567 52.94 1,832 
Tobacco 32 6.23 16 50.00 16 50.00 514 
Total Industriel 5,879 56.09 654 11.12 5,225 88.88 10,482 
The vast concentration of under-aged workers (apprentices) was found in businesses employing I- 
5 persons (58.88%), whereas their percentage declined significantly with the increasing size of 
business (22.23% in businesses employing 6-25 people, and 18-88% in businesses employing more 
than 26 workers). 140 The morphology of Greek industry, dominated by small businesses and 
workshops, did not favour the development of sharp distinctions in working class consciousness of 
137 As Andreades notes "In smaller industries ... where an almost patriarchal character had been preserved for so long, the worker is rarely inclined to quarrel with an employer that works as hard as hw does and 
under the same conditions. " (See Andreades A, cited in Koumandaraki A, 1995, p47) 138 GSIZ AIEI kai y 11ijon ton Pograo on rga on Pa Nomixanikon kai Emporikon epixeiriseon energithisa to 
&plemvrio tou 1930 139 ibid. 
140 GSYE, Apograyfliton Potemikon kaj Viomihanikon Ephinseon 1811211920 
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the role between employer/employee, capitalist/worker. Instead, it created expectations of individual 
mobility. 
Personal and patronage relations, resulting from a common village or indeed family background 
(in combination with the persistence of rural ties of migrant laborers), were often transferred from 
the rural to the urban centers, becoming another dominant feature of Greek manufacturing and 
industry. The lack of heavy industry and the persistence of relatively traditionally organized 
manufacturing industries also prevented the emergence of a large industrial proletariat on the scale 
of that in the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe. The influx of refugees and rural 
migrants was absorbed by industry only to a limited extent, forcing them eventually to enter the 
already crowded service sector, where the reproduction of self-employed occupations and intense 
competition in the labor market meant an additional obstacle to the growth of organizational 
activity. 141 
On the other hand, the inter-war period witnessed an unprecedented growth in industry, followed 
by a sharp increase in the size of the working class, which doubled between 1920 and 1930. 
Although in terms of numbers, the amount of workers employed in agriculture was still larger than 
its industrial and manufacturing counterpart, the capitalist mode of production became, in terms of 
economic importance, the dominant feature of the Greek economy. As we have seen, during the 
interwar period, Greece was the most industrialized of the Balkan countries. 
The influx of refugees and their settlement in the cities, in combination with the large numbers of 
migrants from rural Greece, led to the emergence of an urban proletariat, which in the case of the 
reftigees had no ties with land or any form of small property. Living conditions were appalling, 
protective labour legislation existed only on paper, ever-falling wages made it progressively more 
difficult for workers to purchase even essential goods (which were extra burdened by taxation), and 
regressive taxation further reduced the worker's purchasing power. The rural proletariat, attracted by 
popular beliefs that presented the cities as a 'paradise on earth', were disillusioned when urban life 
welcomed them with under-employment and harsh conditions. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that along with the above developments that favoured the 
growth of an urban working class and the emergence of a radical consciousness, there were co- 
e xistent elements that were working against such a development. First of all, the constant movement 
of populations lasted, as we have seen above in the report of the Refugee Settlement Committee, 
141 Tarrow SG (1967)p35 
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until the late 1920s, meaning that for many people involvement in local party or trade union politics 
was not credible since their place of living and work lacked stability. 
The persistence of under-aged employment (sometimes amounting to half the workforce) 
heightened the characteristics described above. The female workforce was also difficult to unionize 
since either their work was of temporary part/time nature (like personal services, housekeeping etc), 
or their place of work was confined to their living quarters. In the case of refugee women, their 
family status (widows and orphans) reduced their bargaining position with their employers when it 
came to wages and union rights. Thus, despite the rapid growth of the urban working class during 
the interwar years, its harsh and uncertain conditions hindered the possibilities for organization. 
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Chapter 3: Aspects and mechanisms of the incorporation of the labor movement 
Introduction- (re) constructing the bourgeois order 
"If in the turmoil of 1918-1919 a new European world seemed to be in birth by the late 
1920s much of the pre-war order appeared to have been substantially restored. )9142 
In his work 'Recasting Bourgeois Europe' Charles Maier analyses the politics of containment of 
the Left and the various paths towards corporatist stability that took place in Western Europe 
following World War 1. These politics of reform and repression aiming to separate the labor 
movement from socialist and communist influences were also applied in Greece. However, in the 
Greek case the rationale behind them was somewhat different. In Greece they acquired largely a pre- 
emptive character, since up to 1918 there was no autonomous, organized or sizable labor movement 
that might pose a real threat to the social order. 
Nevertheless, the politics of incorporating the labor movement into bourgeois society -by which I 
mean the containment of radicalism, or at least the possibility of this- was very much on the agenda. 
Subsequently, the various measures that were taken by the government, either in the form of reform 
or active intervention, were "designed to forestall the danger 'which has appeared from new 
theories ... of seeing peasants, workers of the 
fields, and the industrial workers of the towns united in 
overturning the lawful state'. -)9143 These measures involved both the application of new methods of 
containment and incorporation -some 'borrowed' from the paradigms of western European 
counterparts- such as a series of anti-communist legislation, and the adaptation of old methods, such 
as clientage relations. These were intended to combat the spread of subversive doctrines and to 
facilitate social cohesion. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview and analysis of the frameworks of incorporation 
of the labor movement. These frameworks were political/ideological and legislative, and involved a 
range of direct or indirect methods of intervention, including institutional, legislative and paternalist 
means to complement active oppression. An outline of those aspects and mechanisms of 
incorporation of the labor movement is crucial in understanding the constraints facing the 
142 Maier Ch (1998) p3 143 From a speech of Prime Minister Venizelos, cited in Mazower M (199 1) p76 
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development of its politics. In juxtaposition to those mechanisms of incorporation we will then 
examine the politics of emancipation, i. e., the various 'deviations' and 'defense' mechanisms that 
the labor movement, or sections of it, managed to develop during the period concerned, with the aim 
of understanding why some were more successful than others. 
A. A political framework 
Ideology 
In this section we investigate briefly two aspects of the ideological incorporation of the Greek 
labor movement. These are the 'national schism' (or Vichasmos' as it is frequently referred to in the 
literature) and the 'anti-communism' that to a great extent replaced the nationalism of late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century as the national ideology in Greece. 
Any understanding of the development of national ideologies in Greece must begin with a 
recognition of Greece's political as well as economic dependence on major European powers. "The 
future of Greece will be decided in London not at Athens , 144 were Lloyd George's words to John 
Stavridi as they appeared in the latter's diary, remarks concerning the developments following the 
Balkan Wars. However, political dependence was exposed as early as independence, "by the 
development of three parties each attached to one of the country's three international patrons. In this 
way, until the Crimean war, the English, French, and Russian ambassadors unofficially presided 
over parties led domestically by Mavrogordatos, Kollettis, and Metaxas respectively. "" 145 The 
personal manifestation of foreign political dependency came with the import of the Monarchy. 146 
The construction of a Greek national identity raised the problem of legitimacy. As Holden notes, 
"when Greece was reborn in 1832 in the form of a modem nation-state there was, in consequence, a 
fundamental ambiguity about her entire national character. , 147 The process of establishing a national 
144 Smith ML (1973) pp 15-16 
145 Campbell J& Sherrard P (1968) p89 146 King Otto was brought from Bavaria (1834); King George who followed was brought from Denmark 
(1863). For the processes of selection, and the involvement of the Great Powers see Mavrogordatos J (193 1) pp33-39 & 54-58 
147 Holden D (1972) p28; for the question surrounding the nation-building process in Greece see also Toynbee A (1922). Holden further notes characteristically: "Typical of this is the inspissated confusion that 
still surrounds the name of Greece. For who was it that bestowed this title upon the modem nation-state, 
and who now thinks of its inhabitants as Greeks? Not, I fear, the Greeks. They may well once have had a 
word for everything, as the antique legend says, but 'Greece' and 'Greeks' have rarely figured in their 
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identity was impeded by intense localism at the bottom and foreign intervention and the import of 
authority at the top of the newly-bom Greek State. The quest for legitimacy was eventually 
manifested in the ideology of Megaloideatismos (Great Idea) 148 . This was a myth of continuity 
between ancient Greece, the Byzantine Empire and the Modem Greek state that involved a vision of 
redeeming the 'unredeemed' Greeks of the Ottoman Empire by bringing them within the confines of 
a single Greek state. In a speech made before the constituent assembly in 1844, Kolletis argued that 
Greece was not confined to the existing borders of the Kingdom, but to "any land associated with 
Greek history or the Greek race". 149 
In this view, the Greek nation is defined in terms of 'historical roots' as well as race. 
150 In the 1864 
constitution, the new ideology found symbolic expression in the new title given to the new King 
George I -'King of the Hellenes' as opposed to 'King of Greeks'. 'National 
identity' and 'national 
purpose' were established (at least at the level of the elite) only to be fundamentally challenged with 
the Asia Minor Catastrophe of 1922.151 
vocabulary. Officially, Greeks call their modern state Hellas, after the classical world of 2,000 years ago, 
and by the same token they are officially known as Hellenes, which implies descent from their illustrious 
classical forefathers. But at the same time, colloquially, they call themselves Rontios, derived from Rum, or 
Rome, and signifying that they are citizens of the eastern Roman Empire whose capital was Constantinople 
-in short, that they are really the children of Byzantium. 'Greece', on the other hand, is derived from the 
Latin Graecia, the province of the Western Roman Empire which stretched south of Mount Olympus 
through the peninsula of Atfica and the Peloponnese. Its international use to describe the sovereign state 
that currently occupies that territory is merely a reflection of the fact that 'Greece' in this modem sense is 
literally a western invention. " (Holden D, 1972, p29). For a Marxist account see Rousos P (1955) pp175-84 
` it worth mentioning at this point the work by Hobsbawm 'Inventing Traditions', where the author 
touches upon the importance of 'manufacturing' traditions and symbols in any nation-building process. He 
mentions three types of 'invented traditions, of which two, are of most relevance to us: a) "those 
establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities", 
and b) "those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority. " (Hobsbawm E, 1983, 
P9) 
'49 Cited in Clogg R (1980) p76 
150 Smith wrote that "the pre-Christian history of Hellenism in Asia Minor helped to form the modem 
Greek view of the geographical and cultural boundaries of Hellenism; it was in the Greek's view of his 
country destiny. " (Smith M L, 1973, p23) At the same time, in the speech cited, Constantinople, the former 
capital of the Byzantine Empire, is portrayed as the 'real' capital of the 'Greek nation. 
151 Legg notes: "The kingdom had been created relatively rapidly; its boundaries had been marked within 
the living memory of many of its citizens. This newness limited the extent of feeling for the state. " (Legg R 
C, 1969, p86) 
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The 'National Schism' 
"And so the Greek people are divided from now on into ... 
ffiends of the Greek people 
and ... enemies of the Greek people. Friends of the Greek people are, needless to say, the 
Venizelists. Enemies of the people are the rest of the Greek citizens! , 152 
The 'national schism' constituted the great political division of the inter-war period between the 
supporters of Eleftherios Venizelos, leader of the Liberal Party and main advocate of 
Parliamentarism, and the Anti-Venizelists, supporters of the Monarchy and its head, King 
Constantine. 153 The schism originated from the conflict between the anglophile Venizelos and the 
germanophile King over the issue of Greece's attitude towards the 1914-1918 War. The former was 
committed to Greece's entry into the war on the side of the Entente, while the latter insisted on 
neutrality. 154 
Views of the character of this schism have varied. The majority of historians, such as Veremis and 
Markezinis, have generally portrayed the schism as a struggle between competing alliances of 
civilian and military fractions for dominance over the state apparatus, a conflict that took place 
mainly at elite level between the royalists and the republican supporters of Venizelos. 155 
On the other hand, Mavrogordatos has suggested that at the elite level the 'schism' had deeper 
roots that expressed a number of fundamental social cleavages, thus introducing the element of mass 
politics into the debate. 156 He extended the argument from one that focused on a mere 'clash of 
personalities' into one involving a wider 'clash of ideologies'. It was a battle between two visions of 
society: the one advocated by a newly bom entrepreneurial bourgeoisie led by Venizelos and the 
Liberal Party, upheld a 'pragmatic iffedentism' that involved a program for state expansion and 
industrialization. The other, advocated by the old established 'state apparatus' and the supporters of 
152 An anti-Venizelist article that portrays the dynamics of the national schism in dividing people into 
'friends' and 'enemies' of the 'nation', according to ones affiliation to one or the other opposing camps. Chronos 30/6/1923 
153 E Venizelos (1864-1936) was bom in Crete and his initial steps in politics revolved around his 
contribution to the local struggle for independence against foreign occupation. He entered the prime 
ministerial office for the first time in October 1910 and played a crucial role in the making of Greek politics 
and society until his death. For more information on his personality and politics see Vournas T (2001) pp7- 29 
154 Mouzelis N (1986) p94; Istorika, 12/12/2000, p5 155 Veremis T (1977), Veremis T (1997); for a typical example of historiography on the issue see also Markezinis SB (1968) 
156 Mavrogordatos G (1983) 
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the Monarchy, upheld a vision of Greece that consisted of a combination of a 'Byzantine 
romanticism' and a 'modem Greek irredentism. ' directed by a 'military-bureaucratic' regime with the 
King at its head. 157 "The struggle therefore explicitly involved totally conflicting conceptions of the 
future of the Greek nation, state, and society, 'a fundamental difference of conceptions regarding the 
nature of the Constitution and the fortune of the Race,... a difference between two political 
"158 worlds! '. 
The 'national schism', however, was also marked by clear geographical boundaries and assumed a 
regional character: the territories of the pre-1912 Kingdom of Greece constituted the electoral 
strongholds of Anti-Venizelist and royalist support, whereas the New Provinces of Northern Greece, 
the islands, as well as the cities of Piraeus and Thessaloniki, supported the Venizelist block. 
159 
Table 19: Area Distribution of Electoral Gains (5 March 1933) 160 
Category of District Seats at Stake Seats won by 
Anti-Venizelism 
Seats won by 
Venizelism 
Seats won by 
The Agrarian 
Party 
-Narrovl'(Old 
Greece) 
107 97 8 2 
-Wide" (New Lands) 79 13 66 - 
Athens 21 20 1 
Piraeus 10 - 10 
Thessaloniki 18 - 19 
Jews 2 2 - 
Moslems 4 - 4 
Privileged Districts 7 4 3 
Total 248 136 110 2 
The impact of the 'national schism' on the consciousness and the formation of the views, passions 
and allegiances of ordinary people has been extensively documented in an endless anthology of a 
variety of sources ranging from press reports, speeches and personal accounts to poems and songs. 
157 Ibid. pp60,127,128,131. Similar views are put forward by Maximos, who writes on the 'National 
Schism': "Although this clash was initiated on matters of foreign policy, it became an internal 
struggle ... When 
later on the masses aligned themselves with the old parties, with the Royals at the head, 
versus the liberals, the political confrontation became a class one. The clash of the two bourgeois camps 
developed into a clash of classes whereby the oppressed strata of society lifted the anti-Venizelist banner as 
a symbol of their struggle against capital. That explains why anti-Venizelism often appeared with anti- 
capitalist feelings... " (Maximos S, 1975, pp13 &15) 
Papandreou G (1941) p8l, quoted in AIavrogordatos G (1983) p127-128. italics in the original. 
159 The geographical division was mainly due to the particular settlement of the refugees in the Northern 
Provinces and the industrial centers, who overwhelmingly supported Venizelos -the reasons of which we 
will examine in more detail in a later chapter. 
160 Source: Mavrogordatos GT (1983) p314 
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Opposing views of Venizelos are presented below. 161 The first is an appeal send to the exiled 
Venizelos on November 14,1923, to return and 'save the country' as he had in the past: 
"Our Father, 
Away from us for so long, you haven't seen with your own eyes the people's longing. You 
haven't heard their deep repentance for the bitter cup of ingratitude they gave to you on that 
cursed day ... 
Come, father. And if the eternal mob later votes you down again, and 
ingratitude shouts 'Crucify, crucify Him! ' don't forget that this is the fate of the great. -PA62 
A Marxist writer of the time remarked scathingly upon the return of Venizelos in 1928: "Only an 
exceptionally demagogic personality could make it simultaneously credible, to workers and 
bourgeois, to capitalists and peasants, to republicans and monarchists, that he is in a position to 
satisfy all, to better the condition of all. Only a wizard could play such a role with success and this 
under certain conditions, objective and subjective. " The writer continued that: "Since the situation 
was unavoidably leading to a generalized crisis of Parliament, and since this crisis carried with it all 
parliamentary parties, the only solution for both party and Parliament to be saved was Venizelos, as 
a model, as leader, fist for the bourgeois, honest administrator for the people, pro-labor for the 
working masses, a 'father' to the refugees, conservative for the conservatives, leftist for the leftists, 
conciliator for the conciliators, intransigent for the intransigents. %A63 
To his supporters Venizelos was a Father and savior of the Nation, and he was frequently hailed as 
a hero, liberator, messiah, prophet. To his opponents he was a fraud; an 'evil force" against which 
only the monarchy could stand. As with the case of the Venizelist cult, the examples of extreme 
admiration are numerous. The views of the Reservists of Peloponnesus are representative. In 1916 
the Reservists wrote to 
"... Express to their god-send King [Constantine] and sweet Father limitless devotion, and 
declare that they are ready to sacrifice themselves to the last for the realization of the national 
ideals, and the defense of 11is laurel-growing Throne. To You the living image of the nation, 
161 See also a quite representative set of images of the 'National SchisrW in Appendix 3. 
162 Mavrogordatos G (1983) p56. For more examples on the continuing 'adoration' of Venizelos by his 
followers in 1935-36, see Birtles B (1938) pp213-215 
163 Maximos S (1975) p147 
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to you the Ruler agent and executor of the will of the state, to you the King of Kings, in 
whom we firmly believe the national ideals and the majesty of the fatherland are 
1464 concentrated... 
The opposing personified manifestations of the 'National Schism', Venizelos and King 
Constantine, seem to have acquired a symbolic character, expressing the social cleavages of the 
'masses', who sought to find a symbol to concentrate their sentiments of anger and disappointment 
generated by their conditions of living, as well as hope for a better future. As the prominent (later 
pro-monarchist) politician P Kanellopoulos wrote in article to Acropolis in 1935: "when the peoples 
lack ideals, they turn to symbols. , 165 
The 'national schism' led to the emergence of strong ideological passions and political allegiances 
of an almost religious character, which operated as a powerful conservative mechanism in inter-war 
Greece, contributing significantly to the delay of the urban and rural labor movement's entrance into 
active politics. Compared to the peasant movements that were growing in neighboring countries at 
the same period, such as in the Bulgarian case under the leadership of Stambuliiski, the Greek 
proletariat seemed ideologically trapped in an 'intra-bourgeois' conflict that had politically little to 
do with the advancement of their own 'class' interests. This of course raises the question why Greek 
workers remained ideologically contained. Elefantis argues that the dominant bipolar politics could 
not be overcome overnight, especially in view of the 'defense' mechanisms, such as repression, state 
controlled trade unionism and anticommunism that the bourgeoisie had developed and deployed 
from quite early on. 166 
For Elefantis, the ideology of communism appeared at a time when the 'old ideologies' that were 
manifested in the Schism still dominated popular consciousness. It was only in the 1930s when this 
"polarization withered away". 167 Following the 1922 Asia Minor Disaster, however, there appeared 
to be a change in what characterized and upheld power relations. Accordingly, Charalambis notes 
164 Quoted in Paparregopoulos K (1932) p234 
165 And the article continues: "Those in favor of the Monarchy say that it will ensure two great goods: 1) 
our national unity and 2) political stability. However, if national unity of a people is in need of a lie in order 
to maintain itself, its existence is superfluous ... It 
is a symptom of great slavishness for a people to declare 
that in order to stand up to it national effort it is in need of bowing in front of even the last of the servants 
of an arbitrary king. " (cited in Kalergis A, 1965, pp56-7) 
166 A comparison could perhaps be drawn with the Irish Free State where languages and myths of dominant 
parties played a crucial role over the formation of the state. 167 Elefantis AG (1976) p345 
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that "Populism and the cohesive role of the charismatic leader did produce, to an extent, social 
discipline and the acceptance of the existing power relations. However, after 1922, it is not 
sufficient. Soon, anti-communism becomes the leading force of reproduction of power relations. 468 
Anti-communism replaces nationalist irredentism as the national ideology 
The First World War transformed the Greek political-ideological landscape in two ways. In the 
first place, it gave birth to the royalist-republican/Anti-Venizelist-Venizelist schism, which proved 
the dominant and overpowering feature of Greek inter-war politics. At the same time, it signaled the 
bankruptcy of a nationalist-irredentist ideology that had been a dominating feature of political elite 
mentality since the Independence War of 1821. Therefore, the political impact of the 1922 Asia- 
Minor catastrophe, 169 which put an end to the 'Megali Idea, i. e. the dream of creating a Greater 
Greece in the Near East, should not be underestimated: 
"The war ended, the 'Disaster' had abruptly and rudely closed the first century of modem 
Greek independence. The second century was beginning in anarchy and discontinuity. 
Greece had suddenly found herself without a fonn of goverment, without a constitution, 
without institutions or state organizations, without ideologies, because all had been 
bankrupted in the conscience of the nation. "170 
The Asia Minor catastrophe put an end to the largest Greek community outside the realm, signified 
the end of Greek iffedentism and the beginning of a parochial signification of Greek identity. The 
element of continuity had to be re-established, leading to the emergence of an "exclusive 
relationship with antiquity", which "became one of the two legitimizing elements of ethnicity". 171 
168 Charalambis D (1999) pp I 11-112 
169 This refers to the collapse of the Asia Minor front and the subsequent wave of refugees. 170 Theotokas G, cited in Doulis T (1977) p93. Accordingly, as Katifores wrote: "The great danger that the 
state and the bourgeoisie in Greece faced in the years 1922-23 originated from the negative, anarchic one 
would say, phenomena of social disobedience (mutinies etc). Initially the state perceived communism as 
another form of disobedience ... Its 
defense was against the collapse of the traditional structures that left behind them a social and ideological vacuum ... We observe throughout the period a hostility in the behavior 
of the authorities, clearly counter-revolutionary, without, however, a revolution. Only the panic felt by the leadership of Greek society facing the collapse of the structures of Megaft Idea can explain this. " (See Katifores G, 1975, p12) 
171 Veremis T (1995) p4l 
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This continuity took the form of official ideology during the Metaxas Dictatorship (from August 4h, 
1936). That regime defined itself as the "Third Civilizatioif', succeeding the Classical and Byzantine 
traditions and combining elements of both. 172 
As for the 'external' enemies of the state, which previously included neighboring states with Greek 
ethnic minorities or majorities, these were progressively replaced by the 'enemy within'. This 
involved a force that had only recently entered the political arena: the Greek Communist Party 
(KKE). This partly reflected the new meaning and significance acquired by the notion of 
'Greekness', a notion that involved the forming of a distinction between 'us' and 'them', whereby 
the 'us' and the 'them' were defined in juxtaposition to each other: 
"... The powerful material and ideational processes of nation-building have set . 
the 
parameters of political legitimacy within the modem Greek nation-state. One aspect of this 
has been the rise to prominence of 'Greekness' in the hierarchy of identities shared and 
exchanged among the population. Being 'Greek' has become almost a pre-requisite to full 
participation in the ['fictive'] community of the nation-state and access to the privileges 
accorded to such 'legitimate' citizens. t1173 
In 1924 the Comintern and the Balkan Communist Federation put forward a policy known as the 
'Macedonian Question'. This advocated the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia, thus 
making the KKE a target of much abuse by the state. A conspiracy to alienate territory from the 
national body did not conform to the newly established definition of 'Greekness'. 174 Apostolakou 
suggested that "to counter the internationalistic and egalitarian rhetoric of the KKE, the state 
employed the notion of 'Greek identity', which was endowed with the heroic and essentially unique 
attributes of the race, or the national community. The juxtaposition of this national archetype to 
172 Sarandis C (1993) pl6l; the following extract is indicative of how the ideologues of Metaxas' 3 rd 
Civilization viewed 'national continuity': "The Nation constitutes ... a conscious historical reality... It is not 
the instant product of just the present generation, but the product of historical development, the work of a 
long series of generations. " Cited in Alivizatos N (1983) p122. On the other hand, the Communist Party 
rejected such transcendental notions of nationhood as a 'sovinist', 'utopian' and 'adventurist' delirium. 
(cited in Rousos P, 195 5, pp30-3 1) 
173 Karakasidou A (1993) p457. Accordingly national identity became a primary objective of school 
education. Hence, in 1927 the Nfinistry of Education, through a circular, recommended the "introduction of 
lectures against communism, and intensification of work towards the cultivation of nationalist values 
among the pupils. " (see Rizospastes 23/3/1927) 
174 On the 'NUcedonian Question' , the KKE and 
its relationship with the Comintern and the Communist 
Balkan Federation we will elaborate further on a later Chapter. 
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communist ideologisms, -such as 'class struggle' and 'proletarian solidarity'- resulted 
in the 
construction of contending public identities. Communists were to be seen as the 'others' in Greek 
society. " 175 
Communist identity, founded on European paradigms such as the 1917 October Revolution in 
Russia and the 1918-1923 insurrections of the working class in Germany, triggered numerous 
pronouncements from across the political and social spectrum seeking to exorcise this identity by 
denying the existence of any reasons for dissent or unrest. As I Nafpliotis explained: 
"Ideas which evolved in Northern countries, under different social conditions, different 
manners and customs, on a different land and under a different sky, cannot easily prevail in a 
country which lives and breaths within a unique environment and whose people have 
century-old roots and traditions that constitute the foundation of their national, political and 
social substance. -)2176 
In a similar tone, A Makris, a merchants' association delegate, argued in his speech at the First 
All-Merchant Conference in Piraeus in 1924 that: 
"... no distinction whatsoever exists between the professional, merchant, industrialist and 
laboring classes. The Greek workers are not of the same nature as their European 
counterparts; they have nothing to do with the workers in London who have only one shirt 
,, 177 and sleep in the streets. 
This notion of communism as being anti-national extended the widespread 'stigma' that had been 
attributed in the past against socialists (such as the Social Democratic Party in the Kaisers' 
Germany) of going against 'national interest'. Of course the extent to which the hegemony of the 
nationalistic state ideology was indeed threatened by the new discourse of class struggle and the 
internationalistic world-view introduced to the Greek political scene by the Socialist Workers' Party 
175 Apostolakou L (1997) p417. Saarela notes on the implications of the nation-building process for the 
newly-formed communist movements: "In these new nation states anti-communism often became an 
important theme in the creation of national identity ... Communism was a more important issue in national 
politics than the size and status of .. [national] communism would otherwise justify. " 
175 The author refers 
to the Finnish experience. In Saarela T (1998) pp2l-2 
176 NafpliotiS 1 (1923) p45 
177 Commemorative Album of the First All-Merchants Conference in Piraeus (1924) p 125 
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of Greece founded in 1918 and precursor to Communist Party of Greece, is something that remains 
to be examined in later sections of this study. However, it is perhaps indicative that in many cases 
') 178 the authorities considered communism to be a 'disease' that had to be 'contained . 
The image of the communist as a conspirator, a 'foreign agent, who was working on a "fully 
developed communist platf' was further enhanced by the press, which 'discovered' communist 
conspiracies behind almost every workers' action. 179 Rizospastes responded to the coverage of the 
Communist Party through the columns of the 'bourgeois' press: 
"Who are these communists anyway? For whatever happens they are always responsible. If 
there is no rain: it is their fault. Someone committed suicide: it must have been the finger of 
Moscow. A lady of the aristocracy has stomach-ache: the communists must have made a deal 
, 480 with a hell demon... 
Of course these developments were not exclusive to Greece. Numerous such examples can be 
drawn from the European experience, from the fiery articles in the French Press revealing a so-called 
communist conspiracy to overthrow the government in October 1928, to blaming the communists for 
the arson of the Reichstag in February 1933.181 
To conclude, in this section we have seen the ideological framework that emerged from the events 
of World War I and the Asia Mnor disaster. The political world was dominated by the 'National 
Schism' between two bourgeois parties. This managed to confine within its ideological boundaries 
the peasantry as well as the growing, but still numerically weak, urban proletariat. The state ideology 
had to re-invent itself after the bankruptcy of the nationalist irredentism that came with the collapse 
of the vision for a 'Greater Greece'. The subsequent notion of Greek identity sought to restore the 
sense of continuity, but was challenged by a new political force: the Communist Party. 182 The 
17" As in a report of the Commissioner of the Regular Admiralty Courtý 27/3/1929, concerning the 'Draft on 
the Security of the Social Regime' (on the debate for the final version of the anti-communist law of 
Monymon that was voted on Parliament the same year). In K Zavitsianos Archive, File I, ELIA 
179 See for example the coverage of the Tobacco Workers' strike (on wages) in Salonica that ended in 
bloodshed, whereby the press reported an 'attack' of the demonstrators against the police as a 'part of a 
communist plot'. Rizospastes 17/2/1927 
180 Rizospastes 4/4/1927 
181 La Gazette 6/1011928, cited in Rizospastes 13/10/1928 
182 On the importance of 'continuity' as a factor of state ideology and stability see Hobsbawm E (1990) 
so 
following section will examine the various methods and mechanisms of control and incorporation of 
the growing labor movement, on both trade-union, and the political levels. 
Parties, Elections and Clientist Networks 
The establishment of a parliamentary system based on universal male suffrage became reality long 
before it did in countries with well established parliamentary representative systems, such as Great 
Britain. As early as 1843 there was universal male suffrage with a few exceptions. The 1864 
Constitution effectively established the constitutional guarantees for the unrestricted exercise of 
political rights to all members of the male population. 183 
However, the establishment of a parliamentary representative system in Greece based on universal 
male suffrage was primarily a manifestation and a mechanism of domination. It did not arise as a 
product of social struggle from below. Rather it was imposed by the local elite from above in order 
to maintain their political and social dominance, by securing their presence in the apparatus and 
power-structure of the newly-established Greek State. 184 
The initial attempts in the 1830s to create a central rationalized form of authoritative power by 
Kapodestrias and King Otto were met with fierce opposition from the local elites: universal male 
suffrage was the solution that allowed power to remain dispersed in the peripheries rather than 
concentrated in the centre. The form of governance did not, therefore, arise as an attempt to balance 
contradictory social forces, or as a result of social struggles between oppressors and oppressed; it 
was merely the outcome of a dispute that took place in the higher strata of society, a 'revolution' 
from above. 
Political and social expression in Greece was manifested in the institutionalization of social 
collectivity, for example through universal suffrage and constitutional parliamentary representation. 
However, this institutional framework remained superficial as far as the real dimensions for the 
establishment of social cohesion were concerned: these existed outside institutions. Institutions, as 
183 See Petrides P (1984); Alivizatos N (198 1) 
184 According to Weiner "only when politics becomes increasingly legislative in character, and when 
elections and universal suffrage is introduced, do numbers, and consequently organizational numbers, begin 
to count. " (Weiner K 1962, p16) "However", Legg suggests, "the Greek experience suggests that under 
certain conditions, if universal suffrage is introduced before social and economic differentiation is far 
advanced, organization and numbers may still not be crucial. In Greece, the existing clientage structures 
simply accommodated universal suffrage; this in turn inhibited large-scale interest politics... " (Legg K P., 
1969, p104) 
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networks of guarantees, typically organized the framework of individual and social communication. 
But in reality and practice they constituted secondary elements, since they merely functioned as a 
legitimizing framework that allowed the mechanisms of domination through the clientage system to 
operate. 185 
In a brief overview of the characteristics of the clientage networks in Greece, the following should 
be mentioned. Clientage networks were to a large extent dependent on intense localism and an 
endemic insecurity that derived from the existence of (or mere perception off) economic 
scarcity. 187 Both of these were related to material factors: the level of development and particularly 
the dominance of the rural economy, and the lack of communication networks and infrastructure. 
In addition, the institutional framework contributed to establish the legitimacy of the state, and the 
social acceptance of that legitimacy took place at the level of inter-personal relationships and 
individual rationality. A powerful individualism emerged as a result. This individualism did not arise 
as a product of capitalist relations of the market-system, but due to the continuous struggle for the 
achievement of a personal relationship with the patron at the expense of others, for the grant of 
favours or prerogatives. Under these conditions, the meaning of social solidarity outside the 
boundaries of the family as a social value remained almost unknown, because even when the 
appropriate conditions emerged for the collective interest to be pursued, the inter-personal 
outweighed the objective interest. 188 The latter, applied to the labour movement, constitutes for many 
historians a key explanatory factor, for what they perceive as the lack of union density in Greece. 
Comparatively, however, the Greek case was not that much different from its western 
counterparts. 189 
185 Clientage was to a large extent a heritage of the "corporate tradition of the Ottoman Empire". where it 
was customary for the local notable to mediate on behalf of his fellow citizens with the authorities. 
(Petropoulos J A, 1968, p53) 
1" This refers to the sort of 'geographical determinism' mentioned by Sanders IT (1962) p12 187 Subsistence agriculture in combination with the inconsistent and incomplete character of land reforms 
and the frequent crises in demand (as we have seen in the section that dealt with the peasantry), resulting to immigration or rnigration are some examples of insecurities an average peasant would endure. 188 It should be mentioned at this point that the 'individualistic' character of the Greek is perhaps quite frequently over-emphasized in the literature (for example Legg K R, 1969; Clogg A, 1979; Jecchinis C, 
1984, etc). To what extent, however, could that characterization be applied as a general explanatory 
categorization for the Greek worker, is somewhat problematic. Since, if that was the case, how could acts 
of workers' solidarity, which existed in many forms and instances, is explained? For such examples see Rizospxtes 17/2/1927,2/3/1927,8/5/1927; Ergalika Maid 6/10/1919 etc. 189 Such writers would include, for example, Fakiolas R E, 1978; Campbell J& Sherrard P, 1968; Jecchinis 
C, 1984; etc. For a comparative survey of trade-union density levels in a number of countries see Appendix 
4. 
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Furthermore, loyalties rarely lay with central institutions. The family's role as the focal point for 
loyalty was critical. Petropoulos mentions that "though its role varied from place to place according 
to custom, the family constituted not merely the basic social unit, but the fundamental economic and 
political unit as well. "190 Considering the centrality of the family in the processes of social life, it 
should come as no surprise that politics was, to an extent, a tool for furthering the family interest, 
whereby "the individual uses politics, either as a politician or as a voter, for family advantage". 191 
Finally, the parochial attitudes towards the state or central authorities were further enhanced by the 
piecemeal acquisition of new territories, which under the sectionalist politics favoured by the 
Ottoman State, were already used to a great degree of autonomy and a lack of uniform 
administration. 
Although, there is always a danger of underestimating the existence and significance of 'national' 
structures by focusing exclusively on clientage networks, 192 it nevertheless seems to be the case that 
localism and politics at the local and regional levels played the most crucial role in the formation of 
national politics and party allegiances. Although, the historical experiences and social structures 
varied from area to area, 193 the rise, establishment and institutionalization of local fractions seem to 
have dominated politics at the local level. This was by no means a characteristic restricted to rural 
society; it extended in lesser forms to provincial towns and even large cities, especially through the 
influx of rural migrant labour who largely became agents of this form of political organization in the 
urban centres. 
Before the 'National Schism', factions were largely founded either on personal ties or instrumental 
patron-client relations, or on existing social divisions formed across locality and traditional, 
190 Petropoulos JA (1968) p56. Pizanias mentioned: "The family is simultaneously the means and the end. 
Consequently every projection and identification ... 
is realized within an extremely closed social 
field 
... Given that the location of the workplace is quite often that of residence, relations amongst workers 
are quite close and more importantly, they are not differentiated ... The narrow social surroundings and the 
concomitantly confined spiritual horizon facilitate the re-discovery of spiritual tools with which they regard 
themselves ... This attitude 
is shaped by the belief in the socially powerful, and indifference to one's own 
social weakness. " (See Pizanias P, 1993, p 146-7) 
191 Legg KR (1969) p33 He later on goes further to suggest that in Greece "family loyalty outweighs public 
feeling; it is commonly accepted that political office will be used to advance family or clientage interests. 
(ibid. p37) 
192 Such as, for example, in the case of Legg KR (1969); Charalambis D (1989) and others 193 In the area that occupied the pre- 1912 Kingdom of Greece (or 'Old Greece' as sometimes it is referred 
in relation to the 'New Lands' that were annexed during the Balkan Wars and World War 1) local fractions 
were more dominant and deeply-rooted in the running of local politics. On the other hand, their political 
influence in the 'New Lands' were less tight, mainly due to the effects of war and the large movements of 
populations. 
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ideological, party or ethnic lines. 194 The 'National Schism', however, provided a political framework 
that forced local factions into a bipolarity, illustrated by the struggle of those who supported the 
Venizelists against the Anti-Venizelists. 
The nature and form of the clientage network (voter-local/provincial patron-national party) has 
been extensively debated. Mouzelis, for example argues that "local oligarchic patrons had such a 
degree of control over the voters, and enjoyed such an autonomy vis-A-vis the national party leaders, 
that on'the national level the various parties were nothing more than extremely loose coalitions of 
provincial political barons. 495 However, although there is no doubt about the influence of local 
patrons on the voter as well as the party policy-making machine, assuming that national party 
composition and structure was no more then a mere reproduction of local politics on a macro-level 
would be an oversimplification. '9Nevertheless, the conclusion that we can extract ftom both 
positions is that the existence of an advanced clientistic network contributed significantly to the 
'control' of voters and party allegiances, reinforcing the 'National Schism' at the level of local 
politics. 
Another crucial characteristic of party allegiances organized on a patron-client or vertical basis is 
that they transcend class barriers or horizontal divisions. Although it has been argued that clientage 
relationships are themselves a form of exploitative structure and should be therefore seen as class 
relationships, 197 cc political conflict along clientistic, 'vertical' lines often cuts across and inhibits the 
political organization of the dominated classes (e. g. the peasantry) along 'horizontal', class lines"198 . 
A prominent Anti-Venizelist, D Gounares presented a view in parliament that could be seen as an 
ideological defence of clientist politics and its allegedly 'egalitarian' nature: 
"... The sum, the union, the harmonious connection of the interests of all individuals, whose 
individual promotion, development, and betterment is and should be object of the occupation 
194 For examples on local factions see Kordatos GK (1960) pp988-995 
195 Mouzelis N (1978) p487 
196As Mavrogordatos suggests: "To begin with, this aspect was of distinctly secondary importance on the 
national level. Not that patron-client sets could not exist within a parliamentary party: both the leader and 
prominent party figures might have a number of deputies. However, insofar as a party could be 
characterized as simply clientistic; on the national level, it would probably consist of a hofizontal alliance of 
patrons ... rather than a vertical patron-client set. " Mavrogordatos G (1983) p78 97 On that position see Causi LL (1975) 
198 Mouzelis N (1978) p475 
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of us all, constitute the interest of the people. Beyond this, there are only empty phrases, 
useful for the deception of the simple-minded. "199 
The Press of the time went even further, questioning the 'Greekness' of parties organized around 
class interests: 
"In Greece there is a peculiar constitution both of the individuals and of the groups. Above 
the economic interests which may create an identity, one places the esteem of persons, the 
Greek tradition, the belief in the person as a strong leader, the local origin, the good 
management of the country by a party. The industrialists have common economic interests, 
but do not constitute one party. They place themselves politically according to the individual 
temperament of each. "200 
The party system in Greece, organized along clientistic lines had a twofold function working in a 
dialectical manner: clientage relationships worked as an agent of political and ideological control 
and incorporation of the 'exploited' as well as a medium between the state ideology and world-view 
and the citizen. Organization along class lines therefore was inhibited within the existing ideological 
and political-structural framework. Accordingly, labor demands were also channeled through such 
networks. The following letter to the Deputy Minister of Labor on 17/11/1936 is quite enlightening 
about the manner in which the patron-client relationship worked in terms of putting forward labor 
demands: 
"Dear Minister, 
We are honored to submit to you a list with the names of the unemployed members of our 
Union, and we plead, given that we recognize in your person our sole patron, that you 
199 Chamber, May 22'ý 1906; Cited in Malloses IH (1926) p93. The view that the function of a national 
party was to transcend rather to represent class interests was not only one advocated by the Anti- 
Venizelists. Sofoules, a prominent Venizelist stated in 1925: "... neither the antagonism of classes, nor the 
economic conflicts, nor other programmatic differences constitute the basis of the electoral struggle here [in 
Greece] 
... The parties are 
distinguished from each other only by virtue of the leader's personal character 
and temperament. " (Fourth Constituent, June 22d, 1925, p669) 
200 Neos Kosmos, July 13'h, 1934 
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mediate [on our behalQ so that our national Government ensures that our unemployed Union 
members are granted the sum given to unemployed of other Unions. , 201 
The clientage framework of power relationships did not provide platforms for confrontation, but 
consolidation. Accordingly, it is indicative that following the disagreement that arose between the 
General Confederation of Labor's leadership and Venizelos, the former attributed the 'ruptures' 
between the two to an "unfortunate incidenf', which left the State authorities with the "impression 
that the representatives of the Confederation intended to question its honesty and good will, which 
never crossed their minds. i= 
Table 20: Electoral results in the interwar period (1926-1936ý 03 
Party/Election 1926 1928 1932 1933 1935 1936 
Venizelists 48,59% 62,74% 47,1% 46,32% Abstained 43,86% 
Anti- 
Venizelists 
41,11% 33% 39,46% 59,22% 65,04% 48,14% 
Agrarian Party 4,97% 1,68% 6,17% 1,77% Abstained 1,02% 
Other Left 0,12% - 0,07% - - 0,09% 
Communists 4,34% 1,41% 4,97% 4,64% 9,59% 5,76% 
Elections became another means of political dominance over the working class. As we saw earlier, 
universal male suffrage was granted in 1864, but it was not a product of long-term struggles for 
suffrage as it was in most European countries of the industrialized west. In inter-war Greece, 
elections were conducted mainly under two systems: the 'narrow-wide plurality system' (1923,1928 
and 1933), and proportional representation (1926,1932 and 1936), with minor modifications each 
201 This letter was sent during the Dictatorship, however, the attitude of reformist labor leaders was not that different in the period prior to Metaxas' coming to power. Letter of the Union of Employees for confirming 
and receiving municipal and port taxes in Piraeus to A Dimitratos, Deputy Mnister of Labor, 17/11/1936, in Aristides Dimitratos Archive, Filel, ELIA 
202 Letter of the Greek General Confederation of Labor (GSEE) to Venizelos, 15/4/1930, in A Dimitratos 
Archive, FilelO, ELIA 
203 Source: Elefantis AG (1999) pp430431. Note that the Venizelists constituted a coalition of up to 10 
different parties in various periods, whereas the respective number of parties comprising the Anti- 
Venizelist coalition amounted to 10, varying from period to period. 
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time. Regarding the constant change and alternations of the electoral system, Mavrogordatos writes 
that "in sharp contrast to the previous stability of the electoral system ... the 
interwar period was an 
era of constant change and deliberate "electoral engineering", which was inaugurated by Venizelism 
in 1923 -in reaction to the traumatic electoral defeat of 1920. v)204 
Table 21: Changes in electoral systems and winners of electoral battles (1923-1936)205 
Election Electoral System Winner 
1923 Narrow-Wide Venizelists 
1926 Proportional Representation Venizelists 
1928 Narrow-Wide Venizelists 
1932 Proportional Representation Venizelists 
1933 Narrow-Wide Anti-Venizelists 
1936 Proportional Representation Anti-Venizelists 
Another aspect of the electoral process, neglected by Mavrogordatos, is state repression. Just 
before the 1920 election, the newspaper Ergatikos Agon published the following statement by the 
newly formed Socialist Workers' Party of Greece: 
"In view of the forthcoming elections, the government employs every means of suppression 
and terrorism, seizing election material through its police forces, banning worker rallies and 
demonstrations, terrorizing with its thugs, such as in the case of Athens, forbidding farmers 
to come in contact with the party, such as in the case of the director of the telegraph office in 
Patras... "206 
In a 1923 letter to the government, the Socialist Workers' Party claimed that: 
"From the various sections and branches of our Party and from our comrades in the 
countryside, we have indisputable information, that the police and military authorities use 
204 Mavrogordatos G (1983) p351. The narrow-wide plurality system involved the combination of two 
types of electoral districts. The 'narrow' ones referred to the territories of Old Greece and the 'wide' ones 
to the lower court districts of the New Lands. 
205 Sources: Flefantis AG (1999) and Mavrogordatos G (1983) 206 Diamartuild kata lisproeklogikis tromokralias, in Ergalikos Agon, 29/9/1920 
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tyrannical measures against our electoral struggle, aiming to terrorize the labor and peasant 
masses that express in favor of our party. Those measures reached the point of exiling our 
party candidates..., of closing down party offices (Kavalla, Drama, Serres)..., of threatening 
and terrorizing our comrades and supporters (as in Kalamata, Skiathos, Kazaklar and 
elsewhere), of censoring or seizing our mail. -ý, 207 
Such practices, including ballot rigging, 208 would become the norrn throughout the inter-war pre- 
election periods, only to worsen through the 1930s. 209 Intervention in the political processes reached 
ultimate expression in military coups -or, the imminent threat of one- which became dominant in the 
inter-war period (1924,1925,1926,1933,1935, and 1936) . 
210 These military interventions did not 
aim at permanent control of the state machinery (prior to the 1936 Metaxas dictatorship) and were all 
short lived. They were due to the increasing ineffectiveness of the existing system of political 
organization, based on clientage and populism, to provide stability and social cohesion. They derived 
from military circles which sought to maintain a balance among the forces competing for political 
power and control of the state apparatus. 21 'The Greek political scene was overall a rather unstable 
one. As Fakiola points out, during the interwar period there were "20 changes of government, 8 
attempted coups, and 3 dictatorships. , 212 
B. The General Confederation of Greek Labour ( GSEE ): Crippled at birth? 
- In Greece the unification of trade union organizations followed the French model, acquiring the 
form of labour federations, local as well as nation-wide (Labour Centres and Federations). A central 
nation-wide union structure organized according to occupation rather than locality (i. e. an equivalent 
to the TUC) did not emerge until 1918, several years after the emergence of the first local labour 
207 DiWnarjUria IOU KOMMOUnigikM KOMMajoS. RiZoSaStiSý 1/ 12/1923 
208 The US ambassador's report on the 1935 referendum on the Monarchy (when the Monarchists received 
some 90% of the votes cast) is highlighting such practices: "... not only is the Monarchist majority so great 
as to 'prove' Greece practically unanimous in its desire to see the King restored, but the figure given for the 
Monarchist vote is actually higher than the total vote cast by all parties together in any previous election in 
Greece, and this by no small margin but by over 400,000 ballots! There may therefore be some truth in the 
rumor that when shown the returns, General Kondyles, the Regent and Premýier, expressed annoyance with 
his followers for 'exaggerating'. " (MacVeach L& latrides J, 1980, p60) 209 See Livieratos D (1994) 
210 For a detailed analysis on the role of the military in Greek politics see Veremis T (1997) 211 See Charalambis D (1989) p102 and also the article by Mouzelis N (1980) 212 Fakiola PE (1978) p9l 
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centre. This particular form of highly localized labour organization was encouraged by the Greek 
state, which created the necessary legal framework for preventing any alternative development of the 
trade union movement. Indeed, according to Law 281/1914, Article 43: "Two or more labour 
organizations are allowed to form an association or union ... only 
if maintaining their economic and 
administrative autonomy. "2 13 This way the government attempted to achieve "a loose trade union 
structure, which would be easier to control. "2 14 
This control was achieved by restricting both union organization and collective bargaining to a 
local or district level. In other words, although a large part of responsibility for the status of wages, 
conditions of work, and working conditions lay with central government, labour unions could only 
put pressure and present their demands to the representatives of local government; or indeed as it 
was sometimes the case, to their local W, who would then use his influence to achieve a 
compromise between labour and employer. Labour disputes and strikes that did not extend beyond 
the boundaries of a 'local crisis' were much easier for the authorities, than a nation-wide labour 
strike organized by the whole occupational category. 
The particular development of labour organization was in part dictated by the economic conditions 
of the time, the small number of wage-labourers, the lack of communication and transport between 
215 the various pockets of industrialization. In addition, Benaroya put forward another theme on the 
reasons for the weakness of the Greek labour movement as a national presence: 
"The historically formed Greek mentality and the unpredictable petty-bourgeois character 
of the Greek 'proletarian' allowed for the idea of workers organization to acquire the form of 
a non-stop process of creating many trade unions consisting only of presidents and 
seals ... Many trade unions were 
led by executives appointed rather than forged through the 
struggles of the working class... using the titles and seals of the trade unions for personal 
exchanges, economic and political in nature, alien to workers' aims. "'2 16 
Once again we observe the phenomenon of 'revolution from above' in Greek politics. Thus, the 
lack of unity of organization and struggle at a national level was mainly due to the following factors. 
213 Law 281/1914 
214 Tzekinis C (1984) p28 215 For details on the morphology of the Greek industry and proletariat see chapter 2. 216 Benaroya, A (1975) pp I 11-112 
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The first was the low level of economic and industrial development that produced a numerically 
small and largely scattered working class. This in turn led to another factor, the loose connection 
between labor organizations, a practice favored by both employers and government. This offered 
better control through the incorporation of local unions into the existing clientage networks. 
Whenever clientism was relatively ineffective, nevertheless local disputes could be dealt with by the 
authorities. 
Venizelos's legislative measures (a subject that we will deal in more detail below) determined the 
form of organization and the federal mode of unification of trade unions. This, in combination with 
the lack of a concentrated urban working class due to the absence of heavy industry, prevented the 
workers from realizing the benefits, or indeed the necessity, for a centralized labor nation-wide 
organization. 
Nevertheless, there were efforts towards trade union unity. On November P, 1918, the first Pan- 
Hellenic Labour Congress was convened in Athens and attended by 252 delegates representing 200 
labour associations, 10 labour trade unions, 2 labour federations and 2 professional trade unions. 
They represented 48 occupations and approximately 60,000 out of a total of some 75,000 organized 
workers. 217 Given the attitude of the state towards labour unity, why was this allowed to take place? 
A number of writers 218 explain this episode by reference to a change in the attitude of Venizelos. 
There are two reasons. The first one had to do with the rapidly changing conditions on the 
international scene following the Russian Revolution in 1917. One symptom was the radical political 
climate that was forming towards the end of World War 1.219 
The second reason was the growing discontent among workers and socialists over the oppressive 
character of the regime 220. An agreement on the composition of a delegation for the forthcoming 3d 
217 Clogg A (1979) p76 
219 See for example: Leon BG (1976), Apostolakou L (1997), Mavrogordatos G (1987) 
2"Leon, for example argues that: "... the war aims revisionist debate, spearheaded by allied and neutral 
socialists after the Russian Revolution of March 1917, affected Venizelos policy. His fear that the growing 
anti-war sentiments in the allied countries and the pressures exerted by the socialist and labor movements 
for a revision of the war aims might adversely affect his own war aims, prompted him to facilitate the 
unification of the Greek labor and socialist movements, hoping thereby to secure their support for his 
foreign policy and through them influence the western socialist and labor movements which were expected 
to play an important role in the future peace settlement. " Leon BG (1976) pA 220 In addition to Demetratos and Konstantinides, two prominent socialists, who had imprisoned, four 
University students, members of the Socialist Youth, were court-martialed and given 4 year sentences for 
having printed and distributed one of Kropotidn's pamphlets; they were soon released on Venizelos's 
orders following many protests. In February, two other figureheads of the Greek socialist movement, 
Petsopoulos and Yannios were once more arrested because of certain articles published in Rizospastes. See 
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Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist conference that was acceptable to both government and socialists 
seemed almost a futile task. It was not only a number of socialists, who might have previously 
placed themselves in favour of a workable compromise with Venizelos's government, who were 
now alienated from the regime. Characteristic of the attitude of organized labour in Athens vis-A-vis 
Venizelos's regime was the fact that upon the occasion of Venizelos's return from the West in early 
January 1918; only 9 out of 26 trade unions participated in a welcoming ceremony -an event that 
made an impression upon official circles. 221 Leon contends that: 
"Now, since the movement toward labour unity could not be disrupted or diverted by 
means of the old tactics, the government, which was, after all, not totally impervious to the 
influence of young bourgeois reformers, decided to accept the inevitable in the hope that 
through the appropriate manipulation of local labour centres it eventually could secure an 
anti-socialist, Venizelist or at least mildly reformist majority in a centralized organizational 
structure. Having reached this stage of indirect control, the government would be able to 
infuse the movement with reformist ideas, secure its support, maintaining social peace, 
neutralize radical influences and drive a permanent wedge between socialist and labour 
, 1222 movements. 
Did the Congress live up to the government's expectations? According to Benaroya's account, four 
major factions dominated the Congress. The first was the Piraeus faction led by Machairas. This 
included most of the delegates affiliated with the Piraeus General Confederation of Labour, and was 
generally anti-socialist (mainly Venizelist-Liberal). A second faction was made up of various labour 
organizations from Athens, including delegates from Peloponnesus, and was under the influence of 
the Labour Centre of Athens (mainly Anti-Venizelist- Royalists). The third faction, which proved to 
be the most cohesive (overwhelmingly socialist), included the Salonica Labour orga nizations, some 
Thessalian groups, as well as the Socialists of Athens and Piraeus. Finally, the fourth faction 
consisted of the Yannios group led by Elias Delazanos and Achilles Chatzimichales who 
collaborated with the Salonica delegation. 
Mzospasles 22/10/1918,29/10/1918,27/l/1918,28/l/1918,30/l/1918,19/2/1918,23/2/1918,25t2/1918, 
2/5/1918 
221 See Moskof (1987) pp196-213; Kordatos Y (1956) pp57-105 
222 Leon GB (1976) p102 
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Therefore it would seem that the Congress had no clear or indeed homogenous ideological 
direction, and that the socialists were a minority. 223 A Liberal, Machairas, the leader of the Piraeus 
faction 224 was elected at the head of the Executive but perhaps even more importantly for the 
government, a war aims program was adopted . 
225 In view of these developments Vice-President E 
Repoulis wrote triumphantly to Venizelos: "Labour Congress proceeded according to our plans. 
Climate [was] anti-socialiSt.,, >226 
Following the conclusion of the 0 Pan-Hellenic Labour Congress, preparations began for the 
unification of the Greek socialist movement. Although, we are not going to deal with the Congress 
itself in this chapter, it would be useful to briefly mention certain characteristic processes that 
preceded it. In early September the Organizing Committee for the Socialist Congress appeared 
before Venizelos to discuss the presence of a socialist delegation to the Inter-Allied Conference 
capable of pushing forward the Greek claims (which pre-supposed the creation of a socialist 
party)227 . The Committee presented to Venizelos a series of 
demands: a) permission for two 
Congresses, b) two months of freedom of action for the successful preparation for the Congresses - 
through the lifting of martial law that was in place, and c) the termination of behind the scenes 
government interference in the internal affair of trade unions. Benaroya, who was a member of that 
committee, described Venizelos's response: 
"Mr. Venizelos accepted the first two terms and promised to give orders as for the 
loosening up the martial law, without however lifting it as such. As for the issue of 
223 Valkanikos Tachidromos 12/10/918,24/10/1918,25/10/1919,27/10/1918,30/10/1918; Benaroya A 
(1921) 
224 Rizospastes, 26/10/1918,17/10/1918; Of the 12 member Executive Committee, 4 were socialists. 225 The program included among others: a) entry to the League of Nations, b) the proclaim of a Republic of 
Thrace, c) International status for the channel of Bosporus, d) the annexation of North Epirus and Ionia, e) 
the proclaim of Pontos as an independent republic and the impact of Wilson. It resembled the reformist 
programs set forward by their European social-democrat counterparts with an additional 'nationalistic' tone 
of Greek war claims. See Moskof (1987) p401; Kordatos G (1956) p311 
226 Leon BG (1976) p 108 
227 Kordatos writes in the 'Communist Review' in 1924: "The Serb and Bulgarian (wide) socialists made 
much noise in Europe for the 'national' interests of the Balkans. The Serbs advocated Serb imperialism and 
the Bulgarians the Bulgarian one. Venizelos' Greek government ... wanted Greek socialism to also make 
noise abroad in favor of the Greek 'just causes'. For that to happen though, there needed to be a labor 
movement, as well as socialists. " (Kordatos G, 1924, ppI14-5); See also Article by Vice-President 
Repoulis in &fia 30/12/1917. 
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government interference ... 
Mr. Venizelos pretended to be surprised claiming that such a case 
never existed... ! 11228 
In any case, whether the Congress was pro or anti-socialist is not the most important element. 
What was indeed crucial was the clear intention of the government to prevent the development of a 
politically autonomous and potentially radical labor movement. The Labor Congress itself was only 
the beginning of a long series of government interventions, which would play an important role, one 
way or another, in shaping the politics of organized labor. 
C. Legislation as a means of incorporation (the stick ... )229 
In Greece the right to establish worker's associations was granted as early as 1864 by article 11 of 
the Constitution. This stated that "Greeks have the right to form associations, complying to the laws 
of the state ... 
having acquired in advance governmental permission to do so". 230 Batikas claims that 
the fact that this right was granted to the working class without struggle, i. e. top-down (in contrast to 
other European cases) had a negative impact on the formation of a militant consciousness. This was 
because it greatly influenced the attitude of the workers towards their exploiters and the state. 231 
The foundations for the establishment of a legislative framework for the development of the labor 
movement in the inter-war period were laid in 1914 by Law 281/1914 (Associations Act). The 
character of this piece of legislation as well as the ideological framework that it reflected was made 
clear from its introduction: 
"The spirit of the right to form associations did not come across, since 1864, the same 
difficulties, seen in other countries through long-term conflicts ... Workers' associations 
constitute today a major social force, acting for the benefit of the social whole, moving 
228 Valkanikos Tachi&omos, 22/3/1931 
229 Moudopoulos makes an interesting observation on the character of legislative measures, which is rather 
enlighting as an introductory comment: "Legal rules, most of the times falsify instead of reflecting social 
reality that they aim to regulate according to abstract rules and usually do not correspond to it ... Abstract 
rules of law have the power to affect social reality and to shape it according to their content. " 
(Moudopoulos S, 1987, pp8-9) 
230 Svolos A (1972) p 129 
231 Bafikas K (1994) p211 
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parallel to the official association of the state, which in plenty of cases has contributed to the 
fulfillment of its aims, being for the state a valuable assistant... -)iM 
It was assumed, in other words, that the purpose of trade -unions and worker associations was to 
contribute to the state's efforts (being a 'valuable assistant 233) for the betterment of the social whole. 
However, in furtherance of that aim, certain measures had to be taken in order to regulate workers' 
associations through legal provisions concerning their establishment and operation, and to keep their 
activity under supervision. Throughout the interwar period there would be plenty of examples 
whereby workers' unions, while initially 'formed for the pursuit of the common interests of its 
members', would at one point or another, appear as 'an element hostile to social peace and a 
dangerous one for the state authority'. 234 Accordingly, in February 1927 the Larissa Court of First 
Instance decided on the dissolution of the city's Labor Center on the grounds that it "went astray of 
the legal purposes for which it was established7. In the same period more than ten trade unions were 
either dissolved or refused ratification of their statutes in the city of Larissa alone on the grounds that 
they were "pursuing aims that were not in reality the ones written on their statutes, but ones that 
were illegal and immoral"! 235 
Accordingly, any reference to the adoption of 'class struggle' as a means of pursuing their 
interests, any estimate by the relevant supervisory state organ that any union practice was the 
product of choice based on class, would result, in the prosecution and eventual dissolution of the 
particular Union. 236 The interpretation of the law would go as far as the persecution of workers for 
even participating in the electoral struggles of the Communist Party. 237 
232 Leontaritis G (1980) p77 
233 Accordingly the State would attempt to become a 'patron' for the labor movement, and by 1918 the 
State would also be in charge, by law, of resolving industrial disputes (see Report of the Socialist Party on 
the anti-labor legislation, 15/12/1919, in Yiannios Archive, Filet, ELIA) 
234 This is described in the introduction of the law concerned (281/1914) as a 'right of the State to defend 
itself', cited in Vagias A1 (1975) p4O. 
235 And the Court decision continues "for the purpose that their founders were communists and therefore 
their pursuing aims were anti-national, against country, religion and family. " (See Rizospastes 21/2/1927). 
Similar reasons were put forward for the dissolution of the Volos' Labor Center 5 months later (See 
!; kzospastes 20/7/1927) 
236 These implications of the existing trade union legislation were put forward in Parliament by the Socialist 
W, A Sideres (See Efimeris twn Sizifisewn tis Voulis, January 1920, p449) 237 Such as in the case of a number of rail-workers who were sentenced to imprisonment, fines, deprival of 
their political rights and exclusion form any future employment from the public sector, for their 
participation in the Party's pre-election struggle. The sentence was passed by the Magistrates Court of 
Larissa, in Rizospasees 29/1/1927 
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Therefore, in order to prevent the creation of associations hostile or dangerous to itself and its 
notion of social cohesion, the state drew up a legislative framework that allowed it to regulate and 
observe all aspects of trade union functions and actions, from their foundation to their dissolution. 
For a newly founded trade union to acquire the right of lawful existence and activity it was required 
to submit its statute to the judicial authorities for approval. This significantly undermined the right of 
trade union members to draw up their constitutions freely and according to their own interests. In 
comparison with relevant experiences in other countries, Greece had one of the most restrictive and 
interventionist legal framework regarding trade union activity. 238 
An application for the legal recognition of a trade union by the state would include: a) two copies 
of the statute, b) a copy of the records of the foundation procedures, and c) a list of the names of the 
founding members as well of the executive. 239 The submission of the statute to the Court of First 
Instance involved significant government interference. In the article 80 of the Civil Code it was 
noted that "a statute, would be considered invalid, unless it determines: 1) the purpose, the name, 
and its head-office, 2) the terms of entry, retirement and expulsion of the members, as well as their 
rights and obligations, 3) the sources of funding, 4) the manner of its legal representation, 5) the 
executive organs and the terms of its composition and its termination... ý240 
In other words, this legislative framework secured, for the authorities, the scope for complete 
control over trade union activity, preventing them from acquiring an independent and autonomous 
militant character. The occasions whereby trade union statutes were dismissed on pretext, such as for 
reasons of 'morality' were numerous. A 1928 decision of the Court of First instance in Kavalla was 
indicative of howjudicial authorities perceived 'morality'. Since one of the law's clauses ruled that a 
union's name should not contain 'terrible, immoral or ill-reputed' words, the Court refused to 
sanction the legal recognition of the trade union 'Proletarian' on the grounds that "this word is not 
included in the Greek vocabulary: this Latin word denotes a class of vile human beings capable only 
of child-bearing and cannot be sanctioned as a union's name because it indicates social distinctions 
f bidS. vi241 which the constitution or 
238 According to the International Labor Office, Greece appears alongside such as Salvador, Honduras, and 
Turkey as one of the few countries in the world with the most intensive judicial interventionism in the 
geration and activity of trade unions. See ELO (1976) 
9 Law 281/1914 
240 Article 80 of the Civil Code 
241 Kladas S (1945) p64-65 
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... and the carrot 
Alongside its authoritarian and restrictive character, the legislative framework that took shape in 
the early twentieth century and that dominated labor-state relations throughout the inter-war period 
also included a number of positive provisions and effects. First of all, it put an end to the existing 
system of 'guilds' or 'craft associations', in which small employers, independent craftsmen, and 
workers had traditionally joined together to minimize economic hazards through mutual help. This 
meant that employers and employees could no longer be members of the same organization or 
union. 242 
In addition, for the first time there were legal provisions for the carrying out of collective 
bargaining, which allowed trade unions and workers' associations to pursue their demands as unions 
and not as mere individuals, thus significantly increasing their bargaining power. 243 Finally, there 
was a series of legislation passed concerning working conditions (such as Law 393411911 'On the 
Hygiene and Safety of the Workers and on Working Hours), women and child labor (Law 4029/1912 
'On Female and Under-Aged labor), as well as wages (Law 4030/1912) etc. 244 These reforms were 
carried forward partly due to Venizelos' strategy of rationalizing and modernizing the Greek state as 
well as a pre-emptive policy for easing the effects of industrialization and thus avoiding the 
emergence of social problems as had appeared in Western Europe throughout the previous century 
(such in the case of pre-1914 UK, US and Germany). 
Other interventionist mechanisms were subsequently established. The Ministry of Labor was 
formed in 1935; however, there were a number of other state agencies that carried forward the 
processes of intervention in the labor movement, such as the Labor and Social Welfare Branch of the 
Ministry of Finance. Its responsibilities included inspection duties for monitoring the application of 
Labor legislation, the operations of trade unions and their finances, as well an advisory role on new 
provisions or additions to the exiting labor legislation. It was also responsible for the administrative 
supervision of trade unions. Officials of the Ministry had the right to carry forward "a written or oral 
examination of the administrators of a trade uniorf', to check trade union records, as well as to be 
242 Kordatos GK (1956) pp25-26,177-178 
243 Theos K& Gkrozos A (1955) 
244 See Leontaritis G (1980) p55; Katsanevas TK (1983) p68. On the actual'effect of this legislation we 
dealt on previous section. However, as Dimitratos noted in his report on 'The Labor of Foreigners in 
Greece': "the attention of the State is rather drawn on granting favors [rousfeffl than the vital problems of 
Greece. " A Dimitratos Archive, File 16, ELIA 
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present in union meetings and observe compliance with the law and trade union statutes. 245 
"Through the various organizations and mechanisms that lay under its jurisdiction, and also directly, 
it intervened on the labor movement, administratively, economically and ideologically. r)246 
The Labor Home (EPYOTIKý EuTia) was established in 1931 by the Venizelos Government 
through Law 5204/3 1, which stated that the purpose of the organization was "the assistance of 
laborers in the pursuit of the economic, spiritual and moral betterment of their class. " This would be 
carried forward mainly through the provision of buildings to house the "occupational organizations 
of the working class". Not all organizations would benefit from this arrangement but only those 
"whose aims and activity complied to the existing laws". 247 According to Koukoules, "the Labor 
Home had a clear purpose from the very moment of its conceptualization: the incorporation of the 
labor organizations into the state mechanism and the creation of an even more complex trade union 
bureaucracy". 248 
Legislation was also created for increasing working class participation in various organs of social 
administration. Representatives of the working class were allowed to participate in various councils 
such as the Advisory Board of Labor (1920), the Supreme Finance Council (1930), in various other 
councils of worker insurance agencies, and in the Senate, which had a provision for Labor Senators 
as representatives of occupational organizations. However, as Seferis noted, the composition of 
those councils was limited to the representatives of government approved trade unionism, hence 
excluding the communists who led a large number of unions. 249 
The degree of how interconnected and incorporated labor leaders were in the frameworks of power 
provided by the state was demonstrated by the 'curriculum vitae' of labor leader A Dimitratos. In 
1928 he was secretary general of the General Confederation of Labor. In 193 1, on the suggestion of 
Venizelos, he was elected a member of the Supreme Finance council. In 1936, under the Demerzis' 
government he took part in the Regulative Committee for Labor Disputes. Under Metaxas' 
245 Vagias AI (1975) p3 9 
246 Batikas (1994) p221; see also Goutos HG (1985) p218 
247 Law 5204/3 1, in Eftmeris fis Kivemiseos, 28/7/193 1. The provisions of the law clearly excluded the 
communist-led Unitary GSEE and the trade unions that operated under its 'umbrella' from the benefits of 
the Labor Home. Since the Confederation was dissolved by a court ruling on 3/1/1930, the Labor Home 
was exclusively intended to provide assistance to the 'official' trade union representative organ, the GSEE. 248 Koukoules GF (1984) 13 
249 Seferis K (1975) p58 
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government he was appointed Deputy Minister of Labor. Finally he also served as the secretary 
general of the 'Labor Party 250 
D. Oppression as a means of containing and controlling the labor movement 
Shortly after the 1928 Liberal electoral victory, the Bill 'on security measures of the social regime 
and on the protection of citizens' liberties', more commonly known as the Idionymon, was submitted 
to parliament. This reflected the government's determination to reinforce the existing legislative 
framework against communist influence on the labour movement. The Idionymon decreed the 
imprisonment of those who organized or led a communist or 'similar' movement which aspired to 
the violent subversion of the existing social order or to the prevalence of a certain class. Conversion 
to or public propagation of communism was similarly penalized, while Articles 4 and 5 banned 
communist assemblies as 'dangerous' for public security and prohibited gatherings of individuals 
who advocated any communist or 'similar' ideology. 
The Idionymon Law, however, was not a conceptualization exclusive to the Greek State. On the 8fl' 
November 1927, a conference organized by the Entente Internationale Anticommuniste 
(International Anti-Communist Alliance) took place in the Hague. Attended by lawyers and legal 
experts representing most European countries, the purpose of the conference was to discuss the 
possibilities of an anti-communist struggle through legal means. The conference suggested the 
adoption of a number of measures (to be undertaken by the interested governments), such as the 
penalization of any group that was affiliated to the Third International and that conducted communist 
251 policy, or even whose actions could potentially lead to communist objectives. In addition, similar 
pieces of legislation had already been passed in Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Estonia and others. 252 
At the same time, throughout Europe, the idea of a 'strong' state was becoming increasingly 
popular among those in power: Mussolini came to power in Italy in 1922, Primo de Rivera's regime 
250 See A Dimitratos Archive, Files I and 16, ELML Theodoropoulos would constitute another good 
example: his name would become almost synonymous of paternalistic state trade unionism. A Kordatos 
wrote: "At the time, socialists were raising complaints that Theodoropoulism was an obstacle to the 
development of our trade union movement because he propagated state socialism and gave workers false 
promises that prevented them from going into action. " (See Kordatos, 1956, p179) 251 Kepetzis M (1930) p5 
252 Efimeris Sizifiseon fis Voulis, 30/5/1929 
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maintained power in Spain between 1923 and 1930, Salazar established his regime in Portugal in 
1928; and King Alexander the First abolished the constitution in Yugoslavia in 1929. 
Even if communist parties were not outlawed as in the cases mentioned above, various regimes 
aimed to establish legal provisions that attempted to penalize not only subversive actions, but also 
ideas. Britain utilized the 1351 Treason Act, the Seditious Libel and Enlistment Act of 1870 as well 
as the Official Secrets Act of 1911 and 1920, and a series of bans following the industrial unrest of 
1926. Twelve Communist Party leaders were arrested just the year before in 1925. In Germany, 
although the KPD was not banned, its involvement in trade unions was criminalized as "participation 
in the trade unions aiming at the subversion of the Reich government". In France labour activists 
faced revived legislation from 1893 and 1894 that penalized anarchist and communist ideas. 
When the Idionymon was debated in the Parliament and Senate there was extensive reference to 
the international situation, such legislative measures and the satisfactory results that they had 
produced against revolutionary unrest in Germany and elsewhere. 253 It has been suggested that in 
more ways than one the Idionymon resembled Bismarck's 1878 Anti-Socialist legislation, described 
as "one of the most complete legislative pieces as far as persecution of social crimes was 
concerned7'. 254 
Oppression escalated under the Idionymon. Rizospastes wrote about the new wave of 
authoritarianism. In 1929, the first year of its application, "there were 1,495 arrests, 554 convictions 
amounting to 2,532 months imprisonment, 125 convictions of exile amounting to 237 months, 265 
, 255 injuries and 3 deaths of workers. There were also 107 attacks on trade unione . The Confederation 
of civil servants was banned, their right to strike re-called, and their wages reduced by 6%. 
Venizelos's response to a civil servant's committee that visited him in order to submit its complaints 
about those measures was characteristic: "Why would you want with a Confederation, an 
organization amounting to 40,000 members? It is dangerous. I'll maintain the 
Federations... [However] if there is any more misconduct, we shall proceed even to their abolition as 
, ý256 well. In a similar tone, Venizelos addressed a gathering of tobacco workers in Kavalla in 
November 1929: "Let us make it clear, if you are Communists, you are enemies of the state and we 
253 Efimeris Sizitiseon fis Voulis, 30/5/1929; Efimeris Sizifiseon fis Gerousias, 17/7/1929 254 Lidtke V (1966) pp33945 
255 Rizospastes, 26/3/1930 
256 Kastaniotis G (198 1) p93. The Federations were organized at a local or regional level. 
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shall dissolve your organizations as hostile. We do not recognize your right to band together to 
-257 become stronger and more threatening to the state . 
In 1928, Papanastasiou warned Venizelos that "the policy which today is directed against the 
communist threat, fundamentally and essentially aims against legitimate labour demands. -258 Indeed, 
during the next few years, the Idionymon Law was used indiscriminately against any form of radical 
agitation , involving not only pro-communist workers, 
but workers across the political spectrum, 
even those who supported the regime. A striking example can be drawn from the letter of the Liberal 
president ofthe Agricultural Credit Cooperative in the town of Giannitsa requesting the halt ofthe 
persecution of two teachers as communists, because they were in fact Liberals! In the same letter he 
proposes the persecution ofanother two schoolteachers belonging to the rival Farmer-Labour Party 
of Papanastasiou as 'communists' ! 259The tables below show a number of interesting charactenstics 
of the 'witch-hunt' initiated under the provisions of the Idionymon Law: 
Graph 3ý Convictions under the Idionmon Law by occupation 260 
0% of the Population 
III % of the persons convicted by 
'Idionymon' 
257 Mazower M (199 1) p 129 
259 ibid. p 128. Note that article I of the Idiotiymoti wrote that "whoever took advantage of a strike or a lock 
out aiming to cause agitation and riots would be punished with same sanctions" that the law prescribed, i. e 
imprisonment up to 2 years and exile. 
259 Letter of Metozes to Venizelos, 26/6/193 1. As Papanastasiou himself had stressed in Parliament while 
the law was debated "we need to keep in mind that none of us can consider themselves safe, because the 
law does not guarantee anyone's safety. " In 1`rakfika, ýivfisewti lis Voulis 30/5/1929 
260 Source: Hellenic Crime Statistics (1929-1934,1936,1937); Slatisliki Eý)etjrjs fis Fllado. v, 1938 (1928 
Census) 
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Table 22: Presentation of the areas where most convictions took place in relation to other social and political factorS261 
Prefectures where Number % of Total Population Industrial % of % of KKE 
most convictions of cases the Of Relevant Workers as refugees su ort 
took place (1929- total Prefectures % out of total 192 193 193 
37) Of total population 6 3 6 
Population 
Attica- Viotia 1195 41.5 1,024,667 16.1 27.5 3.2 7.1 6.0 
Tarisa 297 10.4 278,465 9.6 11.4 14. 13. 17. 
9 6 7 
Thessaloniki 227 7.9 539,986 11.0 48.1 9.9 7.3 9.6 
Kavalla 144 5.0 119,140 17.3 62.7 14. 27. 23. 
9 5 8 
Lesbos 84 2.9 161,557 8.4 22.0 5.4 15. 14. 
3 2 
Samos 59 2.7 70,497 9.1 10.2 0 2.2 53 
Drama 38 1.3 111,572 9.4 70.3 7.3 7.0 
I 
The above tables show the extent of arrests and convictions that took place, removing many 
labour movement militants away from activism for various periods of time ranging from a few 
months to several years. They also indicate that the great majority of the 'victims' of the Idionymon 
were workers, a number directly disproportionate to their percentage across the total -population. 
This gives credibility to the view that the law was aimed at the labour movement. Most cases 
occurred in areas with either large concentration of workers or areas that en oyed communist support j 
well above the national average, which was around 5%, reinforcing the above conclusion. 
The state used other forms of intervention to oppress the labour movement. For example, it was 
able to intervene in the composition of the Congress of the General Confederation of Greek Labour 
(GSEE). In 1926, the authorities carried forward a somewhat 'original' method of altering the 
balance of forces in the Congress of GSEE. During its Third Congress, the authorities arrested a 
number of left-wing delegates (Benaroya mentions eleven) whom they kept under guard on a ship at 
the port of Piraeus until the closing day of the Congress! In this way, the majority of the executive 
that was marginally voted into office were reformist, leaving the communists in the minority. 262 
At the Fourth Congress of the GSEE (1928), apart from the arrests of delegates, there were also 
additional actions carried forward by the Confederation's executive, further undermining the 
organization's role as representative body of the labour movement. The majority of the Executive, 
which, as mentioned above, belonged to the reformist camp within the Confederation, decided 
261 Sources: Hellenic Crime Statistics 1926,1933,1936; 1929 Census; Burks RV (1961) p221 262 Benaroya A (1975) pp 178-18 1; Livieratos D (1985) pp 162-169 
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during the fourth day of the Congress proceedings to cancel the cards of the delegates. Issuing the 
renewed cards to their 'own' delegates meant that those delegates not possessing the renewed card 
were prevented from attending the Congress by the police: 213 out of the 443 delegates were 
excluded. 263 Therefore, the change in the balance of forces in the Confederation was not, as it is 
usually portrayed by a number of labour historians, the product of a shift in ideology, but one that 
was 'artificially' created through state intervention. 264 
The authorities also intervened in individual unions and workplaces through both indirect and 
direct means of intervention. In the case of the former, the most frequent involved the surveillance of 
trade union assemblies, which was not within the legal competence of the authorities. 265 Examples of 
the latter can be found in the arrest of communist trade unionists during a union assembly by the 
authorities who were already present, such as the case of the Heraclion Asia-Nfinor Refugee 
Union. 266 Artificial majorities were not only attempted and achieved at the higher level of the 
national labour organization, as in the case of the Confederation of Labour in 1926 and 1928, but 
also at the medium level of workers' organizations, i. e. the Labour Centres. 
The case of the Labour Centre of Athens offers a good example. Prior to the convention of the 
Centres' General Assembly in 1927, eight out of the thirty unions affiliated to the Centre were 
expelled and excluded from representation. The existing leadership of the Centre received 49 votes 
and renewed its term in office. The 'Left' Unions' voting power consisted of the 35 votes that 
corresponded to the Union delegates who were excluded from the proceedings, another ten votes of 
delegates who were not excluded and managed to vote, and another twenty who were excluded from 
voting on the grounds that they were not in order with their financial responsibilities towards the 
Labour Centre. On the other hand there were allegations that at least twenty out of the Union votes 
that supported the existing leadership were either artificially engineered or belonged to Union that 
263 KE tou KKE (1998) p7l 
264 See for example: Fakiolas RE (1978) p93 and Jecchinis C (1984) p63 
265 For example, see the telegram of protest sent to the government by the Assembly of Administration 
Boards of the organizations of All-Workers' Center of Volos, whereby it is asked to "order the Volos 
police to stop surveiling the assemblings of the workers' organizations according to the law. " Rizospastes 
15/1/1927 
266 See Rizospastes 3/4/1927 The reason given by the authorities for the arrests was that the communist 
union members "were obstructing a legal assembly ... by disturbing through indecent means the order of the 
particular union". 
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were non-existent. 267 Therefore, although the balance of forces in the Labour Centre of Athens was 
favourable to the Left (65 to 49), that faction found itself in a minority position. 
This method of state intervention was, however, not always successful. A Report by the Minister 
of Transport noted that "when in 1933 there was a change in government, there was every attempt to 
favour the workers that were govemment-friendly. However, that was not easy since replacing the 
permanent workforce with others would cause the uprising of the workers. , 268 
During the inter-war period the police authorities, alongside their surveillance of trade union 
activity duties, were also responsible for infiltrating the unions and the union leadership, aiming in 
the long-run to split them and create unions that were more government and employer-friendly. In 
view of the above police activities, the Labour Centre of Salonica published on 21" of May 1922 a 
petition condemning the methods used by the authorities: "The head of the Salonica police 
Headquarters colonel Papakonstantinou has reduced almost all of his local professional activities to 
the coordination of the persecution of the working class ... He was willing to dissolve the labour 
organizations and accordingly he established a special force of undercover men... who revelled at the 
,. )269 expense of the workers. 
In 1924, the MP Yiannis Pasalidis publicly condemned from parliament the mass creation of such 
reactionary unions by the state authorities. According to Pasalidis, the authorities in Macedonia and 
Thrace were establishing fascist groups that terrorized trade unions as well as fascist worker's clubs 
that were provided with arms. Pasalidis presented to parliament the relevant evidence and 
documentation, among which there was a written order by Garrison Headquarters to provide armory 
to such 'unions. The Prime Minister was forced to acknowledge the activities of the authorities, but 
justified it on the argument whereby "nationalist workers have also the right to form unions", and 
267 Accordingly the 4 representatives of the Bakers' Union were illegal because they had been recalled by 
their own Union prior to the Assembly. The Well-Diggers' Union had 4 delegates although they were only 
allowed I (since they did not have more than 100 members). The Tobacco Workers' Union were 
represented by 5 delegates, whereas they were only allowed 3 (they had about 200 members), whereas 
there were another 2 Unions (the Porters' Union and the Butchers' Union) which did not exist at all, and 
were nevertheless, represented by 2 delegates each, etc. (See Rizospastes 23/5/1927,24/5/1927,28/511927, 
31/5/1927) A few days after the elections in the Athens' Labor Center the Municipality of Athens decided 
its funding of an extra 50,000 drachma (Rizospastes 6/6/1927) 
268 And the report continues "taken further into account that the Left, who mobilize the workers, having the 
power, would find the excuse to call for assistance from the rest of Piraeus workers, even the Athenians, 
towards the creation of disturbances. " (Report On the Organization of the Working Personnel of OLP, p2, 
in A Dimitratos Archive, File 16, ELIA) 
269 Livieratos D (1987) pp96-7 
73 
continued to say that the current policy is a mere continuation of a practice introduced by the 
previous Liberal administration. 270 
The extended establishment of such unions, which in many instances existed only in name, had a 
significant effect in altering the balance of forces within the GSEE . 
271 As Benaroya observed, "after 
eight years of existence, the Confederation received unions that did not exist, or existed only in 
fantasy. Their delegates came with orders from the reactionaries of Piraeus, who have managed to 
receive from the Piraeus Municipality great sums of money towards their expenses. v-)272 
It also had a great effect on every-day life of workers as well as on the running of trade unions. 
Such was the extent of terrorist activity against the working class that it is worth citing extracts from 
a testimony of an eye-witness: 
"A fascist parastate organization called "National Greek Uniow' [EOVIKý 'Evwaiq Exx6q], or 3E, 
stormed at nights in working class neighbourhoods and trade unions firing guns. They had the go 
ahead by the police. 
I remember when I was in a meeting with other workers, because we were being briefed by a 
tobacco-worker who had just arrived from Russia, and 7 members of the 3E stormed and started 
firing on us ... A month earlier they have been to the Maritime Union, and they had also been to the 
Construction Worker's Union, where they shot dead Staboulidis, their secretary... 
We started placing special guards outside union buildings. 
After a while, stormings became daily, not just by the 3E, but also by the police... 
In 1933 there was a storming on the Salonica Labour Centre ... 
defended by some 150 
workers ... Seven workers were shot dead, many were wounded and we organized a mass rally 
outside the White Tower [AEuK6 n6pyor, ", 
270 Accordingly he mentioned: "The previous government gave the order to the administrative authorities 
and in agreement with the military authorities for the establishment of nationalist worker's unions, which, 
however, are not reprehensible". Cited in Livieratos D (1985) p49 
271 Batikas mentions that in the establishment of such unions contributed the ever-worsening material 
conditions and living standards of the workers; most recruitment was taking place in the lower strata of the 
working class and the unemployed. (Batikas Y., 1994, p253) 
272 Benaroya A (1975) pp179-180 
273 Mpratsos N (1998) p 15 
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Conclusion - 
We have seen that the Greek state, unable to provide legislative reform or effective political 
mediation, increasingly relied on the use of force. The Idionymon Law, inspired by political 
developments and legislative innovations that were taking place in various forms and to different 
degrees throughout the continent aimed to eliminate communist influence in the labour movement 
by penalizing not only communist activity, but also actions leading to such activity. What followed, 
however, was a general attack on almost all manifestations of working class radicalism. On many 
occasions this became a tool for resolving personal and political differences. 
There were almost simultaneous efforts to, on the one hand, alter the balance of forces in the 
leadership of the General Confederation of Greek Labour in favour of the reformist pro-government 
camp, and on the other, to terrorize the working class and the trade unions by establishing and 
arming parastate groups and reactionary unions. This was a simultaneous attack on the top and 
bottom of the organized working class aiming at its effective control. 
Those anti-working class measures exhibited striking similarities with those taken by the Fascist 
governments of Italy and Germany. Indeed, one year before the establishment of the fascist regime 
of General Metaxas on August 4h 1936, Kondyles made much of his meeting with Mussolini in the 
Summer of 1935, hailing him as "the greatest man of the present epoclf' who had "achieved a 
magnificent task, having disciplined a lively people ... and 
having solved the problem of the 
cooperation of capital and labour. , 274 The stability offered by Italy's (and Germany's) example was 
becoming increasingly ever more appealing to the ruling elites of Greece. 
274 Andrikopoulos G (1977) pI SO 
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Chapter 4: The Development of socialist politics, Part 1: The Communist Party of Greece 
(1918-1936) 
Introduction 
Any attempt to produce a political history of the Communist Party of Greece, is a challenging 
project. That is because of the existence of long-standing 'myths' and 'foregone conclusions' held 
and re-produced in the existing literature. This chapter analyzes those claims and assumptions. 
One long-standing but unchallenged claim is that of the direct line between the leadership and the 
members of party at grass-root level. This has been portrayed as a unidirectional power relationship 
that worked from top to bottom. Accordingly, the image of the monolithic Party has generally been 
taken for granted, even though 'substantive' homogeneity was achieved quite late in the course of 
the development of the history and politics of the Greek Communist Party. 
This chapter argues that relationships between party leadership and party base, national (KKE), 
regional (BCF), international (CI) manifestations of the communist movement were never smooth or 
clearly defined, but varied considerably throughout the inter-war period. Continuities and ruptures 
are also not as clear as has been assumed. Relying on party and CI politics as they have been 
presented in party Congresses and publications, much of the present literature presents an account of 
the development of communist party politics, which is superficial. The relationship between the 
Communist Party and the organizations that developed outside the ranks of the communist party has 
also been neglected by the literature. 
As far as the role of the Comintern is concerned, although it would be a mistake to examine the 
historical development of the Communist Party strictly from a 'national' point of view, there is the 
danger of over-emphasizing the role of the international element, and of imposing categorizations 
and theoretical dichotomies, that either did not correspond to 'national' realities, nor provide a fixed 
'set' of explanatory tools for interpreting political processes that involved a much more complex 
inter-play of factors. As Saarela noted on the variety of pre-existing identities: "The reception of 
ideas and concepts was not ... a passive occurrence; national communists 
interpreted new ideas and 
concepts through their past. 5275 
275 Saarela T (1998) 'International and National in the Communist Movement, ' in Saarela T& Rentola K 
(eds. ) Communism: National and International (Helsinki: SHS) p 12 
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Finally it should be noted that incorporation frameworks such as legislative and active oppression 
are indeed crucial in any explanation of the different manifestations of national communism. 
However, they are not necessarily sufficient on their own to provide an explanation of how the 
various 'defensive' methods and mechanisms came about. These did not evolve as product of some 
mechanistic process, i. e., as a straight forward response to particular circumstances, but often 
involved various degrees of creative flexibility and initiative on behalf of the 'defendants'. 
Accordingly, our approach to Communist Party historiography is not going to be solely based on 
the 'classic' categorizations and periodizations used so far, notably the First, Second, and Third 
Periods used by the Comintern. A mechanistic application of such explanatory models risks over- 
simplifying national and regional developments within a specific Communist Party. 'Obvious' 
outcomes do not always derive from 'obvious' reasons. Rather, we shall focus on the interplay of 
relationships among the agents involved in the making of the politics of the Communist Party. The 
Communist International was indeed one of these agents, but was it always the determining one? If 
and when it was, what were the circumstances? Could it be argued that in the case of local 
communist party politics it played little, or even no part at all? 
To what extent is reference to the Comintern and the periodization it established to interpret the 
international situation and determine the politics of the communist movement a useful explanatory 
toot in examining the history and politics of a particular national section? And perhaps more 
crucially, what would be the value of such reference for the purposes of this particular exercise? 
There are two considerations that need to be made: 
a) First of all, this Thesis argues that the development of working class communism had more to 
do with processes at grass-root level (i. e. the community and workplace) and less with 
decisidn making at the top level. If this is the case, then what will that mean for the impact of 
CI politics itself on those processes? 
b) And even if we assume that CI influence affected mainly the top-level of the party, what form 
did this influence take? Was it consistently effective throughout the interwar period? 
77 
Early Greek Socialism 
In terms of the formation and development of radical socio-political thought and organization in 
Greece, the historical period that preceded the foundation of the Socialist Labour Party of Greece 
(precursor of the Communist Party), can be divided into three phases. 
The first period dates from 1833 to the mid-1870s. During this period, the first elements of radical 
thought were 'imported' and 'implanted' within the Greek social and political thought by Western 
European immigrants and political refugees, who arrived in Greece to avoid prosecution in their 
home countries. These represented an ideological spectrum that ranged from French Utopian 
Socialism (brought by supporters of Saint-Simon) '276 to anarcho-socialism. 
(brought by Italian labour 
immigrants, and political refugees, proponents of the Garibaldi movement). 277 However, the 
former's ideological influence never went beyond the limits of various intellectual circles whereas 
the latter, although developing notable political activity, remained confined within the ethnic limits 
of Italian communities, and the geographical limits of the major port-cities, where those 
communities were to be found. 278 
Major manifestations of both radical theory and practice that emerged in Greece in that period 
failed to assume the form of 'concrete' social alternatives to the status quo, and to develop into 
popular movements. Instead they made their appearance as 'conceptions' for social change that co- 
existed with popular demands, such as the widening of Constitutional freedoms. 
The second phase dates from the mid-1870s to the beginning of the 1910s, and was characterized 
by the formation of Socialist Clubs. 279 The first Socialist Clubs were formed by intellectuals, such as 
Drakoulis and Kallergis, most of who had either studied or lived abroad, such as Skliros, Argiriadis, 
Yiannios, Theotokis, Chatzopoulos and others. Those efforts to introduce socialist thought 280 and 
276 These would include, among others, F Graillard, L Delaury, V Bertrand, and perhaps most notably, 
Gustave Eichthal. On the activity and impact of the supporters Saint-Simon on Greek thought see: Moskof 
K (1988) ppl48-50; Vikela D (1893) pp277-3 1; Dimitriou M (1985) pp49-55. 
277 On the activity and impact of the Italian labor immigrants and refugees see: Moskof K (1988) p152, 
Dimitriou M (1985) pp62-70; Kairofulla K (1923); 
278 Namely, the ports of Patras, Piraeus, Syros and others. On their inability to develop into mass 
movements, Leon G B, mentions: "The radical ideology of these first nuclei failed to reach the masses who 
were spontaneously reformist when politically conscious. The slowly growing labor movement in towns 
such as Patras and the Piraeus... proved to be more amenable to reformist socialism than to anarchism. " 
IT -On G B, 1976, p3); See also Farakos G (1984) p60 1ý 79 See Dimitriou M (1985) pp113-71; Leon GB (1976) pp3-7; Farakos G (1994) pp61-3; loannidis Ch 
(1971) 32-5; Koutsoulakis Ch (1966) pp 17-21 
280 This involved the emergence of an extensive number of socialist -or socialist inclined- press, such as the 
'Hellenic Republic' (Elliniki Dimokrafia), the 'Socialist' (Socialistis), Noumas, Rigas, Ardin and others, 
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organization281 in Greece had several characteristics. Firstly, they were localized, and did not acquire 
the form or dynamic of a nation-wide movement. Secondly, there was little ideological uniformity 
among them, due to the fact that they revolved around the ideological 'authority' of certain key- 
intellectuals who most often were also the founders and lifetime leaders of their Club. 282 Their 
ideological persuasions involved an amalgamation of anarchism, Christian socialism, humanism, 
Darwinism and German Social Democracy, the theoretical boundaries of which remained on several 
occasions rather vague in their perception, interpretation and application. 283 Thirdly, the localism of 
the first socialist labour organizations, in combination with the 'personalization' of their politics, 
became the major obstacle in subsequent efforts to unify the various scattered Socialist Clubs into a 
national political party. In a letter dated 7th of July 1911, Drakoulis wrote to Huysmans, the 
Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau on the failure of those efforts: "In reply to your 
letter..., I hasten to inform you that our Socialist Party is still imperfectly organized. There are a 
number of obstacles to overcome, and the greatest of these come from those who should be our 
comrades. Through intrigues, personal jealousy, bad faith and general ineptitude our work is still in 
an embryonic state... 1,284 The inability of socialist organizations (outside KKE) to transform 
themselves from 'parties of personalities' into 'parties of principles' remained dominant throughout 
the interwar period. 285 
that addressed various social problems from 'radical' points of view. At the same time, the first translations 
of socialist and anarchist pamphlets, and works made their appearance through Journals and other 
publications (such as a variety of extracts from the 'Capital', and the 'Communist Manifesto' in Parnasos- 
1878-, Engels' 'Utopian and Scientific Socialism', in Mellon-1909-, as well as various brochures by 
Kropotkin, Bebel and others). 
291 Although theoretical work clearly out-weighted organizational expansion, a number of Socialist Clubs 
did emerge, such as 'The Sociological Company' (Koinoniologiki Elairia) -1907-, the 'Federation'- 1908- 
The'Socialist Democratic Union'-1909-, the Greek Socialist Party-1909-, and others. 282 Characteristically, in a letter/article to Noumas (September 1911) the author, referring to the l6ader of 
the Socialist Club of Athens, Yiannios, talks about Yiannionism, stressing the impact of the individual 
'authority' in socialist politics, as well as the 'interpretation' of socialist theory in Greek reality. (In the 
File: Publications on N Yiannios, ELIA) 283 The account of Benaroya (Salonica Federation) on his first visit to the Socialist organizations of Athens 
in 1912 is indicative on the diversity of 'perceptions' of socialism at the time. Accordingly the Jewish 
socialist describes his surprise to find the portrait of "Jesus instead of Marx" hanging in the offices he 
visited. 03enaroya A, 1986, p69) 294 Cited by Leon GB (1976) p7 285 In an answer to a membership request to the Socialist Party of Greece, Yiannios mentioned: "I think that 
you have understood that those who follow Stratis [a leader of a rival socialist organization] are not true 
socialists, but follow him due to personal liking, which is not at all socialistic. " In Membership Request to 
the Socialist Party of Greece by the President of the Athens Commerce Enýployees Association, 13/9/193 1, 
Yiannios Archive, Filel, ELIA. Note that the membership request was not addressed to the Party, but its 
leader, Yannios himself. 
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The third phase dates from the early 19 1 Os to the formation of the Socialist Labour Party of Greece 
in 1918: This period is characterized by the continuous efforts to unite the scattered socialist 
organizations. These include the 1911 -initiative of the Socialist Centre of Athens; the 1915 initiative 
of the Salonica 'Federation', the Socialist Centre, and Socialist Union of Athens; the 1917 initiative 
between the Socialist organizations of Piraeus and Athens; the January 1918 initiative of the Labour 
Socialist Union of Athens, the Salonica 'Federation'; and lastly, in August 1918, an initiative called 
by the Socialist Organizations of Volos, Corfu, Piraeus, Athens and Salonica. 
The main factors that underlined the failure of such attempts can be summarized as follows. 
Firstly, the struggles for hegemony between the various socialist organizations resulted in a great 
deal of suspicion between the different parties during talks. On that issue, the answer of Speras to 
Yiannios is characteristic: "I find myself unable to collaborate in your group, which was proved to 
utilize ideolory for personal disputeS"'286 . 
These were further re-enforced bLy on-going personal 
antagonisms among the leaders of the various groups concerned, being mostly organizations 
revolving around the persona of particular key-figures. 287 Secondly, the increasing ideological schism 
between the groups, which became more and more evident in debate on the issue of the Sociaffsts" 
attitude towards World War I in general, and Greece's iffedentist ambitions, in particular, impeded 
288 unity efforts. Finally, there was political 'flirting' of certain socialist leaders with Venizelos' 
Lfberat Party, notabfy in the case of Drakouies and Yfannios., 2'" To the above shoufd be added a 
"' Sao Le1M-, VX4!; Mar A-2 ZiaMi-IS, 19.29,1.7 420 XýO: P-NN1-; CW? 69r-S a? N YA2. 'A?: -OS 297 & Mal , W, e , x, a Athens, ) and Benarqya (a distinctive socialist of the Salonica 'Federation). Durigg the preparations for the 
convocation of the first Pan-Hellenic Socialist Conference, Yiannos was calling for the 'Greek' socialists to 
"save Greek socialism from any Jewish influence" (namely the Jewish dominated Tederation'), conluding 
that "they don't want Jewish socialism in Greece. " (Rizospastis, 4/9/1918). See also Benaroya A (1949) 
p71,13enaroya A (IM) ppBO & B7; lAzafisV X (1996) pp451-470; Koraatos ri (IM) p171 289 The attitudes ofthe Greek Socialists towards the War and Gmece's role in it varied ffum. - a) Drakouffs' 
SVPPVft fV1 VWLZIOý P&CY WIM-ft 1,10 *& ltg=ýVM Vý Ta=a& itlfftViýA- WSPTAM -&VO%% 2ediot 
javo. 11'enwN ia th. - war 6W the SkL- of the Eaemte ýsee Dzakou. W E, M5, ppnn-133,, Smjtc)., erjFA jqjjý 
p9333-4'ý, bj Ytanniona'a sWqart fric invotvetnant in. the war only &% a. igaticy Qf uaiianal defeilse (swe 
relevant articles in Sosialislika Fullq. issues 1, Julty 1915, and 2, At; _gust 
191ý), to q) the 'Federation's 
position which adopted an anti-war policy, and later on subscribed to the Zimmerwald movement (see 
article by Benaroya, in Tachydromos, 18/3/193 1) 
Yiannios wrote in Novem6er M6. "We are not Venizefists. We 6efieve, though, that whoever attacks 
Nerfizelos loday becomes an ally ol Wing flonslanime, and Yhe sodiffias ehoose Yhe lesser oT eýhls. ' 
(SmieWiAr F&417,10, Mdt vm&-r 1916) Vie fiak b&o Ma Y&L%6m &Td 6- Li&-M Par4, mqj- a& hs ýw 
bw.. -ýc *& vatmv-- Vtwt bas beAM skmseti .% vbt JAVA n4h nums 
charaorrizaticum: 'zgenf a VeniY&qM=Tnjiw, (RizaViavkv JJR/J-924)ý 'vmpJoyee of The liberal OW, 
(Bizospastis 29/3/1922), but evidence can be found in order to confirm the 'flirtin@: with Venizelism 
(membership fee receipt for the Liberal Club, relevant correspondence, etc-In the File: Publications on N 
Yiannios, ELIA) 
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series of occasions of state oppression manifested in the prosecution and banning of the socialist 
press, and the prosecution and conviction of socialist leaders. 290 
Unity is achieved- The foundation of the Socialist Labor Party of Greece 
The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Congress took place in Piraeus from the 17th to 21'd November 1918. It 
almed to unite the various scattered socialist organizations and to establish a 'unified party of the 
working class, with independent class politics... "291 The composition of the delegates reflected the 
muftfpficf(y of fdeofogfcaf currents that dominated the socfafist movement and thought in Greece that 
preceded the Congress. In addition to the polymorphous composition of the delegates, the Congress 
was simultaneously faced with a plethora of dilemmas. Those dilemmas reflected a variety of what 
may be called 'classical' socialist problems that have troubled all socialist parties across Europe, as 
well as a number of issues that were perhaps more specific to the 1918 context, i. e., issues of the 
Greek involvement in war, and attitudes towards the post-war order. 
- Should they adopt a maximalist or a minimalist program? 
- Should the party operate within the existing bourgeois-parliamentary structure, or pursue an 
exclusively revolutionary strategy 
- Should they open party ranks to a broad membership, or should the Party be restricted to a 
conscious socialist avant-guard? 
- Should they strive for the establishment of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' or for the 
establishment of a 'people's republic' as a transitional stage towards socialism? 
- Should they embrace or reject the League of Nations as a bourgeois construction? 
- Was the best course of action to advocate the abolition of the monarchy or tolerate it in order to 
aggravate internal contradictions that would lead to revolution? 
- On the issue of the on-going war in Asia Minor, should they position themselves in favor of a 
"war of national defense', or condemn all wars as 'bourgeois wars' ? 292 
290 
Z's 25 
291 
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A! Archai k4ai to Progamma tou Socialistikou Ergalikou Kommatosý Ypomnima epi ton Eksolerikon 
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Table 23: Organizations and ideological currents represented in the I" Pan-Hellenic Socialist CongreSS293 
Area Organization Members Delegates Right Center Left 
Athens Socialist Union 100 6 2 4 
Socialist Youth 250 - - - 
Socialist Centre 20 1 1 
Drakoules 30 - - - - 
Piraeus 100 4 3 1 
Salonica Federacion 500 10 5 5 
Youth 300 1 1 - 
Kavalla 30 1 - I 
Volos Socialist Union 100 4 1 3 
Socialist Club 
Larisa Socialist Union 50 2 2 - 
Socialist Club 
Corfu 20 1 - - 
Mitiline 20 - - - 
Other 200 1 - - 
Socialist Youth 550 7 - - 7 
Press 3 3 1 - 2 
Mps 2 2 - 2 
F- otal 
__T I 
42 i 19 I 15 II 
The debates on those issues reflected and led to the crystallization of two contending tendencies 
within the party. The first was theoretically affiliated to the European model of Social Democracy 
especially as manifested in the Erfurt Program of the German Social Democracy. 294 The second 
subsequently advocated adherence to the Communist International, and eventually comprised the 
Left opposition within the party. 295 
However, apart from the departure of the Yiannios' centrist-reformist group from the conference, 
the newly formed Socialist Labor Party maintained its unity. 296 The reformist majority was dominant 
on the domestic agenda, passing political resolutions, such as the establishment of a people's 
republic as the intermediate transitional stage to socialism, and promoting economic demands, such 
293 Sources: Benaroya A (1931); Courie et at (1918); KKE (1974) pp3-4. The rather vague categorization of 
the participants in Fight/Center/Left had to do with an amalgamation of factors including, their attitude 
towards the issues of Greece's participation in World War I, their attitude towards the Internationals etc. 294 Moskof K (1988) pp400-1 
295 Nikolopoulos T (1983) p 17 
296 On the grounds of becoming "an instrument of anti-national elements ... manipulated 
by the Salonica 
Jews" Kordatos G (1956) p311 
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as a reduction in indirect taxation. 
297 On issues of foreign policy, however, the dominance of the Left 
was seated with the passing of resofutions, such as the fetter of sofidarity "To the Soviet Repubfic", 
as well as a proclamation of "Condemnation of the Entente's intention to intervene in the civil war in 
1.298 Russia7. The Congress also adopted a resolution advocating the establishment of a Balkan 
Confederation, as weff as the forming of a poffficaf bureau coordinating the class struggfe in the 
peninsula. 2"Finally, the Congress adopted the position of "revolutionary violence, being necessary 
for the acquisition of powef, as well as the necessity of a "-common struggle, centrally directed, of 
the international proletariat. 000 
The rninutes of The conference reveal certain key characteristics that are crucial in the 
understanding of the future development of the new party. Firstly, the amalgamation of ideologies, 
politics, and diverse leading personalities that stood as a major obstacle to the process of the 
unification of the Greek socialist movement in the past, remained clearly evident throughout the 
proceedings. The confrontations were rather personal in character -Yiannios, responding to various 
'detractions' against him, noted that "there are admittedly certain matters that can only be solved 
throlighpistoleMl_ with delegates questioning 'the socialist qualifications' of each other . 
302 
Secondly, The newly-formed party lacked confidence in its effort to estabYisb a political and 
ideological identity and hoped to draw from the experience of its Western-European counterparts 
(experience that was not yet realized in the Greek conditions) even to the extent of obvious 
imitation. Characteristic is the proposal concerning the party's statute comprising a mere translation 
from the International., 303 or the debate over having an introduction or not (in accordance with the 
Treadii or German examplee). 1Q4 In the debate concerning the parlys attitude towards the 'League of 
Nations that had been embraced by most socialist parties in Europe, Yannios dismissed the various 
doubts expressed by a number of delegates by saying that "we are primitive socialists, showing lack 
of respect towards the socialist parties of Europe. v)305 
297 Stt Progiamwa fmISAmerimn Apaitisewn 
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Finally, there was the problem of infiltration of secret agents, aptly expressed by the demand: 
"Mky the secret agents leave Ithe Conference]" ! 306 The conference voted to issue a complaint to the 
government for banning the press from reporting on the conference proceedings, and to Inform it that 
"it can take part in the conference in an official and honourable manner through its officials, and not 
throu y. i. )307 There was , gh 
the various agents of secret police. We are not in session secretty, but opent, 
a general but nevertheless clear tendency to present socialist politics as law-dhiding, existing wiftn 
the limits of legality, which, in the eyes of its advocates, did not justify the various state measures 
against it. 
The impact of the Russian Revolution 
The I't Pan-Hellenic Socialist Congress was inclined towards a social democratic ideological 
tendency. Some bV11/6 of the delegates supported Yffis outlook . 
30'Nevertheless, Yhe prevdiffing spirit 
was revolutionary. It is characteristic that, unlike the Inter-Allied labor and Socialist Conference, the 
Greek socialists, including the right-wing, adopted a resolution on the anniversary of the Bolshevik 
Revolution, expressing their support for the Soviets and condemning any allied intervention. It is 
striking that many of the delegates who voted for this resolution, were also delegates at the London 
Conference that took place just 10 months before, where they distanced themselves from the Russian 
Revolution expressing their 'disappointment' at the turn of events. 309 
I-lowever, those events and processes wi*fin the domestic socialist scene need to be understood 
against the backdrop of circumstances prevailing in the international socialist movement. As we 
have seen, the debates put forward in the I't Pan-Hellenic Socialist Conference were quite similar to 
the issues that were debated in Yhe European socialist parties. 310 'The Social-Democrafic tradition and 
ideological framework that emerged based on the domestic and international developments 
mentioned above was challenged in autumn 1917 by the successful Russian Revolution as well as 
the Left opposition within Social Democracy itself At the same time the founding of the Communist 
International in March 1919 arguably intensified the progressive undermining of its predecessor as 
the sole 'spokesperson' for the international labor and socialist movement. The Greek socialist 
"6 KE tou KKE ý) 932) p4 7 
307 KE tam KKE (t9 U. 1 94 5 
309 See table 23 
309 Moskof K (1988) p401 
'31" See Geary D (1989); Defler L (1973) 
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movement had no significant social-democratic tradition behind it. Indeed, Greece was the last to 
form a nation-wide socialist organization in the Balkans; Serbia had formed one in 1903, Bulgaria in 
1894 and Rumania in 1893 .3 
11 Timing was to prove crucial. 
The Russian Revofutfon as weif as the revofutfonary actfvfty in Germany, whfch was taking pface 
at the same time as the Congress, had a dual effect on Greek socialism. On the one hand, it 
contributed to the realization of workers and peasants, in different ways and to different degrees, of 
the division between them and their employers, until then, seen largely as job-providing patrons. The 
effects of war and the Asia-Minor military campaign were highly unpopular among a populace wom 
out by having "been almost on continuous war footing since 1912. iiM TheLy had alienated the lower 
classes from The nationalistic vision of The "bourgeois crusadere. At the same time, news was 
coming from Russia of an uprising that advocated redistribution of wealth (namely land) and the end 
of all wars, giving the Greek socialist movement a significant boost towards achieving unification. 
The limited and somewhat 'selective' images of what was happening in Russia would prove crucial 
in the formation of perceptions among Greek socialists. 
Therefore, it would an over-exaggeration to claim, as many writers have, 313 that the Left tendency 
at the f `1 Pan-Heftenfc Sociaffst Congress was mafnfy a product of "disfifusfonment"' , . 
134 or of 
"unrealistic politics% 315 since the developments in the party did indeed reflect particular domestic 
processes and conýiderafions. 'TbeRuss*ianRevolufion was a catalyst, not a foreign model copied and 
imposed on the Greek reality. There was also a great degree of millenarianism. Delegate Oikonomou 
mentioned characteristically: 
"The golden day of salvation has arrived. The sunrise has begun. The entire world is on the 
move. It could not have therefore be otherwise for the Greek workers, its conscious part, to 
depart on the long road of its salvation ... 
Honor and glory belongs to the workers of the North 
,, 316 that sounded first the great call of resurrection. 
311 (k 
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On the other hand, the Russian Revolution forged in the consciousness of Greek socialists a strong 
sense of the need for unity. It pushed the small, non-coordinated, scattered socialist groups towards a 
new sense of 'historical responsibility' and towards the establishment of a united party and trade 
union movement. 317 And as we have mentioned before, there was no strong social democraticgroup 
to insist That unity must be achieved on their terms. As the delegate from the Socialist 'Youth of 
Athens mentioned in his opening speech to the conference: 
"The general revolution [Russian and Gennan] and the labor agitation in Greece, gives us 
the right to believe that the working class is approaching its awakening. These favorable 
conditions have to be taken advantage of, so that we can bring Greece where other peoples 
have already arrived. -)018 
From Social Democracy to Bolshevization 
In a series of articles published in the Communist Review (Kommounistiki Epitheorisis) in 1922, 
Georgiades, an executive member of SEKE, portrayed the first four years of the party as a sequence 
that varied from the initial 'revolutionary utopia' (the preparation for the forthcoming socialist 
revolution, the realization of which went far beyond the existing capabilities of the party), to the 
subsequent acknowledgment of Greece's petty-bourgeois character, which would inevitably require 
the establishment of a political formation which would revolve around "propaganda and 
organization. "" 
However, it would seem that the boundaries between Those two phases were much less clearly 
defined: indeed, the latter was evident from the very birth of the party. Despite the almost 
millenarian enthusiasm (the 'revolutionary utopia' as Georgiades put it) that was expressed by the 
majority of the founding delegates, there were numerous indications throughout the 1918 conference 
of what the character of the party was intended to be. This 'utopia' would soon with er away in the 
consciousness of many of them. By 1924, many of SEKE's social-democratic leaders, such as 
317 &VRousosPý2977),, KordWas G()936)p. )9Q 
311 KE tn KKE (19&7. ý p2l-, uvA= &JZ%Ae OrA-1A--. "We- all w-Pd W uPAjuAwA ijL. it Ub uq w i%, whaba toa 
proloqg the weaknesses and messyness of Greek labor, or to create here the awakened workiqg class that 
would be capable of following the steps of the working class of the rest of the world in the great international movement. " (ibid, p24) 
319 See Georgiades GA (I 922a) pp97-104; Georgiades GA (I 922b) p 18 1 
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Georgiades and Sideris, held the view that the bourgeoisie had overcome the temporary setbacks 
caused by the radicalization following World War I and had stabilized its authority nationally as well 
as internationally. 320 
On The issue of nfinimum and maximum programs, Kouriel stressed The need for the ? arty to focus 
on how it would be able to carry through its propaganda in the best possible way "within the existing 
status qUo. m, 321 On the issue of whether to make a reference in the party statute concerning religion, 
Chaffinficbales mentioned that the addition of any such article 'would be bad for propagancla. 1%12Z 
On the issue concerning the name of the newly formed party, there was a debate whether it should be 
called just 'Socialist'. Accordingly, Darnigos and Chatzimichales argued that although the addition 
of the word Labour in the Party title would be appealing to workers, it may put off intellectuals who 
rnýky be less willing tojoin their cause. 323 On the debate concerning the requirements for becoming a 
party member, "fiannios stressed to bis comrades: '... you d& t want to create socidVism, but an 
electoral movement. -324 
Therefore, despite the 'revolutionary' phraseology, it would seem that in practice, the newly 
founded Socialist Labor Party of Greece was intended to be a political organization that would 
operate within the framework of the 'status quo' rather than seeking to overthrow it, aiming at the 
electoral support of wider strata of society rather than at 'ideological purity. Over the next years, the 
party issued several statements of complaint to the government concerning ongoing prosecution 
against its members and press, insisting on the non-subversive nature of its politics and methods, 
thus confirming its social-democratic character. 325 By February 1922, the reformist ideological 
orientation of the party had crystaffized. rh a resofution of the iftst Pan-Heffenfc Conference of the 
party it was noted that: 
"The Party, still going through a period of organization and propaganda, needs a long 
period of lawful existence. The level of the party's offensive cannot exceed the limits of the 
A 
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party's political strength ... 
Taking into consideration that Greece is a petty-bourgeois 
country, it is necessary to fight the spirit of petty-bourgeois compromise, shown by the 
devotion of the people to the democratic and parliamentary principles, not with negative and 
fruitless propaganda, but with the widest possible participation of the party in all 
parliamentary struggles and organizations. -)5326 
The resolutions adopted by the party in that convention became known in Party history as the 
'February Theses'. It is interesting that three months earlier, an article in the 'Red Trade Union 
International' that referred to the 'peculiarities' of the development of the socialist movement in 
Greece, had mentioned: "A most crucial [characteristic] is the petty-bourgeois psychology of the 
masses, due to which, at times, even the pioneer elements of the Greek proletariat are forced to 
exercise politics of compromise. -)327 
However, by October 19M the balance of forces in the ideological composition of the party' s grass 
roots membership was overturned in favor of more radical politics, due to the return of the party 
members who had been at the Asia Minor front. 328 The social-democratic leadership would soon find 
itself marginalized. By 1924 most of the founding-members of SEXE would be outside its ranks, 
either because they were opposed to the Party's ideological turn or because they were expelled for 
being 'reformist. Some of them formed various short-lived and marginal political groups, and others 
aligned themselves with Venizelos' Liberal Party. This shift in the balance of forces had a significant 
impact. Since the 'old guard' "possessed political experience and organizational skills". their exodus 
allowed the party to be exposed to "another uncontrollable and revolutionary-like group" . 
329 
The Irregufar Congress of the party that took pface in the same month dectared the resofutfons of 
the last Congress to be a "temporary basis" of action, and called for the determination of a "detailed, 
complete, and elaborate maximum program". 330 By the Third Irregular Congress (ýOh November 
1924), the process of transformatfon from the Sociaffst Labor Party of Greece to the Communfst 
Party (Greek Section of the Communist International) was complete, and the party resolved to 
326 
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embark on a process of re-organization according to the requirements of its new political identity 
331 (the process of bolshevization) . 
What was the attitude of the newly founded Party towards the International in Ns first period? 
From the outset, the question "which school do we belong to? vj332 was a troubling one. To a party 
that fooked to forefgn modefs and experfence for the constructfon and fegftfirifiation of fts own 
ideological identity, the timing of its foundation was crucial: it had taken place between the decline 
of the Second and the rise of the Third International. 333 
The establishment of the Communist International in March 1919 renewed the debate concerning 
the party's international affiliation, an issue that had a prominent position at the discussions that took 
place at the annual meeting of the party's National Council, just two months later. 
334 The vagueness 
surrounding the character of and issues around the newly founded International and the unsettled 
situation in Russia, combined with the fact that the Second International had been the main source of 
historical experience and theoretical guidance. Despite the significant sentimental impact of the 
October Revolution, the earlier experience with the Second International still had an important 
influence. The position adopted at the National Council reflected the variety of views on these 
issues. 
Although the party was instructed 'to prepare the ground' for its future adherence to the Comintern 
(the proposal to join immediately was voted down), it additionally declared that such a decision 
"'should not prevent the party from maintaining relations with those parties of the Second 
International which remain faithful to Socialist principles. "335 Furthermore, in the discussions 
concerning the '21 Poin& of acceptance to the Comintern, leading members of the party provided 
their own versions of what they thought those terms meant in relation to the development of the 
'national' socialist politics. Kordatos underlined that the significance of the terms and principles of 
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the Comintern consisted in their "educational and empirical value", 336 whereas Sideris argued that 
due to the particular class composition of Greek society, it would be necessary for the party to 
determine "at least temporariV' its politics "at its own accord. )-)337 Of course this vagueness about 
the 21 Points was very characteristic at the firne across the socialist parties worldwide -the Socialist 
Party of Italy and the Independent Labor Party in Britain are cases in point. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting that at the same time that the discussion on the 21 Points was taking place, an article 
appeared in Rizospastes, written by an Italian Socialist, which concluded: "We accept the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, but not the dictatorship Of MOSCOW.,, 338 
It is not surprising therefore that at the Yebruary Conference of 1922, The party adopted a 
resolution whereby it accepted "all the resolutions of the Congresses of the Communist International 
up to this time as documents of historical significance which should 'enlighten' the party in its 
course, according to the historical period the movement in Greece is going through. "339And this was 
decided despite the fact that the 2f Points themselves included an emphasis on international 
discipline. 
However, there were also co-existing counter-factors to these developments. There was 
widespread concern among the Greek socialists not to "stay behind" in the "international struggle" 
(identified increasingly with the Comintern and the Soviet Union), but "to follow the road that has 
340 
alreaqy been taken ELy the rest of the Socialist Parties of the Balkans". In April 1919 the founding 
Congress of the Communist Party of 'fugoslavia took place. In May 11919 the Bulgarian Social 
Democratic Labor Party was renamed the Communist Party of Bulgaria, and in January 1920, the 
Balkan Socialist Federation became a section of the Comintern and was renamed the Balkan 
Communist Federation. 34 1 To the above should added the "psychological influence 1.342 that the 
October Revofution exercised on the consciousness of members, reinforcing their faith in the 
336 
Aet, &S AM 
337 
S1 
&tSQIjj, &U A, (to 
339 See Rizoqwfis, 8/12/1920 
339 Rizosp=tes, 20/2/1922 
340 APOfaSjS gia tj T j Kfi Diethni, in Rizospastes, 12/4/1920. To the occasional allegations by political rivals, 
or former members who broke away from the party, that the over-dependency on 'foreign' decision making 
centers was dama&g the "nationaV movement, the Party answered characteristicaffy: 'ney mean in tfifs 
manner to separate the workers of Greece from Yhe rest of Yhe linternafional labor family an6 to push Yhem 
toow-ds a smWL- &H afndrcats &-id cuaWavdscs at a daw whea tbe- ourHng dIsss h? &hff a2wmrks, 
2 stv I S**, C'M vzwa -- .' 
(Rizosp-astis, IW71197Aý 
341 
ý 
, SeCApcuqnlJ&. -; A &DAgk&q A (198.9)pA55-5ý; ZS cc aIqoNnW. s4LqP fJ994)P25 342 see Georoades GA (j 92 1) p25 
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Comintem, even when the revolutionary movement in Europe was in decline, and the isolation of the 
Soviet Union was becoming apparent. 343 
Bolshevization (re-organization) and Crisis 
Following the Fifth World Congress of the Comintern in 1924, re-organizing the Party on the 
basis of cells became an immediate task. This involved the replacement of the "contemporary 
organizational division in electoral districts in accordance with the administrative division of the 
State", with one based "primarily on the location of the workplace (factory cells) and secondly on 
the location of their place of livingý 2344 ; hence "taking a great step towards becoming a real 
Communist Party. xt'1465 
This attempt however to apply the 'bolshevik model of the one way to revolution' to all countries 
was not without problems. Initially the party base resisted the re-organization: old sections co- 
existed with the newly established cells, which in many cases existed on paper but not in reality. 346 
However, the process became the "center of our organfzationaf work ... concentrating aff the energies 
of the party", resulting in an increasing "lack of touch between the party and the masses" and 
ultimately in "the loosening of the labor movement". 347 This experience was not unique to the Greek 
party. Simifar probfems were reported also by farger and more experienced communist parties, such 
as those of Great Britain, France and Germaqy. 348 
In addition, the existence of multiple mechanisms, such as organizational committees, trade-union 
committees, propaganda, alongside the district committees made the party mechanism too heavy and 
343 gr , J; JW 'Oft This was we ofbourse exckui iw to 4 eek case. Thwinez, in an Wkk on the 460 an., sa, 3& 
ocwl= Ravdbatiatx cawmea& QMdIA 6WMXJxX% af de Firw& CQmmunist P". Ua wcate. tbat "the. ded%iati 
of the majoritv of the socialist partv ... to align 
itself with the princýples of the October Revolution and the 
newly-founded International was mainly a product of emotionalism... " (Roussos P, 1975, p106) 
344 RiZoSpaSteS. 12,21/12/1924; Quoting Lovovsky (Red International of Labor Unions) in a plenary 
session of the District Committee of Athens it is stressed: "this is not just an organizational matter. The 
issue ot commudist cens 'in factofies 'is of a great and p6mary Importance poTifical one - Position on the 
La6or- Issuefior the I" F*nary SessAirt q . 
fthe, 4rhew A: OkY Commiftee, 10YRV1927, pS, FS, CPiL On the 
damg-b in be 3ýwv v'Tarl'alt Set hpPa6m 1). 
'k, 
yd 0, 345, R . 9,7 6Mdj, &W Jkop 61V , kop. , 0 ar sxe" Y/, _, M9 , CPA 46 KKE (t974hJ 192U-, In a. reqQrt by the Executive CQmmittee it Ls nateA d)at "im the reatizwtiw. af the 
relevant decisions nothirIg has been achieved due to lack of effort ... The cells, in their great tnýiority have 
not even been formed, or did so mechanistically, which means that, on the one hand, the old social- 
democratic organizations has been dissolved, but one the other, it stood unreplaced by the formation of a 
new one. " (See Report of the ECftom 119 to 151111925 to the Ertraordinary meeting of Salonica, p2, F I, 
CPX) 
347 Se rh d 7! CM oft e a4s S of e ec Si je 4th Paror Congress, FS, Report of aomay . 4pos7blckks ro all the 
memf*73 of KKE., V&, Repml on the wfiom of the CC, fyom 9/1W26-25f2/29,, pI, V-3, V? AL 
348 See CWT. E H tj 97bb) P03, ). b. 37 
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inflexible. It weakened "creative work at the base", the effects of which were further re-enforced 
by 
a "bureaucracy of directivee". 349 "The mechanistic division7 and "overload of Party work" among 
cell members, especially as the number of members per cell had been reduced due to re-organizing, 
had led to the disappointment of Party members and their eventual exit from the Party ranks. This 
phenomenon was especially evident among new members. 
350 
Table 24: The development of KKE membershi P351 
Date Membership Date Membership 
1920 1,320 1930 1,500 
1924 2,200 1934 6,000 
1928 2,000 1936 17,500 
Such an elaborate restructuring scheme proved time consuming and overstretched the already 
limited human resources of the Party. However, despite the numerous problems faced by the process 
of re-organizing the party (in addition to the "total lack of experience" and the difficulties posed by 
state prosecution and oppression), "' the cell system did eventually show signs of cohesion and 
stability, and by mid-1927 the first positive reports begin to arrive at the desks of the Party 
headquarters. 353 
349 KKE (1975a) pp373,520-1; Proceedings of the Salonica District Committee, 1/4/1928, FIO.. 
350 See Letter of the Politbureau to the Cavalla District Committee, 25/3/1929, F13; Memo of the 
Organizational Office of the KKE to all cells, I1 /5/ 1927, F6; Decision of the Politbureau of the CC on the 
situation of the Pireaus organization, 21/1/1929, F12; KKE (1975) p416; Report on the actions of the 
Piraeus District Committee, 13 August-End of November, p3, F6; Decision of the District Committee of 
Salonica, 19/5/1930, F14, CPA 
351 Elefantis AG (1999) p3 19. See also Appendix S. 
352 See Analysis of the decisions of the 4rth Party Congress, F8; Report of the actions of the CC to the P 
Ertraordinary Congress ofKM p 11, F 1, CPA; On the issue of state oppression there will be a more detail 
section further on this chapter. 
353 See Letter of the Salonica District Committee to the Polithureau of the KKE, 3/5/1927, F5; Memo of the 
Salonica District Committee to the CC of the party, 19/5/1927, F5; Analysis of the decisions of the 4r1h 
Party Congress, F8, CPA 
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Party crisis and its characteristics 
Like many other Communist Parties, the KKE was often torn by internal struggles. These often 
concerned the issue of democratic centralism and internal democracy. An issue of Deltion, the organ 
of the Party's Central Committee (1/2/1926) states: "A communist party needs to found its 
organization based on democratic centralism. However, democratic centralism may be fully 
exercised only in communist parties that enjoy lawful existence. An illegal communist party is 
obliged to achieve a strict centralization, so that it could guarantee its bolshevik monolithic unity, 
discipline and direction in action. This must be done at times at the expense of [party] democracy, 
despite whether or not it is characterized by some as a supposed authoritarianism on behalf of the 
responsible administrative organs of the party. " It was later stressed, however, that "centralism does 
not mean annihilation of initiative of local branches", which was particularly encouraged in periods 
of illegality when communication between the 'centre' and 'peripher ' of the party was weak. 354 
The emphasis on the importance of 'bomogene! V, especially at the top levels of party Ifierarchy, 
was shared by a variety of members who belonged to either the dominant or opposition group in the 
party. This was clearly evident in the proceedings of the Central Committee (CC) session on 
4/4/1927 which discussed the composition of the CC. During that session all sides argued against the 
proposal of the CI representative of electing a 'balanced' CC, and in favour of one comprised of a 
majority "of one or the other fraction7". 355 Homogeneity in the highest decision-making body of the 
party was not achfeved untif f931-2, afthough it was not the outcome of an fntemaf process, but 
rather an outcome of external pressure and intervention. 356 
However, centralization and bomogeneity by no means meant that inner-party discussion was non- 
existent. In 1923, for example, the forthcoming Party Congress stressed through the pages of the 
party press that "in view of the internal dissensions, the CC will follow a policy of impartiality, and 
will allow the expression of all trends of thought so that at the next regular congress, the struggle 
will be based on platforms and clear-cut trends and not on personal anta, onisms. -)-)357 Discussion g 
354,!;,: 
ýý 9.1 )Z; '20wrle's 2 2,14,1) 9V YCKE 9732 iV. so Z, F 353 (SAeProceeding&-qf die Sesgionof dw CRtaralCommitwe, 4/411927, Fl, cmý 
356 See the section on the interventions of the International. It should be said that also crucial as a bondigg 
element in terms of the homogeneity of the Central Committee, was its Secretary Zachariades, whose 
prestige among ordinary and non-ordinary members, evident in the frequent characterization of him as the 
'Leader', reached the levels of a personality cult. (See KE tou KKE, 1947, where in just the first 5 pages of 
the preface the name of Zachafiaaesis mentionea 12 fimes; also see YM touXXM, 194Y) 357,, b, t 
. 2,5 f9 fj 923 Ospas es, // 
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platforms were provided especially during the peak of the inner-party crisis of 1925-1927 on party 
tactics. This crisis broke out during the Pangalos dictatorship (1925), whose widespread persecution 
of communist activists and organizations had caused serious problems for the party. Those 
discussion platforms were manifested in the publication of statements and views of both sides in 
party presS,, 358 as well as within the party organizations themselves. 359 Even Stinas, who was later 
expeffed from the Party and fed a Trotskyist group, admitted in his memoirs that during the f 925- 
1927 Party crisis "there was truty free discussion. , 360 
7his crisis was mainly about the character of the party. Poullopoulos, perhaps the most prominent 
figure of the 'opposition' group, argued that the Party had to go through a re-structuring process 
which entailed a more "strict selection" of members, in order to combat the "bad quality in the 
composition of the Party. " "There cannot be", he argued, "a serious Party unless it attracted a 
number of intellectuals from the bourgeois or petty bourgeois strata, who would be able to provide 
enlightenment to the uneducated Greek proletariat on the grounds of scientific socialiSM.,, 361 This Of 
course went against the Party effort to budd a mass organization, hence the devefopment ofan inner- 
party conflict was imminent. 
Critique and self-critique of the upper Party organs was sometimes quite fierce, and such views 
were openty put forward in paqy discussions. 362 Admittedty, however, after 1931, the monolithic 
character of party discipline was fully realized for the first time since the party's establishment, and 
inner-party debates took place either strictly within the limits of party branches, or sometimes not at 
all. 3631t should be mentioned though, that keeping the inner-party discussion strictly an internal 
matter was a policy shared by quite a few grass-roots members, who were preoccup]! ed with the 
catastrophic consequences of the 'open debate' (the publication of opposing views in the Party press 
during the 1925-1927 crisis), for the image of the party to outsiders, as well as for party morale. A 
"I St. 
- 
Pawspastes, Wgulgis, w7acJIS, NVI917., 0Wft, -fizM, 4ftst +, 'Z, U 
fJ? &zqiaK4eA 31000,927) 
359 See Decision of the Xanthe Achtida, 1/12/1927, F% Letter of the Cavalla Achada to the Politbureau, 
lin/i927, F5, CPA; Letter qf the CavallaAchlida to the Politbureau, 13/7/1927, F5, CPA; Decision t? f the Salonica Session on the inner-party struggles, 14/8/1927, F5, CPA, - Letter to Maximos, 23/2/1928, F8, 
CPA. 
-w Stinas A (f 995) pf ZJ 
361 Quoted in Strigkos L (1979) p4l 362 SM f JLtjf& Aýs , jj, t rtttt& .1 tk jjr1tyd jE, &aaU, & 3? " Jýn I's tp Tniym YNE. itu VI tx2LT*t Tj% Tairl ýVhvts, & 
KKE, p,, %Cý JJ D-J J J, J J5) 
363 It is, rather indiative that although. unfil 1.93 1., diverse views within. the garLy were 6ven. the a9gartunity 
to publicty develop their argument through the columns ofparty presq, after 193 1 there is absolutety none. 
Party press became in name and in practice 'the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. 
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Party member wrote to Rizospastes in March 1927 to warri that "workers who are supporters of our 
Party still talk about the ongoing 'nagging', as they tend to characterize this inner-party discussion. " 
In another letter to Rizospastes, it was mentioned that this process has led to the destruction of the 
idea of the leadership as the "sum of the best fighters". This now appeared as a "bunch of selfish and 
malevolent individuals". 364 
The arbitration of inner-party disputes had the following characteristics. Rizospastes stressed in 
1927 that "the mechanistic means of expulsion are the last means that the party would use against 
harmful tendencies. 1365 Accordingly, the issue of the "party purges" through "the expulsion or 
compufsory redundancy" of the oppositfon, 1M as has been presented by varfous Commurifst Farty 
historiographers such as Kousoulas or Noutsos, appears somewhat problematic. The case of 
Pouliopoulos and his fraction, which became known as Liquidarism, 367 constitute a good example. 
Accordingfy, he was portrayed by Kousoufas as the first major "victfin of the Staffrifst fractfon 
Pouliopoulos was appointed Secretary of the party, only to decline on the grounds of finding himself 
"unable to meet the requirements of the post for the central organ of the partyý -) . 
369 
The CC then embarked on an attempt to keep hfm fn the party: the newfy appofnted party secretary 
was sent to meet him in order to convince him to change his mind, he was proposed as a party 
candidate for the parliamentary elections of November 1926, which he once more declined and 
finalty on 10/10/1926 he resigned from the Party. 370 He explained his reasoning in a statement 
published in I une IM entitled 'N iews on the basic problems of the Oreek Communist movemenf . 
In this brochure he argued that the low quality of Party members prevented it from fulfilling its 
historic duty. Accordingly, he placed himself outside the ranks of the party and asked for a purge of 
fN 364 &&ýt 4zý . Mw2a ýYk Rizospwfes WV10,21 WA Rizospasks WIMIT, -M-t 2&vz' d 
Aýpa&pcdas V jnA&a7vweA A/WJ927 
365 Rizospastes 9/8/1927 
366 See Kousoulas DG (196ý) pp22-9; Noutsos P (1994) pp2l onwards; Noutsos P (199ý) 367 The term 'liquidarism' that was attributed to the opposition refers to a term that the Bolsheviks used in 
1908 to describe "a group of intellectuals that aimed the dissolution of the party by all means. " (See KKE, 
f 9U, pp49-9) 
368 See KousojAas D0 (1%5) pp-22-3. Tor an analysýis of Yhe Iremfinclogy Ynal were adoptedi by commurfist 
17SM, histedugraphy (arch &s SWht&aT versus Tratsk-yinTr) see Wer off hr (Ads sectim 369 V b'QM is TWX% in ICJQQ. VA skidikA Um 9-t. *& T-TvixUsýpJ ýNt M&P-S. Int bptama 
familiar wilb vrjAj. -4 idms. Juring tbr. wm it) Asia Afimr JJ9J9-J. 922) w-bri-r, be, Jm* on zaive, W. He 
was the KKE representative at the 5h CI Congress in 1924, and at the Yd Party Congress that took place the 
same year he was elected Party Secretary (He was just 24 years old). After his expulsion from the Party in 
1927 he established the Opposition Spartakos group and remained politically active in various trotskyist 
. 
gg or anizations until his execution by the Italian army in 1943. (See Livieratos D, 1992) 
,,, See Decision of the C17 of AXE on the mailer of comrade Pbutiopoutos, FJ, CPA; Letter of 
Pouliopoulos to the CC, IVATA'926, *24MY92b, M19)1926, IWIWIM6 
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all "diminishing elements". 371 His views, however, did not find much support among the rest of the 
members ofthe CC. 
Two months later he announced his wish to 'offer his services' to the party. He was required by the 
CC to produce a statement of 'self-critique', which later on was considered 'unsatisfactory', and the 
CC hence decided to postpone the arbitration of the matter until the forthcoming party congress. In 
the debate that followed, the CC's demand for more than a "typical statement of discipline" from 
party branches on the issue was characterized as "blackmail" by various sections of the party, which 
rqiected the notion of committing "either ty Z72 . pical or virtual 
indiscipline! The issuing of 
"hunfffiatinpr statements of repentance, w1fich became a standard requirement for re-entry into the 
Party ranks deterred many former members from rejoining the party throughout the period. 373 Party 
members who cUd not aspire to the views of the one or the other fraction soon feft the pressure to 
"join the inner-party struggle on the side of one or the other", resulting in the voluntary resignation 
of several members. 374 Characteristic of the situation was the following letter published in 
Rizospastes (f 6131f 92 7): 
"5 days ago comrades Aggelis and Flokos came to me, presenting me with a statement that 
they wanted to publish in Rizospastes on the ongoing discussion. They asked me to sign it as 
well. I told them that I had only recently joined the Party and therefore I was not yet fully 
orientated [on the issues involving the discussion]. They informed me that all my fellow 
sailors were in agreement and, as a 'communist' I had an obligation to sign. I made the 
mistake of doing so. Could you please take the necessary action to suspend my signature. I 
believe that several other comrades were deceived Linto signingl... -)-)375 
371, ýý, Yeh%iwa, JUM 2-927, F4, CPA. &e &1s&LMer&" D ý1-09. )) p-7) 
_V_Party &&ft& aftd d_ re _Pal. t'att 
a, 4W 372 p .P 
no66, F8, CPA 
Ze UPOnsihilidev Of dw Pir=u& (wgaWzation, 1927, F6-, UW= 
373 See for example Vgenopoulos' statement in Kommounistikon Vinta, no38, January 1925. This practice 
seems to have been utilized for preserving a legitimate image of the Party to the outsiders, rather to the 
insiders, since in internal discussions the party did admit that it was on the wrong side. See Sklavos' 
statement CiViff). They both refer to the 'issue ot re-entry of the break-away group of Communist Uflon, 
which was expelfed by the Phrty in f924. 374 %%i. %tt I IM .. -14-, 4St so Repwl ca, Ws n it twt 10 2MýUms effff Of S MMiTfM 11D the FC&jbU7e=, 14'11, Yt2,1 
'01271aRW'4 '74.7 
19- 
, F. 3s CP, 4 375 Rimspastes 161311927 The statemant sipueA was. a declaratian, against the views af ftuliagroilas 
(oppositioq), published in Rizospastes' column on Internal Discussions. It was send kv the 6h Piraeus Part ,v Cell. 
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Almost identical phraseology was used by both leadership and opposition to justify their positions 
and attack each other (the 'true' communists and representatives of the international communist 
movement against the 'sectarians', or 'social democrats', etc). 376 On many occasions the 
confrontation fumed from poffricaNdeofogicaf into personaf, on the basis of "Who/What are you, and 
who/what am I", accompanied by "prescriptions* of Leninism, heaping up irrelevant bits and pieces 
from Lenin's WorkS. "377 It is interesting to note the opposition's response to the allegations that 
appeared in the bourgeois press on a supposedfy forthcoming spfif of the party: '"we have never 
expressed any desire to split from the Communist Party, and we continue, with the same 
decisiveness, to consider ourselves soldiers of communiSM., 378 
In addition, there were affegations that "part di y scipfine" was rewarded by the assignment of posts 
in the party hierarctky. 3790n the other hand, the opposition also advised its kympathizers/ supporters 
"to remain in the party by any means possible', to "Aign themselves with the party line, present 
themselves to the masses as advocates of the party line in order to gain their sympathy and occupy 
party postS. i, 380 However, compared to the opposition's claim that its views were shared by the 
'mijority of party memberP, the leaders'ffipýs claim that it eifJoyed a '96*j/6 support (although 
admittedly exaggerated) seems closer to the actual balance of forces in the party. 381 
376 %tt Letter to I&XjMS, jSjOUjCjj%j%_ , 
Decision of the PiyQeus District COMMMell on the present pwty 
, criNeA J 92 7, F4 RqLqrj no ihe jvjexwJ %ijAWjav aud 1he ra*LnaxWWes ijf (he Piraelu argaw: 7atjaq 
121811927, F6, CPAý Similar 'practices' were reported in later inner-party struggjes: see Declaration ofthe 
minoritv qf the Politbureau qf the CC qf KKE, I Y2/3 1, F 15; Deckiration of Voreinos to the Politbureau on 
the inner-party struggle, 193 1, F 15, CPA 
3'n Article of Maximos in Rizospastes 15/2/1927, published in the special column provided by the paper for 
internal discussions 
3"t See Declaration oj Gialsopoulos wo Poullopouios, imim, pl, N; See also Letteroj Ae Piraues 
DYsV&7' CommiWee to the PbMurvau, f 61717 92 7, M' . 
49k& -Pmp ftogram of the Araeus 
commillee, TNM921, Y. G. Suth iTA`LtvýýM tk suppuft UP *It Twtýt vmuý& bt ýI?, TH=am in U-1AVIVLaTiMn 
the IWk of film, p0jilka) pwks, which )IM be Jeak wiM fiwhmr co Wky C4-vfer 
379 "Whoever liked tn be seem as &%diqUned members of the iUepl 19", even. if they were ignorant on. 
persons and situations, were called upon to slander, based on 'directives' Ryselt Kordatos, and other 
comrades. Their use ofcourse was not without reward: they were 'appointed' cell, achades, district 
committee leaders, etc. " See Report of Thomas Apostolides to all the members of the KKE, 1924, p7, F3, 
CPA 
See A 380 Proceedings oj the QppcWfion, ))31ISa%, p2, Tv%, IML 
381 S ýýk7 t2IdVW k 19, ), CC M7) W& 179 172, F49 12 , 2,, 11,411921 ke e0hasdant of the IW, 27. Tb ter is q)WO. O. -mid kýj 7xvM-A bu tbz TxQCM&%% 49 *z VMOZ%WM i&wdf Wbant *6 is 
mewjrwv4- "in. Pirmiis: we kave strenS* in Aibm%: mcd really, in Salcdcx. we havejl. Lq begun IDqd The 
fbundationsý in all other cities we have none. " (ýSee Proceedings of the Opposition, 9/3/1928, p3, F8, CPA) 
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The party's attitude towards the choices of its past leaderships could perhaps be characterized as a 
continuous process of self-invalidation of its own history. 382 Accordingly, past leaderships were 
disrnissed by the succeeding ones as "opportunist', 'liquidarisf, 'petty-bourgeol: ý', 'Ieffisf', 
"centralisf', "fractionist", or "without principles". 383 The "aphorism' of individuals, which in many 
cases acquired moraf, rather than pofftfcaf content (stfgniatfiffig words were usec( such as "traitor, " or 
ec spy"), was also a frequent practice of party leadership towards those members who had "gone 
9 384 astray' . 
This practice led to the following remark by the representative of the BCF: "the comrades 
of the Greek Party pface too much emphasis on personaffffes and refationships among 
individuals 
... with characterizations of 
individuals you seek [however] to escape your own 
responsibilities. , 385 
During the development of inner and extra-party disputes, opposing fractions adopted ideological 
characterizations for themselves as well as each other: StalinistsALeninists - Liquidarists/Trotskyists 
- Centrists. These ideological categorizations, which later on crystallized in communist party 
historiography were, however, over-simplistic. Most categorizations were adopted from one or the 
other side in order, not so much to explain analytically, but to morally and politically discredit the 
opponent, while at the same time establishing their own moral and ideological 'high ground'. These, 
yet again, not only constituted exclusive ideological and political armories in the disputes between 
Communist Party and Opposition, but between different fractions of the Opposition itself, which was 
far from homogenoUS386. 
'Ybe didbotomy of Stalinism versus'Trotskyism poses the most interest, as it is admittedly the most 
widely present in relevant literature. 387 The answer is probably best provided by the founding 
"I ;n -&t tlwvq, ý& W. 2& b-J Wa *P. ? AVh, -M% %26 
rj]arjarjj_7e, d byj D2jSt2kV-DjCWY, SUPPWed by pcJjtjrjJ rharjarrizatiaw mrh as 'cppcvIumst'V 'seaxian', 
etc. The term 'mistake' became a "tool of political confrontation and not of analysis" (See Tsokopoulos V, 
1990, p82. ) 
383 See for example KE tou KKE (1945); KE tou KKE (1946); KE tou KKE (1947) etc. 3N4 Accordingly, Kordatos, a key Marxist theoretician, and former Secretary general of the party will find 
himself to be called anything, from a "Trotskyist dazed goat" [note. Kordatos was never a Trotskyist], to an 
ýagent of the bourgdiitd' (See Neoi Proloporoi, Mardb 1934.1be arficle was gignea by Zevgos, member of 
the Centeral Commiluee) 
385 qjýtt + iýlt 3? 2, jVj +11UNW& +I%t bItZk-WOM UtAýM d 1224YWatSA26M, OdL 
cameabout to estaNish the 'Commun; st LWag' tsm Jlstmiko Tmýna fis KE tev KKE, J 99J, p) 9b) 396 A=ocdi*y dff=cut frarAians. and %rouq a tha cAnsidjued, tbetwAtves to be in. the '0 qqa-Wjnt3: of KKE 
battled with each other "for the title of the genuine BolsheviV (see Neos Dromos, 1/6/1936, p2; Simea Iou 
Kommounismou, 10/7/1932, p4, as well as issues of the latter, 17n/1932 and 24n/1932) 
397 Used both by Communist Party and non-Communist Party publications, each utilizing the dichotomy for 
their own purposes (for examples of the latter -namely Trotskyist friendly accounts- see Asteriou E& 
I-anibatos G, 1995; Emmanotiffiaes Nt 2WT) 
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members of what was later to become the national section of the International Left Opposition. 
Accordingly, Maximos noted in Spartakos, the opposition's theoretical journal, that the inner party 
struggle that broke out immediately after the Pangalos dictatorship would have occurred despite the 
existence or not of an "international opposition"388 . The leader of the 'opposition' Pouliopoulos also 
noted in Spartakos, that the finfing of Their movement, in relation to the internal struggles wifffin The 
CPSU, was merely a "historical coincidence'089 . Another Trotskyist, Anastasiades also mentioned 
that "those years [f 925- f 927, when the supposed 6reak 6etween Stahnists and Trotskyfsts occurredl 
we did not know much about Trotsky. We were not informed on those disputes. "390 
The dichotomy of '-HeW versus 'Nilldin% as an explanation of innerýextra-party disputes, 
dominated both party as well as the respective opposition's written and spoken legacies, and served 
as the basis for constructing self-imageS. 391 Finally it should be noted that besides the political or the 
personal character that the inner-party disputes have occasionally acquired, most opposing individual 
or groups indicated that the drive behind their actions was a deeply rooted belief in the 'cause'; it 
was a question of which wzýy was the right one. 392 
The role of the International in the period 1924-1931 
The International became a means of legitimization. By becoming a 'national section' of an 
international organization such as the Comintern, the Greek socialists added legitimacy and prestige 
to a Party that otherwise lacked these due to its short history and lack of tradition. It is characteristic 
that the references to the Communist International increased remarkably during party crises. Indeed, 
SoWte 
,; ýo 'M 
%_ ký jqjý 389 Sto- 3 Wt S%%t2 0', P Im. 
390 See Anastasiades Bibliocgaphical Note, in Syri%ps Nikos Archive-, Sub-File: Memoirs of the member of 
the Opposition, ELIA 
39' Accordingly, brake-away groups of the Communist Party will present themselves as 'genuine', 
'honorable', 'courageous', 'fighters', with 'ethos', having written "the brightest pages in the history of our fa6or moment' On the other hand, the 'opponent' woufd 6e characterized as "compromising' 
'nafionaYise, 'Tasdisf, 'woMng beffin6 Yhe scenee, etc tsee Nikolopothos1b, 1%3, pr), Sjinas A, J%ý, 
92t 179 802 S9x lsodofetf) 
CM bt fZUVA ill'tbn ,P 'Mic VY di P%rjýj IC _ýi lit ýtlmy rx MW M vw_m . 92. j (J. qnriko Thima tis KE Uw KKA J99JA- Slinm A fJ_9&5A- Dr4zkvarjjrw qfibe lbvjjpd Djyýawiav 3f j&, KKE, in SpaHakos, p 1,, 4/11/1927.. F4, CPA etc. Characteristic is the attitude of 'Stalinist' Barziotas (ýee 
Karliaftis L, 1991; p8) towards his characterization as 'Stalinist': ý'I am 
-Proud of 
the 
characterization ... Indeed Stalin committed theoretical and political mistakes, gross violations of the Leninist principles of collective leadership and rules of Party life... ". however, "for us, the old generation 
of'KKE, Stahn was considered as the one who carried forward Lenin's work... ' (Barziotas V G, f 996, 
pp145-. 1) 
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the 'authority' of the International was used by both leadership and opposition to justify their 
positions. In a letter of the 'minority of the Politburo' to the 'majority' written in early 1931 there 
were even allegations that decisions and policies of the Comintern were misused or misinterpreted in 
order to serve the latter's position in the inner-party struggle. It particularly mentioned: "Comrades, 
up to now you have pursued an anti-party policy of distorting the opinions of the opposition by 
forging the documents of the Comintern... You appear as acting in accordance with and under the 
approval of the Comintern only to serve your own ends... , 393 
'Me interventfons of the Comintern took varfous forms, such as in the decfsfon makfng of the 
Central Committee. 394 In the debate concerning the composition of the Politburo (meeting of the CC, 
41411M), the Comintern representative bad proposals on w1dich individuals should be voted into 
which positions. Those proposals were not without opposition. Papanikolaou, commended: "My 
experience makes me foresee a total anomaly. Fractionism and compulsory resignations. We have to 
be allowed to vote for a majority of one or the other ... freely. , 
395 The answer of the Comintern 
representative was characterfstfc: 
"Our experience, larger than that of comrade Papanikolaou, does not make me foresee what 
he does 
... 
The delegation proposes precisely the best comrades. The development of other 
parties shows us the development that the KKE will follow with the solutions put forward by 
us. The comrades must have faith in the experience of the CI.,, 396 
The remark by Chaitoglou that "the manner by which we tend to pull comrades by the hair and 
place them in higher responsible positions cannot possibly be to the service of the party"397 came in 
393 Letft If the Minlarityq tfa pogit6UrjjjaU to the r) P1)4t6UTIzQUof the cc Df rX'E' I IfUll'in'F&S. see 2&% 
14AVP t3f 10 Ibe RMUMezw, 2S/J. /JQ_IJ, FPS, 1, eiWar x3f XefeJku; &s-. VhrejUM AO Xbe 
Politbureau, 30/1/193 1, F15; Rizospastes., 21/8/1927; Letter to the Polibureau (no43), F4, Why we quite 
ftom the Politbureau: Open letter to the members qf KKE and the Executive Committee qf the Communist 
International, R; CPA 
394 It would be difficult to pin-point the exact time that a representative of the Comintern begun to be 
present at meetings of the higher administrative organs of the Party and how regularly, due to the 
incomplete nature of theParty ArdNives. However, the eaffiest example oasnte proce nse I un wa I 'h edi g of tb 
3'd Extraordinary Party Congress (2611-317VI924). There is also one present in a CC meeting dating 
414f IS21, Y", a? X 
'9', 6 ke1j, vS, &YA ýw CC, ,A1, A/J 3010") 7, pu'ý 
CR A 
396 ibid- 
397 ibid. pp34 
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vain: the CC voted overwhelmingly in favor of the representative's proposalS. 
398 It should be noted 
that by f 927 the Soviet Union couid cfaim to be the sofe exampfe ofa successfui revofution, since aft 
other attempts such as Germany and Hungary had failed. Accordingly, the USSR's authority and 
credibility among communists should not be underestimated. As far as the Comintern was 
concerned, it regarded itself as "the only representative of Marxism and the only power which is 
capable of leading the proletariat in its struggle for the overthrow of capitaliSM.,, 
399 This view was 
shared by the vast majority of Greek communists. 
In addition, Comintern interventions manifested themselves in the arbitration of inner-party 
disputes. This often involved an evaluation on behalf of the Cl of the content and the parties 
involved in the dispute that did not always correspond to reality. Accordingly, Pouliopoulos made 
the point that "the object of our inner-party struggle is not the acquisition of certificates of 'leffism', 
but the arbitrary differentiation made by the delegation of the Comintern [between different groups 
in the Partyl, A00 This differentiation between different groups in the leadership, and their 
1-cfassifficaffon-' was noted to be more reflective of the fnner-struggfes within the CPSU rather than 
the KKE. 401 It is also interesting that despite early examples of 'defiance'. 402 the CP increasingly 
relied on the approval of the C1 on organizational matters concerning members1fip, especially 
regarding the higher administrative strata of the party. 403 However, the O's interventions were not 
exciusively aimed to 'sifence" opposition, as has often been written, but sometimes to ensure that 
dialogue was taking place: accordingly during the Third Extraordinary Party Congress the CI 
198 yt-N. Irs, NW. 4, Nb5ktVmzW. I (*; A. P4ý. Skviý, Aw ieAt-. v= k& fvavd in. Vht pi-zoztt&Yg% zk V., & Vd 
F, Y1. r"jjnWY JRWJY 
CkVWr&% Wben $ho- prrp"J3 ckf Lh-r CJreprescutalives oYrrwJvJmjngJy jefrafe'd 1121 
of the CCs by 29 votes to 21 (, See Istoriko Tmima tis KE tou KKE, 1991,9112., see also pages 188 and 191) 
399 'Extracts from an ECCI manifesto on the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Comintern', 
2/3/1929, in Degras J (1965) p19 
4m Open letter ofPouliopoulos to the members ofKKE, in Neo Ksekinima, p6 174; In a statement addressed 
to all the members of the Party made by Apostolides it was noted, among others, that there was a degree of 
favorafism on beMT of the representafive of the BaYkan Commurfist Tedlerafion (that often operatea as a 
medium between the Party and the Q) towards those in the CC who 'Cook care and flattered him". who also 
ýapptTad to bt %bt ka VM&& týomtv +4,26k im. ýRepmt of ThorAw Apwtc4de3 to all Ae 
F3, CPA) 
401 Ibid, pp 10,12 
402 Such in the case when the C1 representative suggested the expulsion of all members of the party apart 
from 100 (as a measure of 'cleansing' the party which was tom from inner-party struggles); a suggestion 
that was strongly opposed by the party and was not carried forward (see Deltion 4/5/1926) 
41" On 2MVISO the T16TAbureau as*kea the Cl for 'its approval for the expluliton of two oppoidion 
members, which it did not carry forward until the C1 has answered positively on the issue (see R&uspasres, 
11WIN1921 & 'IMM9,11. YVV wiabtl Mt 'Itt It"ey to, the pofil6yeau, 'WIN431 by ckaikas- 
EftkhWes, FJA CR4; aaJKKE, )97, 'ý% p579). TWs bdk aFpavs &fMaNy kr the First finwas p&ldf the 
orgonizalinual vxucture of the P&tty &% taic as, the 981111P. of 1936, wberdiy "the biri% or expulsion. of 
members of the CC must be passed over to the CI and await its approval. " (KKE, 1975b, p3 I Z) 
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representative cautioned the Party for not having carried forward the necessary discussions at grass 
roots level, nor receiving feedback from them. 404 It should be mentioned here, however, that it would 
be difficult to determine exactly bow seriously those cautions were meant. There were also cases 
when the Party's decision to expel members of the opposition were overturned by the Comintern. 405 
In other words fn many cases the Cf had the fast word. 
Finally Comintern interventionism manifested itself in the determination of policies -for example, 
the case of the Macedonia Question, also known as the National Question. The slogan for a 'Unified 
and Independent Macedonia' was adopted ky the BCF during its 6 th and 7d' Convention (1924). 
Hence, the Oreek section was required to publish a manifesto propagating this position. The 
reception of the slogan by the party's local sections was not encouraging, and the majority of them 
even "refused to debate them altogether", leaving the CC in a position where it received "pressures 
internally as well as externally". 406 
However, fractures appeared not only at the grass-roots level, but also at the higher levels of ? arty 
authority. Stavrides, Kordatos and Apostolides, all members of the CC, warned against the adoption 
of the slogan arguing that it was alien to the actual national condition since it did not take into 
account the recent significant changes in the ethnic composition of the territories concerned, notably 
through the settlement of Greek refugees from Turkqy. 407 Moreover, they contended, the poliq 
would favor the nationalist propaganda of '-Oreek reactionariee and trigger a wave of oppression, 
which could even lead to the outlawing of the party. 408 
Those arguments were put forward at the Fffth cr Congress fn f 924. It was recognfzed that the 
slogan served the propaganda interests of the Bulgarian party, which was hegemonic within the 
404 jk C 2&k a& #Ia "i a wtk: &% I AMVA C. k IN 
S=CINng whkjj is not the. raw Jvre, Tbej-r were. Do Xr--rCQwrM Mersing-samong Ibe. VWXW lxrj., DCJV4 
but only ptherings of some of the members. " (Istoriko Tmima tis KE tou KKE, 1991,920) See also 
Istoriko Arxeio (I 99ý) pp214,3 5-7. 
405 Such as in the case of Pouliopoulos (see Stinas A, 1985 p123), or the expelled member that went on to 
form the Communist Union (see the proceedings of the 3; 
s Extraordinary Congress, in Istoriko Tmima tis 
KE tou KKE, 199 1, pp 197-200) 4" See Report oj nomas Apostolodes to all the members qj KKE, T3; Procee&ngs oj the Fxkaor&nwy 
Cortgress q1the Party (A&vem6er IRN) p2, CPA, Objections were raised in the 3 rd Extraordinary Party 
V-VnvtSs by +ffit 'Itrtstvakwts toý iht Mttt&T&& DWakt, suvlh 2M iT, *a tast Id i"ht DMM ýdwmh 
(7$a, ikoTn2k. WfisKEIvvKKE, J99), p)83) 
407 NoW tha tjX gar& : ul, ar rJogn. was elaborateA by the Bulgpf= iputy only monihs, before. the excbMge 
ofPopulations that came after the Asia Minor catastrophe. See SEKE(K),, 1991, pp99-102; See also Rqport 
of Momas Apostolodes to all the members of KKE, F3, CPA 
408 Papadopoulos' answer was characteristic: "It is certain that we will be under persecution. But won't we be under persecution in all our struggles since we operate under a bourgeois regime? " (Istoriko Tmima tis 
XJB touyam, 1991, P119) 
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BCF, causing fractures within the Federation. Butit also recognized that KKE could be outlawed as 
a result of its potential adoption. Nevertheless, the Comintern insisted on the position of the BCF. 409 
'The objections of the Greek party were rejected for reasons ranging from "not-truly communisf', 
"self-seeking", "Austro-Hungarian", "nationalist" and "Luxemburgian". Moreover, at the Party 
Congress that followed, the C1 representative spoke of a "social-democratic opportunist" 
tendenCy. 410 In the vote that followed only 2 votes out of 31 opposed the adoption of the slogan . 
41 1 
However, it shoufd be noted that the notion put forward by the existing fiterature, that the adoption 
of the slogan was a classic example of crude Comintern intervention within its national sections, is 
somewhat problematiC. 412 That is because it does not take into account that the notion of 'federalism' 
in the Bafkans was not a foreign invention. On the contrary, it had been an issue propagated by the 
progressive forces throughout the Balkan states (including Greece), whose roots can be traced as 
back as the 'federalist vision' of Regas Pheraios (Velestinles) at the beginning of the Eighteenth 
centUry. 413 The notion that "the struggle for social salvation of the Balkan peoples" could be onty be 
realized 'through the framework of a federalist multi-ellinic Politeid' was also popular among the 
Jewish socialists of Salonica, who held a crucial role in the formation and the politics of the 
Communist Party. 414 They held a defensive attitude towards the progressive Hellenization of 
Macedonla4ls 
In the 1926 general elections, just two years after the policy's adoption the Communist Party 
scored three to four times more votes in Northern Greece (11-16%) than it did on a national average 
(4,38%). However, the Party provided the government with a pretext for suppression on the grounds 
409 &, %. The C&, r 117 &W jiý I 4t st Inc atima) ý19W) pp)57, )f 2; ýanwAp%-sAqW+, r /& all Mw Awwk4f 
of KKE, F1, CPA. 
410 Declaration of poUliopoulos to the 3rd Regular CoWess of KKý 10/9/1926, F2, Report of 7homas 
Apostolodes to all the members of KM F3; Open ktter of Pouliopoulos to the members of JMEý in Neo 
Ksekinima, p6 R; Proceedings of the Extraordinaty Congress of the Party (November 1924) p5, CPA 4rr The Congress endorced the views of the CI representative stressing that the adoption of the slogan was 
not a "product of a narrow conception of discipline, but of conscious realization of our principle prograne', 
'a question ofprincfpfes ... and not a strategic man eouvre. " See Proceedj)igs of the Extraordihmy Congress 
of the Party Oiovember 1924) p, 'Uýk IDn a similar %one, Nikola: ides, Yhe ? arEy` s represernfivelin Yhe bf-Y 
&rgt, Vd Vt the . 7fd EA, -traxd&&q- CaiWm of Me ATrO, &W 'Ith, - =ry ing fvyward of Or, - BCF dxiski= oas 
I Twat V. WrX-- Muw QX dkkilAvd" bA, -QUI%MýM ts, 1L CW-VM&Skk Wt"J., klsw&*ýN Twimt Cis KE uYa 
KKF, J. 9-91, p] J. 9) 
412 See, for example Stavrianos LS Q959) p670ý Elefantis AG Q999) VV4548, etc 413 See Kordatos G (1977); also Daskalakes AV (1976) and Kitromilides P (1998). This 'federalist vision' 
was also propagated by various 'bourgeois democratic' groups such as the 'Democratic East Federation' 
F oup of'Panas, I: Maraakopoulos ana others (on the parficular group see also Zeugos 0,11946, p9Y) 1114 See Benaroya A (f 986) pp! 9- 10,22 415 n St, 06g1hs Is %2L 2MMa M IMM 2a 2LTI "WTAYMMýM US'at i1bMAIS M tt 01 
refu5ed to recogwze &-te Bomroji.? A ý) 93b) p. 3 4. 
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that it aimed at the territorial dismemberment of the Greek state. The actual ability or indeed will of 
the Communist Party to carry forward this project is rather doubtful. Nevertheless, the accusation 
would constitute the grounds for anti-communist legislation and prosecution up to the 1970s. 
Pouliopoulos, who at the Congress was one of the main advocates of the BCF position, made his 
self-criticism just two years later: 
"Our politics on the issue ... went 
bankrupt, and it could not but have gone bankrupt in 
Greece, because it came, not only as the result of a false estimation of the real balance of 
-)-A16 forces in our country, but also of a pure revolutionary romanticism... 
The proclamation of the policy provoked a series of oppressive measures by the State: party 
members were prosecuted and convicted for treason, and parliamentary immunity of Communist 
Deputies in parliament was lifted. 417 The slogan was not replaced until 1936 by 'Total equality 
among ethnic minorities-', when it was noted that 'the change does not mean the rejection of the 
Marxist-Leninist principle of the self-determination of peoples", but is imposed "by the very change 
in the ethnic composition in the Greek part of Macedonia. "A's Nearly fourteen years later the Party 
acknowfedged the "Greek reafifies 'that were put forward by its own members it the very beginning, 
but they had been at the time dismissed as a social-democratic opportunist tendency. 
The new Party 
This period was initiated by an act of the C1. The intervention of the Comintern arguably reached 
its peak in 1931, when it carried forward the replacement of the entire Central Committee. CI 
interventions in the composition of CP leaderships were common during the Third Period (see the 
cases of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Germany in 1928, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Britain, US and 
France in 1929, Poland and Spain in 1932). However, it should be stressed that the intervention was 
officially invited by the Party (indeed by both 'sides' involved in the dispute), which found itself 
416 DeaWatiM of P. Duliopoulos to the 3rd ReguW CongressDf Y&E, VUc9jqj, 6, ! FI, r'j? P, 417 
Ow i3f Er ,k p7, FJ; Dmiyin - WVIJ 
J? evj, Ibe CC M, Ao - AmndWaV m i3f 1he XKE. fl9.2-5 v 13flbe Politbureau on the Party policy concerning the Macedonian issue, 5/1/1928, F8, CPA; Efimeris ton 
Sizifisewn tis Voulis, I sr Period, 2"d Session, 1927-8, pp253452 418 y "n (1975b) p296 
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419 
unable to arbitrate the internal strife on its own. It is crucial to refer to the developments that 
preceded the Cf intervention to understand what foflowed. 
In January 1931 the ECCI issued a resolution regarding the inner struggle over Party tactics in 
KKE, warning the Party of an imminent split and criticizing the paralysis of Party activity as a result 
of the on-going internal fighting. The resolution was published in the Party press causing even 
greater havoc, with the 'minority of the politburo' accusing the 'majority' of using the prestige of 
Comintern to legitimize its own position within the Party. The rivalry in the Politburo intensified 
resulting in an almost complete halt in all other Party activity. There were allegations that local 
organizations that did not side themselves with the majority of the politburo were denied financial 
aid, and there were several cases whereby Party branches refused to fulfil Party directives. 420 In view 
of the unfofdfng situation, the majority of the pofftburo proposed the reaffiation of a Congress 
"under the guidance of the Cl in order to find a way out of the dead end that the Party faces 
today. v)421 
The minority of Ilie politburo also agreed that 'the fracfionist struggle was leading to a splir and 
that "the Party had been absorbed in a vicious inner-party struggle between the two groups"; hence it 
"failed to mobilize its forces against capitalist attacle'. The solution proposed was not much different 
than the one put forward by the majority: "Our differences with the present majority of the Politburo 
continue to exist in full. And they will continue to exist until a final solution is brought about by the 
ECCI to which we have referred our inner-party disputes. " The passage that followed this statement 
is characteristic: "We side in advance with the Comintern line concerning the arbitration of our inner 
party struggle. The Communist International, which concentrates the experience of the international 
revolutionary movement cannot but help our Party to find its way through its tested and proven 
guidance. A22 It comes therefore as no surprise that apart from the objection of a few party officials, 
419 jU C'jz'ý 4& IV ýM ý ', f'. 'C'M N tt vM 4ZO k TAM WO trMY& Stj &MM WA sfawmas Wmin bekh SIM. -IN VIM 
Jrz&. r&bjp as WrJJ 25 Ibe. (be PkVjjAurr, 4yJ"3fI&eX-FfEs 2-7/4 /-3 J, FJJý 
CPAý for the latter see Declaration of Voreinos to the Polithureau on the mistakes during the inner-party 
sowl7le, 24/3/1931, F15, CPA. The installation of the new leadership was accompanied by a 'Call of the 
ECCI to all the members of the KKE' (See Neos Rizospastes, 1,2,3/11/193 1) 
420 See Decision of the Politburo of the CC, 27/4/1931, in F15, CPA, and Letter of Voreinos and 
Nefeloudes to the Politburo, 30/1/1931, in F15, CPA 
""'L 'Letter of Chiftas, ana Eu6climaes to tbe? oYttburo, 2M931,1inTIS, CPA 
422 Leverof Voreinos to the FbIftbura, 24171MV, in FIS, CPA 
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the new leadership, which 'enjoyed' the approval of the International -and therefore reflected its 
prestige- was accepted bLy the grass-root membership with little opposition. 
423 
7he unity acIfieved willfin party ranks revived opfinfism and militancy producing positive results 
in a short period of time. First of all, KKE's membership began to grow steadily each year up to 
1936 ending a long period of stagnation which had objectively limited its capabilities as a party. 
Over six years (1930-1936) Communist Party membership increased from just 1,500 to some 
17,500. 
At the same time, the number of workers mobilized by the Communist Party grew significantly. In 
1932 KKE-led strikes accounted for 41.5% of the total workers mobilized. In 1933 the respective 
figure was 80.2%. Following the 1933 elections, the Communist Party became the largest political 
force in five major working class cities (Larissa, Karditsa, Volos, Xanthe and Kavala) and 
established itself as an important political actor in many others. 424 
Based on the decisions of the Seventh Comintern Congress as weff as growing domestic demand, 
in 1935 the Party announced its Popular Anti-fascist Front policy and was active thereafter in its 
pursuit. Several attempts were made to approach potential allies such as the GSEE, the Agrarian 
Party, the Socialist Party as well as the Liberals and an Agreement on 'Common action against 
military fascist dictatorship' was signed in October 1934.425 The character of this effort were 
reflected in the Security Report ofthe Adinfstry of Interior, pubfished in My 1935 by. 4crqpohý. The 
report mentioned that "Special efforts towards that purpose [it refers to the anti-royalist-fascist front] 
are taking place by the communists at the Labor Center, where, as the report suggests, they find 
more fertile soil. Their executives in their vast majority already have embraced the slogan of an 
'anti-royalist-fascist front', and that is due to the fact that until now in every gathering of Democratic 
citizens, communist workers and other individuals have played a leading part, demonstrating an 
aggressive attitude against the authorities and clashing with them. A26 The dynamic of the Popular 
Front was, however, hafted by the estabfisfiment of Generaf Metaxas " Dictatorship in August f 936, 
introducing a whole new chapter in the history of the Communist Party of Greece. 
423 UF kf V4ý & tý't V Is % pwtj kv, 42--ts tht 
"zbsdUr Miss" f&v Ekfa-wis AQ1,99A PJ-19) 
424 Party Activity Report, published in Neos Rizospastes 21/1/1934 
425 Rizospastes 6/10/1934 The parties that signed the agreement were: the KKE, the Agrarian Party, the 
Socialist Party, the Workers Social Democratic Party, the GSEE, the Unitary GSEE and the Independent 
Unions. 
11-7,6ACropofis f-T1,71wis 
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Conclusion 
This chapter discussed a number of issues central to the understanding of the development of 
socialist politics in Greece and to the Communist Party in particular. Uneven development resulted 
in the concentration of labour in scattered pockets of industrialization. The localism that became a 
distinct feature of the trade union movement, as seen in chapters 2 and 3, had an impact on the 
development of socialist thought and action as well. The belated emergence of a nation-wide 
socialist movement, in combination with key international socialist developments, such as the 
October Revolution and the formation of the Comintern, and with key national developments, such 
as nation-building, help to explain the Greek Communist Party's unique characteristics. 
It may be argued that the emergence of communism in Greece did not coincide per se with the 
formation ot the Socialist Workers' Party of Greece (SEKE). Indeed, in the period 1918-1924 the 
SEKE constituted an amalgamation of predominantly social democratic elements and of trade union 
officials who exercised great influence among large sections of the working class. It was not until 
the Third Extraordinary Congress of KKE in November 1924 that this period ended. The party now 
developed a clearer ideological orientation. Nevertheless it faced two serious problems. The first one 
was the unprecedented wave of suppression that was introduced by the Pangalos' Dictatorship of 
1925 and that continued with the introduction of the 1929 Idionymon Law. It took the Communist 
Party a long time to adapt to and deal with these developments. The second problem was that 
although the party managed to agree on a general ideological orientation as a section of the 
Communist International, there were subsequent disputes over the tactics that should be utilized to 
fulfil its goals. The latter led to confusion, a continuous alternation of policies and to internal 
divisions. 
Accordingly, in the period between 1925 and 1931, the Party went through two major internal 
crises, one in 1925-1927 and another in 1928-1931. The first crisis was mainly about the character 
of the party, involving views on the necessity of a re-structuring process which entailed a more strict 
selection of members. This view was expressed and championed by Pouliopoulos and an emerging 
'Opposition' group. But it did not find a favourable audience with the majority of the Party, which 
aspired to become a mass organization and not an elitist group of revolutionary intellectuals. During 
the second crisis the conflicting views were as follows: one group (Eutichiades, Chaitas) argued that 
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the focus of the Party should be on the organizational effort. They argued "first organization and 
then revolUtiolf". 427 The other group consisted mainly of trade unionists such as Siantos, Paparigas 
and Theos who argued in favour of a party policy that focused on transforming the various 
spontaneous strikes into a general political strike. 
Table 25: Changes in slogans and campaigns of the Communist Party in the interwar period 
428 
Date Slogan / Campaign Comments 
1918 'Popular Democracy' (I" SEKE Congress) Dismissed as reformist 
1920 'Workers and Peasants government' 
(2'd SEKE-K Congress) 
1926 'Left Democracy' Dismissed as reformist 
1928 'Revolutionary Democratic Dictatorship 
of workers and peasants' (4h KKE Congress) 
1930 'General political strike, of armed demonstrations 
of the working masses, of mass action of soldiers 
and sailors' 
Dismissed as a leftist 
deviation by the Cl 
1932 'War against war' 
1934 'United Anti-fascist Front' (S'h KKE Congress) 
Following the intervention of the Comintern in 1931, the party acquired a clear character and 
strategy. 429 Elefantis characterized the post-1931 KKE as "a 
* 
new Party" that enjoyed homogeneity at 
the level of leadership, was free of internal strife and had the legitimizing approval of the 
Comintern: "Indeed, following the party crisis and the decline of the 1926-1932 period, a wind of 
optimism, militancy and revolutionary spirit blew within the KKE. " The dynamic that developed in 
that period reflected in the growing party membership that rose from 1.800 in 1931 to some 15- 
430 16.000 by 1936. 
427 See KKE (1975a) pl6l 
429 Based on the Party's official documents as they are presented in KKE (1974a), (1974b), (1975a), 
(1975b), and KE tou KKE (1988) 
429 Which in context had to do, among others, with failure to lead the growing spontaneous wave of strikes, 
the failure of the 'general political strike' campaign, the continuation of the inner-party dispute despite the 
existence of a clear CI directive for its halt, the slowing down of the process of bolshevization, and others. 
(KKE, 1975a, pp294-306) 
430 Elefantis A (1999) p 13 9 
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Another important aspect of socialist politics was the relation with the International. Accordingly 
this chapter argued that this relationship was not one of a mere mechanistic implication of 
Communist International directives by its national section. Policies that made sense in the Greek 
context and in the minds of Greek socialists were implemented much faster, and in some cases, 
certain elements'of such policies pre-existed in domestic politics, such as in the case of the 
Macedonia issue and the forming of an underground party apparatus. Those policies of the 
Communist International that did not correspond either to Greek realities or to sentiments of Greek 
socialists found strong resistance, from both the top and the bottom of party hierarchy, such in the 
case of re-organization according to factory cells. Critically, however, this changed over time. 
Schema 1: Comintem periodization vs CP historiography periodization 
I st Period: Epoch of the 2nd Period: 'Certain 3rd Period: 'Class 4th Period: - "Me 
Communist revolution of p artial MbIzation of against Class' threat of Fascism! 
the proletariat! capitafism' 
1918 1924-1925 1928 1934-1935 1939 
1923-1924 1931-1932 1936 
From SEKE to KKE Reorganization and Crisis: The New Party 
a) 1925-1927 
b) 1928-1931 
Accordingly, there were distinct differences to the extent the Comintern influenced Communist 
Party politics. In the first period (1918-1924) the Comintem had little more than 'moral' authority. 
In this period, SEKE stressed on numerous occasions the need for "national ways to socialism" and 
accepted the documents of the CI on the grounds of their 'advisory value' . 
43 1 During the second 
period (025493f) the Comfntem influenced the Party in a number of poficies, nota6fy the 
Macedonian Question. However, although Comintern directives were acknowledged in official party 
documents, there was little elaboration on'their subsequent application to Greek realities. In many 
cases their existence remained on paper only. Nevertheless, there are a number of developments 
431 DotC: Sý Im 
Z/2. /J, ()22 
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within the Communist Party during this period, as we will see later on, that can indeed be traced to 
wider developments in the international communist movement. It was not until the period after 1931 
when the Communist Party managed, with some success, to adapt the general positions of the CI to 
the specific national conditions and to develop an effective strategy to build upon them and achieve 
its goals. 
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Chapter 5: The development of socialist politics, Part II: Qualitative characteristics 
This chapter will discuss a number of qualitative characteristics of the development of the 
Communist Party, with particular emphasis on Party composition and on particular situations. It will 
examine how Party members responded to state oppression. How did communists manage to extend 
their influence in a hostile environment? What organizations did they use and how effective were 
they? This chapter will then discuss the various divergent movements and tendencies that developed 
internally and externally of the Communist Party. These elements are crucial in providing a holistic 
picture regarding the development of the Communist Party throughout the interwar period and will 
prove a useful tool in the later examination of the case studies. 
Membership and composition 
The following quote from the party press is characteristic of the selection and acceptance of 
members: "Many members are easy to find. Good members are difficult to get. It is the latter we 
need to focus on ... A good communist 
does not ask for membership, but for work; does not ask for 
rights, but for responsibilities. He will earn these ri hts y ca ý-A32 ,gk rrying 
forward his responsibilities. 
7he Greek Communist Party conducted its recruitment in the form of campaigns. Ms may seem 
to contradict the above, since although importance was placed on 'quality' rather than 'quantity', 
cells were expected to fulfill the requirements of these recruitment campaigns and answer for their 
success or failure -usually the latter. 
433 It was not until 1932 that the party realized that "the question 
concerning the recruitment of members in the Party is not a matter of speciaf campaigns but one of 
the most significant 4y-to-dky aspects of its work. , -A34 
The party considered what it characterized as the earlier "pefit-bourgeole composition of its 
members as the main factor producing inner-party criSiS. 435 This belief, in addition to the process of 
boishevfzatfon that stressed the need to attract more industriaf workers to the ranks of the party, 
432 A d; I, it 0, StrOSSOd to t&. M)S ecor fig) f2s Wt tO CXMPt MV? beS 11*hOeg 4-4181U, 2fiRg &VT P2& ), k+Oq'OF 
-AM, Z&L VA rAUWMqQI1U-Y V. XfQCMM= kL 0114WL DCUOU, 4151197A 
433 See Action report of the Salonica District Committee, 1927, F6; Action re rt of he Piraeus District po I 
Committee for the months January, Februapy, March 1928, p5, F 10; A ction report of the A thens District 
Committee, March-August 1926, p8, F9, CPA 
Hence the Party called for a "radical change in the up-to-now recruitment methods. " KKE (1975a) p373 
Rizospastes, 23/11/1926 
III 
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constituted the socio-economic composition of membership as an issue of primary importance. A 
memorandum from the Politburo to the Thessaly District Committee underlined that: "if in a given 
time period 100 members were recruited, out of which the 70 were not industrial workers, then their 
recruitment could not be seen as having any value. -A37 However, the objective of establishing a 
membership based on industrial workers was never fully realized, as table 2 indicates. 
Table 26: Social composition of Party Membership (1927ý 38 
July 1927 Workers Non-workers Peasants Total December 1927 Workers Non-workers Peasants Total 
Members 1040 260 292 1592 Members 1189 238 418 1845 
% 60.40 16.40 23 100 % 56.20 12.7 31.2 100 
Cells ndustry S mail 
Industry 
Street Village Total Cells Industry Small 
ndustry 
Street Village Total 
Number 53 77 31 51 222 Number 58 75 30 79 242 
% 28.20 34.50 14.20 23 100 % 19.25 32.20 37.75 37.75 100 
By 1933 the social composition of party membership was as follows: Factory workers: 6.6%, 
Other workers: 36%, Land laborers 3.7%, Total workers 46.3%, poor and middle peasants: 50.7%, 
439 Employees: 1%, and Miscellaneous: 2%: "Not at all satisfactory", according to the Party. On the 
other hand, the social composition of member representation at party congresses was 
overwhelmingly in favor of members of working class origin. 440 
436 See Report of the Athens District Committee, March to August 1926, p6, F9, CPA; Analysis of the 
decisions of the 4r1h Party Congress, F8; The examination of the past of members was also an additional 
measure of preventing "instruments of State security forces from infiltrating the cell" (KKE, 1975a, p418) 
437 See Memo of the Politbureau of the CC to the 7hessaly District Committee, 18/3/1928, F8, CPA; Note 
that Thessaly is a predon-driantly peasant district. 
438 The numbers are presented exactly as shown in the party statistics (even when in cases they don't add up 
to precisely 100%). See Strength and Composition of the Party during the two periods July-December 
1927, F8; Similar numbers can be found from statistics drawn from Districts with relatively high 
concentration of workers, such as in the case of Athens (workers: 53%, peasants: 31%, misc: 16%), or the 
Macedonia District (industrial workers: 27.6%, other workers: 25%, peasants: 39.9%, misc: 7.3%). See 
respectively Slatisticsfor the Athens Organization, June 1927-November 1928, F4; Organizational Sialus, 
October 1928, F10, CPA 
439 KKE (1975a) p473 
440 At the 4'h Party Congress (1928) the social composition of the delegates were as follows: workers: 
70.8%, peasants: 8.4%, misc: 20.8%. See Analysis of the decisions of the 4rih Party Congress, p2, F12, 
CPA- Similarly, there was efforts to keep a 'working class majority' in the composition of the leadership as 
well (See Istoriko Tmima tis KE tou KKE, 1991, p188) 
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It is interesting to note that up to the early 1930sý 41 membership remained at more or less the same 
levels, with minor fluctuations upwards or downwards. This appears to be not so much due to the 
lack of recruitment, but due to the fact that new recruitment only just marginally made up for the 
number of members who were expelled, quit, or became "inactive". 442 It is also quite interesting to 
note the ratio between party members and party "influenced". 443 In the Salonica District, for 
example, the ratio between party members and party influenced ranged from I to 2, to as much as I 
to 25. That meant that the Party's strength could not be measured solely on the grounds of its 
membership, but extended, to a wider circle of people. 
Table 27: Party members and party 'influenced' as reported for the I' Achfida of the Salonica. District (1928)"4 
Cell Members Influences Ratio m/i Cell Members Influences Ratio m/I 
Ist 10 250 1/25 7 15 1/2 
2'r 25 350 1/14 5ff' 17 200 1/12 
3'j-- 15 120 1/8 7 th 4 90 2.5 
To what extent did it make sense to re-organize a party along the lines of workplace, with special 
emphasis on factory cells considering that Greece was largely an agricultural country, and that Greek 
politics were traditionally characterized by an intense localism? No doubt, it had partly to do with 
concerns within the party over its identity. However, although it may appear at first glance that the 
re-organization entailed by bolshevization was entirely a product of a misconceived mechanistic 
application of a CI directive to distinctive domestic conditions, it should be noted that the re- 
organization of the party had been on the agenda since June 1922, due to the nature of the 
441 KKE (1975a) pp471483 
442 See for example Action report of the Central and West Macedonia District Committee, 176; 
Organizational strength and Social composition of KOA in the period March to September 1928,179; It is 
also interesting that at the 1928 Party Congress only 8.3% of members were members since the first 2 years 
since the party was founded (1918-1919), whereas the percentage of members who had join in the last 3 
years since the Congress (1925-1927) was 37.4%. SeeAnalysis of the decisions of the 4r1h Party Congress, 
p2, F12; The 'party age' of the Athens organization in 1926 was 1-2 years: 75%, 24 years: 15%, 4years 
and over: 10%. See Report of the Local Committee on the status of the Athens Organization and on the 
action of the committee and the measuresfor the betterment ofparty work, F2, CPA 
443 Party 'influences' were mainly Party sympathizers that were seen as potential members 
4" Report of the last Session of the Salonica Organization, 1/411928, p2, F 10, CPA 
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"contemporary political situatioh.,, 445 The latter referred to the realization that the existing party 
organization ieft members too exposed and, hence, vufnerable to increasing state oppression. 
Elections 
The party's attitude towards the issue of elections is analytically significant, since it provides 
qualitative and quantitative answers to a considerable number of CP historiographers who have 
presented the KKE as a 'sect', based, at times, almost exclusively on the record of its electoral 
performance . 
446 TheLy do not take into account however, that the party itself did not consider itself as 
another "electoral macbine comparable to other Greek political parties during the inter-war period. 
As Stavrides argued: "The Party does not believe it can ever win power through elections but only 
through revolution. Yet it must always take part in elections because the electoral campaign offers 
excellent opportunities for propaganda and agitation; besides, the rostrum of Parliament is an 
vA47 excellent forum for the propagation of the Party's views to the people. 
Accordingly party cells were instructed that putting aside day-to-day party work in favor of 
electoral campaigns was totally unacceptable . 
448 The party also discouraged local or district party 
branches that would put forward 'moderate' electoral programs aiming at improved voting turnouts, 
as these, it believed, would lead to "the direct adulteration or even disappearance of the class 
character of mass struggles... -A49 
The party"s electoral turnout in areas with higher concentrations of working class voters was as 
450 
much as 2-5 times the national average. Indeed, the party obtained the first place in the voters' 
preferences in a number of working class towns such as Volos, Serres, Kavalla, Drama, Xanthe, and 
working class municipalities of Athens and Piraeus, such as Drapetsona, Kaisariani and Kallithea. 451 
Yet, the ratio of party support and actual votes appears to have been unbalanced. The party claimed 
to have mobilized as many as 150,000 people during its electoral campaigns in 1932 and 1933 but 
received just 60,000 and 80,000 votes respectively. Although this could simply be a matter of the 
446 
447 Stavrides, guoted by Kousoulas DG (1965) p4O, See also Action Report of the CCfrom 91911926- 
251211927, p 14, F3, CPA 
448 See Action Report of the CCftom 91911926-251211927, p8, F3, CPA 
449 See Letter of the Polithureau to the Salonica District Committee, 18/5/1929, p2, F 13, CPA 
"b See relevant tables see Appendices I and 2 
431 See KKE (197.56) p 190,300; New Nzospastes, 1/10/1932; Linardatos, cited in Vournas T (1997) p381 
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Party exaggerating the numbers, it seems to be confirmed by the electoral results of local elections, 
which was relativety higher, ranging from 15-60%. 
452 This was also due to other factors: a party 
report acknowledged that not all votes for the party were 'consclousý' or ldeologýically aware votes. 
The number of 'non-conscious votes' was estimated at some 20% of the total. 
453 It should also be 
taken into account that the anti-communist law of Idionymon denied those who were convicted under 
it of their electoral rights. 454 
State oppression and its impact on the Communist Party 
State oppression against the party manifested itself in a multiplicity of ways during the inter-war 
period. First of all, it was apparent through threats against participation in party rallies. This occurred 
through the press, the issuing of leaflets and false announcements concerning supposed cancellation 
of rallies, and the personal intervention of officials. In Larissa, for example, the National Bank 
warned that possible attendance at a forthcoming party rally would result in "a refusal of 
credit. "455By 1928, it would be within the official competence of the authorities to shadow public 
gatherings and "suspicious persons. 46 
This authoritarianism also manifested itself in the form of prosecution of Labor centers and trade 
unions associated with the party "aiming to the bankruptcy of the KKE in the consciousness of 
workers", on the one hand, and a "positive contribution to the reactionary labor center in order to 
substitute for the CP", on the other. 457 Communist Party members were also often laid off in 
factories, 458as weff as expeffed from their trade unions. 4--9 
452 T)V tla,, 2 I es A MS HWO C, 2W&Md fiua? &-i-s c; md h? Sm-Isfiki ton IWL-Wikoa Ekk%vv, 2-97-7,29ok6 
andEamGreece-Gammuizism: Repartfor dw- First Half Year, 1935, FGZWII*II, P&Q-, Neas Rizaspasas, 
1/10/1932,9/4/1933. Not all communist members or supporters were holders of electoral books (which 
were necessary to vote). On the 1936 election Rizospastes mentions that "in certain Party Cells at least one 
third of the members did not possess electoral books ... The same, more or 
less, was the case among the 
,, 
pporters of the Popular Front. " Rizospastes, 31/1/1936 su 
See Report oj the &ecutive Committeeftom 2/9 to IYI 2 2923 to the atraordina? y Session oj Wonica, 
V58, FI, CPA 
4 See Rizospastes 8/1/1936 
455 Sm Rep<wt on the Peasmt Fatly of W711927, VS-, TbkX-- '44-M. StW. M. fiW. I. latbIM 7ý" IE%JIV&t% 
canceimiag surmps Sri xTra Ibe yeaker. 4 ru, ae&. r i3f Ar LastMareWhojo andAeuxt Arare D. Lsoki 
Committee to the Politbureau,, 5/5/1930, F14, CPA) 
456 See Foreign Office to the Undersecretary of State Report, 29/8/1929, p99 in FO 371-12926, PRO; 
Duties that mey be allocated to the Gendarmerie in the Towns Police are, or may be in the future, 
established, 29/3/1928, p2, PRO 
"-"7 'Me class conscious trade unions ... that 
have not yet 6een dissolved 6y law, were denied the right of 
assembly an6 Wilying... 'The arrestslimpfisonment, and eyAle of our rriffharfts are a daily phenomenon... ' 
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460 
Another method utilized by the authorities was the infiltration of informants into party ranks. 
A&nfiffedfy, one has to question the va(fdity of accusations of 'spyfng*' both by the communist party 
itself, which used the term regularly to dismiss political opponents, as well as in police reports, 
which included individuals who sold 'information' as an easy source of income. There are, however, 
cases that confirm the practice of infiltration which refer to specific party members, such as the case 
of the editor of Rizospastes (1929). 461 
71ere were afso viofent confrontations with the forces of the pofice, cavafry and occasionaffy the 
army. These were employed to dissolve party or party-led rallies and demonstrations. 462 Violent 
clashes also took place with supporters of the Venizelist or the Royalist 'camo%. 441 rThe most 
frequently utilized method of oppression against the Communist Party was perhaps the 
imprisonment or exile of grass-roots and top party members (Stelechý). 464 The ill-treatment of 
communist party members vhfile in confinement was almost an every day phenomenon: on average, 
in the period 1927-1936 there are 198 allegations concerning use of violent treatment published per 
annum. in Rizospastes alone . 
465 The conditions of confinement were even worst in exile, as described 
Reinfam-Ay qr &- SessAay qf Cemin-al Xesl JA%neudmig 6w Ak- &, AUT aAud ol Ak- jnz-1j, 
organization, 16-17141193Z, iýZJIT, -Sm&ba Action Report -of 
dte &/Aaica DistrictGammittee, from a- 
NX1927, p3, F6. Action ReADortof the Central and West Macedonia District Committee, F6, CPA 
458 As a result the factory cell (, M) was dissolved. See Action Report of the Athens District Committee or f 
the Second regular District Session of the Athens organization, plO, F9, CPA. Similar examples are 
reported also in Pireaus, resulting to the dissolvement of the 8tf' and 1P cell of the 46Achtida (see Action 
Report of the Piraeus District Committee for the months January, Fehruary, March 1928, p 10, F 10, CPA) 
Also in the case ofRaif-workers (R&ospas1es51T1'f 9ZT) and'robacco Workers (Rilrospastes 3/4/1 91V) 
459 Suen as In Yhe case of 15 party members from Yne Sbop Asýislarfts'Orfion ofkYhens under Yhe allegafion 
that orcre tfjiL? g to (&L-e atier the Ua; va & ar&-r to tuya it ; da &-t instruawnt of tMr 
PKW, wbWdC ksm Proceedfts of the Emergency General Weting, WVV111, im., &%iiAWts 
Ard&4 File], F11AX Ancdber exaq& can be fcmd in mked)v 0 
.f 
Alban& 
19/11/1928, in Aristides Dimitratos Archive, File I, ELIA) when 23 members were expelled on the grounds 
that they were pursuing "foreign aims". 
4" See Letter of the Central and West Macedonia Organization to the Politbureau of the CC, 26/9/1930, 
p3, F14, CPA. In Neos Rizospastes, 12/1/1933 the party warned "all the party branches", that informers 
'travef around the country side presenting themselves as party officiafs, possessing talse certificates and 
seals oT Yhe CC of XXE) 
461 Thl ;f &W ;Siqff the A A. Wir&&q. (G&N7 to S if armat M CA*d ft repad aU 
QtTwe, s=d% tv&kd-. On the collection of evi&nce on the matter of distri6udon of 
. reYo1Ada&vyhrwJwP. S 
j4/25/1,929,1n2, sid1. &i3MMArrNvr, F-Url, EIJA 
462 See Letter of the Central and West Macedonia District Committee to the Politbureau, 16/3/1928., V2, 
F10, CPA 
463 These were usually intensified during election periods: see Rizospastes 7/l/1924,22/8/1928 etc 
4'A See Report of the East Macedonia and West Thrace District Committee to the Politbureau, 7/11/1927, 
FS, Anafysis of the decisions of the 4r1h Party Congress, p 1, FS; Letter of the Poritbureau to the Thessaty 
District Committee, AV311M, T%, CPA 
465 Rrývspumts, 2817YI 925 la view of the t=(awirt cammcraiý-t party mm&ers rmxived fium the autharkies 
0a pwtj %2MA.. "Most '"bo st& 2mtsttA nyast TA Wk va%ý&& *&-j km-H MW%Wh2dVM"&k Mwitis Zk 
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in a letter dated 20/7/1926 by Maximos: "malaria is destroying us. We are in a state of physical, 
lypical as well as practical isolation... "'" 
7he party's electoral campaigns were obstructed by methods that included confiscation of 
electoral material, electoral fraud, arrests of party candidates, closures of its electoral centers; the ill- 
treatment of its electoral representatives -who observe the regularity of the electoral process, arrests 
and exile of party members and sympathizers. 467 
The Party press was banned for periods, and its cfrcufatfon obstructed. 4'ý8 Occasfonaffy, the 
authorities even imposed 'pre-emptive bans' on particular kind of articles, which "would refer to the 
provocation of passions, the incitement of divisions, or the encouragement of citizens to 
disobedience, and the spread of subversive and worrying news. i-A69 The authorities could be quite 
resourceful in coming up with allegations to prosecute members who distributed brochures or other 
propaganda material. Indeed, in Thassos, three party members were taken to the prosecutor on the 
allegation that they were "stirring [the population] into Civil waei,! 470 During the period 1929-1931 
alone there were 175 reported indictments against the paper, wbich amounted to a total of 2D2 years 
of prison and millions of drachma in fines. At the same time there were 24 police raids and attacks 
ky extreme right groups against its offices and press facilities. 471 
At The same time among some sections of society there was indirect tolerance and sometimes 
active support of state involvemen t472 . This was seen 
in the setting up and encouragement of para- 
state and-communist organizations of fascist or uffra-natfonafist orientation, such as the "Aff- Worker 
Union of Nationalist Trade Unions', the "Organization of the National Sovereign State", the 
*&, P2Aj. T'b t? IV, 2, bM+,, wjt&vq, tNtvk OMI b"+, ýVg IM tO&I +KMVN, - ýOMJA ý, t tM9&&St, & J, -, tZ%M 2G? -%-A 
ibe. SWjggjr,.. " DWWav, J. 12,1J92,6 JA-Irralmov was So harnb JjW CkCr"rMjjY jremb, 04d I'D &jjh 
(Rizospastes, 16MI 93 11 
466 Letter of Maximos 20n/1926, KKE Archives. Persecution has occasionally caused international reaction 
(See Protest of the Austrian 'Committee agaist Terrorism, in Rizospastes 5/6/1927; Protest of the' 
2ýtnse Committeefor the rictims of "ite Terror, in Rizospastes 17/6/1927, etc) 
46' Ergahkos Agon, 29/9/1920; Linardatos 9 cited by yournas -r (mr) ppigo-f. See afso reports by 
Pizospastes IIIJ1956 unfil '21MM6. Pffiegafions agiinst vafious means oT obstruciion of Yhe 71ý s 
ek-taM campaign are repa W daily. 468 p 
, tj S, s zoqmk 1$ vas renwwd to Meos J? izaVviw. sfrr, w JAWD-11 to 111-1/J. 9-14, dijetoa ban i1spuMcatica 
469 Memo to all newspapers ofAthens and Pireaus, 10/10/1935, in Sfaelos Dimitrios Archive, ELIA 
470 Rizosj7astes 7/2/1927 
471 See Zorbalas G (1967) p70 
472 By 1935 the admiration of high government officials with fascism and its 'achievements' was clearly 
evident. Government Vice-President G Kondylis's words were characteristic: "The Duce. By creating 
fascism and pfacing it as a barrier to the wave of catastrophe utopian ideas [he is referring to the Russian 
lkey&6on), &wO Yhe -woAd-from batbafism ... 
Long Yive IrZy, long Yive Yhe DuceY' che6 by Voarnas'T 
(1997) p. 786 
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"Company of Social Defense and Providence", and the organization of 'National Conferences' 
('Against the Enemies and Corruptors of Religion, Language, Family, Property, Moral 
Consciousness of the Country' ). 473 Towards the end of the interwar period, violence against members 
ofthe KKE by such groups became progressivefy intensive, resuiting sometimes even in death. 474 
State oppression had a variety of results. In many cases party cells were dissolved, and party work 
in trade unions was suspended or diminished. Party members were reported to be "literally 
terrified". 475 Matly sections of the party were unable to convene due to the lack of quorum, resulting 
in disruptions in The day-to-day functions of the party at a grass-root level. 476 On some occasions 
state oppression led to passivity or "disbelief that, with its present strength, the party was able to 
9-A77 defend itself.. 
Due to hiding, imprisonment or exile, the party was often deprived of its executive members, 
seriously distorting its decision making process. A letter from the Politburo to the Thessaly District 
Committee dated March 1928 stated: "On the vacuums that were created due to arrests there is no 
other wýky of filling them, other than the spring up of new stelechi lexecutive membersj., -A78 Those 
arrested included the party secretary (1925' ), the Central Cominittee in its entirety in 1926. 'Wis was 
replaced by a reserve CC set up precisely in the event of such a development. Arrests also involved 
the party's Ws (1932), and the party's elected local authority officials, including the Mayor of 
Kavalla (j934). 479 The arrests, apart from the impact on the organization of the Party, had an impact 
473 jqkjjZ'h 
ý Lý 2; 9 Rizosasks'14VI934,9W 1914,11ft'If ActionReport of the CC to the 
-EVr'Mv4Qaq' C-nigve-V z3f = J9.7.5, MR, J2, IJ, CP-4; -'/ IV Of C0-VIr0j-jY00 Macedonia on the status and responsibilities of the party organization, 16-7/4/1932, ipl., F17., CPAý 
.g 
-t tt gg Dimaras A (I 97ý) p 143 Mssion Statements of such organizations propa ated he ba le aj ainst foreii n 
propagandas, and especially communist propaganda7' (Mission Statement of National Union of Greece 
[FýEEJ, 1927, in Sfaelos Dimitrios Archive, ELIA) 
#7# Sucft as in tfie case of'rhomopoufos, wfto dies from an attack ffoin mem6ers ortfie EEE (Wationaf 
Urfion fireece), see Syfiggas NTkos ArdVive, Yllel, 'ELIk Note Ynat lin 4%; 192') IAbor leader Winiltmos 
sea a edlcWaar to "JagW-v to -IMCUAj&te ,- VrM f to du, Got nff, warder, 'rarthn 
*at V* CMIA &'9tvA *W-s-tints 
6/1927) w The communLms, " (SeeMzaý%Lves 5/ 
4w 5ým 45ý- See Action Report of the Athens District Committee for the Second regular District Session of the Athens 
organization, plO, F9, CPA; See also Action Report of the Piraeus District Committee for the months 
Jwmwy, February, March 1928, p 10, F 10, CPA; On the wider impact on trade unions see Memo of the 
Politbureau to all the party organizations on the re-organization oj trade-unions, 2 616ti 93 ri 
476 JUýOSPMWS, 91'51'1921,2=7922 
477Rizospasles, 15/8/1931 
479 I. C(terq (jVepojjt6UreCM(o(k jk=1Y 
Faxt Afacedhn and ff rast 22trace Div. &kj Chmmilke A) Ihe P"ieeau, 7. /1 J. /J -927,. F-'ý, CPA; Analxvis t3f the decisions of the 4rth Party Congress, p 1, F8 ý Report on the post-strike condition of Salonica, ip 1, F 11, 
CPA 
479 MZOSPaSteS' 16/4/1925, Deltion, 1/2/1926, Neos Rizospastes, 12/12/193 2; Rizospastes, 9/9/1934 
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on its politics as well, since the absence of certain executive members could easily change the 
balance of forces in the Central Committee. 480 
On the other hand, the violent clashes with the state authorities often had the opposite results, 
arousing enthusiasm and fighting spirit among the victims of their aggression. A letter to the 
Politburo dated March 1928 notes: "We should not try to avoid confrontations ... but seek 
confrontations which arouse the militancLy of the masses. A81 
Accordingly, the party developed a variety of means of defense against state oppression. 'These 
included the acquisition of typewriters and polygraphs to ensure the continuation of publications of 
the party press, as well as the establishment of 'safe houses' for party meeting and sessions. 482 
Preferably these were houses of party sympathizers, rather Than members who were known to The 
authorities. Public places, such as trade union offices were avoided. 483 
Party ceffs were instructed to keep records of onfy absofutefy necessary party materfaf; the rest 
were to be destroyed. 484 Thqy were to set up 'substitute committees' and secretaries, in case their 
regular counterparts were dissolved or deprived of members due to persecuflon. 4" Contact between 
party 'center' and 'periphery' through the post and other written means was to be limited, and 
increasin g 86 g emphasis was put on direct (face to facq) exchanj e of information. 4 Thqy were also to 
re-arrange re-assembling points in case rallies and demonstrations were dissolved, and to set up 
487 488 
safeguard measures for rallies and speakers. Anti-fascist unions and clubs were also founded. 
The Party afso estabfished "Workers" Refief", an organfzatfon that aimed to provide fegaf, financiaf 
and moral help to the persecuted, imprisoned, exiled members and their familie s489There were also 
"survival groups, or collectiv& organized in prison as well as in exile, wbich worked as a means of 
480 ý 19'A j4ht 2: ;5,12 eatwiva Wd 
N, vfrJtvdvs) b"w me. j ni1xvily after the-wra rdf Cbaiw aM FO-jrhWea 481 See Letter of the Central and West Macedonia District Committee to the Politbureau, 16/3/1928, iV3., 
F 10, CPA; on a similar note see Letter qf the East Macedonia and West 7hrace District Committee to the 
Politbureau, 5/5/193 0, F 14, CPA 
41r2 Letter of the Cavalla organization to the Pohlbureau, 17/5/1927, FIO; Memo of the Politbureau to all 
the party organizations, 8/1/1929, F 12, CPA 
4" Memo qj the Pohlbureau to all the party organizations, ISMIM9, pl, F12, CPA 
484JWeMa oft , hepOAr6UrCaU to atYirheparryorgamýailbw, 817179229, pf, Ff2, CPA 485 IA OfINpolijbUyetr4l OjIlhe 07 i ajion3,9 OjjjjS, jq,,;, j j 
486 
em ID pwty gm 2 
eaw a. Aar 6pzmw . RF 9. ?,, F CP 4 
497 
0P 
ýv 
Letter of the Central and West District Committee to dw Polithureau, 1.011.928, p2, F to, Cpk Letter 
of the East Macedonia and West 7hrace to the Politbureau, 5/5/193 0, F 14, CPA 
418 Resolution on the organization ofAnd-Fascist Unions of sejýdqfence, 193 2, pp 1 -2, F 16, CPA 4'9 There will be further elaboration 'Worker's Relief' fimlher on in this Chapter 
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solidarity, but also acquired an educational, political and moral character. 490 Workers' Relief even 
organized escapes from prison or exi(e. 4ý9j 
In May 1932 Deltion brought to the attention of party members an additional hazard to the party: 
gossip! The article mentioned in particular: 
"On many occasions, gossip that involves party matters in cafes and streets by comrades 
and non-comrades, has become the cause of assault on party organizations ... In the case of 
Piraeus, comrades opened a conversation with non-party members 'when x was the secretary 
we were doing well, and now that we have y the organization has dissolved'... [and as a 
consequence] they were sounded out by security forces-informers who seek to open such 
discussions. "492 
Legal and illegal status 
Kousoulas mentions that "while the Politburo was organizing the 'illegal' apparatus, the 
Communist Party was legally recognized and operated freety in the political arena. ), 493 In a collection 
of memoirs Partsallidou makes reference to ffie nature of'legallity' the Communist Party erfj oyed: 
"So we therefore entered legality, or rather to the well-known status of semi-illegality, the 
'legal-illegality' as we called it then. Communists who were handing out leaflets were 
arrested, there were search raids in houses, others were dragged to the police stations for their 
docwnents, there was biting in Securit i-A94 .y 
1police stations] 
The question of legal and illegal status and activity received a great deal of debate in the party. Up 
to 1923 there were nurnerous occasions where the party expressed its intentions to operate within the 
490 &vMz-kasKý]W)&S, ý KamariwuK A ý2001,2)saoPar", ppill-22-7, CPA 
491 q Sjj& as in diA cm Qf Bp-zutWm% M cm 41111932 (vASyciq&u Mikav. Axdivp., Fite. 1, ELMý 
492 Deltion, no4, May 1932 (photocopy), F16, CPA 
493 Kousoulas DG (j965) p86 
494 Partsalidou A (1983) pIO-1 I 
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framework of legality. 495This tendency in the party manifested itself in the so-called 'February 
Theses', fn whfch ft was noted that state oppressfon was 'beyond the partys capacitfes to cope", and 
that therefore the party was in need of an "extended period of legalit "'. 496These views were 
dismissed "defactor just 4 months later, and characterized as "opporturfisi' "97 
Apostolides' account of 'how we got' to the February Theses involved a combination of factors. 
First of all, the initial blend of the beliefs of the founders of the party "did not constitute a very safe 
guarantee for the revolutionary development of the party. " Secondly, he pointed to "the decline of 
the revolutionary movement of Europe". Thirdly, he noted the failure "of the 'leaders' at the 1920 
electionsý', and also the persecutions "that made them reveal their true selves". 498 
The questfon of fegaffty derfved from objective condftfons, narnefy the fnabilify of the party 
organization to cope with external pressures. Hence, it became an issue of contention among the 
different ideological currents of a party that had still not crystallized its political identity. Eventually, 
an 'underground' party organization was set up to co-exist with the 'legal' one. 499 The process, 
however, due to The inexperience of the party, was not without problems: there were reports of 
inefficiencies of the 'illegal' apparatus up until the early 1930s. Commenting on the impact of state 
persecution against the Greek Communist Party and the latter's ability to develop an underground 
mechanism, the CI official Kabaktsiev wrote: "Unfortunately the KKE did not have the experience 
of its sister parties and therefore, the present conditions of terrorism have resulted in the complete 
disintegration of the party activities. '" 
495 n ý, 5, t 
i ka&A tjý't ý tk 2, , ýt f 2:, TA it M %Ut st 54Z, tw* , svzo M&t %VftTVM&TA VA VMrkeis, 
&W=dkw af IJv Wy'5 rkruvA canoývjgnq, Ixem Lw pwy =Uirs esc, rar. shat Arse. luns were re4varA 
and the party's response did not gp further than the issue of a complaint. Later on those bans would not be 
as effective. See Rizos pastes 13/2/1919; 23/11/1919; 13/11/1921; 20/2/1922; 12/411922. It should be noted 
that such concerns were not exclusive to the Communist Party, but also to the wider organizational 
manifestations of the Greek Left: In the Proceedings of the Socialist Party of Yiannios it was mentioned, 
among others, that organizing pofiticaf raffies were not even 'an issue for de6ate", ifthey feff outside the 
Yirdfts of legality 6ef=6 by Yhe rejime. tProceedings Book oj fne Adminisiralive Committee, Meeiing oi 
3,17,1416, Ymmýjs Am-*ioe, Fik-1, ELLA) 
496 p 
497JU=VuWu 27J-5/J. 92-1. On 11r. Mcdogiral rhangets a-ad vWfi Plarly Isclics Vr, 11f, Vajaw 'FrCLM SorjaJ 
Democracy to Bolshevization, and 'Inner-party Struggles'. 
498 Report of 7homas Apostolides to all the members ojKKE, F3, CPA 499 The party insisted throughout the inter-war period on the co-existence of the 'legal' and 'illegal' 
apparatus: "We need to fight decisively the legalist tendencies concerning the adaptation of our work in the 
possibilities provided by the bourgeois law, as much as the Iefl' ones, that abandon without a fight aff 
posiftiffifies ol legal work and prodiim Yhe 6irect pass to Illeggifty" WNE tlSol5a) p37P 00 2XMek? ff, no 1, Fc&usq - 19,26. See elso A,, MW 'VqRW t3f44W CCjf L? m R JO Wzld A7 YP41/1, g 7, F3; 
Rejxwc on the Party status during the July &ssim, MI, ptt, 'Et-, Letter of the Potitbureau to the -Salonica 
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Legal 'front' organizations: Defence mechanisms against state persecution and ideological 
incorporation 
The Party developed legal organizations to defend itself against state repression. As one Party 
report states: "KKE, although an illegal organization, must form whenever possible, legal 
organizations in order to use them for propaganda and agitation among the masses. Co-operatives, 
art, sport and other organizations could be included in such. 'legal' organizations. "501 The KKE 
established a number of such organizations. One example was 'N orke& Relief. 
Workers' Relief (Ergatiki Voithia) was the Greek section of the Workers' International Relief 
(KO. P. R). It was established following the period of Pangalos' Dictatorship (1924-1925), and it 
aimed to provide "relief for the victims of proletarian struggle through the development of class 
solidarity and the exploitation of the humanitarian beliefs of the petit-bourgeois strata. "502 The Party 
stressed the importance of not presenfing*Workere Relief' as a communist organization, the effects 
of which "would be catastrophic", considering that "the period of relative legality is only 
temporary. " '503 The Greek section of Workers' Relief, like its International counterpart contributed a 
great deal in creating 'points of contacf' with the mijority of 'indifferent workers who live 
, M4 apathetically, who have never taken part in political events. 
International Workers " Relief was gradually marginaffied after f 929 as a consequence of the Mid 
Period. However, despite occasional reports of mishandling funds, 505 the Greek section of Worker's 
Relief engaged in sigifificant activity throughout the rest of the interwar period, providing material 
and moral support for the exiled, the imprisoned, fugitives escaping prosecution and their families, 
as -well as legal and medical support . 
506However, the organization did not manage to conceal its 
Ov'rmi. -I ca%mi", IwA/19o, g Fs; DA-iM! AV 01AW 
FIS, ak 
501 See Deltion, nol, Februarv 1926, KKE(1975a)p525, KKEfI975b. )pI9I 
"2 See Deltion, no2, February 1926, F2, Decision of the 3r4 
6ongre;, ý 
01 KKE on Red Relief, pp 1 -2, F3., CPA 
Decision of the 3"" Congress of KKE on Red Relief, pp4, F3, CPA 
Munzenberg W, quoted in Carr EH (1976a) p273 
Such affegations can 6e found in Letter of the Cavatfa organization to the District Committee Bureau, 
12A2)1Vn, TI% Report on the handling of the W. R. C, ISQ%, ppl, IJID, f-? A 506Repwt&WtefL-4VeAýareawc. ifWie CC of=,, 28411928,171, F8, Mt- Z&Y&-r(7jfr1feCeYaftdaYAiffi! sr 
Macedonia District to the Pofs(6ureau of the CC,, IrdC9ICjM, 1ý1, V k4, Qk V% fil-A Wm)d tx? tgk=t im 
Ibe. warkdf WR jrv-Pjrb%aJj&v A fEW)ppl-ý J7,60 
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party affiliations, partly due to the attitudes of members themselves who saw it as an extension of the 
party, and by the mid- 193 Os Workers' Relief was declared illegal by the courts. 507 
The 'Union of Old Soldlere was the Greek section of '-Internationale des Anciens Combattants et 
des Victernes de la Guerre, established in 1924. This consisted mainly of demobilized soldiers of 
the Asia Minor front. With slogans such as "war against war" and a radical agrarian reform program, 
the Union managed to make considerable progress, and soon they "were to be found everywhere" 
with a membership amounting "to at least 20,000. , 508 
Anotber front organization was the 'Red 'Federation of Spore. Red Sport involved a variety of 
sports, ranging from football, running, boxing , swimming, cycling, volley-ball to 
boat racing, 
witnessed considerable growth consisting by the mid-1930s of some 100 sport clubs and 10,000 
members nation-wide. 509 It maintained that "the bourgeois class shows us the way. It shouts at us: 
Sports for ciass struggie. "51 " Finaffy, other organizations inciuded 'Friends of Soviet Russia' , 
'Socfaf 
Solidarity', 'Pan-Hellenic Anti-Fascist Organization' and 'Union of Defense against Capitalist 
Attack'. All of these were national sections of an international network of front organizations 
supervised by the Communist International up to the beginning of the 1930S. 511 
Other organizations of the Greek Left and KKE's relationship with them 
These groups, were derived either from the contradictions forming throughout the political and 
ideological development of the Communist Party itself or pre-existed as parts of the small, but 
distinctive, socialist tradition. However small these groups were, their existence, their rise and 
decline was closely linked with the development of the Greek Communist Party. 
107 Stt p ,, Zporj to t; le p0jj(6UTeCUDf the CC of r-KE, 'IVVI0J'I%, 73, V%, C-M Greece: Communism, Report 
fivAr &raadAWYean J9-7, i, A F0 286/J J. 3 1, PRO 
508 See Letter of Mr Bentinck to the Maripess Curzon of Kedleston, FO 286/856, PROý Letter of Mr 
Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon qf Kedleston, 8/8/192ý, F0286/85ý, PRQ, - for the radical program of the 
Union see Union of Old Soldiers and Victims of War (1975) 
509 See Greece: Communism, Reportfor the Second Hay'Year, 1934, p6, FO 286/113 1, PRO; Tsintzilonis 
Ch (1989) pp175,195. Red Sport, since its establishment in 1927 would be receiving extensive coverage 
tbrough the columns of the party paper (Pizospastes, 27)3n927,374)1927) 
510 And the article continues: "Because ftseWfthe bourgeois c? ass] is using it for its own interests, to pud us 
WMI fivm VM +4,10 ivrm US 2S2&M+L VW týzas. 'I Pj2D3PM*3 4MI9171 Týft +dW61tI tk palfit'S UP *it WtM 
of spons poses much hwerest Accord.; ng)j, thane woW P-wh b&, &T mny1a, abaw AW 'amf2ir treatp.. Tat' 
of"the Wir%p6ts. referee, apimst die wQck4 claas athlet&' RizaspaWs 31411927 
5 11 See Greece: Communism. Reporfýfor the Second HqIf Year, 1934, p5-6, FO 286/113 1, PRQ, - Letter qf 
Mr Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 8/8/1923, F0286/8 58, PRO 
123 
Social democratic tendencies derived from the ideological belief or political observation that 
"domestic communism has no objective grounds for existence", that "due to the particularity of 
capitalist development in Greece, the obligations of the Communist Party were those of pre-war 
Social Democracy", or indeed that "the preaching of socialism according to the foreign models was 
too premature for the Greek worker", who ought to, first of all, "learn how to read and write, and 
acquire some lessons of morality. , 512 Greece was perceived as "socialisticalty backward" ýy a 
number of Greek Socialists who argued that The national advocates of the socialist ideology being 
"as uneducated and as divided ... were not yet 
in position to give direction to the working class". 5 13 
Accordingfy, recurring key-themes that can be found in a wide range of sociahst fiferature of the 
period include "socialist quality, not quantit 514 and "education first, action latee,. 515 
Although a number of those political or ideological tendencies developed to form political parties, 
some more successfully than others, they initially established themselves solely aiming to promote 
theoretical work and education. Characteristic is the case of the 'Marxist Archive' group that formed 
within the ranks of KKE in 1923, in order to familiarize Greece with the fundamental works of 
, 516 "Marxist Theory and Action. Similar views can be found in the 'Policýy Outline' of the Spartakos 
Journal5t'l 
Below is a schematic representation of the development of socialist organizations throughout the 
interwar period: 
"' Mrk d ft, -&vustzsým in. Democratia, IG9410.14, -, AMMMement of the opposition of KKE, W. %s 
rVraardi=ypuWjrjfjon of4wAakiLs pZ 3927, F4; OialzcpoWcuý eked by Kctrdalcýs GtJ97.2)p29 
513 In What do we mean by 'socialist direction, Yiannios Archives, File 1, ELIA 
514 In 9%at is the Socialist Party qf Greece, Yiannios Archives, Filel, ELIA 
515 "We primarily seek to educate socialists, not to produce voters" (in What is the Socialist Party of 
Greece Yiannios Archives, Filel, ELIA) 
See Yr; eion Marxismou, no f, f -5- f M; Afso see Letter ofMonstantine Baras (difflcuft to ready to the 
PoWbureau, T, 9; Winitlar examples would consf=e Yhe pdollicafion oT sever& Yneorefical magaiines, suen 
as I Lqx ZvV,,, 1 R? Epm-N etc. M&Aiam o*c orute h? Sptvtz1-v-x, & tiýeo- of dic groug's etwitz-al dimi6xrt to 
femm'L, p", qA "Vb& MtdzC v&N cQvmmmis& WC,. -W, wd vt, %. Wzý KKE. 
fý Or. NOWý%U. P, 1.9.9-1 P 13 6) 
517 Spartakos., 4/11/1927,94, F4. Similar views can be found also in Kommounismos 1/10/1920 (journal of 
the'Communist Union'. ) 
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Schema 2: the development ofsocialist organkatiwms in the 
Inter-Warperied 
KIKE Arxeion 
Archival-Manists (11511923) 
Triti Katastmi 
'Third Situatiod 
2 1(1917) Left Opp o sition of I 
KKE (4/11/1927) I Union of Communist I Internationalists (1929) 
Unite d Opp 0 sition 11 
of KKE (1923) KOMLEA 
11 
Fractior-d5ts , spartakos, Group (1931) 
(1929) 11 --+ 
Communist Left 
Conununist, Group (1932) 
Unit; Z Group 
10 
---- OPP- KAKE (1934) Manists-Leninists 
Organization (B olshevik) 
OKDE (1934) (1934) 
Xcos Drc)mos KDEE 
'NewWayl (1933) 
Communist 
Group 
EOKDE(1937) 
F. M lanation of Symbols/Abbreviations 
Split I Adherence to another group-party 
Group tittle change 
KOMLEA C onuuunist Group of M arxists-Leninist of Ore aca 
-Archival Marxists 
LAKKE Leni: nist Opp o sition of KKE 
KAKE Con=unist Achival-Marxist Party of Greece 
OKDE Organization of C ortmunist Internationalists of Greece 
KDEE P arty of C ommunist Internationalists of Ore aca 
EOKDE Unite d Organization of C ort=unist Internationalists 
of Greece 
In many cases the independent course of those groups was short, ending either with their 
dissolution, their fusion with other groups or, as was quite common, with their total or partial re- 
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entry into the ranks of the Communist Party. 5 18 Internal heterogeneity, which in most cases ended in 
conflict and even sphis, was by no means an excfusive "privifege-' of the Communist Party. Indeed, 
quite frequently, even break-away fractions from the KKE would soon find themselves with almost 
as many internal ideological and political tendencies "as the number of its founders". 5 19 The history 
of the pofiffcaf organizations that existed outside or dprived from the Communist Party can be 
perhaps characterized as a continuous process of split and unification, which often involved re- 
establishment and re-naming. Most of them end "small inward-looking groUPS". 520 The factors 
behind this devefopment were both domestic, i. e., the ongoing disputes among hegemonfc Y-igures 
and the numerous diverse tendencies that either pre-existed or emerged as soon as the groups 
embarked on their independent political course, 521 or indeed international, concerning mainly the 
ongoing struggfes within the ranks of the International Left Oppositfon. An artfcfe in Spartakos in 
October 1933 argues that: 
"If despite its criminal mistakes, Stalinism remains the dominant current of the proletarian 
movement, it is because of the leadership fraction with Trotsky in the core, of the 
monstrosity, which calls itself International Left Opposition. v1522 
KKE managed to be identified, even in the consciousness of its political opponents and dissidents, 
as the dominant, if not exclusive, domestic manifestation of the international socialist movement. 
111 vs ýT. *& M-Abt vht, g 1KMktv9 %v6?. VVA LMIM'e. crmtzt kIc-t14), ?. TF. tt. ý& 
024A Jiv. ratirely of $J. Cvm=nW Vhicw tJ, )e Yd Sýýjm t7dV KalakxjA a sea. Lcw of the Ccvmitm. 
Unitary Group (19311, the greatest part of Group for the Bolshevization of KKE (, 19301ý See Rizospastes 
14/12/1924,20/6/1927, Neos Rizospastes 14,1 ý, 16/9/193 1.; See also Letter qfKonstantine Paras fiýýifficult 
to read) to the Politbureau, F9, CPA. 
319 Nikolopoulos Th (1983) p8l. In this case, the author specifically refers to Workers' Socialist Union 
(ESE) that was established in 1924, by former members of SEKE (such as Georgiades, Sideris, Benaroya, 
etd) 
520 See Asteriou E& Lambafos A (09S) p9Q, A view also shared by Emmanoudides M (zW2) p44 The 
1, &+, lm -vwaýd trxp-&TA vn Aht ptvoim thntrn6m by Traing i'liv& `ffit Lt% ýir, Gytmt ... mwdttio find kotboJd ýa &e 1kar movement um&W Pokica))), t; Ko. PP44-5) 1,2 4he 
pracetedi%& Qf the maed% Qf tbe b&xaalianal Bureau, Qu- the 4cth. Inmmatianal (t93 71 it 4 mratianed that 
the 1934 crises of the Arxeion, which was the main political oqzanization besides KKIý, left it from a total 
of 1,600 members to just 75 with Busson (Vitsores) and 60 with Witte (Giotopoulos). Cited in Michail S, 
1982, p44. See also Appendices 12 and 13. 
5'zf On the role of hegemonic personalities and their role in maintaining or undermining group cohesion, 
there is aa qtflte indicative series of memoirs in Syfiggas Nikos Archive, Sub-File: Memoirs of the 
Mem6ers of'the Opposition, ELLA. See especiaffy the memoirs ofG Theodoratos (Mastroyiannis) and D 
SUE&B3. 
522 SeCS tzjvýr ým 
I no-? it 14,1107119.7.72 p2l; 
See &ha SpwAzLýT, fiv 17, M? ý mr, &-r 29-7 1, pp, '14-25 
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Even as late as 193 1, the 'Trotskyist' opposition would identify KKE with "the revolutionary party 
of the proletariat in its totality"., 523 and actively supported it in its electoral struggles. 524 The domestic 
hegemony of the KKE partly was further re-enforced by taVing advantage of the CI poYicy on the 
existence of only "one communist party in every country". 525 This CI policy provided international 
fegftfmfzatfon to fts Greek nationaf sectfon (KKE), and ft worked as a deterrent agafnst the 
independent development of a number of break-awýky groups. 526 
Aspects of Communist Party work in the trade unions 
The main medium of party policy within the trade unions were the 'fractions' (fraksia). Deltion 
indicates their purpose and character: 
"The fractions are party organizations within other organizations of workers, whether legal 
or illegal. The fraction, unlike the cell, is not based on the place of work but on the 
participation of a member in a given non-party organization. The fraction is composed of all 
party members belonging to the same non-party organization... 
The fraction channels party views into the organization. The fraction has its own 
organization, discusses issues, reaches decisions in connection with matters which interest 
the organization in which the fraction operates, but it always did so in accordance with party 
directives. vP527 
I, 10,11, 523 St7AtVP&t5 Wat W 1-5. X 
memivrs ckf Jhv- Pohilwyeau iha qW 4wing lbe. jn=r-p2rJy sbwggks of JR2.5-7. Ja lbr. Mier k was 
mentioned that the opposition "recognized repeatedly that the KKE is the sole proletarian party in the 
country, and condemned in practice the schism and break-up, that mky have resulted from some of their 
declarations. " (See Open Letter of S Maximos, K Sklavos, T Chainoglou '"y we resignedftom the 
Politbureau' to all the members of the party and the Executive of the Communist International, p7,1927, 
R, CPA. (See af so Declaraction of the United Opposition o. the AXE, in Spartakos, p 1,411 fA 9*ZT, F4, 
ICTIA; Widilar Niews were expressed by Yhe organlzafion 3 Wftuafion tTrifi Katasfasi) Whose members 
KKE (, WA&p=w, 20,6119,27) 
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526 Such as, for example, in the case of Papanastasiou's Communist Union. In the proceedings of the party 
published in Kommounistkon Vima, Papanastasiou stresses that "the Communist Union toeing the line of 
the International and to the interests of the struggle desires its unification with the Communist Party... " 
(Kommounistikon Vima, no38, January 1925) 
'7 'By non-party organizations we mean trade unions, co-operatives, conventions, councifs, 
adnfidistrafions, comrrfinees, meefings etc" Dehion, nol, Tlebruary 1926-, see also Pizospas-tes, 2VIWIM4 
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Throughout the inter-war period there was a significant divergence between the actual number of 
party members operating in the wo! kplace and their wider influence in terms of individual workers 
as well as unions as a whole, although the latter seems to be partly due to the apathy of most 
unionized members. It is interesting to note the ratio among organized/non-organized workers, as 
well as fraction members/'influences'. The follovAng statistics are for the trade unions in Athens that 
are considered "under Communist influence": 
Table 28: Communist Party influence in trade unions. 528 
Trade Union Non-Organized Organized Active Members Fraction Members 
Industrial Union of 
Builders 
1,500 1,200 550 70 
Leather 2,000 2,500 400 110 
Metal . 5,000 250 100 12 
Foods 10,000 3,000 1,500 80 
Railways - 1,500 1,500 40 
Press 1,000 500 400 25 
Bakery workers 1,500 550 250 20 
Table 29: Ratio of fraction members to sympathizers/supporters in Salonica (January 1927)529 
Trade Union Fraction Sympathizers Ratio Trade Fraction Sympathizers Ratio 
Members / Supporters (1)/(2) Union Members / Supporters (1)/(2) 
(1) (2) 1 (2) 
Tobacco 24 2,800 1/117 Railways A 9 300 1/33 
Technicians 16 Majority in - Railways B 30 500 1/17 I the Council I I 
Brewery none- I Under KKE - Press I -none- Complete 
Workers 
- 
influence party ntrol 
The situation among "reformist" and "revolutionary" trade unions appears to be "almost 
identical": in particular, "the number of unionized members is too small", "there are no strong ties 
among unions and workers", and "the unions do not bother with the day-to-day issues of workers 
528 See Reportfor the II Ordinary Session of the Athens District Organization, and Ordinary Local Sessions 
(I in March 1926-11 in November 1926, and an extraordinary in A ugust 1926), pp 13-4, F9, CPA; Similar 
picture is given by reports on other cities such as Salonica (Letter of the Salonica District Committee to the 
Central Trade Union Committee of the Party, 30/1/1927, F5, CPA), and Piraeus (see Action Report of the 
Piraeus District Committee, ftom 1318 to end ofNovember 192 7, F6, CPA); Rizospastes 9,10/4/1927 
529 See Letter of the Salonica District Committee to the Central Trade Union Committee of the Party, 
30/1/1927, F5, CPA 
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and fail to guide them effectively. ', 530 There were warnings against the substitution of communist- 
injauenced trade unions and their administrative organs by party organizations, resulting in a 'fack 
of democracy, non-regular accounting of administration, the replacement, without approval of the 
workers, of elected officials", etc . 
53 'Caution was also raised in Party circulars concerning the lack of 
attention that was given to organizing the unempfoyed or pofificaffy expfoiting their occasionaf 
spontaneous mobilizations. 532 
Apart from '-externar factors that obstructed communist work in trade unions, such as state and 
employer oppression, perhaps "the greatest factor", was, according to a Party report of 1927, "the 
subjective weaknesses of our own organization, its inability to arouse enthusiasm among the masses 
through its slogans... ". 533 By the early 1930s the party realized that it was more effective in the 
mobifization of workers under the banner of day-to-day demands, concerning wages and working 
conditions... than under political slogans. 534 
Slinfilar observations were made on the matter of "approaching workers', where it was stressed that 
"whenever we presented our selves to the workers intending to recruit them straight away in a party 
cell, the results were minimal", whereas, "on the other hand, when we talked to them about wages, 
bread, their living and other matters of their factory ... then we had favorable results... , 
535moSt 
notably, it was mentioned throughout party circufars that the party's fabor poficy was most 
frequentty dependent on the "spontaneous development of events"'. 536However, apart from the rather 
non-systemized character of Party work in the trade unions, up to the beonning of the Mos, there 
were plenty of examples where of communist contribution led to the foundation or re-establishment 
of Unions and Labor Centers in places where they had not previously existed, or had become 
530 Stt DeleiSiM laf the p1aijj3, A3, IZ , au 0 nq 'VI, 
FJ2, CPA; In anotbry inslawe it is nvnijawd $bat "We. czwld mentiao even mare eUmpjrs tp &h. -ow That the actions of many communist administrations of trade unions is no different to those that are non- 
communist. " (see Letter qf the Secretary qf the Military Prison cell, 22/6/1925, p20, Fl, CPA) 531 KKE (1975a) pp429-30 
332 See for example Reportfor the II Ordinary Session of the Athens District Organization, and Ordinary 
Local Sessions (I in March 1926-Il in November 1926, and an extraordinary in August 1926), p18, F9, 
CPA; Decision qj the Central West Macedonia District Committee Session on the condition and 
rusponsi6ihi*s oftheparry organ&aabn, f 6- 7141'1932, p6, Ff 7, CPA 533 4Stt Aetion p %I of the Pj70eU3 Di tyj IC ittee, WTOY 3e Umm fym JU8 lo emof lkwmbey 1927, PI, P6, U 
'k- 11 0-dwaq, &- See J. 1so Rý- =0- Of /k- 4, tk, 'W adW0q'Z=a1 
Seuiatu (I in Mwch L926-U in Yovember L926, andan ex&aardinary in Augusi L926), 191.5, F9, CPk It is 
also noted that maily members of the party even fail to reLgister at their own unions (KKE, 1975a, p39Z) 534 See Decision of the Politbureau on the Question of the General Political Strike, F14, CPA; KKE 
Q975a)p336 
tIq KRX (f 975a) pp4 f 2-3, tZ5 
Neo Ksekinima, 5 une 1921, p%, T, 4 
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inactive for one reason or another. 537 From 1932 onwards, however, party work in trade unions 
became more systemized, and the increasing party influence was seen in the growing tabor 
mobilizations that took place under its guidance or tLy its initiative. 538 
Theoretical work in the party 
The impact of the Russian Revolution on the Greek intellectual world was immense. A call to the 
"Suffering peoples of Russia" published on 2401 October, 192 1, signed ky 24 of the most prominent 
Greek writers, poets and artists, stressed: 
"We the Greek intellectuals are also spiritual children of Russia, of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, 
Gorky, Andreyief, and so many other great Russian teachers who helped us to see the light of 
artistic truth, the way of true civilization. , 539 
Although in their great majority they pursued their theoretical and artistic contribution to the 
'cause of socialism' outside the ranks of the communist party with perhaps a few exceptions, such as 
K Paroritis and D Glinos, they produced an extended series of theoretical works propagating or 
sympathetic to the socialist ideal. 540 
Within ten years after its establishment the Party was deprived, through resignation or expulsion of 
the vast majority of those intellectual members who were theoretically equipped to 'teach' Marxism 
or appty its method to the 'domestic condition'. 541 Once they were no longer in the Party their 
theoretical contributions were rejected, as the following example illustrates: 
537 kjýt eA SbM ke ýp TXM &% 'iZ13sposles w7JI9,11), DMV, Wzamm Zý 
NivAlim fJ?. &jq"js 2,1-1/1927A ljkv Cente'r af Cbrb Sý-JMaJ1Vrr3oF Chaim 
QUzospastes 23/5/1927) 
538 In 1933, more than half the workers mobilized, and more than 2/3 of strikes that took place were 
communist party-led, and the numbers grew progressively reaching their peak in 1936. See Yhe Condition 
of the Trade union area after the call of the CI, 1932, F16, CPA; Neos Rizospastes 30/11/1933,21/l/1934, 
Rizospastes f 6151'f! 736 
539 Pizospas-tes 2VIV1921. Punong tne gignatofies were KosfisPalamas, loanrfis Grypafis, Konslanfinos 
Thweolis; Pandis Hdrf4 Gdgmým Xempouibs, Aggeibs S&dimws, Ke" Vkmmlis, M&cs Kamawd-m 
540 SurI exampJes can be. Ruind in Ibe, publication a wicu. Ls Jourmj% qucb as, NOW -Pratqnarig Vmer4 Koinoniki Ereuna, Noumas, and others. Such efforts were also influenced by developments in European 
intellectual currents: so after Spring 1933, when Andre Zid embraced the socialist ideals it produced a "true 
intellectual storne'. (G Vournas, 1997, p45O) 
541 Such individuals would be, among others, for example, Kordatos, Sklavos, Maximos, Sideris etc. 
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"G Skleros' 'Marxism' is the most crude distortion of Marxism in favor of the interests of 
the bourgeoisie, but, the various opportunist individual and groups that KKE fights against, 
do not represent anything else but, in one form or another, the opportunistically distorted 
'Marxism' of Skleros, and play no other role, but that of the agent of the class enemy in the 
proletarian camp. , 542 
The 'intellectual vacuum' was to be filled with the graduates of the Communist University of 
Workers of the East (KUTV). From 193 1, all the members of the Politburo, apart from one, were 
former students of the KUTV. 543 The 'drainage' of the party's theoretical sources was further re- 
enforced by the process of 6ofshevization, whfch, through its emphasfs on a party composftion based 
on members of proletarian background, produced a subsequent 'suspicion' towards intellectuals. 544 
A final factor contributing to the suspicion of intellectuals was the influence of the international 
movement which entered a phase of 'popularization' and dogmatic interpretation of Marxist 
knowledge and method, especially during the Third Period in the early 1930s. 545 
Theoretical work in The party developed different manifestations. 11he establishment of a"Bureau 
of Propaganda and Statistics' stressed the importance of the existence of "systematic educational 
work" in the Party, which had to extend beyond the limits of "empiricism and narrow everyday 
improvisation. ', 546 The party press, included Rizospastes and Communist Review and a few other 
domestfcaffy produced pubffcatfons. But for the most part frnported and transfated works were the 
542 B 'uavrious indhAals &-. 0 groups, t&' U77C r *&ý 0&r 61 Ck, ýZ'2 Ug M, A"L A ft =&X I 01F MA " CC) &^, AMA , WA S i *VX &L 
Katd. ajas, P aataqQWa%, tb it Arxeia n, cial, WL Zm%q% G (19 11 &ý, 79 -, la ulad= utirk tie, reSim -L ta Y= dam%, 
perhaps the most important Marxist theorist of the time (and former Secretarv of the party) as -forger of the 
teachings of Lenitf', "apologist of the parasitic Greek bourgeoisie! ', "ideologist of agrarian-fascism7, 
"praiser of counter-revolutionary trotskyism", etc (in Zeugos G, 1933b , p24; see also Zaugos G, 1933c, 
pp7-1 1) 
'54" "Ibat 'is Yiantos. It Is difficult to Imow the exact number of Greek Communists that attenaea vafious 
educational establishments in the Soviet Union, but, for example, a publication by Istoriko Arxeio falks 
*VC41MMU& TA 15 T#MSVM in lVit -StW 1935-1916 kUt WO&V MUý0,1%3, T#P'116-4) 544 Chaad 
. 
4stk i the int , W.; On ofthe ,eS erl e C1 represewtj ve & viog the CC sess.; oa 1,2.4, svi) J -9-7 7, wbeo 
k ;, v 
suggpv. eA ta reqLace & =mhec Qf the Cammittee Qf bitellecold badqymnd, with. am Qf wQtkbig, CJZSS 
backi ground, so that "the relative balance amorkiz intellectual and workers fin the CCJ would be overturned. " 
See Proceedings of the CC, 4/4/1927, p2, F3, CPA, On the matter of excepting intellectuals (especially at 
higher post of the party hierarchy) it is mentioned that "Intellectuals are welcomed to the Communist Party. 
However, Agkit-Prop [Agitation-Propaganda Dept], ought to focus on the creation of executive members of 
worldrig class ofigin, because only 'in their case 'it 'is posiible to estabTish a close conneefion With the 
masses .. and secure the 
dominance ofa proletarian psychology in the Party. " Seeoeivb, no4,026 545 4ja_ limit tým: TW Kq TM ITIAt lyqc Tlpzffv tsSset 
W)Z"n 
ýF 
I ), /), /Jg, ) 
", VWW, _5 
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main sources of political education. 547 The Party press involved the wide-spread involvement of 
members in production of articies: in f 934 afone there were some fOWG fetter-articies pubfished in 
Rizospastes from party members. 548 Participation in contributing to the collection of articles was 
widely encouraged, as was the publication of smaller localized newspapers based in the workplaces 
where Party members were employed. 549Rizospastes was the first attempt to establish a daily 
nation-wide newspaper that reported systernaticaffy and through speciahzed theme cofumns on fabor 
550 issues. 
Agkit-Prop (Agitation-Propaganda) classes took the form of a series of theoretical courses across 
55 552 
party organizations. 1 However, they suffered from low attendance. ) and the suggested 
bibliography and sources derived mainly from works of Lenin, Stalin, 21no-viev, and resolutions of 
the CI. The complete absence of the 'Classics' of Marx and Engels was striking. 553 
The foffowing statement from the report of the Athens Party Committee (1926) compfetes the 
picture described above: "With the exception of a tiny minority of members which just manage to 
approach a medium level of Marxist education, the rest are still on the level of illiteracy. iý554 The 
inefficient fevef of theoreficaf work in the party that threatened to "keep it at a fevef of infant age, " 
was on several occasions addressed throughout the inter-war period, but admittedly there were no 
555 major breakthroughs. 
71fis reinforced a tendency towards dogmatism. In a series of articles Kordatos addressed What he 
called the "vulgar economism. and technocracy" in the party, condemning the subjection of the 
communist party to a centralized authority in Moscow that presents itself holding "Papal. 
547 LTp tZo 1(3,11 M dMtV4, t&, nvAks tk Ltvln, vpwk 1ý; Vm *&, "Mtt kreaks WA 
sme ewjas frm various wa&s puNisbed in beArreav &w. Mv. TimW 19234 3UrIr 2IWEDqej5 warks 
that were translated (in whole or in part) were: 'The Communist Manifesto', 'Civil War in France', 'The 
18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 'Critigue of the Gotha Program'., 'Poverty of Philosopky., 'Anti- 
During', 'The Origins of the Family, Property and the State, 'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific', 'Theses 
on Feurbach'. After the establishment of the Marxist Library, publications intensified. 
See Zormpa(as S (f 967) pp'73-4 
549 See Kamafinou A (2W2) p9l Such newspapers linduded "The TefilazerWorkee t25W1%Tj), "Me Red 
Engikww' (6,7,11930) etc. a? t he cinvilatba ofX; m*t=t-x sw Appmlik 7 
"0 (V% the &mIwpv. -, -zvA d lthzx px---A w- SmjwIs K TYA 
551 31cse wer4 in many occa! dms, faiWW by university Audents members of The Communist Youth who 
were occasionally dispached to party cells, for precisely that purpose (ýee Partsalidou A, 1983, P2 1) 552 See for exampleAction Report of the Piraeus Local Committee (Janua7y toApril 1927), p2, F6, CPA 553 See Agkit-Prop program of the Piraeus District Committee, F6, CPA; Course program for the Mxxist 
Leninist School ofA thens Piraeus, 193 2, F 17, CPA 
See Report on the Condition of the Athens ()rganizaffon and the Actions of the Committee on the 
measures on the belterment ojparty work, V2, V-11A 
555 SeeDes%w, aa4,411,11906, La&rcythL-SaTeAvýp'(Yi'hL-. itksi-A"-Pi-fmff CeiV,, 2121 (5111925, p414, FI, CPA 
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infallibility", degrading Marxist theory and method into "religious dogma7 . 
556 Dogmatism, which 
existed throughout the Party hierarchy right down to the grass-root fevef, -57 was condemned 6y the 
Party itself bLy the mid-1930S 558 and there were a series of theoretical attempts to de-dogmatize 
Mandsm, especially regardinglits vulgar application to the 'Greek conditions. 519 
There were, however, few attempts to produce any substantial theoretical analysis and 
understanding of the Greek conditions, and hence, to suggest 'domestic' solutions to key-issues of 
action and propaganda. Party understanding of the domestic conditions was founded, the most of the 
inter-war period, on the relevant analyses of the CI of "countries with medium level of capitalist 
development. " The first attempt at a "scientific anatomy of the country's economic structure" did 
not take place until 1934 . 
560 This inevitably hampered the Party's ability to attract a mass base. qy 
the time it managed to do so, the popular front dynamic fhat bad begun to develop was suppressed 
by the Metaxas' regime of 193 6-194 1. 
Conclusion 
This chapter we has discussed a number of qualitative characteristics of the Greek Communist 
Party. Firstly, we have seen that despite the fact that the Communist Party aspired to be the political 
expression of the organized working class, in terms of the social composition of its membership it 
was a Party with a mainly peasant base. This feature remained dominant throughout the interwar 
period and posed a constant problem for the Party leadership. Its preoccupation with increasing its 
working class membership meant that potential members from the countryside were inevitably 
excluded from its ranks. Of course Party membership should not be confused with Party influence. 
As we have seen, in many factories the ratio of Party members to Party 'influenced' could be as high 
as I to 100 or more. One the of the most striking examples of this was in the working class city of 
556 &0 Wkk. S b], Kord42toS cFaWS ýhf dOC4,1724- NS 2. Vd C. UWAVOWS Of 31XX; SM7, PP)79L287P 'Ler, 12-2 RM 
Lavin1se, 71ýM-9, wd'Ba&taMa&, Ux Mea Epitheadd, 1933-19,14 inue. Ga. similar 
Neo Ksekinimq, p IS, June 1927, F4, CPA 
557 Partsalidou wrote in her memoirs: "Many of us were dogmatic due to lack of knowledge and experience, 
and we stuck in models ... It would take several years for us to overcome such vulgarities, which did so 
eventually with the massification of the party. " (See Partsalidou A, 1983, pp29 & 56) ss'L See Za6hafiaaes (1945) pp52-5. Although there are doubts as to wbat extent the 'conaemnafiojP ot the 
mistake of dogmatism of previous feaderships by the new one is not but a 'toot of poNfical confrontation 
126ý *QM WYAýýW, UfiY12t1& fV1 stuy-mg Wam -T=Vy 1&- LsTrafts. ý%ttVsrAtqxk*m 
14,19%,, 
p0ol) "9 Sev Roussos PtJ9 4-7) pp&-73 560 ZarjWiZ&% N(1945101 
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Kavala, where in 1934 the KKE, numbering just over 100 members, received 3,781 votes and 
elected a Mayor. 
State oppression was important in understanding the politics and attitude of the party towards 
certain types of work, such as elections and other legal activities. The Communist Party bordered on 
illegality throughout the interwar period despite its actual legal status. Accordingly, even when the 
Party was not officially banned, the extent of state persecution against its members and their 
activities did not vary significantly. However, the crucial element in examining the State's response 
to the 'communist danger' consisted in the various structures and defence mechanisms that the Party 
developed against state persecution and ideological incorporation. 
Finally, the examination of internal party struggles and inner party democracy, as well as, of the 
divergent tendencies that developed inside and outside the Communist Party is crucial in 
understanding the power relationship between the Party's membership and its leadership. This 
relationship was never one-way or straightforward, and it varied considerably over time. In addition, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, the language and categorizations that emerged during party 
disputes are also important in order to analyze and break down long standing pre-conceptions in 
Communist Party history. Accordingly, we have seen that the Party crisis of 1925-1927 that was 
recorded in Communist Party historiography as the first clash between 'Stalinists' and 'Trotskyists', 
a Greek version of the developments in the CPSU, was in reality nothing like that. 
The crisis began on matters of Party tactics that had to do solely with the Greek experience 
following the impact of the Pangalos' dictatorship. It was only later that Pouliopoulos, the leader of 
the Greek opposition, aligned himself with Trotsky. In other words, this so-called clash between 
'Stalinists' and 'Trotskyists' never actually took place because the particular categorizations did not 
apply at the time. On the contrary, it was a historical coincidence that was later adopted by both 
parties for their own reasons. The 'Stalinists' adopted it because it proved handy to use against any 
future opposition within the Party, which they just dismissed by labelling it 'Trotskyist'. The 
'Trotskyists', on the other hand, adopted it because it provided them with international lcgitimization 
of their existence as a political force. It is crucial to determine the nature of the relationship between 
the two groups in order to understand why in some cases, despite the split, the two parties did at 
times cooperate locally. 
To conclude, this chapter has highlighted the importance of qualitative characteristics, such as 
social composition, membership attitudes and schisms, in understanding Communist Party politics. 
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The implications of this for examining Communist Party politics in different localities will be 
discussed in the following case studies. 
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Chapter 6: Working class communism in interwar Greece - The case of the refugees in 
Kokkinia, Piraeus. Part I 
Introduction 
Chapters six and seven discuss Communist Party activities in Kokkinia, which was an 
administrative part of the district of Piraeus for most of the inter-war period. Chapter six discusses 
the economic, social and political background in which the Communist Party operated in Kokkinia. 
It examines various aspects of refugee settlement and conditions of living, and investigates how the 
process of settlement itself was utilized as a means of political incorporation. The chapter then 
examines the channels of political participation and power, the electoral process, and the effects of 
incorporating the refugee populations into the existing national dichotomy between the Venizelists 
and the Populists. Finally, it touches upon the relations among refugees and the authorities, state 
officials and the RSC, which played a crucial role in forging community identity. It concludes by 
looking in detail at community politics and ideology. 
Several writers have put forward hypotheses about the impact of refugee status in Greece on 
political consciousness. Mavrogordatos, for one, argues that "the refugee workers themselves 
rapidly became the most radical part of labor. Regardless of their background, petty bourgeois 
illusions and ambitions were soon largely destroyed -lacking the support of small property, family 
ties, clientism, and unbroken traditions provided in the case of native workers. "561 Other writers 
such as Mazower (f99f) point to urban refugee fiving conditions and poffficaf negfect in order to 
explain refugee radicalism. On the other hand, Clogg argues that refugees "were largely lacking the 
mutual trust and hierarchical authority necessary for cooperation and collective action. "562 This 
chapter wiff criticaffy assess the vafidity ofthose cfaims as appffed to Kokkinia. 
The settlement of Nea (New) Kokkinia was established in 1923, mainly by refugees from Asia 
Minor who fled following the collapse of the front and the retreat of the Greek army. It constituted 
an administrative part of the Municipality of Piraeus until 1934 when it became a separate 
municipality. In 1929 the newspaper Acropolis referred to Kokkinia as a "great working class city" 
'"Mamogm1m, las G ý29099) p)43 
'562 (J%aqý Týj Is r-lj, a%z K IR 
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,, 563 which "constitutes the main engine that drives the commercial and industrial life of Piraeus. By 
1936 ft was reported to be the fifth fargest cify fn Greece. 
Settlement and conditions of living 
On the 13a' of August 1922, a counter attack by the Turkish forces under Kemal brought about the 
coffapse ofthe Asia Minor front. rust two weeks fater the Turkish army entered the regionaf capitaf 
Smyrna. The weeks and months that followed saw an unprecedented effort to evacuate the 
populations of the area and the remnants of the Greek army. To illustrate the magnitude of the 
refugee influx, a former president of the Refugee Settlement Commission noted that a US equivalent 
would amount to some 26 million persons or one quarter of the country's population. 564 
According to a report on the refugee situation in fate 1923, the number of seff-supported and pardy 
self-supported refugees was estimated at some 280,000 and 250,000 respectively (for issues of 
employment and geography of industry see the following chapter). The number of entirely 
dependent refugees amounted to some 620,000; this estimate was expected to rise as the winter set 
in to some 934,000. Furthermore, the percentage of refugees estimated to have been 'definitely 
absorbed in the normal economic life of the country" was 25%, alongside which another 25% were 
said to be self-supporting "through partial employment, help of more fortunate friends and relatives 
etc. " The remaining 50%, a figure that was expected to rise, was characterized as "completely 
destitute. , 565 As late as 1935,13 years after the arrival of refugees on Greek soil, there were still an 
estimated 35,000 (out ofa totaf ofsome 330,000) farnifies that had not fiffy settfed-"ý6 
The financial assistance that was provided in the early years of settlement was rarely enough to 
contribute towards a return to work in a profession that resembled the one abandoned back home. 
Most of that money was spent on subsistence. Most refugees had to find additional income doing all 
563 Acropc&s IVIA919. IF% w&&Mm? & k&mwým Va IONt t: tý %tt Vstýt*zist tk 12k2aus ý1960sý -PI% WA 
Par&irjJj: Y 2SI61J. 936 
564 Morgenthau H (1929) p2 
565 'Statement regarding the refiigee situation in Greece: Prepared for the Committee on Mercy and Relief 
of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America'. Send by BP Salmon, Special Commissioner of 
the Greek Minister of Public Assistance, 3/12/1923. (Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/13 1) v4 Yyrkos M K, 1959, "Ibe refugee problem aslit appears toaay, Athens, pamplilef) p4, See also Central 
Refugee Supervisory (Kewpuai Ehoxreý2 ffpoay*wvj 1957, 'The refugee problem at its present phase' 
ýXlbtw), P%,, ýn M6&lt 151 MK K)nkvs, ASYNX 
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sort of petty jobs, whereas other lived through petty-commerce. 567 Some 73% of a survey sample 
taken by the Generaf Staffstfcaf Service of Greece in f 930 had an income that was fower than that 
required to achieve the minimum of subsistence. 568 According to the newspaper Acropolis, the 
sudden loss of property and professional status created a menWity of fataYism among the refugee 
ý 569 population that could be summarized in the phrase "there is only today, no tomorrow. 
One of the major fssues fnvofved in the settiement of refugees was housfng. According to a memo 
of the RSC to Venizelos, many apartments were built with only one room, in many occasions 
lacking a kitchen, or even a toilet. Communal toilets, sewages and washing places were often 
570 located at a common backyard that connected a number of such one-roomed apartments. POADA 
would characterize RSC contractors as "business wolver that took advantage of refugee desperation 
for security and "built the known houses, without any roofs, without floors, without varnish, and a 
thousand other deficiencies... 'M1 Even as soon as 1929, there were reports of maqy newly-built or 
lidif-bui. 11 houses that were at the point of collapse. 571 
Refugee families would occupy houses yet to be finished "in order to secure some form of 
permanent housing, fearing that thqy might be left behind and homeless. , 573 At the same time, a 
number of refugees became squatters and individually built small fin houses that would resemble the 
favelas (tin houses) in Brazil. 
According to a survey carried forward in 1940 by the National Insurance Foundation (IKA) some 
71% of the houses in Palaia (Old) Kokkinia consisted of just one room, housing up to 5 
individuals. 574 One refugee, Argyropoulos, describes the houses of the settlement in his memoirs: 
"Each of them (he refers to them as a series of shacksl was 60 meters in fength, and 6 meters wide; 
the whole shack was divided into 40 rooms, measuring 30 ... Whatever you spoke, no matter how 
567 LtLt7htff, CWSftVt 4VX -&T&4t 
ý 15t, 
/ I& , W, ý% I st WAUN 
KckUjajj Ccmmnist Party Rr=4 UrNw. of KKE 
569 Cited in Maurogenes PagagVlogoulou Q 99919133 
569 Acropolis 14/3/1929 
570 And that situation occurred "despite the good will and experience of the RSC planners. " See Memo of 
the RSC to Venizelos 30/6/1930 (Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/133) ,; 7 
'j FUWD. 4 81111926. FOADA: Aff Refugee Defense Organization for Beneficiaries of'the Excftanged 
? roperfies) IýYIqmpoa7vrudj ý5pyfrvwoq )4rbvq; hucuwi)Xwv Avrcbýgaw) 
2 Araceeding-s of the E=vtiov Dowd of nbw PLhIkks. 1 Asis Aflwr Ceiwa- IMA119,29 (AnaWte al' tbe 
2 Ql&&d &! at ww'; CkAex, Euký 
573 lwmvjcw, Casseft 'vexhal IraditiLwa, fife rqpnrL-; efc, before J. 9-14, Audio Arcfiive of JIFAEA 
Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 574 Cited in Vasiliou 1 (1944) p150 That is considerably higher that the average 57% that involves Athens 
and Piraeus. 
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quietly you spoke, you'd be heard by [at least] three of your neighbors. And you would be able to 
hear them too.. ), 575 
Table 30: Overall table of the refugee settlements in Piraeus (14110/1928)576 
Settlement Houses (1) Houses (2) Rooms Families Persons Value (Drs) 
Ionia 714 2,785 5,495 3,539 14,126 58,526,288 
Kaisariani 283 1,419 2,777 2,993 10,780 26,098,982 
Vironas 228 1,341 2,883 2,094 7,710 34,900,042 
N Kokkinia 925 4,728 9,134 6,390 33,332 82,279,302 
Total 2,150 10,253 20,289 15,016 65,948 201,804,614 
On occasion of yet another flood, Acropolis would write in December 1933: "Within those pitiful 
and disgraceful hovels hundreds of thousands of refugee families still live, although with the money 
spent, they could have been able to have all acquired, not of course palaces, with elevators and 
central heating, but surely humane houses, which would not be under constant danger of collapsing 
over the heads of their poor tenants at the first blow of the wind or the first rain. " The end-result of 
the flood was that 250 houses were deemed un-habitable or abandoned in P Kokkinia, and another 
24 in N Kokkinia. In total some 36 houses collapsed in P and N Kokkinia, whereas some 2,000 
homeless people left homeleSS. 577 
Despite the existence of specific construction regulations for the housing of refugees provided by 
the RSC, these were rarely observed in practice, leading to a somewhat 'chaotic' establishment and 
the growth of refugee urban settlements. It is suggested by Vlachou that these 'irregularities' 
concerning the settlement planning and contraction were not merely the product of incompetence of 
the various architects and contractors who carried out the job, but of political intent of corruption as 
a result. 578 
575 Argiropoulos S (1980) p 12 
576 Numbers I and 2 refer to different types of housing. Report of the Nfinistry of lEegyne, Welfare and 
Precaution (Engineer Athanasiades) 14/10/1928, (Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/132). See Appendices 
14 and 15 for more data on housing. 
577 Acropolis 4/12/1933. 
578 See Vlachou G et at (1978) pp 117-120. We shall elaborate further on political intent behind settlement 
fluther on in the course of this chapter. 
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An additional issue that had to do with housing was, of course, rent. The RSC was by no means a 
charitable organization: its funds, allocated for the housing of refugees, were to be returned (at least 
in part) in the form of rent. That meant that the majority of refugees found themselves indebted right 
from the very beginning; the threat of eviction remained for many years to come. Inability to keep 
up with their tax payment responsibilities resulted in the imprisonment of even petty-professional 
refugees. 579 A refugee from Kokkinia recalls: "You used to read on the shops: Closed due to 
bankruptcy. The newspapers published every day, court decisions of bankruptcies of commercemen 
and small commercemen, and next to these [the announcement] of several suicides. The picture was 
completed by the confiscations carried forward by the various mayors and others that occupied a 
responsible post on the state apparatus. "580 
The death rates among the refugee popufation were staggering: The ratio of deaths to births in the 
period between 1923-1925 was 3 to 1; an average of 6,000 per month were estimated to have died 
just in the first 9 months following their arrival on Greek soil. In certain cases, the death rate reached 
some 20% in a matter oýjust a. year. 581 Acropolis reported in 1933 that "the unfortunate refugees that 
are in need of medical care compete with each other for a bed", since the existing 31D hospital beds in 
Kokkinia are not sufficient for Piraeus' largest settlement, with chronic problems of hygiene. 582 
The settiements facked even the basic infrastructure: '"The biggest pro6fem of water suppfy is 
faced by the especially important and large settlement of Kokkinia. Built on the north of Piraeus, 
this settlement is located in an area that is particularly dry... " Water was pumped "only a few hours 
per day", whereas it is mentioned that "new wells that have been opened by the Ulen Company at 
the area of Renti, east of Kokkinia, create some hope for the increase of water Supply.,, 583 
Ffnancfaf and socfaf hardship was further reinforced by the inabifity of the state to provide the 
refugees with the much needed compensation that they were promised from the very beginning of 
their settlement. A complaint put forward by 'Greek citizens from Turkey' dated 31/1/1935 
mentioned the ongoing changes towards the resolution of the issue concerning compensation: 
"Facing this new situation, the interested parties mentioned that it is a sign of state heartlessness 
towards them, the continuing alternation of laws aiming to the resolution of not such a complicated 
matter and their subjection to numerous procedures. " The new situation that is mentioned above, 
579AI&, 
IM ; 9*5w tr, 7.1713,12933 580 Ax%TaWih% S (19&0ý 1; t9 
581 See introduction of Greek RefiWee Settlement Commission (1926) 
582 Acropolis 7/12/1933,12/6/1931 
5113 League of Nations (1926) p138 
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refers to the eventual reduction of compensation to just 20%, which in the end was accepted in view 
of the "economic despair" of most refugeeS. 584 
Settlement was to prove an ongoing and gradual process, which in the case of many refugees 
would last as long as a decade after their initial arrival in Greece. As noted by H Morgenthau, the 
Chairman of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission: "During these three years at least, the 
urban refugees, urged by some strange instinct, were continually on the move. There are few urban 
families which have not flitted again and again from one large town to another in order to see with 
their eyes the possibilities offered by each locality visited. "585 
Ms "strange instinct" becomes cfearer through the testimonies of refugees thernseives. A refugee 
named Nikolaides mentioned: "Those of us who settled in the country-side acquired pieces of land 
with our compensations and live relatively good life. The others that stayed in the cities live on the 
daity wage, even the petty-professionals. Z86 However there were cases of refugees who were sent 
for rural settlement in Macedonia, and came back to KoWinia 'penniless and threatened to the of 
hunger", with the thought that at least the urban centers could at least provide them with some sort 
of wage. 587 Furthermore, as maRy places were not suitable for settlement, lacking the plkysical or 
economic resources to sustain a population, refugees were quite often forced to disperse from Ibeir 
original location trying their luck in other parts of the country; many would perish in the process. 588 
Another estimated 50, WO refugees emigrated from Greece to other countries in search of 
589 emplqyment. 
But that was not the only reason behind constant refugee moVility: 'In the course of Their ffigbt, 
the members of a family became scattered and lost one another, and in many cases survivors did not 
succeed in rejoining each other until after a year or two. For two years the newspapers devoted many 
columns to insertions by those who were looking for relatives scattered around Greece, or who had 
disappeared in the confusion. Even to-day cases occur of a mother discovering her child or a father 
his family. , 590 
2&a, g 584 Ms, MIV ws If IFYJ 4, ELLA 
585 Quoted in Mor%enthau H (1929112258 
586 Microfilin SE35: Todq's Settlement of Piraeus and Suburbs, Archive of the Center for Asia Minor 
Studies 
587 Acropolis 6/2/1929. 
f" See Testimonies of Magdaline Kamakidou and Minas Anthemides, in Microfilm SE35: Today's 
Settlement oWiraeus and Subuibs, ArcIfive of the Center for Mia Minor Stuffies 
-5R9 Cited in Hirschon RB (f 976) p4 
5 90 vil tA -stmNemerit v-v=r&, ý-, vn k1c" 116) P3 
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Kokkinia was not an exception to this rule. As another refugee mentioned, "not everyone came 
straight from Asia Minor to Kokkinia, because they kept moving to various parts of Greece ... and 
that was determined by various reasons and especially by the occupation they once had had.. Some 
left [Kokkinial because they were farmers and moved to rural centers or villages ... and vice 
versa. , 59 1 The degree of mobility can be seen in the table below showing the population increase in 
Kokkinia throughout the interwar period: 
Table 3 1: Population increase in N Kokkinia592 
Year Population Change in % Year Population Change in % 
Pre-1922 - 1934 40,086 20.73% 
1926 29,285 - 1940 59,552 48.56% 
1928 33,201 13.37 Change 1926-1940 103.35% 
Social and economic hardship among the refugees was widely held to be a basis for potential 
political radicalism. Indeed, echoing a typical view that was widely held in literature a journalist 
would note: "What kind of social stability would you expect when popular strata, economically 
exhausted from high rents, dying or undermined from a multitude of diseases in miserable shacks, 
became very easy victims of the attractive revolutionary teaching? v)593 However, the RSC officials 
were aware of that 'social threat', and the Chairman of the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission 
Ch P Howland made it clear in the 1926 Commission's Report that the motivation behind the 
settlement of refugees was political as much as it was humanitarian, if indeed not more so. He 
mentioned in particular that "... children dying of want, and men become anarchists. There were not 
lacking those who fish in such waters, and who use for that purpose the poacher's apparatus of 
-dynamite. Relief of despair on such a scale is as much a political necessily as a human 
respgnsibilily.,, 594 So was settlement a means of refugee incorporation into the status quo? 
591 Interview, Cassette 'Experiences/ Memories', in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as 
Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
592 Data based information found in League of Nations (1926) & Kayser B and Thompson K (1964) 
593 From a conversation with a journalist, cited in Leontidou EL (1981) p155 
594 Greek Refugee Settlement Commission (1926) p. xvi. My emphasis. 
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Settlement as a means of incorporation 
Reftigees were not to be 'incorporated' into the existing urban centers. On the contrary, RSC 
settlement planners decided to locate them in separate 'satellite' communities so that "they would 
not interfere with the 'normal' life of existing cities".. and in order to "ensure a more homogeneous 
social environment within the urban refugee settlements. , 595 They were accordingly built at a 
minimum distance, varying from one to four Wometers; from the f 922 city boundaries. -"'* Hence, the 
suggestion made by Leontidou that "exclusion and segregation of refugees was planned' appears to 
be not far from the truth. 597 The actual distance in addition to the distinctiveness of refugee housing 
that was quite uniform ("resembifng a mifitary camp--' as the League of Nations put ft"), and the 
limited means of communication and transport with the existing communities of native Greeks, 
turned the refugee settlements into actual ghettos, where social life was effectively isolated. A ghetto 
mentality was further reinforced by their cultural and linguistic differentiation, which was further 
enforced by cultural stereotypes attributed to them by native Greeks. As Hirschon notes, "the urban 
quarters soon developed a distinct character based on both physical and social distance. This in turn 
gave rise to various ideas regarding differences between the two groups and soon the social 
boundaries between the two sections of the population were marked and differentiated by a 
multitude of notions regarding their cultural attributes. "599 It is essential to note that one of the areas 
of activity where refuges and natives did interact to a certain extent was that of empfoyment (as we 
will touch upon in more detail further on in this chapter). 
In addition, it is often suggested that the allocation of refugee settlements was politically exploited 
as a means of gerrymandering. In particular, Pentzopoulos mentions that "instead of trying to 
influence the political returns of an area by changing the geographical borders of the electoral 
districts, the same result was obtained by altering the population density of the region and by 
increasing the liberal element in politically crucial counties. '" Similar political intent was implied 
for the administrative decentrafizatfort that took pface in f 934 and meant the creation of 4 separate 
595 h? Leaw;, Jou EL ý2932)p)27 
596 IAQ*jýWM F 
_L 
(19&11 IP129 
597 Leontidou EL (198 1) p 128 
598 League of Nations (j926) p137 
599 Hirschon. RB (1976) p34 
6w Pentzopoulos D (1962) p 182 
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municipalities that previously were part of Piraeus, one of which was Kokkinia (we shall elaborate 
further on this issue later on in this chapter). 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that refugee settlement was not carried forward without 
consideration of limiting social threats, and more specifically communism. In particular, N 
Astroulakis, a refugee member of the city council of Piraeus from Kokkinia, mentioned in an article 
in a local paper that the whole exchange and settlement of refugee populations was conducted in 
view of international developments (i. e. social unrest and revolutionary movements in Europe). 
Specifically, he stated that developments concerning the refugee issue unfolded the way they did 
because "those with power were scared that those two and a half million refugee hungry stomachs, 
which according to Napoleon are the ones that fight the wars, were capable in bringing about the 
overthrow of the contemporary social regime. "601 
In the f 930 Buffetin of the Nationaf Bank of Greece, the rofe of the RSC in the battfe agafnst the 
'internal enemy', i. e. communism, was praised: "If the patriotism of the ruling classes and the good 
sense of the refugees continue to hold in check those doctrines which claim that happiness and the 
progress of a nation can only be acquired by submitting to the rule of a group of fanatics, enemies of 
the enlightenment, persecutors of all liberties and all initiative; and if, in several dozen years ... a 
strong race of peasants, born out of the mixing of all elements of Hellenism secures ... the prosperity 
of Greece, that result will have been due to the impulse given by the RSC. 1, -, 602 
Finaffy, there is ffttfe doubt that RSC pfannfng of settfements was conducted fn a more or fess 
direct link to existing or emerging industrial areas around urban centers. 603 The rationale behind this 
policy was twofold: on The one hand The refugees were in need of a well organized and prosperous 
industry", and on the other "the factory owners had an interest in the settlement and guaranteed 
accommodation of workers". However, the relation between these two factors was not always 
harmonious: the factory owners would on the one hand employ as much as double the workforce 
located around their factory, but on the other, as industry grew, it would often do so at the expense 
of existing or further settlements. 604 For example, in 1935, an W for Piraeus would submit a 
60'Awgemisis ISAM1911 
602 
jjIWj=j 
R2jIk,, af r 
_Oerre jWgejjj4 iSSW j pill j)eCeA -- P rwrJc)IjD. JM 603 As Leontidou mentions: "The RSC policy thus created a close connection between industry and refug_ee 
communities, and consequeritty a strong emplqytnent linkage among the industrial population of Greater 
Athens. " In Leontidou EL (1981) p137 
604 Copy of the Report of the Commission [RSC] that looked into the expressed complaints of Panaras's 
Company against the expropriation of fields for refugee settlement. Send by the Nfinister of National 
'Economy to flieTIfimeMnister'sPoYffical Office MIMM (Arckiive oTEVeriizelos, File 173767) 
144 
question in Parliament regarding the 'unreasonable' demolition of reftigee houses following the 
request of a factory owner. That was not a unique episode according to the NIP. 605 
Channels of political participation and power 
Soon after the arrival of refugees, a new 'class' emerged within their ranks known by the popular 
name of tzormpatzides or prosfugopateres (=refugee fathers). They were quickly incorporated into 
the status quo through their assignment in managerial positions in the RSC or in Banks and 
Ministries! 606. Marky of them acquired loans from the National Bank for setting up enterprises, and 
thus formed an `elite among the refugee population 607 Their social and poUtical status in refugee 
communities was further reinforced through the emergence of hundreds of refugee associatione8, 
which facifitated "their personaf advancement" by "achieving disgracefuf exchanges" among them 
and their prot6g6s. The Communist Party would dismiss the role of those refugee associations, 
branding their presidents as "organs of the big tzormpatzides", who "have become negotiators of 
refugee issues and exploiters ofpoor refugees whom thqy suck dry in various W; 2ýYS:, ý609 
InI929 an auction of permanent housing in the refugee settlements was announced, the 
responsibility to "determine the number of houses that would be built in each settlement' 'was given 
to individual refugee Ws, who would produce a report after touring the settlementsý10. The decision 
therefore of who got Wbat in the newly built settlements did not fall to an independent committee 
who would make a decision based on clearly defined criteria, but to refugee patrons following 
individual tours of the settlements. Calls by non-communist refugee groups for "the organization of 
the refugee world to be realized ... not for creating victims of clientism and looking for hatred and 
new schisms, as everyone has been doing up to now" fell on deaf ears. 611 
A typical example of such an association in KoIddrila was the "Polifical Asia Minor Center. An 
article in Rizospastes in 1929 notes that since the association was founded in 1922 neither an 
605 P'ý"rw 
606 See League of Nations (1926) 
607 There are also often quoted alleptions of acquiring, through various means largpr and numerous 
compensations., or manipulatin_g the System of City Associations 11-6aT%M Amicdw XVveTcLýOt%Ld)vj in 
order to acquire the best pieces of land to house themselves, etc. (See Miospastes 25/4/1929) 
'8 This was also facilitated by the existing legislation that allowed the formation of associations as long as 
they had more than 7 mernbersl (See Patris 25/2/1929) 
4'4 RYzospastes 251471929 
610'*rOPO&S 8/'5/'1! 9zz9 
611mikywinliki vmlam 
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assembly had been called, nor did an executive council exist. There were almost no members in 
order to justify the association's typical or legal status, nor was its statute known to the people. So 
how did the association come about? "In the beginning some assistance has been provided to the 
newly arrived refugees, cloths, food and various sums of money that were distributed personally by 
the president [of the association mentioned above] at his own discretion, without having to answer to 
ailyone, because the refugees knew nothing then about unions... -)9612 Elections were eventualty held 
in nfid-1929, in a meeting called by the 'presidenf Ifimself, who was elected by 2199 votes out of 537 
613 cast. His election was not free of allegations of buying votes in exchange for various favors. There 
were afso affegatfons that he "threatened to evfct from theff houses aff those that befonged to other 
unions apart of his own. , 614 
Various initiatives for the emergence of local refugee associations, were often met with bostility 
by established ones. So for example, when the residents of P Kokkinia decided to proceed in 
elections for a local branch of the Political Asia Nfinor Center of P Kokkinia, the executive council 
of the Center rendered it in advance invalid and illegal and proceeded with expulsions. 613 
To what extent were such refugee assocfations representaffve of refugees? A fetter to R&ospastes 
in 1923 notes that only 240 out of 20,000 refugees took part in the election for the delegates to a 
Congress of refugees from Pontos living in Athens and Piraeus. In particular, some 100 voted in 
Athens and another 130 in Piraeus electing 24 delegates each, while many settlements were not 
represented at all. As the writer concludes, "in other words, a number of individuals, members of the 
organizational committee, took it upon themselves arbitrarily, to represent their flock ... These 
individuals put themselves and their friends on the organizational committee, and in a close circle 
they voted for delegates to the congress, and at the congress they elected a Board of Directors for the 
Central Union. 3616 
612, q P; 0 ;j tr Az XJW4 613 
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Stellios Argiris of Loxandra, from 50 Drs each, and also promised to Loxandra herself that he would 
provide her with a tent Lyaavriptj to house sick niece at an exotic place. He also gave 50 Drs to Michael 
Petrakes, house [mp&yKa] number 358, whereas some voted twice... " Article by A Chatzidimou 
Tiý, es 7n/1929) 
'A See Pizospastes 2finn929. And be was *maeea able top reffize Ifis threat of eviction, such as in the case 
of his former daughter-in-law Sofia, although for personal rather than political reasons. (See Rdospwres 
'If"w'19, n) 
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Could those refugee unions be considered as an effective pressure group for refugee interests? 
, 1617 Rizospastes alleged in 1929 that POADA was pretty much hooked "on the government's car. 
'Ibis was probably not far from the truth, but relations between refugee unions as well as other 
refugee committees and the Liberal Party were not always harmonious. Despite the fact that no 
serious breakdown ever occurred, there were occasional frictions, mainly surrounding the issue of 
elections and the inclusion of their representatives in the Party electoral tickets. In 1928, when 
Venizelos turned down the demands of POADA for listing its candidates, they threatened to enter 
the electoral struggle on an independent ticket. In the end, a compromise was achieved between the 
two parties, and three refugees instead of one were listed on the Liberal ticket. It is suggested that 
618 
Venizelos did not want to have more than one refugee candidate in the parliamentary elections. 
However, such refugee committees cannot be seen as serious pressure groups when it came to 
demands that went beyond those having to do with their own incorporation into the political system 
in general and Venizelos' Liberal Party in particular. In the occasional instances where they would 
move away from their open reconciliatory politics they would do no more than "threaten with paper 
war and ridiculous announcements". Avoiding direct confrontation by taking their demands to the 
streets they would rather "gather the seal-keepers of the refugee associations and make 
resolutions. "619 Indicative of this unwillingness for direct action are the proceedings of such an 
assocfatfon: the Pofificaf Asia Minor Center. Accordingfy, in a meeting on 7b May 1927 it was 
"suggested that the refugee world should mobilize a little, in order to show its dissatisfaction against 
the government. " There was also a great deal of talk about the "profiteering of the capitalist and 
financial centere'. So, what course of action was in the end decided? None other, but the forming of 
a committee that would "present itself to those responsible in order to express either their complaints 
or problems. ý620 
'The effectiveness of such action, however, was doubtful. Refugee committees would often appear 
at the doorstep of a ministry, asking for a hearing by the minister or his deputy, in order to channel 
their demands. On many occasions they would just be turned away and told to come back 'next 
week' . 
621 Furthermore, the various refugee associations were divided by personal rivalries, making 
617 pdZWPaSteSjq/ ,II 6's A&aVu%4e3! 4/S/JQ2S and 7/S/J 923 
619 Rizospastes 25/4/1929 A view that was also quoted in Acropolis, called refuVe associations an 'abuse 
of seals'. See Acropolis 21/2/1929 
620 Proceedings 7/511927, Archive of the Political Asia Minor Center, ELIA 
671 RizospasjeS 19/1/1929 
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them easy to manipulate by playing one against the other 622 . So, while 'pursuing the interests' of the 
refugees, "one president woufd hate the other, a refugee woufd be denouncing the opposing 
associatiolf-k23. 
The government was well aware of the social implications of exclusion from the power networks 
that clientism facilitated. In November 1929 the President of the Government sent a memo to all 
Ministries and Public Authorities under their jurisdiction that was entitled "Towards regaining the 
public's trust in public authorities". It mentioned that "it would indeed be a great achievement, and 
the notion of the State as a representative of the whole of society would be established in the 
public's consciousness, if the perception, that unfortunately has deeply infiltrated all social classes, 
that only through the mediation of powerful patrons it is possible for even the smallest case to be 
dealt with, was to disappear. -A24 However, not much action was taken in practice ky the government 
towards the fulfillment of such a goal. 
It may be argued that this was probably because short-term political effects and benefits took 
precedence over the longer term social ones. It was a well established fact throughout the interwar 
period that the Venizelists managed to secure themselves a position of power through the patronage 
of the refugee populations. An article in Proia in 1935 suggested that the Venizelists deliberately 
cultivated the notion among the refugees that if their political opponents were to ever rise in power 
they would 'unleash hell' upon them, "taking away their houses, their farms, their settlements. " The 
article is clear on the intentions behind the maintenance of the refugee/native dichotomy on behalf 
of the Venizelists: "they wish for the refugees to remain a separate factor, in order to exploit [the 
position of beingl supposedly their patron, against their supposedly enemies. ? 625 
Further proof of the utifization, endorsement and support for the cNentfst network as a modef for 
channeling demands and power by the Liberals can be found in the correspondence of Venizelos 
himself. Accordingly, refugees as well as natives would often write letters to Venizelos, confirming 
their allegiance to the Liberal party in general and to him in particular. These letters would often 
include 'examples' of their activities in support of the party, as well as names of people who could 
confirm the background of the sender. 626 Interestingty., the role of the patron was also plqed bLy the 
Church; hence the Arclibishop was often asked to intervene with the Mnister responsible a specific 
622 &, r V &! 12'apmk f) %J, q., ýt t2m JzR JP 'i 'IVA/, 1CJJCJ 623 p 4 ýaP: & 2-MM929 
624 'Towards repining, the public's trust in public'authorities' (Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/105) 625 Proid 23/1/1935 
626 See for example Letter of MI Polites to Venizelos 17/8/1932, in Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/93 
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case in order to conduct a clientist exchange. That would refer to either employment in public 
services or entry into university, even in cases when admittedly the candidate "did not have the 
necessary qualifications. -A27 
However, Royalists were not able to utilize these networks of power among the refugees for a long 
time. Indeed, it was only in 1933 when a Populist Political Club was finally established in Kokkinia 
"working non-stop, for the service of the various needs of the settlement. -, 628 
Liberals versus Populists and Refugees versus Natives. The incorporation of refugees 
through a national-political dichotomy. 
Why were refugees overwhelmingly Venizelist? There is no doubt that there was a well 
established wide-spread belief that the Crown was responsible for the Asia Minor Disaster and "all 
evils in the land". But even more interesting perhaps is the respect, if not admiration, towards the 
Liberal leader Venizelos, even by people who would not necessarily identify themselves as 
VenizeliStS. 629 However, the reasons behind the more or less solid refugee support of the refugee 
popufation, which throughout the f920s wouid be more then 90,16, was more than the impact of 
Venizelos' 'great persona'. 
First of all, refugees were able to pinpoint the process of their salvation in a single individual, 
General Plastiras, a Venizelist who took the initiative to lead the refugee population to safety 
following the Asia Minor disaster. Hence "many considered that they owed their lives... to Plastiras 
and Venizelos" while at the same time "they were unaware of what happened behind the backs of 
the Greek element in Turkey the same way that the Greeks who lived in the homeland were., -5630 in 
addition, refugees sought in Venizefos, the "right person for the job*' of repatriation "despite the 
temporary measure of exchange of populations decided ky the Treat 631 
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Party Braneft, Archive ofKKE 
631 Mikrayiati)d 5; %jjonj 
149 
What is sometimes also ignored is that refugees were, to differing extents, politically conscious 
individuals, with beliefs which overwhelmingly republican and liberal. Hence, in that respect, they 
would indeed identify politically with an anti-royalist block. "Republicanism for the refugees", was 
according to refugee WM Kyrkos "connected to the disaster and to their fatherlands and to the 
graves of their fathers and to everything most valuable and holy that a man could have . '-ý32 In 1932 
the local Piraeus newspaper Neoi Aýa&oi pointed to what it called the 'trifioly exploitation of 
Democracy as a symbol of the Liberals, in the same way that their opponents used Royalism as the 
flag of their camp, and brought about disaster destroying themselveS. ", 633 By 1936, candidates that 
belonged to the Liberal camp would urge voters in Kokkfnia not to vote for the Communists on the 
grounds that "their vote would go wasted, and afterwards there would be a dictatorship. "634 
Of course, added to fts bloc mentality were the attitudes of the 'olber side', the Populists, whose 
anti-refugee sentiment would often reach the point of racism and hysteria. Indicative of such 
attitudes were several articles published throughout the interwar period by Anti-Venizelists calling 
for the cleansing of the capital from the "refugee herd", and propagating separation between the 
"pure-blooded Greeks" and "Turk-seeds". 635 Refugees' identification with the Venizelist camp 
meant The continuation of an already existing political scblsm, which was now reinforced with a new 
element, ethnicity. According to Kathimerine, the native [hence Royalist according to the paper] 
electorate, would be forced from the sense of 'injustice' into becoming "a block of 'revolutionaries', 
who will bring back the King and kick out or eliminate the refugees! ""636 Attacks against the refugee 
population were not restricted to verbal ones, but often became physical. Violent clashes between 
refugees and natives were reported almost from their very first settlement. 637 
As the refugee association POADA mentioned in its paper, such feelings emerged among the 
native population because the latter were "poisoned with convincing evidence ... that their misery is 
caused by the refugee parasites and that the recently submitted sums from the exchanged properties 
to the beneficiaries by the National Bank were distributed by the Democratic Block for buying off 
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refugee votes" and practically 'stealing' the elections from the rivalS. 638 Indeed, the 'Association of 
Native Piraeus' Residents' made it cfear in an announcement in f 933 that they considered that the 
worsening of the crisis and unemployment in the area was due to 'Tiraeus having been occupied by 
various individuals completely foreign to the place. ýý39 
A felfter to Venizefos from a refugee party activist regarding the Liberaf Party's work for refugees 
ahead of the forthcoming elections sets forward what can perhaps be regarded as a more or less 
widespread refugee view of the opposition (i. e. the Royalist camp) and its campaign: on the one 
hand holding "fat promises in favor of the refugees" and on the other, getting ready "to throw them 
back to the sea, if they were to be favored by the people and come into power. , 640 
Viotent episodes between natives and refugees were recorded throughout the interwar period A 
1933 report by the Nfinistry of Interior noted the use of 'terrorist methods' by natives against 
refugees, further fueled by the rhetoric of Populist politicians who would "encourage natives to 
annihilate the refugees. "641 Even as late as 1936 natives were called upon to create 'defense' 
associations against the refugee&2, Such attitudes would be also encouraged on the other side by 
Venizelist refugee officials, as reported by a local newspaper in Kokkinia, which attributed 
misfortunes topalaioelladites Ithose from 'old Greece, i. e. nativesj . 
643 
On the other hand, the apparent electoral predominance of the Uberals among the refugees was 
not solely the product of individual choice. For example, there were several allegations of 
misconduct during the 1923 elections, the first elections whereby the refugees were to exercise their 
voting rights. According to reports published in Rizospastes, the garrisons that were present outside 
electoral booths in Piraeus "forced every voter to enclose in the envelope a Venizelist ticket", 
whereas the refugees were literally "driven to Liberal Party electoral centers where they were 
provided with the necessary remittance paper [aMo)pqXqp-ri, i. e. the Venizelist ticket] on the advice 
that 'anything else they may be given would be of .. Metaxas'. " Furthermore, refugees were 
segregated outside electoral booths, "perhaps [for the Liberals] to exhibit their majority. " Those, 
whose ticket was not properly sealed in the envelope provided, were handed another already sealed, 
638p 
,q qDW /1 9 16 
639 Acropolis 2/8/1933 
640 Report with no date or sender's details referring, to the work of Liberals in favor of the refugees Lýrchive of E Venizeloq, File 173/13ý) 
1 As a result, 2 refugees were reported to have lost their lives. Report of the Ministry of Interior / Head of 
the Police to the Private Office of the Prime Minister 23/2/1933, in Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/113 "2Acrqpo& 6ý211 9136 
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whereas "in many places there would be even an additional check on ... the content of the envelope. 
" 
The instances of reported electoral misconduct were so many that Rizospastes would call them an 
'electoral farce'. 644 
The Communist Party was aware of the consequences of the schism, which polarized the refugee 
and the native populations in a dichotomy of ethnicity rather than class. Rizospastes stressed in 
1926: "Greece is not divided into natives and refugees. Greece is divided into rich and poor, people 
who live without working and those who work day and night not being able to earn themselves a 
living. "645However, there was no serious movement from the Liberals towards the Communists; at 
feast not before the f 930s, when a stow but steady teak began to break the refugee efement away 
from the Liberal Party towards other, anti-Venizelist, democratic parties. This process was linked, 
according to the refugee NIP M Kyrkos, to a progressive loss of faith in the capabilities of Venizelos 
646 to deal with the issues with which refugees were concerned. 
Elections and Refugees 
It is important at this point to elaborate on the issue of elections in regards to the refugees, an issue 
briefly touched upon earlier in this chapter. Important factors include gerrymandering and 
manipulation of the vote through rigging, harassment of activists or other means. In addition to the 
settlement of refugees in electoral districts in order to achieve a positive outcome for the Venizelist 
camp, gerrymandering was designed in order to "minimize the possibility of refugee majorities", 
thus hindering political independence of refugees and incorporating them into the existing two-party 
system to the advantage of the Venizelists. 647 
Men the Popuftsts came in power fn the f 930s, they attempted to reverse the effects of Venfieffst 
gerrymandering to their own advantage. Hence, on the forthcoming separation of refugee 
settlements into self-governing municipalities, a policy carried forward by the Populists, Venizelos 
' &-e SM' &ISO iraW AfW B19WA1,41 M2.2,12902. KD R%-Awoukns 
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645 "So, when the time of elections come, everyone will have to choose among the wealthy refugee who 
cooperates with the wealthy native, and the poor refugee whose comrade would be the poor native worker 
or farmer. " Rizospastes 7/9/1926 
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argued that "it is obvious that the separation of the settlements, being carried forward at the eve of 
local elections, is being subject to solely party reasons. " Indeed, as Kafandares, the leader of the 
Progressives stated: "if there was ever a suitable opportunity for the refugees to be emancipated 
from the political parenthood of the Liberals, this is the one. vA48 
Other means of controlling the voting outcome involved electoral rigging. In the elections of Y934 
in Kokkinia, invalid Liberal Party ballots were found and confiscated in four different voting 
stations. 649 In 1933 there was a trial at the electoral court of Piraeus on electoral misconduct, 
according to which some 7,939 voters were alleged to have voted illegally. Among the evidence put 
forward supporting claims of electoral rigging there was a telegram of a Liberal city councilor 
Asproulakes to Venizelos himself, where it was mentioned that "thanks to the 800 new voting 
booklets, Kokkinia would overwhelmingly vote for Venizelos., 650 Similar allegations were made in 
parfiament by the successor of Venizefos as feader of the Lf6erafs, Sofouies who argued that some 
28,000 fake voting booklets were issued by the Populists between 1934 and 1936 in the electoral 
districts of Piraeus and Athens alone. Finally, the cleansing of the electoral lists in Athens, Piraeus 
and Salonica was decided ky law in January 1936. This took place after the subsequent elections . 
651 
7he most glaring example of electoral rigging was The 1935 referendum on the re-introduction of the 
Monarchy, when Kokkinia, until then considered a Venizelist -hence republican- stronghold, 
nevertheless 'voted' overwhelmingly in favor of the King. 652 
Another means of voting manipulation came to surface during a court case put forward by 
newspaper publishers. This involved the financing during the pre-election period of the newspapers 
concerned by the Liberals Club, with the object of reporting positive comments about Venizelos, 
which would be distributed free of charge to the refugees. However, the Club did not fulfill its 
agreement, paying just half the money promised, and as a result the paper publishers brought them 
648 Acropolis 7/5/1933 
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to CoUrt. 653 To the above factors should of course be added the interventions of the authorities in 
electoral campaigns. Indeed, electoral campaigns were closely watched by the authorities. Even 
electoral advertising had to acquire approval from the police before it was allowed to circulate. 
Workers distributing electoral material for the Communist Party were often harassed by the police, 
physically abused, or indeed arrested and held in custody. 654 
Relations between refugees and public authorities, state employees and the RSC officials 
A report of Michalakopoulos to Venizelos 1929 stated that "during my tour it was brought to my 
attention that the clashes among local, especially lower, administrative organs and citizens occur on 
a daily basis, causing the dissatisfaction of the latter", causing "hostility towards the authorities as 
well as the state. " According to the report "residents complain that they are over-oppressed by lower 
administrative organs ... We should not be forgetful of the constantly arising conflicts among the 
RSC organs or among natives and refugees. , 655 In many cases, such conflicts would arise from the 
ever-widening gap between promises made from higher offl-cfafs to refugees "to deaf with their case" 
and the inability (oýjective or not) of the middle or lower administrative strata to fulfill them. 656 
What were The reasons belfind sucb affitudes? 
First of all were the RSC officials' attitudes towards the refugees. The debate that took place 
during an RSC conference concerning the collection of debts is indicative of they way they 
perceived and dealt with the refugee issue. Mr. Eddy, the Chairman of the RSC suggested that there 
was "an organized campaign in all quarters to resist any attempt to collect debts from the urban 
refugees", adding that he did not agree with the claim put forward by refugees that the "house prices 
were in excess of their real cost, "' Papadatos, the Under-Secretary of State, tried to reason with Mr. 
Eddy saying that "it is not that the refugees do not want to pay, they really want to pay, but the year 
1928 had been so fruitful of misfortunes, in the epidemic of the dengue, etc., that the people really 
cannot pay. He said that even among other classes outside the refugees this same difficulty is 
experienced in collecting money... " 
653 Rizospastes 25/5/1933 
654 S-1m Art 177 i- we 
28/3/1933 and 3/4/1934 
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But Mr. Eddy pointed out "the representatives of the refugees were all men of substance - 
shopkeepers and professional men, well able to pay their debts... ". The debate clearly showed a 
fundamental lack of understanding of the situation 'on the ground' by the higher officials of the 
RSC, whose picture was limited to the few, and relatively well-off, 'representatives' of the refugees 
with whom they had to deal. The final remark of Prime Minister Venizelos on the subject is also 
interesting: "The Prime Minister agreed with Mr. Eddy that the refugees must pay... He desired 
however that we should not take forcible measures until the elections were finished. 2,657 It came as 
no surprise therefore that refugees grew to see the RSC with suspicion, if not indeed as exploiters: 
"Morgenthau, that great banker, the robber of Greece", stressed a refugee, referring to the former 
chairman of the RSC! 658 
To what extent Mr. Eddy's claim that non-payment of debts was a part of an "organized 
campaigif' has any truth is difficult to answer. Overall such manifestations of resistance appeared 
spontaneous. However, it is clear that the Communist Party not only supported, but also encouraged 
such activities. So, for example, in the instance of several residents of Bosporus St in N Kokkinia. 
who not only refused to pay, but also declared that they recognized no debts to the RSC, the 
Communist Party through its organ Rizospastes urged other refugees to take their actions as an 
example, a first step towards escaping from what is referred to in the newspaper as voting 'crowd' 
mentality. 659 
11owever, it was the usual practice for those in authority to blame the communists for almost all 
ills of society. Another example of such attitudes could be found in an interview that was published 
in a local Piraeus paper by Papastratos, an W who was involved in the tobacco industry in Piraeus. 
Asked by an interviewer whether the 'labor consciousness' of the Greek worker could be deemed 
satisfactory', Papastratos answered: "[satisfactory] enough. However, it would have been even 
more satisfactory, if it was not for the disease of communism. Unfortunately the Greek worker has 
fallen victim of a group, instruments of the 3rd International. Those instruments of Moscow, 
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possessing a great deal of money have managed to corrupt a great part of the laboring world and 
make them more interested in the theories of Lenin than their ownjob. ', 660 
However, putting the blame on the communists did not help the autborifies, wbether industfidiists, 
the state or the RSC, from escaping accusations of misconduct concerning the process of refugee 
settlement during which some individuals became richer and the vast majority of refugees were left 
devastated and impoverished. The Union for 'Housing Defense' reported on state housing and 
housing built by the dissolved RSC: "However, this noble and humanitarian cause was abused by 
various cunning people, to the point where many of them managed to appropriate more than one 
house which, through a series of anomalous dealings, they transfer on reward to other beneficiaries, 
earning in this way unheard of profits out of other peoples' misery. "661 Similarly, a later article in 
, 4crqpohý pointed out that "There are today some bigwig businessmen, known to have made their 
fortunes from the contraction of refugee housing, as there are civil servants that are weighted by 
serious suspicions, that not due to mere irresponsibility, but also due to matters of self interest and 
material benefits and exchanges they gave those important works to morally suspicious 
individuals. , 662 
In any case, what certainly did not improve the image of the authorities in the consciousness of 
refugees was their unwillingness to prosecute those individuals. Accordingly, the Public Works 
Bureau noted that "in order to avoid any misunderstanding, our report as well as all our other 
activities, by no means aim against any persons, nor attribute responsibilities, because they do not 
aim in proving any wrong or hazardous doings... ý9663 It was not until 1929 when the Minister for 
Weffare refuctandy ordered an investigation into the "crirnfnaf defficiencfes of the newfy bufft 
houses. "664 
But even at the level of local politics, the majority of refugees often found themselves alienated by 
the policies of those in power. It is perhaps indicative of the spending priorities of the Municipality 
of N Kokkinia, that the capital allocated by the budget for administration costs was more than 
double the money spent for Health and Care and Social Welfare put together. It is also worth noting 
that just 2.3% of the local authorities' income from direct taxes came from what was classified as 
66044ýýATCýýj 
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663 Report of the Public Works Bureau (Nfinistry of Transport) to the Nfinistry of Public Health, Welfare 
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664 Report of A Michalakopoulos to Venizelos, 1929 (Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/106) 
156 
taxes on "profits of commercial and industrial enterprises. " The main bulk of tax-income came from 
indirect taxes that involved mainty consumer goods. 665 The maintenance of a relativety large 
administration raises further questions regarding the use of the public sector for political purposes, 
especially if one takes into account that the criteria for employment in the public sector included that 
the candidate had not been sentenced ky the Idioqymon Law. 666 Further scandal concerned a trial of 
Ainlradakes vs. Koraes, the mayor of KoWiffia. 'The proceedings revealed that the latter bad 
acquired refugee compensation twice. That did not improve the image of authorities among 
reftigees. 667 
Of course refugees were not always apathetic when they felt exploited by the authorities. On the 
contrary there were plenty of cases where refugees in Kokkinia reacted collectively to injustices 
imposed on them by people in authority, especially during the 1930s. An example would be when 
the mayor of Kokkinia, Koraes auctioned the water that was provided free by Ulen Company, 
resulting in a charge that was unbearable for the residents of Kokkinia, who already lived under 
harsh conditions. What followed was a form of popular uprising against Koraes' measures uniting 
professional, worker and cultural associations, sparking what was later to evolve into a "popular 
unitý" in Kokkinia. 668 
Community politics and ideology 
Various social factors contributed to the development of the refugee psychology, including their 
personal experiences and history. When interviewed, Kokkinia refugees from Asia Nfinor argued 
that two main characteristics of their people were dignity and pride [(piAoriyo], on the one hand, and 
a strong sense of solidarity, on the other. The experience of forced dislocation and what followed 
was a crucial binding element: "Through the known tragedy of the flight from Turkish soil, the 
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Archixe-&Qf dip. M-Unidgalilbty Sum 1ýýetcm be CQUVAiUL dip. 1915-1916 bA%et. 
666 Resolution of the Municipal Council of N Kokldnia, n092,15h Meetiqg, Oh and 7h of Februarv 1935, 
Archives of the Municipality of Kokkinia (Nikaia) 
667 Rizospmtes 4/10/1934 
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settlement in this hostile environment, and disappointment, every one was... looking back to the lost 
lands where they lost their households, and relatively comfortable life -compared to Greece. 5669 
In KdVkinia, as in other refugee settlements, neighborboods were formed by settlers according to 
place of origin. Achieving some degree of homogeneity (although by no means always) contributed 
to a network of personal ties and sense of mutual help that pre-existed in many cases the Asia Minor 
Disaster. Homogeneity was preserved by restricting marriages within the boundaries of the given 
COMMUnity. 670 Regional identification was very strong. Hence refugees of common origin would 
usually address themselves as '-compatriote or '*patriote, as opposed to others who would be 
referred to as 'foreigners' [a. Upyep ircql . 
671 As the 1926 report of the RSC noted: "The icons, holy 
books, objects ofthe sacristy and ritual vessels which piety or superstition succeeded in saving in the 
hurry of departure, assume particular importance. " These became symbols of the lost homelands but 
also represented the will of the community to survive, overcoming the hardships of the present, just 
as thqy overcame the hardships of the past. 672 They can also be seen as kymbols of continuity, 
maiVing The re-Virth of past communities. The sense of continuity was further reinforced by names 
of roads, squares and other public places referring to locations that were abandoned in Asia Minor 
and elsewhere, or to lost family members. 673 
On the cultural differences dividing refugees from locals, one refugee in KoWnia observed: "If 
someone worked as an employee somewhere in Athens or Piraeus, especially if it was a woman, 
according to the mentality of the time, they would avoid saying to others that they'd be living in 
Kokkinia. [That is] because the very word Kokkinia was synonymous to that of a crook, a ripper, a 
loafer, an immoral person ... The 
joy and hospitality they [the refugees] would show for another 
person they [the natives] would misinterpret it in a bad way... " The refugees seem to have been 
over-expressive of their emotions in various manifestations; an attitude that seems to have often 
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scandalized the native Greeks. 674 Women refugees were seen by the natives as of 'low morals' due 
to their "participation in industry-". as weft as "their freedom of mobifity" in pubffc pfaces. 67.5 On the 
other hand, refugees perceived the way of life of the native working people as being inward-looking, 
relatively isolated and rather distrustful. According to another interviewee, the distrust of natives 
against refugees was further reinforced if not actively promoted by various party-bosses. 676 
Internal social cohesion was an issue addressed on many occasions. Refugee leaders often called 
for a "solid internal harmony and unity to be in place", whereas through various festivities and 
public speeches they would remind their less-fortunate compatriots that they all shared a common 
fate; that they were all, rich as well as poor refugees, bonded by the common experience of 
Catastrophe and dislocation. 677 
7he Communist Party constantly tried to break through this intra-class bond of regionalism and 
common experience, trying to establish in refugee working class consciousness that a rich and a 
poor refugee did not really 'sail in the same boat'. Its organ Rizospastes would often point to 
examples where poor refugees were ill-treated by their 'protectors', praising examples of solidarity 
among poor workers and calling for others to follow their example . 
678 The Part ace a _y also 
had to f 
wide-spread apathy and passivity that was a dominafing feature among refugeee affitudes, for at 
least the first part of the interwar period. According to a refugee member of the Piraeus city council, 
the refugees accepted their situation "with the temporary ease of their pain through the injection of 
narcotic morphine that is their hope. Great was the refugee pain. Even greater was their 
, -, 679 tolerance. 
The Communist Party became increasingly successful, especially in the 1930s, in utilizing those 
features of intense social life and solidarity bonds to its advantage. Social festivities had a strong 
communal character, and frequently acquired a political character as well. It was not by accident that 
several of these festivities were later banned by the 4th of August regime "in order to avoid 
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trouble" . 
680 Despite their financial hardship, refugees in Kokkinia regularly exhibited their working- 
cfass sofidarity by contributing to the fund-raising by the Workers' Reffef As an activist recaffs: 
"we'd be going freely to the cafds with Workers' Relief coupons asking for contributions, and 
everyone would give, there'd be no one who would say 'I won't give you'... even inside the cafds 
we would not hide ... people 
knew then the fight that was given ky the working class, the exile. .., 
"ý81 
In its battle to win over the 'hearts and minde of refugees, the Party had to face an intense anti- 
communist campaign that was channeled through various means into the communities. The only 
means of information available at that time was the newspaper. S Tsavoures, a refugee in Kokkinia, 
would describe the picture of communism portrayed by the press: "millions of dead in the Soviet 
Union ... 
forced labor camps ever k82 . ywhere... 
it was all over the newspýpers. ' Furthermore, if one 
went through the press of the time they would most likely get the impression that there was a well- 
planned communist conspiracy in the settlements, and the rest of the country to undermine the 
state. 683 
There was plenty of anti-communist agitation through the columns of the local press in Kokkinia. 
An article published in Anamorfosis entitled "A disease - social theories and their devastating 
effect7' warned of the "'dangerous spread of those utopian ideas", as well as of the consequences that 
the "ideas of equality and justice" and "extreme socializatioif', would have on "the present 
society. -11684 As communist activity became progressively apparent in all areas of the settlements' 
fife, anti-communism a(so increased, especfaffy from the Liberafs, who saw their efectoraf base 
685 threatened . In aAy case, ky the earty 1930s the language of 'class'... and 'class war' was 
progressively becorning part of every-day vocabulary. As a local KolMtfia newspaper noted in 
1932, class war had gone beyond the notion of being a 'sociological fairy-tale', had skipped the 
limits of academic research, and had acquired a "clear form and was taken down in the streets of the 
cities of hunger and misery, wearing the mask of strikes. "686 
680 jj[ý-t '44, C 4W S ,A tjU, Mvelt 2LSW&*&p- VU WYA X V%ý, -Z e, tc 12F. &EN Mkkki?, % 2a, %ttt 26 
KC&I-inia Crm=niq Paily RrsacA ArrN Ye. af KKE- 681 Interview, in Cassette 'Kokkinia-Ilistory', in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia 
Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
682 Testimony of Tsavoures Strates, in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia 
Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE. 
'6" See Jror exampf e Acropoft 3f /15/1929 
6" Anmorjosls 11AVISOM, see Mso WIVIS65 
685 Sw '&a6L=mwtdst caesade' of Li&-ral firsporofKa W--*, mF& &%vWch the cakram PwHr, mparovd 
14; aqwSfts VQ014 686 
. 12j2L, 
&Z Avage J J. /I 2/19-12 
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The church also played an important role in promoting an anti-communist ideology. As one 
refugee communist recalls: "the priests played their part in deceiving people through their Sunday 
sermons ... maintaining as much as they could obscurantism, and especially passivity and 
anticommuniSM., 07 A communist was portnkyed as an individual who aimed at "destroying the 
family, destroying the motherland, destroying everything if they could. 76"' Anti-communism was 
promoted within the various refugee associations, which were concerned "to put an end to 
communist tendencies. " Accordingly, circulars were published "opposing the activities of 
communist propaganda" and warning the refugees not to, "fall victims to the Turks' 
collaborators. "689 Communist efforts to counteract these obstacles amongst refugee workers in 
refugee communities will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, Mavrogordatos' claim that refugee radicalism was due to the lack of "small 
property., famity ties, clientism, and unbroken traditions" appears somewhat problematiC. 690 
Although small property miight have been absent, the other three elements that Mavrogordatos 
claims that the refugees lacked seem, upon further investigation, to have been there. Extended 
family ties were very important. Kinship networks of solidarity and self-help were maintained and 
reinforced in refugee settlements throughout the interwar period. Adding to the fact that extended 
families generally settled in the same neighborhood, a great deal of time was spent seeking lost 
family members and those who were initially scattered soon found themselves in their original 
communities. 
We have also seen that due to various circumstances community ideology and politics was 
relatively strong. Crucially, this ideology and politics helped to maintain a sense of continuity. A 
link with the past proved a key element in coping with the harsh living conditions of the present and 
in achieving social cohesion. Hence, the role of tradition and its various manifestations were 
extended and reinforced. 
,C 
697 TW "MM LWMOU L4E,, Jý kra 41 &" MtIiNt vA IMP&AX MA , Lt St &VvMke, ývk & 
K&W. Wa Ccvrmjlpjst PjrjY Rraw4 ArrM ve aKKE. 
688 Testimony of K Kehagjas., Cassette 'before the 4h of Augpst' in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as 
well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branck Archive of KKE 689 See for example, Proceedings of the Political Asia Minor Center, 5/7/1924,30/8/1924,6/2/1925 
690 Mavrogordatos G (1989) p145 
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As far as clientism is concerned, we have seen that clientage networks sprung up almost as soon as 
the refugees arrived on the Greek coast. Clientism among refugees derived largely from the need for 
individuals who would operate as mediums between the authorities and the refugees. This initially 
had to do with the distribution of aid to the newly arrived refugees but it was soon extended to other 
areas of social, political and economic activity. We have also touched upon the political clientism 
exercised by the Liberal Party and its implications in the electoral expression and political 
organization of the refugees. Certainly, Clogg's claim that refugees "were largely lacking the mutual 
trust and hierarchical authority necessary for cooperation and collective action7' is problematic. 691 
There was both mutual trust manifested in strong community bonds and Ifierar6hical authority 
manifested in the various refugee associations. The problem lay with the refugee associations, whose 
manipulation and dependence on dominant politics (mainly of the Liberal Party) prevented the 
development of any serious independent political activity. 
Mazower's claim that urban reftigee radicalism could be explained in terms of living conditions 
and political neglect is also problematic. Firstly, harsh living conditions do not automatically 
constitute a basis for radicalism. On the contrary, they may lead to quite an opposite result: 
passivity. This was certainly initially the case with the urban refugees, whose preoccupation for 
securing the means of survival and in whose fears of future security kept them away from radical or 
trade union politics. We shall elaborate further on the relation between urban refugees, the organized 
labor movement and communism in the following chapter. 
The next chapter will explore labor activity and trade unionism in great detail. It will examine the 
various means of incorporation of the labor movement in Kokkinia and the methods by which the 
Communist Party overcame them and gained influence in trade unions and among the refugee 
population more broadly. It will elaborate on communist activity among refugees, outlining the 
obstacles faced by the Party and pointing to the factors that led to the rise of communism in 
Kokkinia in the 1930s. 
691 
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Chapter 7: Working class communism in interwar Greece - The case of the refugees in 
Kokkinia, Piraeus. Part H 
Introduction 
Various views are put forward in the literature concerning the attachment of refugees and of 
communism. Koumandaraki suggests that "it was refugee workers, not surprisingly, who contributed 
most to labor radicalism in Greece during the interwar years, and it was they who most readily 
supported the Communist Party. , 692 Hirschon takes the argument even further suggesting that 
"locaMies such as KoWnfia becameknown as Communist strongholde" By contrast, Leonfidou 
argues that "factionalism in the GSEE and Comintern directives pursued by the KKE could hardly 
mobilize the urban popular strata in the interwar period. " Dritsa also suggests that there was no real 
KKE tactic towards refugees until 1936.694 This chapter will examine such claims by looking into 
the devefopfng refatfon between refugees, the labor movement and the Communfst Party. 
Industrial development in the Piraeus district 
Unemployment rates remained high throughout the interwar period. The 1928 census found, some 
22.28% of workers previously employed in industry and transport were without a job in the Piraeus 
distriCt. 695 Labor mobility was also quite high: as mentioned in the Greek Refugee Settlement 
Commission report in f 926, the urban refugee sometimes had'"to change his trade six times in a year", 
making it "difficult to find a general solution for the labor problem amon. b se lers. "696 An g ur an tt 
important characteristic of the refugee labor force was the unusually large participation of women, 
since most families were deprived of their male members who had been lost at the war front or had 
emigrated in search for employment. 
, 6V& 2ký 190 
692 JqJ 
693 
694 
JJBWJ= R C. f J, 983) p47 
Leontidou E (19811 iVI63 and Dritsa M (19891 IP60 
695 That figure is slightly higher that the national average eguivalent of 21,13%, and considerabty higher 
than the rate of unemployment in the commerce and service sectors which amounted to just 7,99% for the 
= period. See LeontidouE L (1981) p85 
3ýreefc Settfement Commission (f 926) p f'T6 
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Table 32: Refugee Population by sex and age (1926)697 
Settlement Inhabitants under 16 Inhabitants over 16 
Males Females Males Females 
Byron 1,478 1,580 2,392 4,479 
Kaisariani 1,977 1,938 2,367 4,268 
Ionia 3,031 3,039 4,030 6,360 
Kokkinia 5,685 5,292 7,240 11,068 
Total (June 1926) 12,171 11,849 16,029 26,175 
According to the above sample of four large refugee settlements, only 24.2% were males over the 
age of 16, who at the time were considered the economically active part of the population. This 
striking inequality among the adult population meant that women and children were introduced to the 
labor process on an unprecedented scale to provide additional financial support for the family budget. 
It also meant increasing numbers of unskilled labor competing for a limited number of jobs. Under- 
aged laborers learning a skill as apprentices were often mistreated, and on many occasions had to pay 
for their training. Krommudas, who was an apprentice himself at the time, recalls: "if you did not like 
it you could take a hike and go. They would find someone else. '-A98 
The working conditions, combined with the imbalance that characterized the adult population and its 
effects, can be seen as presenting three important inter-woven characteristics that, may have had a 
significant impact on the construction of the social psychology of the urban refugee, Problems of 
subsistence, in combination vvithjob insecurity and the need for the cooperation and contribution of all 
members of the family to overcome those problems, undoubtedly contributed to the refugees' 
perceptions of self and community. 
Another important characteristic of the occupational geography of refugee settlements was the high 
percentage of manual laborers, which in Kokkinia reached 52% of the total. Women themselves were 
also overwhelmingly employed in industry at a rate that exceeded 7 1%. 699 
697 Greek Settlement Commission (1926) p176 
698 Krommudas K (1986) pp25-26 
699 GSYE Apografl ton kawlimaton k4i'ton biomixanikon epixeiriseon anergithisa ton Septembrio tou 
1930,1934 
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Table 33: Division of labor for selected refugee settlements (1926fw 
Settlement Miscellaneous 
Occupations 
Workmen Total Number of 
Families 
Byron 2,687 501 3,188 2,258 
Kaisariani 2,253 1,605 3,858 2,489 
Ionia 3,568 2,448 6,016 3,793 
Kokkinia 4,679 5,198 9,877 7,153 
Total 13,187 9,752 22,939 15,693 
Which industries employed the refugee workforce? According to the Greek Refugee Settlement 
Commission, by 1926 there were some 36 industrial establishments located in the refugee settlements 
of Athens and Piraeus, the overwhelming majority of which 27, were carpet factories. There were also 
"4 weaving shops, a factory for dyeing and chemical products, a chocolate manufactory, a nail factory 
and ceramic works", and an additional rubber goods factory was "in course of construction. "701 In 
,, 702 addition, one must take into account some "500 looms installed in private houses. The latter 
greatly contributed to the formation and development of an informal household economy that mainly 
involved female labor. The development of a household economy seems to an extent to have been 
planned in advance by the RSC itself, which reported in 1926, that "many houses were designed as 
such, in order to be suitable for ... carpet manufacturing. 
, 703 In any case many houses would soon turn 
, M4 into "real shops, even factories. This type of economy, however, was mostly of a supplementary 
character (i. e. to other forms of employment), since in most cases "they did not secure the necessary 
resources for living. vMS 
700 Greek Settlement Commission (1926) p177. The report explains the categorization of occupations as 
follows: the first column exhibits "the number of inhabitants engaged in an occupation in the same 
quarters", whereas the second one exhibits "the workmen, that is to say, persons without a specified 
occupation, laborers, manual workers etc. " 
701 Greek Settlement Commission (1926) p187 
702 Greek Settlement Commission (1926) p187 
703 League of Nations (1926) p 13 6 
704 Report of the Public Works Bureau, Ministry of Transport to the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Precaution, 11/10/1928 (Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/132) 
705 League of Nations (1926) p132 
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The politics of labor incorporation and emancipation 
According to an announcement by the Piraeus Labor Center in 1923, labor activity had been 
paralyzed and the Center had almost reached the point of dissolution over the previous two years. Its 
break from the General Confederation of Labor (because the latter had been passed under the control 
of the Communists) had resulted in the disaffiliation of many unions, creating a feeling of distrust 
and disappointment among workers. The Center was deprived of the means to publish even a single 
proclamation. However, many trade unions were slowly coming back to the Center, or considering 
doing so. 706 Hence, at the time when refugee populations were being settled, forming a new urban 
proletariat, the existing organized labor movement was unable to integrate the new proletariat. It was 
too busy picking up its own bits and pieces. 
An announcement of the General Confederation of Labor stated that "the refugee workers, 
become, not to their knowledge, the pretext for breaking workers' strikes causing misery to their 
fellow workers ... workers' unions must, not for one moment, allow the refugees to play that role [i. e. 
that of labor reserve, a means for the employers to combat strikes] that is harmful not only to other 
workers, but also to themselves. , 707 
Nevertheless, by the late 1920s the first seeds of communism among urban working class refugees 
seemed to be well in place. Through the columns of Rizospastes a communist refugee named K 
Afgitas tried to convince his fellow refugee workers of the need to participate in the forthcoming 
Labor Congresses and in trade union processes. He attributed the refugees' lack of interest in 
unionization to the 'disease of fatalism', as well as social and religious prejudices, the personality 
cult of Venizelos, and of course the desperate situation in which refugees found themselves upon 
their arrival, when survival and immediate needs took precedence over unionization. Accordingly, 
refugees stood "foreign to the labor struggles, and in many cases they became even persecutors and 
enemies of itliv7O8 Calls by the Communist Party to the refugees on the "need to organize" 
themselves in lbeir unions seem to have fallen on deaf ears. 709 
V t ht j?; S 706 MTA ýi% MTS, was ubu ctats ýZ ?m 'W. Vmw av&w. F. 49 1? Rhospaste s 
J, 9/7/J, ()23 
707 Rizospastes 11/9/1923 
708 Rizospastes 7/3/1928 
709 "You need to take an interest to yourselves first. You need to organize yourselves ... You are many, 
whereas your exploiters are few. " (Rizospastes, 19/10/1924) 
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The author of the article admitted that refugee labor was used to bring down wages and break 
strikes. Refugees were encouraged by various prosfygopateres to fonn their own separate labor 
organizations (as in the cases of the National Tobacco Workers' Unions and the Salonica Rail- 
workers) thus dividing the labor movement. However, the article ended on an optimistic tone, 
reporting that in the last couple of years "the refugees, being proletarians by their nature and 
position, under the pressure of reality had entered labor unions in mass numbers and have fought in 
the front line [7rpOT(O(FT6tVjOaV] on many occasions as it was their duty to do so ... The bourgeoisie 
. ). )710 hits the entire working class, without making distinctions between locals and refugees... 
During the 1928 take-over of the Confederation of Labor, four communist-led trade unions in 
Piraeus had their voting strength reduced in the Congress: the Shoe-makers, the Bakery workers, the 
Cqrpet workers, and the construction workers. 71 1 By 1929 the trade union strength of the Communist 
Party as reflected by the unions which participated in the Unitary Congress was as follows: 
Table 34: Organizations from Piraeus that took part in the Unitary CongresS712 
Organizations' Name No of Delegates Organizations' Name No of Delegates 
Unitary Labor Center of Piraeus 3 Dockers Tontos' I 
Unorganized Cotton Workers 3 C66 Employees 2 
Motorists Union 3 Sewing Workers 5 
Unorganized Carpet Workers I Shoe Makers 3 
Mechanists Union I Bakery Workers 3 
It is important to note the participation of settlement committees in the union of male and female 
sewing workers of Piraeus, as well as of the unorganized workers employed in the carpet industry 
(representatives from nine factories took part). 713 The sewing and carpet industries constituted the 
main employers of refugee labor for most of the inter-war period. In total some fifteen labor unions 
were affiliated to the Unitary Labor Center of Piraeus as it was first established in 1929.714 It is also 
I 
710 Rizospizsfes 7/3/1928 
711 RiZOSPaSIeS 11/511928 
712 Rizospastes 4/2/1929. Total of delegates representing unions: 237. Total number of delegates 
re yresenting unorganized workers and minorities in unions: 52 
71 Rizospxles 3/2/1929 
714 RjZOSPWteS 14/4/1929 
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interesting to note the increasing coverage by Rizospastes of the sewing and carpet industries: from 
the late 1920s onwards, there would be several reports on the ground about the working conditions 
in those industries. 
A series of reports on the carpet industry reveal a great deal of information about the working 
conditions and employers' practices. In Kokkinia there were two main carpet enterprises that were 
set up following the settlement: 'Eastern Carpet' and 'Oriental Carpet', with factories employing 
300-500 workers each. There were however, smaller enterprises with a workforce varying from 20 
to 200. Working hours ranged from 9-9.5 hours to 15 hours for women, and pay was based, not on a 
daily wage system, but on a piece-work basis. As for labor protection laws, as one worker reported: 
'(as in every other industry, they do not exist. " It was quite often the case that mothers and daughters 
worked alongside each other in the same factory. 715 Unionization of the female workforce was 
forbidden, as well as any discussion concerning the creation of a union. "Tavored' workers were 
positioned in order to watch for any trade union activity. Hence a 1927 attempt to form a union 
failed. However the effort was repeated with more success in 1929. 
Workers' interviews in Rizospastes provide useful information on the working environment. For 
example, one interviewee stated that in order to keep the workforce divided "the enterprises also 
play the card of ethnicity. Hence they push the Greeks against the Armenians and the Armenians 
against the Greeks. In order to achieve that they use the following trick. To supervise the Greek 
workers they employ an Armenian favorite of theirs, and to supervise the Arrnenianý, a Greek 
instrument of theirs. 2716 Kinship links were also used to control female labor. Hence, it was quite 
usuai for employers to baptize the c1tilldren of some of the workers in order to bave them on their 
f Ctory. 717 side during industrial disputes, or to achieve social cohesion within the a 
Tbree months after these reports appeared fn R&ospasres, a strfke 6roke out in the Piraeus carpet 
industry (Kokkinia, Tambouria and Drapetsona). I. Thoides, the secretary of the Unitary Federation, 
observed the development of the strike in Kokkinia. His account of events and tactics is informative 
on communist activity in refugee labor struggles. Initially five factory committees were set up 
through the initiative and encouragement of communist party members who were active in those 
2r2a 715 , Ojn ý, XM 46 V .2 , eiz v2sw ww". - fami1j, 
1UL thA faaQ&%, P-VPXjAtij dia winam, marbing, dP. PQýLa QC , thaLc dil&m ta \19-ark, atQ% wikh dick beds in order to keer) them bv their side, so that thev won't have to get qp from the Winning machines ...... Rizospastes In/1929 
716 See special report of Rizospastes in the Carpet Industry, in Rizospastes 21/3/1929,22/3/1929 and 24/3/1929 
"" Pizospastes 25ý5n 93 1 
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factories. Under their guidance, the strike quickly spread in the course of two days to some twenty 
factories -almost all of Kokkinia's factories. 
The report states, however, that when the members of the Unitary Federation (i. e. communist trade 
unionists) took an active role in the strike mobilization, instead of trying to support the committees 
they suppressed this initiative, losing "a huge driving force, something that cost us a heavy deal, 
because afterwards we were not able to, on the one hand, gather the female workers to the cause, and 
on the other, we condemned them into a level of apathy one might say, that is for them to look upon 
us as bosses, shaking their head to everything we might have been saying... " The marginalization of 
those committees deprived them of every link with the great majority of the striking masses. 
Accordingly, the Kokkinia meetings, were initially rather successful. Afterwards, however, as the 
strike spread, the Unitary Federation was unable to mobilize even those they had in the very 
beginning. Nevertheless, the strike was successful: it prevented wage-cuts and instead achieved 
increases from 2.80 to 3.10 Dr for every thousand knots. 718 Finally, another element highlightened 
by this experience, was the utilization of militant workers coming from 'more experienced' branches 
of industry to the aid of the strike. 719 
The 'Action Report' of the Piraeus District Organization reported on the Carpet industry in 1928: 
"The carpet workers' association was under the influence of the reactionary forces. Through 
systematic work of our people it [this influence] was neutralized and [the association] passed over to 
the hands of the [class] conscious workers. " However, the report noted that the presence of the 
reactionary forces in the carpet industry "remains strong. ', 720 
Communist influence in other unions where large numbers of refugees were employed was 
uneven. The Port Customs' Union was a mass organization influenced by radical forces, where the 
only opposition to the Communist Party came from "the refugees who were influenced by leftist 
elements. " There was no CP fraction among the Cotton workers, whose union was passive and 
excluded the female workers who comprised the majority of the workforce. There was special 
concern that "the attention of the party cells be focused in the cotton factories. " The Sewing workers 
were split three ways. A few workers belonged to the union of Speras (former member of the CP), 
another union was mentioned to be under the control of 'the Piraeus secret police' and had another 
719 Rizospasles 217/192 9 
719 In this case, from the shoe-maker unions. See Rizospastes 1217/1929 720 Action Report of the Piraeus District Organization (January to March 1928), p8, FilelO, Archive of 
KKE 
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200-300 members, and the union influenced by the CP had about 2,000 members. It was reported to 
be doing rather well, especially in confronting attempts by the authorities to dissolve their union. 721 
There are two further interesting elements in this report. The first concerned what was referred to 
as 'employer terrorism': "Comrades who are discovered by the employers are thrown out of work, 
other employers are informed, and hence finding a job for our members is becoming a real problem. 
This creates panic among workers and approaching them becomes increasingly difficult. " 
Accordingly, party activity was disrupted as entire factory cells were dissolved again and again 
through the firing of communist members. The second concerned the level of unionization: some 
48% of the workers in Piraeus were said to be unionized. However, just 1% was said to be taking 
active part in the 'class struggle. 2722 
Finally, two further elements should be mentioned regarding trade union activity and communism. 
Firstly, a significant number of refugee workers were not organized politically in the ranks of the 
Communist Party, but were nonetheless militant, some more consistently than others. 723 Second, a 
frequent 'route' to communism, would be through apprenticeship, when young apprentices were 
acquainted with the ideology and practice of communism through their training. Such phenomena 
were quite usual among shoe-makers for example, whose union remained under radical influence for 
724 most of the inter-war period . 
Alongside those labor activities coexisted various means of incorporation utilized by state 
authorities, labor leaders and refugee associations in order to keep communism away from the 
workplace, and trade union activity under control. The employers took advantage of the 'schism' 
that was developing between the natives and the refugees and adopted a strategy of 'divide and rule' 
in the workplace. 725 Accordingly they used surplus refugee labor to get rid of more militant and 
experienced workers in the organized labor force, replacing the latter with much cheaper and much 
more subservient workers. This was further reinforced by the fact that "class consciousness was not 
721 Action Report of the Piraeus District Organization (January to March 1928), pp8-9, FilelO, Archive of 
KKE 
722 Action Report of the Piraeus District Organization (January to March 1928), plO, Filel. 0, Archive of 
KKE 
723 Interview, Cassette 'Various occasions before World War II", in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias 
as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
724 Testimony of Klearchos Triantafillides from Antabaza of Asia Minor, in Audio Archive of PEAEA 
Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 725 Exact phrase, used in Interview, Cassette: 'verbal traditions, life reports etc, before 1934', Audio 
Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
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developed among the Asia Minor element in such a degree, in order to be able to provide support to 
,. )726 the agents of struggle. 
Refugee associations portrayed communism as an anti-refugee political force. The refugee 
association Asia Minor Center, for example, responded to the call of Rizospastes for cooperation 
among native and refugee workers by issuing a counter-brochure in which they depicted 
"communism as the reason behind the Smyrna massacres ... as well as collaborators of 
Kemal". 727 
On the other hand, reformist labor leaders exercised their control over members through 
employment as a tool of incorporation. A memo to the Minister of National Economy underlined the 
situation that existed in many labor unions in Piraeus. It referred particularly to the practices of the 
unions' leaderships, who, according to the memo, "expel those who rise [against them], place in 
profitable jobs those that they favor, and in the process they do everything they can in their self 
interest, whatever keeping themselves in power requires. " The memo concluded that government 
control, through its Labor Bureau branch in Piraeus, was almost non-existent, unable to intervene in 
the practices mentioned above, or to protect workers "'against the many wrong-doings of their 
employers. iM8 
On the other hand, labor leaders were reluctant to mobilize against their 'employer-patrons'. A 
letter of the secretary general of the Dockers' Union of Piraeus is indicative of labor leaders' 
attitudes on how far workers' demands challenged employers, as well as of worker-employer 
relations: "We of course did not demand for our poor table to be replaced with the rich one of the 
ship-owners or the big businessmen. We demand that the little black bread, that is also mournfully 
harmonized with the totality of our misery, not to be taken away from us ... Our aims are 
limited to 
the logical boundary of not being deprived of our bread ... And 
is this people worthy of always being 
sacrificed? ... A good Governor is the one who does not separate his children into favorites and 
disowned, but the one that considers them all as his children and divides fairly his goods to them so 
that no complaints arise... , 729 It comes therefore as no surprise that in many occasions, refugee 
I 
726 Interview, Cassette: 'verbal traditions, life reports etc, before 1934', Audio Archive of PEAEA 
Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
727 Rizospwtes 10/4/1925 
728 Memo of the Director of Commercial Navy to the Office of the Minister of National Economy, 9/3/1929 
ýArchive of E Venizelos 173/68) 
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workers who attempted to set up a union in their work place or to lead and participate in strike 
activities would lose their jobs. 730 
Considering the obstacles facing trade unionism, it is no surprise that the first priority set by the 
Communist Party in Piraeus in the mid-1920s was reviving the trade unions, "for workers who are 
affiliated to them to realize that they are indeed necessary goals to the advancement of their 
interests. "73 1 They also placed priority on the organization of non-unionized workers, as they viewed 
that "this passive section of the proletariat ... can only objectively serve as the 
basis for 
reactioniSM.,. )732 Towards those means they would mobilize factory committees as well as 
neighborhood committees as a means of agitation. Accordingly, over the following years, a series of 
trade unions were formed or re-organized in the Oil industry, the barbering association and the Bed 
Manufacturers' union. New party cells were formed in industries that employed a large number of 
refugees, such as in the tobacco and cotton industries. 733 
Nevertheless, by the end of 1927 the Party counted only some 21 cells (16 in enterprises and 
another 5 in petty-enterprises), numbering 179 workers. The Party's report stressed that "despite the 
fact that Piraeus constitutes the largest proletarian center of the country, the Party organization found 
itself unable, not only to transform Piraeus to a fort of proletarian struggle in Greece ... 
but even to 
achieve even the slightest progress. " The blame was attributed, according to the report, to the 'false 
line' followed by the Piraeus Organization itself "while in the hands of the Liquidarists" (i. e. the 
opposition). 734 
What became progressively apparent in the 1930s was the degree of incorporation of 'reformist' 
trade unions into the State or local authorities. In the case of the former, two main points can be 
raised from police reports of trade union activity. First, meetings of the General Confederation of 
Labor were supervised by the security police, who in turn completed detailed reports on their 
intentions. This strengthens the argument about the incorporation of the main-stream labor 
movement. Second, there is important information on the attitude of the General Confederation 
730 Such as in the case of G Nikolaides, later candidate for Mayor in Kokkinia for the Communist Party, see 
Biographical Note of G Nikolaides, in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia 
Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE. Also See Testimony of Sklanounis Dimitres (ibid) 
731 'The immediate duties of the Organization on the labor issue' p5, in File3, Archives of KKE 732 'The immediate duties of the Organization on the labor issue' p7, in File3, Archives of KKE 733 'Report on the activities of the Local Committee' of Piraeus, January-April 1927, File6, Archives of 
KKE 
73' 'Report on the organizational development of the party from the party's plenary session to-date', July 
1927, FiIe8, Archives of KKE 
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towards strikes, as well as its communist rivals. A 1931 police report on the GSEE mentioned the 
possibility that the Confederation could call for a strike, "not so much out of sympathy and 
solidarity with the civil servants [who were on strike], but because ... of the need to hold on to its 
side the conservative worker elements" and prevent them from being diverted "towards communist 
and archeiomarxist organizations.. . ', 
735 Local authorities also played a part in the incorporation of 
trade unions. Indeed, the municipality of Kokkinia would often finance the housing of 'friendly' 
labor unions, sponsor their participation in National Labor Conferences, or simply provide them 
with financial assistance. 736 
On the other hand, communist activity in labor unions stepped up during the 1930s. Propaganda 
material was used to inform workers on developments in the trade union movement Its distribution 
often involved groups of workers who would position themselves at particular road junctions 
leading to the great Cotton factories. Then, as workers came out of the factories they would 
approach them individually, starting conversations on current issues and arguing in favor of 
involvement in trade union activity. There was very little public transport and workers would go to 
work on foot over large distances, making street agitation a real possibility. 737 
Of course this process was not always calm and peaceful. As one Communist Party member 
recalls: "Thousands would go down to the factories and we would go along with them selling 
Rizospastes. Security would chase us, catch us, beat us up, make us go through Jesus' torments 
[ird0q], and people would set us free out of sympathy towards us... [because] we understood the 
working man, the oppressed and that was what people liked about us, because it was not only for 
one or two days, but for 34 years that this was going on. Every day, every day... , 738 
735 See 'Classified- Urgent letter/report of the Special Security Bureau of Athens to the Headquarters of the 
Police, Special Security Department, 23/2/193 1, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/108. For police reports in 
Piraeus see 'Urgent-Classified report of the special security branch of City Police to the Police 
Headquarters in Piraeus, 25/2/193 1, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/108 736 See Proceedings of the Municipal Council of N Kokkinia, 16h Meeting, 28/12/1934, Archives of the 
Municipality of Kokkinia (Nikaia), See also Proceedings of the 57 th (30/10/1935) and 65 th (4/2/1936) 
Meetings (ibid) 
737 Interview, Cassette 'Various incidents before World War H' and also 'Before the 4,4 of August- 
Testimony of Kotes Kechagias', in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia. Communist 
Party Branch, Archive of KKE. 
739 Interview, Cassette 'Before the 0 of August-Testimony of Kotes Kechagias', in Audio Archive of 
PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
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Throughout the 1930s, Communism spread through social networks, channeled through members 
of their immediate social circle such as friends and family. 739 Communist trade unionists were very 
keen in taking communist-controlled unions into solidarity strikes when another branch of industry 
was involved in strike action (this included both sections of the same industry or a different 
industry). They also established strike 'fund-raising' activities, assisting strikers financially and 
legally through Workers' Relief and by providing moral support and sent over trade unionists to 
provide organizational and legal support. 740 
The Unitary Labor Center of Piraeus progressively showed more interest in local issues. Hence, 
when a flood once again affected the residents of Kokkinia, it was quick to circulate brochures 
calling refugees to demand food rations, clothing, decent housing and coal. This effort reportedly 
met with success. 741 Workers viewed Rizospastes with sympathy, because it was the only paper that 
reported on their strikes and working conditions. 742 
Strike activity was also stepped up. In the summer of 1933 there was a 27 day-long strike at the 
Cotton factory 'Retsina' in Kokkinia, one of the longest strikes in Kokkinia in the interwar period. 
Strike-breakers driven into the factories under police escort were attacked by strikers, and violent 
clashes followed. Arrested strikers were freed by the intervention of crowds who ran to their 
assistance. Those arrested would be legally and financially supported by Workers' Relief. The strike 
ended in success, achieving a 10% wage increase and a promise by state officials to end terrorism in 
factories and enforce the eight-hour day. 743 
Communists successfully utilized the opportunity of strikes to present themselves as champions of 
workers' rights. During a strike in Kokkinia, a number of strikers was arrested by the police for 
clashing with strike-breakers, Nikolaides, a Communist Party mayoral candidate for Kokkinia, 
headed a committee that intervened and had them released. Such actions earned communists a great 
deal of respect among workers who may not have been communist, but who nevertheless had a very 
strong working class identity and solidarity. 744 
739 Interview, Cassette 'Testimony of Klearchos Triantafillides' in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as 
well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
740 Interview, Caýsette 'Testimony of Klearchos Triantafillides' in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as 
well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE. For Workers Relief activities see for example 
Miospastes 15/7/1933,18n/i933,13/8/1935 etc. 
741 Rizospastes 4/12/1933 and 5/12/1933 
742 Rizospastes 24/5/1931 
743 RjZOSPaSteS 15/7/1933 and 18/7/1933 
744 The interviewee mentioned that the crowd that was waiting outside the precinct were ovedoyed 
watching those arrested being freed. Interview, Cassette 'Before the 4th of August-Testimony of Kotes 
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Soon, working in particular industries, such as the Tobacco industry, was considered by many as 
the first step before joining the party. 745 In 1935-1936, more and more unions adopted the 'Popular 
Front' policy; 'reformist' unions joined the communist unions to form a united body. 746 Just two 
months before the rise of the Metaxas dictatorship, the popular anti-fascist front was beginning to 
gather strength. 
It is important to note that there was a great deal of competition among the Communist Party and 
other left-wing parties (namely the Archeiomarxists, i. e. the Trotskyists) for influence in the trade 
union movement. Indeed, there were several cases in which trade unions in Piraeus changed hands 
between the Communists to the Archeiornarxists and vice versa. A good example is the Bakery 
Union of Piraeus whose leadership changed three times in the course of just six months in 1932.747 
Rizospastes reported that the Bakery Union in Kokkinia remained in the hands of the 
Archeiomarxists: "In Kokkinia there is a clique of Archeio-reactionary bastards that had established 
for some time now a splitting [StaunaaTir, 6] union of Bakery workers. At the head of this break- 
away move were the Archeio-fascists Tzitzopoulos and Mosxopoulou, those excellent 'Bolsheviks 
Leninists' who have signed a declaration and submitted it to the security police and their union 
claiming that they are not communists but simple trade unioniStS., "748 
Opposition to the Communist Party withered away, however, during the mid-1930s. The 
Archeiomarxists' position regarding the trade union movement in Piraeus was that the 'Stalinist' 
Unitary Labor Center and its affiliated trade unions should unite with the reformist Piraeus Labor 
Center. At a meeting of representatives of all parties in December 1933 the Archeiomarxists' 
proposal was rejected both by the Communist Party representatives and the trade unionists of the 
rival 'Trotskyite' group, the 'Liquidarists' who aligned themselves with the Communist-led Unitary 
Labor Center. 749 
However, the main opposition to the Communist Party in the trade unions came from the social 
democrat, pro-Venizelist sections of the organized labor movement. In Piraeus, the social- 
democratic and pro-Venizelist influences in the organized labor movement had strong roots and 
Kechagias', in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive 
of KKE 
745 Interview with Nikandros Kepesis (1711/2003) 
746 Such in the case of the Tobacco workers, See Rizospastes 22/5/193 6 
747 It was taken over by the Archeiomarxists in May and passed on back to the Communists in December of 
the same year. See Pali ton Takseon 24/5/1932 and 3/12/1932 
749 Pizospastes 4/10/1933 
749 pali ton TakSeon 19/12/193 3 
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preceded historically the formation of the Greek Communist Party. Many of their leading figures, 
such as Sideres and Dimitratos, played an active role in the formation of both the General 
Confederation of Greek Labor and the Communist Party itself, and acquiied high posts (Dimitratos, 
for example, was Secretary of SEKE, 1918-1919). Those who adhered to SEKE's first social- 
democratic leadership found themselves outside Party ranks by 1924, following its switch toward the 
politics of the Comintern. However, they continued to exercise significant influence in the trade 
union movement in Piraeus for several years. The hegemony of the social democratic tendency in 
the Piraeus labor movement remained strong until the very end of the interwar period. 
The peak of trade union activity and communist involvement only came about a few weeks before 
it was all terminated with Metaxas' Dictatorship. It has been argued that the events during the May 
Day demonstrations in Salonica were a wake up call for Greece's laboring classes. That was 
certainly true for the workers of Kokkinia. Eye witnesses recall spontaneous demonstrations 
breaking out in Kokkinia, which were met with force by the authorities. A week later a general 
strike was called in Athens and Piraeus, and Kokkinia achieved one of the largest rallies in the area 
(if not the largest), amounting to thousands and forcing the police to barricade themselves inside 
their precinct. The army forces that were called upon to re-establish order were reported to have 
united with the strikers and demonstrators. 750 
But already a few days before the events in Salonica, there was evidence of growing working-class 
solidarity in Kokkinia led by Communists and communist trade unionists. In a meeting called by the 
communist-led Tobacco Union to put forward their demands and give information about the 
ongoing national strike of their branch of industry, more than 12 Kokkinia Unions took part along 
(Y. ý). 751 with representatives from the Unitary Labor Center and the Popular Front , 
Only a few weeks before Metaxas took over power the strike movement spread all over Piraeus, 
with Tobacco workers, shoe-makers, sewing workers, miners and all sections of the All-Workers 
Center striking in solidarity. The workers' participation in the strike in the Piraeus District reached 
almost 100%. The Communist party managed to give a two-fold character to these mobilizations 
750 Interview, Cassette '4h of August, etc. ' in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia 
Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE. Rizospastes reported that it was the biggest mobilization of 
people in the district ever, amounting to some 20,000. See Rizospastes 11/5/1936 
75 1 The meeting also raised a great sum of money to help the tobacco workers live through the strike. See 
kzospasles 7/5/1936 and 8/5/1936 
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involving working class solidarity, on the one hand, and anti-fascist solidarity on the other. For the 
first time, at Communist Party rallies in Kokkinia the participants numbered thousands. 752 
Refugees and communism 
Elefantis holds that, by 1924, as soon as "the committees for refugee settlement were on the job", 
and "peasants at their newly acquired farms a great opportunity was losf' for the Communist 
Party. 753 In other words, the bourgeois order in Greece stood safe behind the relative stabilization 
provided by the refugee settlement. Did the Communist Party lose a great opportunity to turn the 
refugees into a revolutionary force upon their arrival, or was this opportunity never there in the first 
place? A very important element that is often overlooked is that "in those years, people, to a great 
extent -and we say this with certainty- were ignorant of the existence of the Communist Party of 
Greece and the labor struggles that had taken place, especially in Piraeus. 1754 Hence, as one worker 
asked, "to what extent could [the Communist Party] being a small party, still in its birth then, 
influence things by mobilizing great masses of male and female workers? iM5 
What actions were taken by the Communist Party in regards to the refugees who were just 
beginning to settle? The Communist Party realized quite early the need for refugees to organize 
themselves in a manner facilitating their participation in the class struggle, independent of any 
clientage networks that "hold them prisoners of the bourgeois parties., "756 However, although the 
importance of the refugee element as a factor in the class struggles of the country has been pointed 
out, there seems to have been a great deal of confusion in defining what exactly their role would be. 
Nevertheless, the refugees were seen as the determining force in the ultimate outcome of political 
events that were taking place. From an economic point of view, the refugees were rendered a 
particularly "revolutionary factor', although their political allegiance to Venizelos was not 
overlooked. In December 1924 the Communist Party, through a circular of the Executive Committee 
to all the Party branches stressed the need to set up a Central Refugee Committee as well as local 
752 Rizospastes 26/6/1936 
753 Elefantis AG (1999) p 123 
754 Interview, Cassette: 'verbal traditions, life reports etc, before 1934', in Audio Archive of PEAEA 
Kokkinias as well as KoWnia Communist Party Branch, Archive of YXE 
755 Interview, Cassette: 'verbal traditions, life reports etc, before 1934', in Audio Archive of PEAEA 
Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
756 'Report if the Executive Committee from 0 of September to 15'h of November 1925' plO, in Fifel, 
Archive of KKE 
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committees that would collect information on the economic, political and professional situation 
among the refugee population. These would include, reports, reviewing refugee non-communist 
press and brochures. 757 
The course of action that was set forward regarding refugee party cells involved, firstly, 
'enlightening' the refugee masses on the segregation between refugees and natives that was 
promoted by the politics of bourgeois parties and putting forward the slogan of a united front among 
natives and refugees. Secondly, the party underlined the need to 'neutralize' the control of the 
bourgeois parties as it was manifested through the clientage networks. 758 The Party believed that 
recent developments left it "facing in a more direct way the problem of a more specific politics on 
the refugee issue, while they have rendered it imperative to depart from a narrow propagandist work 
to more wide-spread action. "759 However, it was soon pointed out that there was a growing gap 
between theoretical work on the refugee issue at the level of the executive committee and actual 
work at a grass-roots level. This situation led to a vicious circle "because the theoretical elaboration 
and understanding of the refugee issue was impossible to carry forward since the Communist Party 
had not established a connection with the refugee masses, but only attempted from outside to point 
out and express their needs. "760 
Towards the end of 1925 and beginning of 1926, Nikolaides along with some other refugee 
supporters of the Communist Party, took the initiative in forming the Refugee Democratic Union in 
Kokkinia. This association progressively managed to achieve a growing presence in local politics 
and cultural activities, becoming a key factor behind the growth of the left movement in Kokkinia. 
Nikolaides was put forward by the Piraeus Party Branch as the candidate for the local elections. 
Despite being in prison he managed to receive some 830 votes. 761 
757 'Circular of the EC to all Party branches' 17/12/1924, in File2, Archives of KKE 
'" 'Theses on the Refugee Issue, 1925, pp 1 -3, in File 1, Archive of KKE 759 'Action Report of the Central Committee to the Extraordinary Congress of KKE, 1925', plO, File 1, in 
Archive of KKE 
760 In 'Letter by the Secretary of the Cell of the Military Prison of Parapigmaton' 22/6/1925, p3 1, File 1, In 
Archive of KKE 
761 Biographical Note of Georgios Nikolaides, in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia 
Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE. A brief history of Nikolaides: He was born in Asia Minor but 
migrated to France in search for employment. While in France, influenced by the international events 
(October Revolution etc) he became progressively involved in working class struggles. In 1923 he became 
a member of the French Communist Party. His trade union activities resulted to his eventual deportation, so 
he came back to Kokkinia where his refugee parents had settled. He was executed in 1943 by the 
Occupation authorities as reprisals for guerilla activities. (ibid) 
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At the end of 1926, the Piraeus Branch set out to form a 'skeleton of settlement committees' in 
order to mediate and become a link between the CP and the refugee masses. Eleven settlement 
committees were set up, calling for meetings in the settlements and arguing for the need of 
'revolutionary struggle', the importance of the movement as well as ways of pursuing the immediate 
demands of the refugees. The committees in Castella and Kokkinia were reported to have done 
particularly well. An especially successful practice included setting up cafd-committees (i. e. 
discussion groups in cafes), which helped to "spread the influence of the Party all over the 
settlemenf . 
762 
The Communist Party was particularly successful with refugees from Armenia. Taking advantage 
of their "sympathies towards Soviet Russia", the CP managed to recruit several Armenian refugees 
and set up an Armenian Bureau. By 1928 Communist Party influence among Armenian refugees 
was estimated at 85-90% ! 763 The strength of the Communist Party in the Piraeus District in 1928 
was as follows: 
Table 35: CP Membership in Piraeus (1927-1928)764 
Period Factory 
Cells 
Petty- 
Enterprises 
Cells 
Street 
Cells 
Total 
Cells 
Number 
Of 
Workers 
Others Total 
Membership 
July 1927 16 1 2 19 144 13 157 
December 1927 16 5 - 21 179 17 196 
March 1928 is - 9 27 250 25 275 
November 1928 15 8 23 170 10 180 
When questioned about how the people in Kokkinia at the time perceived communists, the 
answers given were somewhat conflicting. One respondent claimed that people saw Communists as 
'trouble makers', but a second one disagreed, arguing that "people who had truly democratic beliefs 
looked up to him [the communist] with great sympathy, and tried to help as much as possible, 
762 'Report on the activities of the Local Conunittee' of Piraeus, January-April 1927, File6, Archives of 
KKE 
763 Action Report of the Piraeus District Organization (January to March 1928), p13, Filel. 0, Archivi of 
KKE 
764 'Statistical Data for the Period 1927-1928', File 11, in Archive of KKE 
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because that was the purpose of human beings". 765 Both statements correspond to the realities of the 
time, as no single view could be taken as generally defining refugee opinion on the communists. In 
any case, views were influx throughout the period concerned. 
The Communist Party attempted to combat the passivity that dominated refugee associations. Its 
representatives in the various refugee meetings and congresses would point out that "only intensive 
mobilization, rallies, demonstrations and decisive struggle" would unable them to succeed so that 
"Venizelos' government accept their demands. "766 The Party also managed to mobilize 
sympathizers, a reserve of activists who are often overlooked. One refugee, who did not join the 
party until the beginning of World War II, mentioned in his interview that "many of us, such as 
myself .. were not organized [as a party member]. However, I never stopped helping out, constantly 
keeping in my mind that my place was with them. , 767 
Women were also active within the ranks of the Communist Party in Kokkinia, especially in the 
tobacco, carpet and sewing industries where the female workforce became familiar with communist 
activities and beliefs. However, the mobilization of women was difficult. In addition to the stigma of 
being a communist, women had to deal particularly with the prevailing stereotypes regarding their 
place in home and society, away from politics and union activity. 768 
Nevertheless, the Party's membership and influence did not match its 'expectations'. Indeed, the 
Party seems to have been well aware of its own weaknesses: Rizospastes reported in 1929 that "the 
fact that Piraeus today constitutes the nest of reactionary forces is due, to a great extent, to the 
inabilities and weaknesses of the Left Block. ". 769 These weaknesses were due to internal party 
disputes as much as to external factors such as incorporation and state intervention. 
The Party Branch in Piraeus experienced more inner-party conflict than any other. In 1924, just as 
the waves of refugees were settling in the area, the Party was busy dealing with a fraction that was 
formed within its ranks called 'Communist Union', which also published its own paper. In 1927, the 
leadership of the Piraeus District Organization and the Youth aligned themselves on the side of the 
765 Interview, Cassette 'Various occasions before World War Il", in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias, 
as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
766 Contribution of the representative of All-Refugee Union of N Kokkinia in a meeting of 27 refugee 
associations of Athens and Piraeus, in Rizospastes 7/4/1929 
767 Interview, Cassette 'Various occasions before World War 11", in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias 
as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
768 See Interview, Cassette 'Various occasions before World War Ir, in Audio Archive of PEAEA 
Kolddnias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KYýE 769 Rizospastes 5/6/1929 
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Opposition (or 'Liquidarists' as they were known in Party literature). A Party report of the internal 
situation mentioned that "the Piraeus Organization, had, more than any other party branch, been 
shocked by internal crisis. v1770 Some 4/5 of the District Committee was reported to be on the side of 
the Opposition. According to Spartakos, the journal of the Opposition, the Youth leadership in 
Piraeus was replaced through the "hiring of a dictatorial committee"', while membership was 
changed by expelling older members on the one hand, and "recruiting every kid they could find" on 
the other. 771 
The deterioration of talks between the two 'parties" into a contest of 'fake' versus 'true' Leninists 
and 'agents of the secret police' versus 'exemplary Bolsheviks' did not help to improve the Party in 
the eye of the masses. 772 Members of the Opposition continued to 'operate' within party ranks for 
some time after the expulsion of their leadership, since they were encouraged by the latter to "follow 
the party line [so that they remain in the party] and present themselves to the masses championing 
the party line so that they gain their sympathy and hence conquer party PoStS. 073 Those inner-party 
disputes kept the Party in Piraeus busy settling its own affairs for most of the 1920s. 
It was not until the 1930s that the party expanded among refugees in general and in Kokkinia in 
particular. Communism in Kokkinia became progressively attractive to the younger generation of 
refugees, who, especially during the social upheavals of the mid 1930s, were keen to participate in 
popular mobilizations. Issues that frequently came up during interviews had to do with radical 
activism, such as freeing militant workers from prison, and overturning cars that had been used to 
break strikes by transporting workers from other districts. Such events, described with noticeable 
enthusiasm, attracted young people to more militant doctrines, progressively breaking them away 
from the passivity that was more common among the elders in the community. 774 One refugee noted: 
"We were then young, and as young people we were most of all extremists... 075 University students 
were also widely utilized by the Party for ideological and educational purposes. Indeed, in the 
770 'Report on the internal situation and the responsibilities of the Piraeus Organization', 1927, pl, File 6, 
Archive of KKE 
" Spartakos, Special Edition, November 1927, File 4, Archive of KKE 
772 See 'Decision of the Piraeus District Committee on today's Party crisis' 29h of September 1927, File6, 
in Archive of KKE. Note that majority of the District Committee were on the side of the Opposition when 
that report was written. 
773 Proceedings of the Opposition Meeting on 9/3/1928, in File8, Archive of KKE 'n4 Interview, Cassette 'Various incidents before World War R', in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as 
well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
775 Interview, in Cassette 'Before the 40' of August', in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as 
Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
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1930s, ideological work among the refugees was stepped up, through the organization of achtif, a 
form of ideological class, which was carried forward by university students in the settlements of 
Kokkinia, Drapetsona, Tampouria and others. 776 
A popular route to communism among young people was the various sports clubs. The communist 
party had realized early the significance of working class and popular sports, and used this to its 
advantage. Several party and youth cells sprang up among the numerous athletic associations of 
Kokkinia in the mid-1930S. 777 Before or after matches, a speaker would often address those present 
and leaflets would be distributed; it needs to be mentioned at this point, however, that not all people 
understood 'what this was all about'. Nevertheless, 'Red Sports' progressively became a part of 
settlement social life. In 1932 the Armenian Federation of Labor Sport celebrated five years of 
existence in Kokkinia, involving a range of festivities, such as football matches among various 
workers' football teams from across the settlement, speeches, parades and singing. Hundreds of 
workers were reported to have participated in the festivities. Extensive sport coverage was found in 
the columns of the Party press as well as in the party youth's paper Neoldia. 778 Also successful were 
the occasional field trips organized by the Unitary Labor Center, combining leisure and 
propaganda. 779 
Communists often made themselves known by loud demonstrations. As Acropolis mentioned in 
1931 in Kokkinia, "during the peak of the market at the settlement around 20 communists have 
gathered shouting in favor of the Soviets and against the existing regime [in Greece]. Drawn by their 
shouting, many workers gathered around them in curiosity, until the communists encouraged them 
to head all together towards the settlement's bakery and acquire through force the bread that the 
government have refused to provide to the unemployed. " The gathering was violently dissolved by 
the authorities, whereas, the ones who 'started the trouble' were arrested on the grounds of the 
Idionymon. An unemployed committee published a complaint announcement which was also sent in 
Parliament condemning the authorities for their attitude and demanding the freeing of the ones in 
custody "who as they claim did no crime". 780 
776 Testimony of Kokkinares Nikos, in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia' 
Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
m Testimony of Kotes Kechagias, in Cassette 'Before the 4h of August', in Audio Archive of PEAEA 
Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 778 Neolaid 1/4/1932 
779 Activities would range from political discussions to theatre performances. See Rizospastes 30/5/1933 
780 Acropolis 9/6/1931 
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Trials were used by the communists as a popular platform to present their ideas. Communists 
earned a great deal of respect as a result of their attitude in the courts. Having been arrested for trade 
union activity, they would often be seen as a true representative of workers' interests, facing the 
authorities and risking victimization by the state: "they'd be admired for their self-sacrifice", was a 
typical view. One refugee recalled an exchange of words between the judge and the accused that had 
been imprinted in his memory "ever since". To a question by the judge 'what do you aim for? ' the 
accused answered: "Mr. President, [we aim] to turn this table that lies before you around". "He 
meant the system, " added the refugee. 781 
The progressive establishment of the image of a communist as a champion of workers' rights, was 
reflected in the columns of a by no means communist-friendly paper, which nevertheless reported in 
1936 on the arrest of Manoleas, the communist NIP for Piraeus: "We have to admit that 'comrade' 
Manoleas is one of the most sympathetic characters of the red block... In Piraeus he is so popular, 
that people of totally opposite political beliefs, big owners and big businessmen would accompany 
him. It impresses how he, until yesterday an insignificant Ship worker, is either at one time a 
candidate for mayor, or an NIP. It is true that the number of votes he received in the last elections 
would be envied by many 'big' bourgeois NIPs. And in Piraeus, if one gets angry because of some 
misfortune created by the state of some usury he yells, between being serious and not: -I'll get you. 
I'll vote for Manoleas at the next election. Legendary therefore is Manoleas to the people of 
Piraeus. M2 
Party meetings would often take place in a convenient cafi6. This was often a safer place to hold 
meetings than the local union offices, which were frequently watched by the authorities. The semi- 
legal status of the Communist Party made the operations and communications of local branches 
difficult. A party member from Kokkinia recalls: "you could say that at the time we acted like 
conspirators. You could not mention who you were or where you were from... " The self-protection 
measures taken by each cell were indeed quite tight. 783 Sometimes gossip would prove the 
communists' worst eneMy. 784 Safe houses were difficult to find, and in some cases party members 
would have to travel a great distance to find a safe place to carry forward the cell's business. The 
781 Testimony of Kotes Kechagias, in Cassette 'Before the e of August', in Audio Archive of PEAEA 
Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 782 Acropolis 8/6/1936 
783 Interview, in Cassette 'Kokldnia-I-fistory', in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia 
Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
784 The party would seriously wam members of the disastrous effects of gossip in the security of party cells, 
in Deltion, no 4, May 1932 p6 
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few safe houses that did exist were utilized for 'business use', but also constituted "a little oasis in 
the harsh conditions of semi-illegality and illegality that we lived through, " where party members 
would find the chance of resting and socializing in a 'friendly-comradely atmosphere'. 785 
In many cases, the first contact with Soviet Communism took place through soviet culture, 
especially Soviet literature and cinema. Information on the Soviet Union, although scarce, was 
available through the party press and brochures. But for most people, even for party members, 
communism remained mostly 'something of the imagination' throughout the interwar period . 
786 It is 
no surprise, therefore, that before becoming full Party members, individuals would usually have to 
go through a 'trial-period' that could last up to two to three months in some cases. 
Refusal to pay rent for refugee houses was actively encouraged by the Communist Party, which 
participated in the formation of 'struggle committees" that coordinated such efforts in the 
settlements. Rizospastes often reported on such activities, as well as related subjects, such as 
evictions due to debt problems. 787 An article by G. Nikolaides, candidate for mayor of Kokkinia for 
the KKE, noted that the supporters of the United Front of Workers and Peasants organized the All- 
Refugee Union, and through its housing block committees, managed to cancel several house 
evictions. They also looked after orphans, secured help for ill families, supported widows and, with 
the 'red MP comrade' Manoleas in charge, fought with the Minister for a watering system in 
Kokkinia. 788 
The internationalist character of the Communist Party sometimes came into conflict with the 
nationalism that was encouraged among the refugees as the explanation of their misery. 
Accordingly, Rizospastes stressed in 1930: "The exploiters of refugee issues [7rpocrVvyoK6"Aoi] 
mobilize themselves demanding compensations from the Turks. Poor refugees must not demand any 
compensation from the working masses of Turkey. They do not live any better than the working 
masses of Greece. The working refugee masses must demand from the Venizelos Government a ftill 
compensation for the entirety of the property left behind in Turkey, and the canceling of all their 
debts to the RSC, the State, and the Banks etc. "789 
785 Interview with Nikandros Kepeses (17/l/2003) and Biographical Note no 2985 of Takes Chioureas, in 
File 'Biographical notes of militants 2900-2997', in KMIEA 
786 Interview with Nikandros Kepeses (17/112003) 
787 Rizospastes 18/4/1930,10/8/1930 
788 RjZOSPaSteS 9/2/1934 
789 RiZOSPWteS 15/6/1930 
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The publication of local factory papers by the party cells in settlements was actively encouraged. 
Hence, a number of factory papers appeared from time to time, reporting on factory issues, trade 
union activities in other branches of industry as well as the life in refugee settlements. Their 
publication, however, was not always consistent due to persecution or inability of party cells to 
790 divert much needed resources, when other areas of activity could seem more pressing. Party and 
youth cells in Kokkinia tried to raise the circulation of Rizospastes through paper-selling 
competitions. This tactic had some effect since it resulted in a rise in the papers' circulation up to 
70-100% or even more in some cases. 791 
Table 36: Results of cell-competition in paper selling (1/9-20/10 1933)"2 
Town Athens Mitiline Salonica, Piraeus Patra Katerine Xanthe 
Increase in 600 60 400 150 60 50 60 
paper sales 
% ofthe 75 50 80 40 50 100 50 
plan II I I I I I 
% increase/ 30 50 30 70 130 
previous 
circulation 
The paper selling team of Kokkinia did very well, placing it among the second best-selling teams. 
By 1934, almost a third of the papers sold in Piraeus, were sold in Kokkinia, reflecting the party's 
growing influence in the settlement. 793 Similar conclusions can be drawn from the following table 
referring to local statistics for 1936: 
Table 37: Results of cell-competition in paper selling in Piraeus (May 1936) 794 
Organization I' of May 3d of May Organization I" of May V of May 
Tobacco W 200 n. a. Drapetsona 130 118 
Kokkinia 491 460 Kaminia 126 n. a. 
Tambouria 250 165 Ship-workers 180 60 
Kremmudarou 236 217 Total 1,613 1,090 
7" See for example Frgatis Lipasmaton [Fertilizer Worker], organ of the communist cell 25/3/1930 791 See Neolaid 18/11/1932, Rizospastes 9/4/1933 
m See Rizospastes 29/10/1933 
793 Rizospastes 3/1/1934 
794 RizospasteS 7/5/1936 
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By 1934, the Kokkinia communists had grown in strength sufficiently to form an Achtida. 
Following a raid on the Rizospastes offices by the fascist organization 'Triaina' (National 
Socialists), the Kokkinia branch stepped up the party's anti-fascist campaign, recruiting new 
members, forming new cells and organizing fund raising events. 795 An Anti-Fascist Democratic 
Coalition of the Kokkinia Youth was soon formed. This included a wide range of youth 
organizations from the settlement, such as political, athletic, cultural and factory organizations. In 
September 1935 a meeting of the Coalition was held, and 72 delegates from Kokkinia's Youth Clubs 
decided to organize anti-fascist democratic groups in every neighborhood block in the settlement. 796 
The parties responded to an invitation by the Communist Party to forin an anti-fascist coalition that 
"they were in agreement in principle" but were reluctant to commit any further. 797 At the same time, 
a local communist newspaper was published despite difficulties -the post office refused to distribute 
the paper. 798 
Progressively the Party and its influence grew. The number of activists reported in pre-election 
campaigns rose considerably in 1935 amounting to hundreds rather than tens as in the past. 799 In 
August 1936 the Piraeus District Organization paper reported on the events that had been taking 
place over the past couple of months. The apparent left turn of the working class and the successes 
of the 'Left Block' within the trade union movement were attributed to the fact that workers had 
been increasingly seeking "more radical solutions to their issues". For the Piraeus Organization, 
their eventual position at the head of the working class struggle in Piraeus was inevitable since the 
path of radicalism and militancy that the workers had been taking was a path that "could not be 
followed by the likes of Kalomoires [i. e. the reformist trade union leaders], but only by us. 12800 
The rise in the strength of the communist party in Piraeus and the settlements in the 1930s was 
also partly facilitated by developments that took place in regards to inner and extra party disputes. In 
1931 the Piraeus District Committee voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Call of the Communist 
International (37 votes in favor and just one against), which criticized the previous CP leadership 
and effectively replaced it, Following these developments, the Piraeus District Committee begun a 
795 See Rizospasles 19/11/1934 and 20/11/1934 
796 Mzospastes 1/9/1935 
797 Rizospastes 25/1/1936 
799 Mzospastes 17/12/1934 
7" Rizospastes 2/6/1935 
800 Proletarios, August 1936 
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campaign tq implement and incorporate the Comintern proposals into the local politics in Piraeus. 801 
This effectively marked the end of inner-party disputes and the beginning of a period of internal 
calm among the ranks of the Communist Party allowing it to focus on external issues. 
What were the relations of the Communist Party and the main Trotskyite Party KOMLEA 
throughout the 1930s? One communist refugee described the Trotskyites as always doing the 
opposite that the Party did: "so if, for example, we were to decide to go on a strike, they'd say no, 
we should not have it there, and if we do, it is not the way we should do it... ". 802 But the distinctions 
between the Communist Party and the Archeiomarxists were not always clear to the refugees. 
Characteristic is the case of a refugee in Kokkinia, who was first approached by the 
Archeiomarxists. He was a member of the shoe-makers Union, where there were regular 
confrontations among the two groups. He described his first contact with the Archeiomarxists as 
such: "there was a meeting held and they took me with them without knowing [what it was about]. 
All I knew was that they were communists of some sort let's say. " He soon broke away from them 
because he disagreed with their tactic of 'first education and then action' and joined the communist 
party where it was held that 'we educate ourselves during the struggle'. When it came to 
commenting about other Trotskyite groups, his answer was perhaps indicative of a general attitude 
at the time amongst communist party members: "We did not know what a Liquidarist was supposed 
to be ... all of them, liquidarists, Trotskyites [i. e. Archeiomarxists] we thought them as a bunch, since 
they were against us so to speak. 403 
Yet, until the beginning of the 1930s, Communists and Archeiomarxists in Kokkinia would often 
invite each other to participate in meetings on matters such as participation in anti-fascist 
conferences or the Workers' Relief. 804 In the 1932 elections, KOMLEA (Archeiomarxists) decided 
not to go down independently but to join the electoral campaign on the side of the Communist 
Party. 805 
The tactics that the Archeiomarxists utilized to promote their agenda in CP meetings included 
going to rallies and assemblies organized by the Party and asking for the floor in order to address 
so' Rizospastes 7/12/1931 
802 Interview, Cassette 'Various incidents before World War II', in Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as 
well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 
803 Interview, Cassette 'Kokkinia, I-Iistory- testimonies of various incidents before the war in Kokkinia', in 
Audio Archive of PEAEA Kokkinias as well as Kokkinia Communist Party Branch, Archive of KKE 804 See Pali ton Takseon 30/7/1930 and 9/8/1932 
805 Pali ton Takseon 27/8/1932 
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those present. They would then shout slogans such as 'hurray for Trotsky', and 'hurray for the left 
opposition'. These interventions were typically followed by clashes between the various groups. 806 
By 1933 Trotskyites in Piraeus would admit that "undoubtedly, during the recent past and 
especially today the Piraeus Organization is not in a very good situation ... 
What one can observe in 
the Piraeus Organization is a dangerous sectarianism that has occupied it, in the districts as well as 
in the professional area. " Typical characteristics included a lack of continuity in action and 
consequently in obligations, and weakness in the process of assimilation of new members. Indeed, 
,, 807 as the report noted "many months have passed and no one has actually joined our lines... 
Although 'internal opposition' was progressively weakened throughout the 1930s, external 
pressures coming from state repression as well as extreme right-wing groups remained at high 
levels. Public Party gatherings and rallies, were watched by the authorities who conducted random 
body searches or, harassed individuals, inquiring the purpose of their presence at the particular 
event . 
808 Refugees who were suspected of communist sympathies or activities would face serious 
obstacles in dealing with the authorities or in applying for welfare and housing. 809 
There were several reports in Rizospastes about house searches in Kokkinia by secret police 
[Xaýpik&q]. Individuals found in possession of any sort of communist propaganda material, such as 
brochures or papers, were physically or psychologically harassed, rounded up and driven to the 
nearest police leadquarters for questioning. There were instances whereby the police would offer a 
shop owner who was found in possession of such material the choice of either losing his shop or 
signing up to be an informer on communist activity in the settlement. In another instance, a refugee 
paper seller was threatened with deportation! This attitude towards refugees who, were party 
members or sympathizers brought a sense of solidarity among a wider number of refugees who 
began to view them with sympathy. 810 
The excessive use of force by the authorities was often criticized by the non-communist press. So, 
for example 4cropofis would write in 18/6/1929 how "a minor clash between strikers and strike- 
breakers, became the pretext for the police and the army to carry forward an entire organized attack 
806 See for example the pre-election rally of KKE in Piraeus, in Pali ton Takseon 16/8/1932 
807 Pali ton Takseon 26/8/1933 
sog See Biographical Note, no354 (Georgios Doukakes) in File 'Biographies of Militants' 301-500, Archive 
of the KMIEA- The particular event mentioned was the celebration of the May Day in 1934. 809 Such as in the case of a refugee widow, Eugenia Gourles whose application for housing was declined by 
the representative of the Ministry of Welfare on the grounds that "she is a communist and her sons are 
Bolsheviks. " (Rizospastes 11/6/1930) 
810 See Rizospastes 22/8/1933,4110/1933,17/9/1934,2/6/1936 
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against the settlement, keeping the spirits of the residents tense because many policemen did not 
,, 811 hesitate even to enter houses holding guns, as if it were a real battle. 
Suppression of- course was not directed exclusively against Communist Party members and 
sympathizers. It was also aimed at trade-unionists and progressives as well as groups that opposed 
the KKE politically, such as the Trotskyites. In the latter case, an open call was made by the Piraeus 
District Committee (of KOMLEA) to their CP counterparts in 1933 to set up a united front against 
state 'terrorism'. 812 
Through the early 1930s there was also a systemization of EEE (National Union Hellas) activities 
in Piraeus: A circular publicized the establishment of a Greek youth organization called 'National 
Regiment of Greek Alkimon', and "called for its members to report at the snitch precinct of 
surveillance of EEE of any 'illegal activities' of communists, civil servants, etc!. Such groups were 
also organized in Kokkinia. 813 
An example of the ever-increasing confrontations between Communists and Nationalists was the 
gathering of EEE members at the Variete Theatre of Kokkinia in April 1933 (around 25 uniformed 
youth with the EEE flag). "However", as Rizospastes noted "the proletarians of Piraeus [in their 
hundreds according to Rizospastes] expressed beyond doubt, that they would not allow the 
establishment of fascist organizations in their borough. " There followed gun fire and clashes among 
demonstrators, the police that were guarding the building, and members of EEE. Following the 
814 classes there were raids of houses and the arrests of seven people, members of KKE. In total 17 
people were arrested and sentenced to 47 years of prison and exile. The Party took the opportunity to 
call for the establishment of anti-fascist Unions of action everywhere. 815 These developments took 
place just after the rise of Nazism in Germany. 
Nevertheless, the Party made significant head-away in the 1930s among the refugee populations in 
general and in Kokkinia in particular. This success can be seen in the Party's electoral results. 
Indeed, in Kokkinia the Party's share of the vote increased from 1.5% in 1926 and an all-time low of 
0.7% in 1928 to 6.8% in 1932 and an interwar period high of 11.2% in 1934. As the table below 
811 Acropolis 18/6/1929. The article refers to the neighboring settlement of Drapetsona; a mainly industrial 
zone, where many refugees from Kokkin7ta worked. 
812 The offer was declined. See Pali ton Takseon, 219/1933 
813 Cited in Rizospastes 13/3/1933. See also Decision of the 5 th District Assembly of the communist 
organization of Piraeus, published in Rizospastes 5/4/1933 
8 14 Rizospwtes 10/4/1933 
815 Rizospastes 12/4/1933 
189 
shows, by 1936 the Communist Party constituted the main political opposition force to the Liberals 
in Kokkinia. 
Table 38: Elections in Kokkinia (1936)816 
Party No of Votes Party No of Votes 
Liberals 4,436 Kanellopoulos 78 
Popular Front (KKE, 568 Archeiomarxists 21 
Kondyles 303 
Populists 129 Total 5,695 
According to Rizospastes the communist vote almost tripled in Kokkinia local elections in the 
period between 1931 and 1935.817 Apart from being the result of communist activities in the 
community as well in work places, there are some additional reasons for this rise in the communist 
vote. By the early 1930s the communist party began to organize the electoral struggle in Kokkinia 
more effectively. It set up an electoral committee and formed tiny nuclei in neighborhoods that were 
responsible for gathering financial support and circulating electoral material. It was often the case 
that a triad would set up a higher plan for itself to fulfill and then call the others into what they 
called 'socialist competition. ' This method of 'incentive' would prove quite popular among party 
cells and spread into other party activities, such as paper selling, producing positive results. 818 Thus 
the Party succeeded to some extent in identifying itself as a genuine champion of workers' rights. It 
also managed to introduce the language of class to a larger audience. A local Liberal-friendly 
newspaper in Piraeus pointed out the danger of having only "one class party among other 
personalized parties", especially in view of 'bankrupted' politicians who would once again in view 
of the forthcoming elections "be in a hurry, with their usual excitement, to present themselves as 
supporters and champions of any sort worker-friendly, or peasant-friendly ideology. "8 19 
916 AnaMorfoSiS 2/2/1936. For more election results see Appendices 16 and 17. 817 See Rizospastes 12/6/193 5 
918 Rizospastes 30/5/1933 
919 Neoi Kairoi 4/7/1931 
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Conclusion 
In the last two chapters we have outlined a series of interwoven factors of incorporation and 
emancipation. A schematic representation of the means of incorporation in juxtaposition to the 
methods of emancipation used by the communist party is seen in the diagram in the following page. 
In regards to the process of settlement and living conditions, economic devastation and the sudden 
loss of status led initially to fatalism and apathy, not radicalism. During the early years of settlement, 
in particular, refugees were pre-occupied with the requirements of day-to-day survival, where 
political participation and choice beyond what refugees saw as necessary for survival was a luxury. 
Constant movement and relocation in search of employment or of lost family members combined 
with a conviction that their refugee condition was only temporary and the hope of eventually 
returning back to their home country, prevented refugees from becoming politically active. It was 
not until mobility rates slowed considerably and the hope of returning was shattered by the Greco- 
Turkish Treaty of 1930 that refugees started becoming more involved in the labor and social 
struggles of their new home-country. 
The very pattern and process of settlement sowed the seeds of doubt and suspicion towards the 
authorities that would eventually grow into dissent. Patterns of accommodation helped to reinforce 
community spirit and networks of solidarity. Private life was a rare phenomenon in such close 
quarters. In addition to their common experience, the way their environment was built led to the 
formation of a community ideology where the community interest took precedence over an 
individual one. Issues of rent payment and debt became the initial elements that led to an ideological 
dichotomy between 'us' and 'them'. A growing sense of injustice contributed to a deepening of that 
dichotomy into 'poor' and 'rich', arguably a form of proto- working class consciousness. 
We have seen that settlement itself was a means of incorporation, to the extent that the segregation 
of refugees made it easy to manipulate them politically and to keep them, initially at least, away 
from labor struggles. Gerrymandering gave Venizelos an advantage in the electoral struggles 
throughout the interwar period. We have also seen that there was a clear political intent behind the 
pattern of settlement to suppress radicalism in general and communism in particular. 
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Schema 3: Means of incorporation versus means of emancipation and responses of the Communist Party 
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Uthaian of rtfugee culb" and 
aWefic associafions for a6tadon 
and propaganda -p 2nicul2ily 
successful among YVA 
In regards to channels of political participation and power, refugee associations and the so-called 
rcfUgec-fathers' (the new refugee 'clitc') attempted to mediate between refugees and state 
authorities and the RSC. Ilowevcr, the inability or lack of will to become an effective pressure group 
may have prevented them ftom becoming an independent political force in Greek politics. In the 
long run this worked to their disadvantage. That is because the vacuum they lcft in terms of leading 
struggles in the community and workplace was picked up by the Communist Party. Furthermore, 
Personal rivalries made refugee associations easy to manipulate by the state and even more 
incffcctivc in championing refugee demands. The role of clicntism and its effectiveness is often 
emphasized; however, as we have seen it was relatively limited in scope. Most refugees had no 
access to the 'benefits' of clicntist nctworks. 
In regards to the nativc-rcfugec dichotomy and the incorporation of refugees into the existing 
national schism between Vcnizclists and Populists, a series of objective and subjective factors were 
highlightencd. The Crown was indeed credited, in the minds of the vast majority of refugees, with 
responsibility for the Asia Minor catastrophe, and the Vcnizclists, on the other hand with their 
salvation. To this should be also added the genuinely Republican- democratic ideological 
background that most refugees shared. This 'block' political mentality was further reinforced 
throughout the interwar period by a widcsprcad belief that they were threatened by a possible 
Populist government; a belief that was enhanced by the various verbal and physical attacks they 
Suffered from Royalist supporters. The schism was also fueled by the Vcnizelists themselves, who, 
of course, had a political advantage in keeping it as it was. After the 1930 Treaty signed by the 
Liberal Party, howcvcr, there seems to be a gradual drift from the Venizelist camp due to 
disappointment with Vcnizclos for his handling of refugee affairs abroad, as well as the Liberal 
Party's adoption of more conservative politics. Accordingly, refugees increasingly started seeking 
more 'radical' solutions. 
In terms of the electoral process, we have noted the importance of gerrymandering, as well as the 
manipulation of the refugee vote through rigging and the harassment of candidates and activists of 
the opposition parties. We then examined the relations among refugees and those with authority, 
such as state officials and the RSC. We have seen the first stages of turning from passive acceptance 
of events into active dcriancc, often regardless of party affiliation or ideology. Such confrontations 
contributed towards forging, what one refugee described as a 'popular unity' in Kokkinia. Finally we 
Pointed to certain key characteristics of community politics and ideology. Mutual tics and solidarity 
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networks worked both in favor of and against the rise of radical ideologies and doctrines in the 
settlement. Particular importance was given to the sense of continuity that was forged through 
various means: collective memory looked to the past with nostalgia, promoting patient endurance of 
the ills of the present, with little care for the future. All these elements enhanced cross-class social 
cohesion. This was reinforced by anti-communism in the press and in refugee associations. 
Solidarity bonds, of course, also worked against social cohesion. When fellow workers or people 
of one's own neighborhood were dealt with unjustly by the authorities, this had a wider collective 
impact in the community. Accordingly, solidarity bonds began to develop along class lines and not 
just ethnic lines as was originally the case. Anti-communist propaganda, moreover, conflicted with 
everyday experience: refugees were increasingly more inclined to see communists as they appeared 
in their everyday life in the community and workplace, rather through the columns of the press. 
The growth (or not) of communism among the refugee working class also had to do with the 
ability of the Communist Party itself to function in the settlements. State persecution of communists 
and internal strife undoubtedly played a negative role in this regard. Continuous Party crises and 
competition from other left-wing groups posed serious obstacles for the Piraeus Organization, which 
made no significant headway until the beginning of the 1930s. Local Party branches in the refugee 
settlements did have some degree of autonomy from what went on centrally due to lack of 
communication, especially when the Party was illegal and its members had to work underground. 
Nevertheless, many of the former 'social-democratic' leaders of SEKE (and later KKE) were active 
trade unionists in Piraeus, with significant influence in the working class of that area. Hence, the 
aftershocks of internal disputes were especially felt in the regional Party branches. Splits in the Party 
often meant the subsequent disaffiliation of several trade unions, further weakening the Party's 
influence in the labor movement. The same applies in the case of the 'Opposition' of Pouliopoulos 
which, as we have seen, had more than half its national strengt4 in Piraeus. 
Nevertheless, the inability of the 'reformist' trade union leadership to go beyond the acceptable 
limits of legal action set by the authorities and to undertake militant steps in pushing forward 
worker's demands and the decline of other left organizations left KKE as the sole political force able 
and willing to lead the struggle. The Popular Front policy proved successful because it allowed for 
trade unionists as well as ordinary working class persons who were not communists (and who up to 
then could have been characterized as 'social-fascists' by the Party) to approach the KKE and join 
its efforts against an increasingly authoritarian state. 
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Chapter 8: Working class communism in interwar Greece -The case of the Tobacco 
Workers in Kavala 
Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the processes that led to tobacco workers' militancy and adherence to 
the communist left. These processes were not as straightforward as it is often implied in the existing 
literature. Mazower argues that "tobacco workers formed one of the most militant sections of the 
Greek labor force", which constituted in the interwar period "one of the most loyal blocks of support 
for the Communist Party"820. The reasons offered in the literature for tobacco workers' radicalism 
could be summarized as a) lack of ties with land, b) the working environment and the unusually high 
ratio of workers to employer ("a staggering 272,8 to I" according to Mavrogordatos), and c) housing 
and living conditions. 821 However, the explanatory model of lack of land ties + big factories 
+working and living conditions = woffing class radicalism is unacceptably mechanistic. 
The chapter begins by discussing the characteristics of the tobacco industry in Kavala, including 
its emergence and development, the unique process of tobacco processing and its consequences on 
employment and labor conditions. The chapter then examines the progress of the labor movement in 
the 1920s and 1930s. In the first part, dealing with the 1920s, the chapter touches upon the unique 
characteristics of the tobacco workers' movement which managed to achieve early victories 
concerning union rights and labor conditions. It examines the influx of refugees and their successful 
incorporation into the existing labor movement. Special importance is given to the attempts of 
authorities to split the labor movement. The chapter examines how the opposing labor camps 
developed and how they confronted each other in the first big strike in 1928. 
The chapter then examines the changes in the industry in the period 1927-1933, ihe reason behind 
its decline and the effects on the living conditions of the local population. It touches upon the 
development of the labor movement before the establishment of the Metaxas' dictatorship, the great 
strike that took place in 1933 that led to the signing of the Kavala Protocol, the eventual decline of 
the conservative unions and prevalence of their communist counterparts, as well as the achievement 
of labor unity in 1935-1936. 
920 Mazower M (199 1) p 126 
821 Mavrogordatos G (1983) p 145 and Mazower M (199 1) p 126 
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Finally, the chapter discusses the development of communism in Kavala. Special emphasis is 
given to the successful adaptation of the Communist Party into the social life of the city as well to 
the alternative 'cultures' that it promoted. It then examines the effects of oppression on the 
Communist Party, the different manifestations of anti-communism, trials of communists and their 
impact on the public. Finally, it elaborates on the crucial electoral battle of 1934, which resuilted in 
the election of a communist mayor (the first one in Greece) and its aftermath. 
The tobacco industry and conditions of work 
The city of Kavala became the most important industrial center for the processing of tobacco, not 
so much because it was located near the tobacco cultivating regions, but because of its suitable 
climate conditions and its natural harbor located at the center of Macedonia. 822 The first tobacco 
cultivation in the Macedonia district dated back to the 1750s, and the first tobacco processing to the 
1850s. Several tobacco companies were established by the end of the nineteenth century, exporting 
tobacco to Russia, Britain, Gen-nany, Egypt, Turkey, Austria, Italy and elsewhere. After 1884 the 
first foreign tobacco companies begun to establish themselves in Kavala, such as the Austro- 
Hungarian Herzoc Co (1889), the British N Mayer & Co (1893), and several US Tobacco 
Companies such as the American Tobacco Company, Glenn, Garry, and Alston. By 1897 there were 
more than twenty companies in the district. 823 
Tobacco workers were divided in 3 main categories according to their part in the relatively 
complex procedure of tobacco processing. The first were the Dektsides, who put together the packs 
of tobacco leafs. The second were Pastaltzides, who were responsible for the particular arrangement 
of tobacco leafs, according to the instructions given by the Dektsides. Thirdly, were the Stivadoroi, 
824 responsible for the tobacco exiting the factory for commercial use and for maintenance etc. 
The tobacco process industry in Kavala exhibited the following characteristics. First of all, a large 
section of the laborers employed in the tobacco industry in Kavala came from the surrounding areas, 
as well as other places. According to a 1928 census, the composition of the labor force according to 
place of origin was as follows: 
822 Kirix 7/12/1926 
823 Deltion Kapnou, May 193 5, no 9, pp 14-18 and Mantzares AI (1927) pp 14 824 Bureau for the Protection of Tobacco (n. a) p124-125, Issue no 642, Municipal Museum in Kavala, 
196 
Table 39: composition of the labor force according to place of origin (1928) 
825 
Origin Men Women Total As % 
Thasos 2,305 2,227 5,309 34.46 
Refugees 1,447 967 2,412 15.66 
Near by villages 577 158 745 4.74 
Native Kavala 4,529 3,192 7,721 50.12 
Total 8,858 6,544 15,402 100.00 
The tobacco-related occupations had a unique charactenstic compared to most other working class 
occupations in Greece at the time- due to natural and technical reasons the processing of tobacco was 
not continuous throughout the year, but was interrupted during the warmest and coldest months. 
During those months an estimated 70% of tobacco workers were unemployed. To compensate for 
this loss of income, wages were some 20-30% higher than the average income nationwide, and an 
insurance system was established. Many tobacco workers gained additional income by working in 
the countryside in the collection of tobacco, or in other petty occupations . 
826 This led to a "confusion 
of professions" where more or less everyone was "partly a tobacco worker. , 827 According to the 
statistics published by the Tobacco Workers' Insurance Fund (TAK) the average changes in tobacco 
workers' income throughout the year (1929) was as follows: 
Graph 4: TAK statistics for average wages (1929)828 
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825 Census of the Tobacco Commerce Association (1928), cited in Kirix 15/3/1930 
826 Mantzares A1 (1927) pp8-9, Interview no 13 of Georgiades Christodoulos, , 
in Oral Testimonies from 
the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum of Kavala 
827 Bureau for the Protection of Tobacco (n. a) p9, Issue no 642, Municipal Museum in Kavala 
828 Cited in Rizospasles 3/6/1930 
197 
TAK was established in 1925, under the pressure from tobacco workers. it drew its resources from 
6% withheld from the wage of workers, and another 6% from the employers. It was Initially 
established to provide unemployment benefits to its members, but in the process it expanded its 
benefits span to include health treatment, pensions, disability, as well as childbirth and funeral 
assistance. However, according to RLospastes, "it was soon corrupted by arbitrary actions", and "the 
executive was passed into the control of the employers... ". Accordingly, "although during the first 
year it distributed unemployment benefits worth some 29 million, in the P year, the sum was just 
18 million, and so on... , 829 Nevertheicss, TAK offered a variety of services. In 1936 it paid for the 
health treatment of some 974 tobacco workers, whereas another 180 were treated for tuberculosis in 
special sanatoria. By 1936 TAK covered directly some 4922 and indirectly an additional 8294 
workers. 93" The benefits given by TAK throughout the year varied: 
Graph 5: Benefits given by TAK (1934) 
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However, unemployment benefits were not always issued by the employers thereby causing 
831 
industrial unrest . 
The authorities were well aware that more effective control was required concerning the 
application of labor legislation for health and hygiene regulations, child labor and other areas. 
Following an inspection of workplace conditions, a high ranking army officer reported a lack of 
adequate ventilation (windows and doors were kept closed to keep the climate dry for the tobacco), 
829 RizzosImstes 6/6/1930 
830 See Assessment Report for TAK, 1936, ppl5-34, in Private Collection ID75/ Issue number 5516, 
Municipal Museum of Tobacco 
831 Interview no 2 of Ch Antikoulakes, in Oral Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum 
of Kavala 
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of toilet facilities, electricity, of water supplies, and even of the basic measures of protection for the 
effects of tobacco processing. The report also noted that some 10% of the total labor force was 
under-aged (twelve to sixteen years old), and in some cases children entered the occupation from as 
early as nine years old. The report described those shortcomings as consequences of "unjustified 
profiteering. " Nevertheless he went on to add that "the tobacco worker should never forget that all 
other labor classes, with no exception, are in much worse fate than they are. 9-)832 
The Labor Movement in the 1920s 
"The tobacco worker constitutes one of the most solid, active and determined among the working 
classes. For the betterment of their conditions of work and economic condition they went through 
fierce struggles that dated back to the Turkish occupation. A33 
Indeed, the issue of non-processed tobacco had been raised as early as 1909, when Kavala was still 
part of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, American and Egyptian tobacco interests attempted to 
export tobacco without having to go through the customary rigorous and rather costly processing. 
The tobacco workers mobilized and managed to halt any export of non-processed tobacco through 
the passing of a Special Bill by the Turkish authorities (1909). It was the first significant victory for 
an emerging militant tradition within the tobacco workers' trade union movement. This relatively 
early start in working class radicalism provided fertile soil for the growth of views concerning "the 
protection of labor through occupational unity, and the corresponding participation [of workers] in 
the distribution of wealtW' and led to the "unionization of the tobacco workers' sector that was faster 
,, 834 and better than any other. After the autumn of 1917 those beliefs became linked with the 
aspirations of the October Revolution. 
In 1919 the issue of non-processed tobacco was brought up again by the Greek government on the 
grounds that any restrictions to tobacco exports were damaging for the economy. Despite the 
government decision however, the tobacco workers, through various means, including strikes, 
932 Report by Fessopoulos G, 4th Army Core to the Ministry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 31/7/1928, pp24-25, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 933 Report by Fessopoulos G, 4h Army Core to the Ministry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, Mn/l. 928, p23, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 934 Mantzares A1 (1927) p6, in Private Collection of IS Erifillides, Tobacco Section, Municipal Museum 
of Kavala. 
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mobilizations, raids or even sabotage, managed to seriously obstruct the export of non-processed 
tobacco for another three years, until 1922. Workers even stormed the boats that carried 
unprocessed tobacco and throw it overboard. In 1922 the government gave in to the demands of the 
tobacco workers and through bill no 2869 it prohibited any export of non-processed tobacco. 
However, such actions were not without casualties. During militant action like the one described 
835 above, in 1924 there were three casualties among the strikers from police fire. 
The Greek state annexation of Kavala in 1913 found both tobacco workers and industrialists 
organized in their respective associations. The communist-led trade union 'Eudemonia' was 
officially recognized by the Greek authorities in 1921, and its union banner read 'workers of all 
lands unite. Another important element that should be mentioned was the multi-ethnic character of 
the union's composition: the executive council consisted of six Christians, four Muslims and one 
Jew, corresponding to the actual composition of its membership. The union's reading room also 
included books in both Greek and Turkish. 836 In December 1921 the interests of the tobacco factory 
owners found expression in the newly formed Macedonia and Thrace Tobacco Businessmen 
Association formed in Kavala. 
However, before we elaborate further on the development of the labor movement in Kavala in the 
1920s, it is necessary to refer to the influx of refugees that took place in 1922-1923. They were 
mainly employed in the tobacco industry; in 1930 they constituted 19,3% of men and women 
employed in tobacco-related professions. 837 Many of the refugees were reported to have been 
former-tobacco workers in their native land, hence they were familiar with the work and had no 
serious problems in finding employment. 838 Contrary to their compatriots in most other parts of 
Greece, refugees that settled in Kavala did not form separate labor unions but were successfully 
incorporated quite early into the existing labor movement, and took an active part in the labor 
struggles from the very beginning. The few refugee associations that were established rapidly 
declined. Only one remained effective. This was largely influenced by the Communist Party. 839 
935 Interview no 2 of Ch Antikoulakes, in Oral Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum 
of Kavala. 
836 Statute of 'Eudemonia', in Private Collection 41/ 6974 and Ministry of Exterior, File 1.14 / 1.119, 
Municipal Museum of Kavala 
837 Census of the Tobacco Commerce Association (1928), cited in Kirix 15/3/1930 939 Mantzares A1 (1927) pp22, Interview of Sahinides Averkios, , 
in Oral Testimonies by those from 
Pontos, Municipal Museum of Kavala 
839 See Ministry of Exterior, File 1.16/ 1.1222, in Municipal Museum of Kavala, Report of the Kavala 
Organization to the Politburo, 17/5/1929, p4, File 10, Archive of KKE 
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The Kavala labor movement, reflecting the multi-ethnic composition of the city itself, consisted of 
840 
unions that included all ethnic sections of society (at the time Greeks, Turks and Jews). In other 
words, the local society and labor movement was familiar with ethnic diversity and tolerant towards 
,-4 the 'other': "there were no natives in Kavala. They were all foreign... '8 1A refugee from Asia 
Minor who settled in Kavala noted that the native populations in the north were advanced compared 
to those in southern Greece, who were more "backward, more conservative. " As proof of this 
openmindness the interviewee mentioned the fact that women were much more confident in Kavala, 
getting actively involved in addressing various social problems. He also pointed to their mass 
participation in the industry; in many other places this was still considered taboo. 842 The locals 
welcomed refugees and helped them to become familiar with the tobacco process and to enter 
employment. It was a period when there was a relative lack of workers in Kavala, hence the surplus 
843 labor was quickly absorbed in the existing industries. 
However, the living conditions of refugees were not much different from those experienced in 
other settlements across Greece. A 1926 report to the Ministry of Interior described the 
developments regarding the refugee populations in Kavala as "tragic", with an immediate need for 
housing. Refugee settlements were not much different to the other ones nationwide, housing several 
f 
. 
844 families in each house -an interviewee mentioned as many as four or Ive 
Equipped with this background, we will now deal with the key characteristics of the labor 
movement. In the early 1920s the labor movement in the Tobacco Industry won an unprecedented 
status in comparison to its counterparts in all other branches of Greek industry. Unions were able to 
promote relative job security for their members by imposing a system of tobacco processing that 
required more workers (in order to increase employment) as well as guaranteeing a greater say in 
determining the wages. And perhaps even more importantly they imposed upon the employers a 
system of hiring workers whereby factory owners themselves had little say. On the contrary, the 
840 See Ministry of Exterior, File 1.14/ 1.1119, in Municipal Museum of Kavala, and Statute of 
'Eudemonia', in Private Collection ID41/ Issue Number 6974, Municipal Museum of Kavala 941 Interview nol8 of Mayrides Georgios, , in Oral Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum of Kavala 
842 Interview of Kostantinos Vlitos, in Oral Testimonies by those from Pontos, Municipal Museum of 
Kavala 
$43 Interview nol7 of Manafes Giorgos, , in Oral Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum of Kavala 
844 Resolutions of the Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Congress, p7, File 173/105, Archive of E Venizelos. 
Interview no 22 of Petmezas Konstantinos, , 
in Oral Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal 
Museum of Kavala 
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process of acquiring new recruits was conducted by the union leadership itself This measure gave 
unprecedented power to the tobacco worker unions, "in a manner by which the management of labor 
at the warehouses has escaped the hands of commerce-men and fallen into the hands of the trade 
union executives and their representatives. , 845 
Unions would appoint or elect 'chief-workers' who would work as their representatives on the 
factory floor. Throughout the 1920s the majority of factories had communists as the union 
leadership, and hence "at that time there was absolutely no communist worker that was left 
unemployed. " In addition, the 'political cleansing' of factories from the communist elements was 
effectively prevented on many occasions. 846 
Accordingly, the union statutes themselves stated their commitment to fight against any condition 
of employment that would involve an individual agreement undermining the existing one that 
required union approval. Unions also took care of the 'education' of their members, through lectures 
on labor as well as social issues "so that they [the members] become conscious of their class and its 
struggles. " The union also promoted the establishment of popular theatres, evening schools, and 
social activities such as arts, music and sport. 847 
Unions were protective of their members, and solidarity among workers was high. A tobacco 
worker recalls, for example, that when a number of workers in the warehouse failed to meet the 
production quota set by the owner and were threatened with loss of employment, the other workers 
would intervene. They would go to the owner and tell him that any loss'incurred by the particular 
worker they would compensate for by extra work: "we will meet the production quota. But you 
won't lay off our colleague. Because he is our comrade and a family man. We shall work more, we 
will intensify our labor and meet the production quota. " Sometimes they would even threaten with a 
mass walk out from work (in their hundreds), in the event that the employer did not hire those they 
wanted. 848 
The dynamic of the communist-led trade unionism was obvious: according to a report of KOE 
published in Rizospastes in 1923, the 'Yellow' Unions' strength was limited to just 500 in Kavala, 
845 Mantzares AI (1927) pp 19-21 946 Report by Fessopoulos G, 0 Army Core to the Ministry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 31n/1928, p18, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 947 Statute of the All-Labor Center of Kavala, 1933, pl, in Private Collection of N Tsoumbakes, Tobacco 
Section of the Kavala Tobacco Museum 848 Interview no 2 of Ch Antikoulakes, in Oral Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum 
of Kavala 
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200 in Salonica, 30 in Drama and another 15 in Serres. 849 This development alarmed the authorities, 
which took advantage of the Pagkalos Dictatorship in 1925 to set up a framework for the de- 
communization of the Kavala trade union movement. A 1928 report by the head of 4h Army Core to 
the General Staff Headquarters at the Ministry of the Army, on what it called 'the Tobacco 
situation', revealed that the process of splitting the movement of the tobacco workers (and thus 
diminishing the influence of the communists over non-communist tobacco workers) had been 
promoted by the authorities since 1925. 
The report mentioned a series of welfare measures as a means of combating the social roots of 
radical trade unionism, such as the establishment of an insurance system (unique to the tobacco 
workers in the interwar period). It particularly noted that the state felt that the rise of communism 
among the tobacco workers was due to "the complete lack of welfare politics on behalf of the state, -" 
850 and it aimed to strengthen the conservative unions. Overall Pagkalos' dictatorship had a 
devastating effect on the radical labor movement. The latter's decline was heralded as the product of 
workers' 'maturity' by the local press, which celebrated that "following the early enthusiasm which 
was aroused among the uncultivated souls by the temping promises of a communist paradise, came 
harsh reality sweeping all illusions and pointing another way to working class prosperity which 
cannot be brought about by the charms of communist utopia ... The working class masses are 
returning to the right path. "851 
The split within the labor movement began to be effective in 1927. In an attempt to safeguard 
conservative unions from the influence of the communist-led KOE, the leaders of the former decided 
to proceed to the formation of a separate Federation of Tobacco Workers, which ironically they 
named 'Unitary Tobacco Workers' Federation', or EKO. This break away produced a reaction at a 
grass-root level, as many union members, although conservatives, did not view positively what was 
essentially a split in their industry's trade union strength. Union meetings where motions to affiliate 
to the new conservative Federation were discussed, often ended in havoc. The Union 'Anagennisis' 
published the following announcement regarding the situation: "Members of our Union, 
monopolizing as it seems, nationalism, started spreading word that the Executive is communist- 
friendly and acts in an extremist way. And that is so, because the Executive was reluctant to send 
: 49 Rizospastes 30/7/1923 
50 Report by Fessopoulos G, e Army Core to the Ministry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 31/7/1928, pl, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 
851 Kirix 27/3/1926 
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straight away a delegate to the founding congress of the conservative Tobacco Workers' Federation 
and because it has tried to bring about the general unification of tobacco workers. -, 852 
Nevertheless, the so called Unitary Congress took place in March 1927, accompanied by extensive 
and enthusiastic coverage by the local conservative press. Views among the delegates on the need to 
create a separate Tobacco Federation varied. A few raised concerns, however, they were dismissed 
as being 'communist-friendly'. But perhaps even more interesting is the adoption by the Congress of 
"the principle of class struggle", and the statement that the conservative Federation would indeed 
cooperate with its communist-led counterpart "if that would serve the interests of the tobacco 
workers. )1853 Next to the principle of class struggle, nevertheless, coexisted the belief in the role of 
the state as a patron of the working class whose moral duty is to implement "humanitarian 
legislation and politice' to the benefit of the latter. 854 In any case, what is indicative of the influence 
of communist unionism and politics is the need by the conservative unions to partially adopt some of 
its principles, for example its language of class. It constitutes a significant piece of evidence on the 
growing hegemony of the communist-led trade unionism in Kavala and its associated discourse, 
assumptions and view of the world. 
One of the first effects of the division of the unionized workers into conservatives and 
communists, was the practice attempted and exercised by a number of factory owners of hiring only 
workers who were holders of conservative union membership cards. Employers had a preference for 
recruiting a labor force through conservative unions, which promoted through their statutes "worker 
discipline within the warehouse" as well as good behavior "towards the chief-worker and the 
warehouse Manager. , 855 However, although this measure worked partially in encouraging workers, 
especially long-term unemployed, to join conservative unions, it was nevertheless met with fierce 
resistance by communist-led unions whose strong presence in various factories prevented the 
measure frdni having any devastating effect in these strongholds. 856 The tactic was also utilized as a 
means of breaking strikes, by partially re-opening the warehouses for work accepting only holders of 
$52 Kirix 8/2/1927 and 9/2/1927 
953 Kifix 6/3/1927,8/3/1927 and 10/3/1927 
854 KjrjX 15/3/1927 
$55 Statute of the Union 'Agapi', Private Collection 79/ Entry Issue 9257, Municipal Museum of Tobacco, 
Kavala 
1156 Kifix 29/9/1927 
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conservative union membership cards. Of course there was sometimes a reaction, which in many 
cases was violent, and conservative workers had to be escorted to the warehouses by the police. 857 
Yellow unions took advantage of a Tobacco Industrialists lockout in May 1927 in order to 
approach members of communist-led unions and offer membership, thereby securing their access to 
work. This tactic worked to the advantage of the conservatives, and the 'leak' towards their union 
was estimated to some 15% of the total of unionized workers. Workers who switched sides and were 
provided with employment were at the same time warned by the conservative union leaders "to be 
productive in their labor" because suspicion of subversive behavior would be to their 
858 disadvantage. 
Following the broader exclusion of the communist-led unions from the official labor movement, 
preparations began in 1928-1929 to fonn a left alternative to the state-incorporated Confederation of 
Labor. The preparations for the Unitary Congress (EGSEE) were reported to have been rather 
successful, with more than 3,500 tobacco workers taking part in electing some 20 delegates. This left 
communist union leaders satisfied: "the majority of the Left Block is immense". The Kavala 
organizations represented at the Congress were as follows: 
Table 40: Organizations from Kavalla that took part in the Unitary Congress859 
Name of organization No of delegates Name of organization No of delegates 
KOE 4 Leather Workers Union I 
Kavalla Labor Center 2 BEO (Construction Ws) 2 
KEK 8 Bakery workers I 
The strength of the tobacco workers within the new trade union body was demonstrated in the 
composition of its newly elected Executive Committee: 7 out of its 25 members were tobacco 
workers. Interestingly, one of them was a member of the opposition group Tiquidarists', while 
860 another was a female tobacco worker, a rare phenomenon for labor executives. 
857 Report of the Kavala Organization to the Politburo of the CC, 17/5/1927, pp6-7, FilelO, Archive of KKE 
858 Kirix 27/5/1927 
859 Rizospastes 1/2/1929 and 4/2/1929 
860 Rizospastes 9/2/1929 
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The split of the tobacco workers' movement into two major camps resulted in fierce competition 
between them, which paradoxically often resulted in common struggles, since neither of the two 
wanted to be seen as backward in 'championing' workers' rights and representing their demands. 
Accordingly, when the 'Yellow' Unions were informed that the 'Red' Unions were considering 
going on strike for pay rises that exceeded inflation, they were quick to adopt the demand and issue 
it first despite the fact that "they did not believe at all in the success [of the campaign] considering 
the pay rise as unfeasible. "861 However, there was an important difference in the manner that each 
trade union 'camp' carried forward the struggle, which in the long run proved to be the decisive 
element as to which of the two would prevail as the sole 'champion' of tobacco workers' demands. 
One utilized "militant" means, whereas the other limited itself to "legal" means, the scope of which 
became increasingly narrowed through the interwar period. 862 
The 1928 strike for a pay rise is a good example. In March, representatives of the conservative 
unions met with the local authorities and Tobacco commerce-men in order to present them with the 
demands of workers for pay rises. Instead, they received an offer to provide conservative workers 
with a special 'favorable work ticket', which they "accepted straight away. " However, the 
communist unions were already preparing for a strike. Such was the dynamic of pre-strike activities 
that "the communists have managed to drag the temporary executive of the conservative Tobacco 
Workers of Kavala to a close cooperation and laid down the foundations for a strike in the tobacco 
industry. , 863 It was only through the last minute intervention of the executive of the Confederation 
that the common strike was not realized, and conservative unions pulled out. This move was heavily 
criticized by the communists who publicly condemned the conservatives as collaborators with the 
State and Capital and traitors to the workers struggle. 
The pressure for calling a strike mounted at the grass-root level. Conservative union leaders made 
a last attempt by the end of May to resolve the pay dispute through talks with the industrialists. 
These however, failed once again to produce any results. The failure of talks and the attitude of the 
conservative leadership towards the popular cross-party demand for a strike "led to the unification of 
communists and non-communists, and ultimately resulted in a movement from below towards a 
861 Report by Fessopoulos G, 4h Army Core to the Mnistry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 3 InIl 928, p2, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 862 Report by Fessopoulos G, e Army Core to the Ministry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 31n/i928, p2, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 863 Report by Fessopoulos G, 4th Army Core to the Nfinistry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 31/7/1928, p3, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 
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strike. " The struggle rapidly acquired a political character as well, strengthened by the presence of 
labor and political leaders from both sides who arrived in Kavala in order to reinforce the profile of 
each camp. Nevertheless, although theoretically divided (at the top level at least), the two opposing 
unions cooperated closely at the grass root level: the struggle committees "although officially not 
cooperating, were communicating closely, " and "common groups prevented strike-breakers from 
working. 1,7864 
The army report on the strike noted: "I have to admit that the leaders of the conservatives begged 
for even a symbolic pay-rise so that they would achieve a heavy strike against the communist camp. 
They did not succeed, however, due to the Tobacco Commerce-men's unwillingness to give any 
concessions. They then tried to address the local authority for help, so that their unions could 
manage to fulfill some of their demands, independently of the outcome of the tobacco workers' 
struggle, and could show that the conservative unions at least managed to have some success. 
However, they failed once more. " In an almost apologetic manner, the conservative leaders claimed 
that "the strike was called by the communists, and they were forced to folloW., -)865 
An additional important element included in the report was the role of the conservative unions as 
keepers of order against any law-breaking by the communists. In this matter they were praised in the 
report as being even more effective in keeping the order than the authorities themselves, and "for 
their attitude in this the State as well as Society owe them perhaps a great deal. "866 However, that 
was not enough for certain conservative elements within those unions who had serious objections to 
the call for a strike by their leaders. In July they broke away from their union forming a new union 
called 'Workers' Salvation' comprised, according to their own sources, by some 200 former 
members of Proodos, the main conservative Tobacco Workers union. 
The strike came to an end in late June. Its outcome was a success for the workers. But this was a 
devastating outcome for the conservative unions, which were now struggling to minimize 
membership decline and leakage towards the communists. The outcome of the strike "even if it was 
inevitable, constituted a triumph for the communists and a strong blow against the conservatives. " 
The latter, in a last desperate attempt to "purify themselves in the eyes of the masses" began to "seek 
8" Report by Fessopoulos G, e Army Core to the Nfinistry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 31/7/1928, p4-5, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 
865 Report by Fessopoulos G, 4d' Army Core to the Ministry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 31/7/1928, p5, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/97 
866 Report by Fessopoulos G, 4h Army Core to the Ministry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 31/7/1928, p7, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 
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legal prosecution and exile" by adopting "revolutionary tactics" ! 867 Even the conservative-friendly 
press was left puzzled by this u-turn in the conservative union tactics. It reported in particular on 
June 17'h: "Whatever happened to those gentlemen, the leaders who in the name of their 
conservatism always sought special favoritism and care by the State and society? You will find them 
at the front line of those complaining today. Instead of providing, as they have the fundamental 
obligation to do so, the tone of moderation and calmness in regards to channeling the just demands 
of workers, keeping in contact with the legal authorities and acting as mediums of discussions for 
', M8 the normal solution of the situation, they have suddenly chosen a different role. 
Finally, the Army report ended by stressing that "if the conservative block does not receive the full 
moral support by the State and Society, the communists will acquire the influence over the tobacco 
workers that they enjoyed up to 1926. "869 In a desperate attempt to halt what was perceived as a 
revival of communism within trade unionism in Kavala, the city's Security Council decided to 
sentence the entire union leadership of KEK to exile on the grounds that the latest strike 
mobilizations did not reflect genuine workers' concerns, but were the artificial product of a handful 
of communist trouble makers. 870 
Significant aspects of the 1928 strike can be emphasized: firstly, was the difference in the 
dynamics of the mobilization of each trade union camp. Accordingly the conservative unions were 
reported to have issued three or four brochures 5,000 copies each, whereas their communist rivals 
issued more than 35, also about 5,000 copies each, which they circulated through special distribution 
teams. Even the Commander of the 4rth Army Core was surprised by the "discipline and allegiance 
that characterized the communists. Proof of this can be found in the frequency of militant actions, 
the circulation of brochures and the superhuman effort that they exhibited in order for the strike to 
'A71 acquire their favorite form of struggle, which they call 'street struggle'. 
Secondly, the tobacco workers' unions managed to convince the professional classes that the 
latter's interests depended on the outcome of their struggle; hence they secured their support. Indeed, 
on the 22d of July 1928, while the strike was in its 12th day, the communist-led tobacco workers' 
867 Report by Fessopoulos G, e Army Core to the Ministry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 31/7/1928, p17-18, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 868 Kifix 17/6/1928 
"9 Report by Fessopoulos G, e Army Core to the Ministry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 3 In/1928, p20, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 
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71 Report by Fessopoulos G, 4h Army Core to the Nfinistry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
Kavala, 31/7/1928, p8 and p 17, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/87 
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union sent an open letter to the Federation of Shop keepers of Kavala asking them to take sides, 
stressing that their "interests are closely linked to the interest of the working class and hence those of 
the tobacco workers. " The Federation replied positively, demanding that the government meet the 
demands of the strikers and, eventually, joining the strike themselves. It was not the first time that 
the professionals have gone on solidarity strike. They had done so in 1926, stressing that workers' 
issues such as unemployment were not solely an issue of their own, but one that concerns the whole 
of Kavala: "a matter of life or death for this City. -)-)872 Accordingly, community interests were 
873 increasingly identified with the interests of the tobacco workers. 
It should be noted at this point that the strike in Kavala attracted support from other occupations in 
other cities nationwide, which was manifested in various acts of solidarity. For example, the Piraeus 
Dockers went on solidarity strike, refusing to unload any ship that docked to the port of Piraeus. 
Their example was soon followed by all other Dockers' unions nationwide. 874 
Another significant element was the strike's durability. The strikers held on with noticeable 
persistence until July the 70'. On the 6h of July just 114 chief-workers were at work out of 13,000 
male and female tobacco workers. Only on Saturday the 7t" of July, a month after the strike was 
called, "hunger and deprivation shook a large section of workers. " But even that Saturday only some 
1,500 went back to work, many of whom returned to strike after a while. Interestingly it was not 
entirely unusual for a number of the strikers to return to work for some days -a week even- and then 
go back on strike. In Kavalla, however, from the first day to the last the strike breakers did not 
exceed 100 and their number did not fluctuate much. 875 
Finally, the 1928 tobacco workers' strike revealed even further the limitations concerning the 
tactics and language available to the conservative unions. These became increasingly apparent 
during the course of events and were further reinforced the following year. When the leader of the 
main conservative tobacco workers' union declared himself to be in solidarity with the ongoing 
mobilization of the tobacco workers in Thasos, the reaction. by the right wing press and the 
authorities was overwhelming. Accordingly, in late October 1929 he was forced to clarify his 
position in an open letter addressed to the Minister for Thrace published in a local paper, admitting 
that he "may have been a bit too demanding", and that "this was by no means an attack on you or 
872 Protocol no99,22/611928, published in Rizospastes 26/6/1928. See also Rizospastes 30/6/1928 and 5M1928 and Kirix 10/12/1926 873 A situation similar to the one experienced in 'Little Moscows', see Macintyre S (1980) : 74 Rizospastes 6n/1928 and 7n/1928 75 Rizospastes 2/8/1929 
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your position, but a mere expression of my deepest sorrow concerning the unjustly treated struggle 
of the Thasos tobacco workers. 1876 The limits to conservative union leaders' militancy were 
increasingly becoming obvious. 
Behind the scenes there unfolded another interesting sequence of events between the local Party 
branch and the Politburo. A series of letters between the two dated after the strike reveal that there 
was a degree of tension and disagreement regarding the strike. The Politburo had ordered all Party 
branches to prepare a nation-wide strike in May, in line with the adopted strategy of a 'general 
political strike'. However, although the communist-led tobacco workers' union in Kavala prepared 
the ground and had already openly called for and set a date for the strike, the Politburo sent a 
message just the day before to halt the strike because all other Party sections nationwide were behind 
schedule. The local Party branch refused to comply and went on with the strike, finding itself 
afterwards accused of "insubordination". To this charge, the Kavala branch replied in a letter to the 
Politburo dated 19th of June 1928, that halting the strike at that moment would mean "the bankruptcy 
of our side in the eyes of the workere' since it would appear as an "abandonment of struggle". 
Furthermore, the letter stressed, "workers are neither soldiers nor pawns on a chess board in order to 
push them backwards and forwards whenever we wish. " 
The local Party trade unionists, drawing from their past experience (the strike of 1923 was one 
example) argued that calling off the strike the night before would cause widespread disappointment 
among workers and distrust of the communist party union leadership that had argued for the strike 
weeks in advance. More importantly, conservative unions would capitalize from such a move by the 
communists and present themselves as the only champions of the working class. Accordingly, when 
faced with the dilemma of following Party orders and responsibility towards their fellow workers 
and union members, communist union officials in Kavalla chose the latter. Somewhat surprisingly, 
no disciplinary action was taken by the Politburo, which explained the mishandling of the 
preparations for a nation-wide strike as due to the disrupting impact of state oppression on the 
coordinating and communication abilities of the Party. 877 This is a characteristic example of the 
relative autonomy of action enjoyed by local party organizations, due in part to problematic 
communication with the Politburo in Athens. Extensive state persecution throughout the interwar 
876 Kifix 24110/1929 
877 Letter of Kostas Nouros (on behalf of the Kavala communist organization) to the Politburo, 1916/1928 
and Letter of the Politburo to the District Committee of Kavala, 27/6/1928, File8, Communist Party 
Archives 
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period meant that communications of local branches with the center were often disrupted, leaving 
the former with more flexibility to focus on local labor issues and adapt the Party line to 
accommodate them. That was largely the case throughout the interwar period in Kavala. The 
changes that took place in 1931 in the national Party might have decreased this degree of flexibility, 
nevertheless it remained a dominant feature of Kavala communism until the very end in 1936. 
A report by Michalakopoulos in 1929 on the situation in Macedonia and Thrace referred to the 
political balance of forces among workers: "A fierce and continuous struggle is taking place among 
the conscious fanatical communist section of the workers in Northern Greece -the number of 
conscious communists is small- and the conservative worker element -which compared to the 
conscious communists is larger- in competing with each other in order to draw to their side the 
largest section of neither communist nor conservative workers, but those who are reluctant to join 
either side, the undecided let's say, who are easily drawn by one or the othýr side to give it the upper 
hand... , 878 Although the number of 'conscious communists' might have indeed been small, this does 
not represent the actual strength of communist trade unionism, as it ignores a large number of 
activists and sympathizers, who always constituted the majority of the party's human resources. 
Nevertheless, what is important in this report is the crucial role of the vast majority of tobacco 
workers who were labeled 'undecided', and who rightly were viewed as the 'deciding element' in 
determining the balance of forces since they constituted the majority of workers overall. 
Nevertheless, according to a report of the Local Committee of the Kavala Organization of KKE to 
the Politburo, the Labor Center consisted by the late 1920s of fifteen unions whose membership 
strength was as follows: 
Table 4 1: Union membership of the unions affiliated to the Kavala Labor Centerg79 
Union Membership Union Mem ersh 
KEK (Tobacco) 9,200 Other Unions with less 537 
Construction 550 than 100 members (10) 
Shoe Makers 300 Total Membership 10,997 
Maritime Workers 180 Unions non affiliated to 337 
Bakery Workers 120 the Labor Center (4) 
878 Report of A Michalakopoulos, 1929 'On the needs of Macedonia and Thrace', p17, Archive of E 
Venizelos, 173/106 
$79 Report of the of the Local Committee of the Kavala Organization of KKE to the Politburo, 17/5/1929, 
p3, FilelO, Archive of KKE 
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The tobacco crisis: parameters and consequences 
Between 1927 and 1933 tobacco exports witnessed a significant decline. It needs to be stressed 
that the export of tobacco varied a great deal as it was heavily dependent on foreign markets and the 
fluctuations in the international economy. Accordingly the production and export of tobacco was not 
at all steady. In the years 1922 to 1932 it was as follows: 
Table 42: Production and export of tobacco in 1922-1932 880 
Year Production in Tons Export in Tons Export value of tobacco 
/whole value of export % 
1922 25,790 36,671 58.7 
1923 57,769 21,362 38.6 
1924 50,297 41,691 51.6 
1925 60,826 41,165 33.8 
1926 61,380 54,695 56.9 
1927 63,216 53,565 57.0 
1928 58,736 49,095 51.0 
1929 78,738 50,055 56.5 
1930 65,869 49,044 56.0 
1931 42,924 43,195 53.0 
1932 27,250 36,620 64.8 
The crisis of 1927-1932 was solely attributed by a report of the Supreme Economic Council to the 
international economic crisis, and the import and exchange restrictions imposed by various states. 881 
The main importers of Greek tobacco (considered a luxury good) were the United States and 
880 Letter of the vice-president of the Supreme Economic Council to the President of the Ministerial 
Council, 20/1/1933, p20, File 173n5, in Archive of E Venizelos 8" Letter of the vice-president of the Supreme Economic Council to the President of the Ministerial 
Council, 20/1/1933, p20, File 173n5, in Archive of E Venizelos 
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Germany, which were both severely affected by the 1929 US financial crisis. 
882 However, the 
decline of tobacco exports was also partly attributed to government taxation (which was as high as 
19.2%), and the relatively high labor costs, that resulted from wages that were above and working 
hours below the national average. Accordingly, the cost of tobacco processing in Greece was 
estimated at 2045 drs per oka (1280 grams), whereas at the same time the equivalent costs in rival 
countries was 15-19 in Turkey, and 11-28 in Bulgaria. 883 
By the end of the 1920s, however, the city of Kavala was facing an additional problem: that of 
overpopulation. The 'city-volcano', as it has been characterized by the press, contained an estimated 
2 to 3 times more population than it could sustain. The arrival of the refugees and hasty planning and 
chaotic overbuilding by the RSC meant that "no piece of land was left construction-free. vi884 The 
Prefect of Kavala, in a letter to the Prime Minister in March 1932 mentioned the problem of 
imbalance between the size of the population and the ability of the area to support it, asked for 
urgent measures to be taken . 
885 The situation deteriorated when the petty-tobacco producers in the 
surrounding countryside became indebted to various financial institutions (mainly the Agricultural 
Bank), leading to the "proletarization of the peasantry that cultivated tobacco, " and forcing them to 
swell even further the city of Kavala in search of income. 886 
All of the above contributed to a growing crisis in Kavala. The city's economic life was sustained 
almost exclusively from the tobacco industry, which resulted in a situation whereby the city's future 
"was totally dependent on tobacco processing and the tobacco workers' wages. " Accordingly, whert 
the income of tobacco workers was halved in the period 1927-1931 there were serious problems 
facing all other occupations in Kavala due to the underconsumption of goods and the inability of 
tobacco workers to pay their growing debts. Significantly, it was usual practice for tobacco workers 
to buy goods (mainly bread) on credit for the period they were unemployed and pay back when they 
882 Mantzares A1 (1927) pp37-38. Although, the extent to which the 1929 US financial crisis is related to 
the economic slump in the capitalist world is a debated issue, this section focuses on the effects rather than 
the causes of the crisis. 
883 The statistics refer to the Basma variety. Similar differences were experienced in other varieties. See 
Kifix 9/5/1929 
$84 Acropolis 10/6/1931 
885 Letter of the Prefect of Kavala to Venizelos, 26/3/1932, File 1731111, in Archive of E Venizelos 
886 Bureau for the Protection of Tobacco (n. a) p58, Issue no 642, Municipal Museum in Kavala 
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went back to work. When work became scarce and wages fell, this system of credit proved 
catastrophic. 887 
Table 43: The decline of employment and wages (1927-1933)888 
Year Men Women Daily Wages Value (drs) 
Men Women 
1927 8,925 5,307 1,316,973 689,710 146,547,970 
1928 8,300 4,773 1,492,394 751,370 170,886,832 
1929 8,103 4,512 1,142,676 581,062 134,258,018 
1930 7,394 4,258 ? ? 116,217,400 
1931 7,012 3,752 513,965 629,876 92,745,863 
1932 6,664 4,326 727,069 567,659 70,817,976 
1933 5,124 4,037 483,855 368,189 46,263,972 
Accordingly the average daily wage for the period 1927-1931 dropped from 105 Drs for men, 40 
for women, to 73.40 for men and 31.20 for women in 1932, and 67.30 for men and 30.84 for women 
in 1933. The average wage, however, rose steadily ftom 1933 onwards. 889 
Poverty and debt were common features, even among the petty-shop owners. Rizospastes often 
publicized the frequent bankruptcies and evictions suffered by this section of the population, 
suggesting that their interests lay with the working class "under the flag of the communist party". An 
estimated 25% of houses in Kavala were "under threat by the greedy claws of the National BarW' by 
1934.890.4cropolis reported on the situation in Kavala in the early 1930s: "The road for these poor 
people, this mass consisting of hard working, wage-earning people ... is a long and lonely one that 
leads to only one place: prison! The public collector, the police officer, also unfortunate victims of 
daily struggle, await them in every comer. " The profiteering role of various Banks was heavily 
887 Tachy&omos 27/3/1932. Proceedings of the Industrial Board of Greece, 1933, p2l, in ABE 6, General 
Archives of the State, Kavala. Interview no 18 of Maurides Georgios, in Verbal Testimonies from the 
Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum of Kavala 
888 Rizospastes 22/4/1934 
8' From an all time high of 30,000 in 1928 it dropped to just 9,000 in 1933, to rise up again to 20,000 in 
1936. In Eleutheros Kifix 27/4/1936 
890 Rizospastes 2/2/1929 and 24/4/1934. See also Resolution 6/11/1927 of refugee and native home and 
shop lenders, in File 9 1, in 11istorical and Literature Archive of Kavala 
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criticized even by the Industrial Board of Greece. 891 In December 1931 a system of popular rationing 
was introduced to help alleviate hunger. During the 27 days following its establishment it gave away 
some 76,268 rations, mainly consisting of bread. 892 
The Labor Movement in the 1930s 
By the early 1930s the image of Yellow Unions that crystallized in the perception of a great 
number of tobacco workers was one that was put forward in an interview of a non-communist 
tobacco worker from the interwar period: "the yellow unions were collaborators of the employers. 
And they [the employers] said to the unions: go to the warehouses and dissolve the strike. And they 
did come, and we knew who they were, that they were collaborating with the employers, receiving 
money from them, aiming to break the struggles of the tobacco workers ... 
Traitors of the labor 
movement. iý893 
In another interview, a conservative worker and trade unionist talked about how the conservatives 
took over his union, which was under the influence of the left. However, "the security police came 
after them [the left trade unionists], and finally managed to catch them and send them to exile, 
leaving the union in chaos. " And he continued: "that is when I decided to intervene, and since I did 
not belong to the left, I went to the security police and asked for their protection ... 
[in the past] the 
employers paid us whatever they wanted and whenever they wanted. When the pact was made [with 
the police] we were paid regularly and in fUll... 11894 This involvement of the authorities in the 
process of employment and in union activities was criticized even by the local press. Hence, 
Tachydromos reported in April 1934 that "the tobacco worker masses, our whole society is in unrest 
due to the arbitrary, unheard of, unbelievable actions of the Security Branch, which forbids tobacco 
,, 895 companies from employing workers without its previous approval. This was a total change from 
the 1920s when unions controlled hiring. 
891 Acropolis 10/6/1931. Proceedings of the Industrial Board of Greece, 1933, p29, in ABE 6, General 
Archives of the State, Kavala 
892 Kirix 18/1/1932 
993 Interview nol3 of Christodoulos Georgiadis, in Oral Traditions of the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal 
Museum of Kavala 
994 Interview no 18 of Georgios Maurides, in Oral Traditions of the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum 
of Kavala 
895 Tacloidromos 1/4/1933 
215 
There were cases reported in the press, whereby the chief of police himself would visit tobacco 
warehouses, dismiss suspected communist workers and replace them with "his own people. " 
According to the same article, a list of suspected communist sympathizers included some 1000 
tobacco workers whose employment future was uncertain. Of course the victims of such practice 
were not exclusively communist, but also workers with simply radical or democratic beliefs, 
drawing discontent ftom an ever-widening spectrum of society. 896 
Increasingly, workers who belonged to Yellow Unions would reject or ignore the decisions made 
by their union leaders. Accordingly, the April 1932 'strike' called by the reformist union 'Proodos' 
was characterized by the following paradox: on the one hand, the Union's Chairman announced 
participation in the strike; and on the other, the vast majority of workers-members of the union were 
at Work. 897 
The corruption and mishandling of union financial resources by the reformist trade unions 
eventually caused reactions even amongst the 'friendly press'. Accordingly Tachydromos reported in 
1933 concerning "the management of the 50,000 Drs that were sent by the GSEE in order to be 
distributed to the impoverished workers of all branches of industry affiliated to the All-Labor Center 
[reformist]... " However, "The Tobacco Workers' Union 'Proodos' supposedly represented by Mr. 
Chatzides presented some 380 members who were unemployed and in need of a benefit, at a time 
when union membership was no more than 260 in 1931 and 62 in 1932, out of whom not all were 
paying membership fees, not excluding the members of the executive itself. "898 Another local 
newspaper went further, calling the All-Labor Center a "private Company, which may have claimed 
to represent part of the working class, managing funds, but in reality it was not recognized by 
anyone. Its financial support by the local council as well as the GSEE was illegal"! 899 
This resentment towards the role and ethos demonstrated by the 'official' representatives of the 
Greek labor movement increased further during the visit of the Confederation's Secretary into 
Kavala in May 1933. Tachydromos went as far as referring to the GSEE's Secretary as one of those 
"leaches of workers' sweat, claiming to be their representative, while the only thing that they truly 
represent is just lifeless seals of dead trade unions. " On the situation regarding the local branch of 
the official trade union movement, namely the All-Workers Kavala Center, the paper suggested that 
896 Proina Nea 31/1/1934 
897 Tachydromos 21/4/1932 
898 Tachydromos 26/1/1933 
899 Proina Nea 3/12/1933 
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in reality it does not exist but in name only, and through administering the immense financial 
resources provided to it by the local as well as central authorities. 9w 
Moreover, a statement made by the leader of the conservative union Proodos in January 1935 
calling for the prevention of what he called "foreign workers", i. e. tobacco workers who came from 
the surrounding countryside in order to find employment in the tobacco industry, certainly did not 
strengthen the appeal of conservative trade unionism to what was essentially a large proportion of 
potentially unionized workers. 901 
At the same time, the radicalization of the Kavala labor movement was reaching its peak for the 
interwar period. The sacking of tobacco workers at the Glen Factory in late July 1933 triggered a 
solidarity strike in four other tobacco factories. They were soon joined by the shop keepers' 
association. The next day all the other tobacco companies declared a lock-out, while the professionals 
called for a general strike. The tobacco workers of Salonica also declared a 24-hour solidarity strike. 
Demonstrations and strike activity spread throughout Greece, in Piraeus as well as all major tobacco 
industry citieS. 902 
During the strike "the entire city was mobilized day and night. " The workers locked themselves 
inside the warehouses and the authorities patrolled the streets aiming to starve them out. Brothers, 
sisters, wives and children of the striking workers invented all sorts of means to supply them with 
food and drink. Workers' Relief organized fund-raising and a food collection for the strikers. A young 
tobacco worker at the time recalled: "We made a committee out of 34 persons which had to supply 
the Petrides warehouse with food ... We found a way: I ran and had the guard chasing me, while 
someone [from the warehouse] dropped a rope [to tie the supplies]. 9'903 
The strike quickly spread to all branches of industry. On the 26h of July it came to an end, resulting 
in a victory for the strikers. Among the demands that they won were a) entry of tobacco workers in 
Togka-type tobacco processing on a 65 drs minimum wage, b) a daily wage that corresponded to the 
rising cost of living, c) an 8-hour working day, d) equal pay for equal work for women, e) government 
support to the Tobacco Workers' Insurance Fund (TAK), f) unemployment benefits (50 drs for male 
workers, and 25 for female during the whole of the unemployment period), g) full medical and 
hospital care (paid by the employers and the State), and h) a lifting of the restrictions imposed on the 
900 Tachydromos 11/5/1933 and 28/11/1933 901 Proina Nea 18/1/193 5 
902 Rizospastes 24/7/1933 and 25n/i933 
903 Interview no 2 of Ch Antikoulakes, in Oral Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum 
of Kavala 
217 
functions of the communist-led trade unions and Labor Center. Rizospastes triumphantly declared that 
"the enormous importance of the victory of Kavalla constitutes an example of the immense power of 
the working class. , 904 The issue of Rizospastes for 4h of August, quoting from evaluation reports of 
the Unitary GSEE, also talked about a victory for the united front from below policy. 905 
The authorities were obliged to call in an official statement for negotiations with KEK -a recognition 
of great importance considering that KEK had been 'dissolved' -officially at least- by the authorities 
just a month earlier, and its Executive had been sent on a 30-month exile to the island of Anti- 
Paxos. 906 The resulting contract, known as the Kavalla Protocol was, however, not respected by'the 
authorities, and a widespread wave of persecutions and exiles followed: in the following weeks all 
those who were thought to be responsible for the strike were either arrested or went underground. 
Some 2,500 people gathered to greet the eight tobacco workers who were transported for exile to the 
Metagogon Prison of Piraeus. 907 
The recent events and the major successes of the communist-led trade unions alarmed the 
authorities. In a confidential letter from the Kavalla Public Prosecutor to the Judge of Appeal of 
Thrace this anxiety was evident: "It should not be considered an over-exaggerated view of Kavalla, 
relatively to the present status of communism, that this city, if it weren't a section of the Greek State 
and if it were not for the reaction of State authority, would present in feeling and social appearance the 
phenomenon of a city with as strong a communist presence as any city in Russia... " The letter 
continued with reference to the events of March 1933 that resulted, according to the writer, "in an 
unprecedented unbelievable situation whereby the official state and the government's representative 
minister and General Governor of Thrace, felt the need to co-sign a protocol, referring to an un- 
balanced agreement with the representative of the strikers, who was a member of the recently 
dissolved communist union on 7h of July 1933, 'Amuna'. " The writer made special reference to the 
effective measures taken in Italy and Germany, which resulted "in the cleansing of society. " He 
furthermore suggested "the ongoing postponement of elections indefinitely" in fear of a communist 
take over of the local authority or to remove the "right to elect and be elected7' from members and 
sympathizers of the communist party. 908 
904 Rizospxles 26/7/1933- 2/8/1933 and Proina Nea 5/9/1933 
905 Rizospmles 4/8/1933. Note the language of the Third Period used. "6 Rizospastes 7/8/1933 
907 Rizospayles 7/8/1933 and 27/8/1933. See also Interview no 2 of Ch Antikoulakes, in Verbal 
Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum of Kavala 908 Rizospastes 9/11/1933, Proina Nea 16/11/1933,17/11/1933,18/11/1933 and 19/11/1933 
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However, the fact that the government and the authorities did not respect their end of the bargain 
raised concerns and created growing dissatisfaction that went far beyond the limits of the pro- 
communist ý block. St Nikolaides, the Venizelist W for Kavala, for example, publicly condemned 
the government's attitude, talking about the "humiliation of the State which backed down on its 
signature. "909 
The 1933 strike's success drew useful conclusions regarding the effectiveness of mobilizing 
sections of the population that were previously widely used as strike-breakers, namely the 
unemployed. In 1934 KOE passed a resolution announcing: 1) the immediate organization of 
unemployed neighborhood committees, 2) the listing of all unemployed tobacco workers from those 
groups, 3) the election of 'struggle' committees from neighborhood meetings, and 5) a call for talks 
among the various unemployed committees in order to elect a CC of unemployed tobacco workers. 
The next day Rizospastes published the "Resolution of the EC of the EGSEE on unemployment, the 
condition and demands of the unemployed and the responsibilities of the Unitary trade unions". This 
stated: "As our experience had proved, the contribution of the unemployed movement to the general 
revoluti onary-emancipation struggle of the working class is great and important. The unemployed 
constitute a first-class revolutionary factor. Their mobilization alongside the employed workers, 
especially in those occupations where unemployment is high (tobacco workers etc), constitute a 
necessary pre-condition for the success of the workers. The unemployed workers on almost no 
occasion failed to do their revolutionary duty towards the striking colleagues. They not only refused to 
become strike-breakers and closed their ears shut to the demagogic lectures of the fascists but also 
took active part in the struggles. The all-peoples revolt in Kavalla would have been impossible 
2910 without the participation of the unemployed in it. ' 
The next two years before the establishment of Metaxas' dictatorship witnessed an effort to unite 
the labor movement into a common front of struggle. As discussed earlier in this chapter, a united 
front between communist and conservative-led unions had been achieved in practice at a gr"s-root 
level on many occasions throughout the interwar period. Even when the conservative unions broke 
away from the communist controlled federation in order to achieve independence of action and 
political orientation, most strikes were carried forward with some degree of cooperation (despite the 
occasional polemical rhetoric). The demand for the re-unification of the tobacco workers labor 
909 Kirix 12/9/1933 
... 910 Rizospastes 3/11/1934 and 4/11/1934 
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movement, although always strong, began to be realized once more from 1932 onwards, when the 
conservative unions invited the representatives of the United Front (KKE) to take a leading role in 
their joint struggle. 911 
The united front was formally realized at the beginning of 1936 (following the Seventh Comintern 
Congress) under the slogan "for bread, jobs and against fascism. "912 This effort was widely 
applauded by the local press which began reporting regularly about the electoral victories, struggles 
and mobilizations of communists throughout Europe, and especially France and Spain. When the 
Communist and Liberal Parties reached an agreement on a common front against the increasingly 
oppressive character of the Metaxas government, the vast majority of the local press greeted it with 
enthusiasm. Now, instead of demanding the suppression of communism, as they did a few years ago, 
the press opposed any arrest or harassment of Popular Front electoral candidates or activists, 
praising them for their "heroic self-sacrifice". 9 13 When a common union named 'Anexartisia' was 
formed by communist and reformist unions, some 6257 tobacco workers were reported to have taken 
part in electing its new executive: an all-time high in trade union involvement. 914 
The Unitary All-Tobacco Workers' Congress brought together all sections of the communist-led 
KOE, the vast majority of the reformist unions (seven in total) and some nine unions that identified 
themselves as independent. Only the conservative Unitary Federation, representing a relatively small 
number of affiliated unions did not participate. The unity of the working class employed in the 
tobacco industry was heralded by the local bourgeois press with enthusiasm, even quoting Karl 
Marx's words: "workers of all lands unite. "! 915 
At the same time, the May Day events in Salonica were unfolding, 916 leading to anger among the 
working-class and democratic people across the country. These events had a great impact on the 
Kavala labor movement. Among the eight tobacco workers that were shot dead by the police in 
Salonica one was from Kavala. The whole city was in mourning, and some 30,000-35,000 people 
911 Kifix 16/11/1932 
912 Rizospwtes 8/2/1936 and Tachydromos 31/3/1936 913 See for example Proina Nea 21/7/1936,6/6/1936 and 21n/i936 914 proina Nea 26/7/1936 
915 Proina Nea 24/4/1936 
916 Those events begun to unfold by a mobilization of the tobacco workers of Salonica who were soon 
joined in an II day long strike by all other sections of the working class. Their demands were economic 
(increase in wages) as well as political (against Metaxas). The strikers literally took over the city. The 
authorities responded swiftly by sending army and naval forces to put down the strike. Following their 
intervention, there were 9 workers dead. 
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attended the funeral, which acquired clear political features. 917 The local press talked about the 
I "fascist government", the "exploiter capitalists", the "worker-slaves that create the wealth through 
, 918 their surplus value" and called for the "end to exploitation of man by man. 
Following the establishment of the Metaxas Regime in August 1936, the "total re-organization of 
the Tobacco Workers along nationalist lines" went ahead, involving elements of the conservative 
trade unions and the authorities. 919 This was soon after the Court of First Instance had ruled the 
dissolution of the communist-led union Aneksartisia. 920 
Oppression as a means of incorporation of the labor movement 
Persecution and its effects on trade unionism was a regular major issue throughout the interwar 
period. At the February 1929 meeting of KOE, points raised included removing police presence 
from factories, dealing with what was referred to as "employer tefforism" through lock-outs and 
blackmails, as well as ways to confront ethnic "terrorism" against tobacco workers of Turkish 
background. 921 
In many cases, strike mobilizations and the reaction by the authorities resulted in Kavala 
resembling a "battlefield", with road blocks, machine guns being place on city comers, charges by 
the cavalry, several shots fired, the use of water guns etc. 922 These clashes often resulted in 
casualties, but no officer was ever prosecuted, and the press was quick to blame the demonstrators 
themselves, stressing that if they sought confrontations it would be "a logical outcome that a few 
heads would be broken in the process. " The human cost of this 'process' was estimated as follows 
for the interwar period: more than ten workers dead and 104 wounded. 923 
It was a usual practice during strike activity for the authorities to mobilize the Army in order to 
assist the police forces in keeping order or suppressing mini-revolts. This practice, however, was not 
always successful. During the 1928 strike, for example, the 9"' Army Regiment, which was stationed 
"' interview nol7 of Giorgos Manafes, in Oral Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal 
Museum of Kavala 
918 Proina Nea 6/5/1936, Special Edition of Tachydromos and Proina Nea 
919 See Letter by the Unitary Federation of Tobacco Workers of Greece (Kavala) to K Kuriakides, 
22/8/1936, File 28, ffistorical and Literature Archive of Kavala 
920 proina Nea 14/7/1936 
921 Rizospastes 10/2/1929 
922 KiriX 13/6/1928 
923 KiriX 13/6/1928 and 14/6/1928. The casualties occurred during strikes in September 1924, December 
1924, June 1928, May 1930, October 1932, July 1933, July 1936. See KE tou KKE (1986) 
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in the neighboring city of Drama, was called upon assist the local authorities in dealing with the 
strikers. The soldiers realized the purpose of their mobilization on reaching the outskirts of Kavala. 
They abandoned their weapons and entered the city unarmed. That was because the conscripts who 
were stationed in the wider area were largely sons of tobacco workers themselves, and all sections of 
KOE, the communist-led Federation of Tobacco Workers were obliged to contribute a sum of 50 drs 
from their monthly membership in aid of the young tobacco workers who had to temporarily leave 
their jobs in order to do their military service. 924 Indeed, the communist-led KOE pushed forward 
with great persistence at sessions of TAK a regulation that would allow army recruits to receive 
unemployment benefits for the amount of time that were out of work in order to fulfill their military 
obligations. 925 
In a similar case in March 1934, the authorities in Kavala were forced to replace two regiments 
that were sent over from neighboring Pravi, and which once again refused to take part in putting 
down the strike, along with two other regiments from another city. 926 As a tobacco worker 
mentioned in his interview: "the regiment consisted mainly of tobacco workers, and if they were not 
tobacco workers themselves, they'd have a brother, father or mother that would have been a tobacco 
worker. How would it be possible [for them to shoot at the demonstrators]. ýM7 This attitude of the 
conscripts was also encouraged by the communist youth cells that operated in the Army. 928 
Police reports, such as the confidential letter sent by the Chief of Police (Special Security Branch) 
to the Ministry of Interior in . 1929, reveal that rallies and meetings organized by the communist-led 
unions were shadowed by the police. That was justified on the grounds that union activities "had a 
communist character ... and 
in most cases aimed at disturbing the peace. " On similar grounds, union 
929 
material such as brochures were confiscated and activists were persecuted and sent to court. By 
1930, all unions in Kavala that were either communist or suspected communist, including the Labor 
Center and even Workers' Relief, were officially dissolved by court order. Communist-led unions 
were unable to call for public meetings or to raise membership funds. However, according to another 
924 Rizospastes 21/5/1930 
925 The measure was also expanded to include tobacco workers that lost their income due to imprisonment 
of exile. See Rizospastes 2/10/1928 and 16/10/1928 
926 Rizospastes 4/3/1934 
927 Interview no 17 of Giorgos Manafes, in Oral Traditions of the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum of 
Kavala 
928 Brochure of OKNE, District Organization for East Macedonia and Thrace (1928), File 173/87, Archive 
of E Venizelos 
929 Confidential letter of the Chief of Police, Special Security Branch to the Ministry of Interior, 
19/12/1929, in Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/106 
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police report for the year 1930, union membership fees were still being collected as the vast majority 
of workers continued to pay 5drs towards their union financial obligations (even if officially this did 
not exist), as well as another 2 drs towards Workers' Relief. 930 
Open party agitation in tobacco warehouses was risky, although, admittedly the very fact that such 
activity could take place was an achievement for communist-led trade unionism in Kavala. When 
such an event occurred at Petrides' factory in October 1932 organized by the Communist Youth, 
some 600 female tobacco workers and 50 secondary school students took part. The main speaker, 
however, was arrested the next day, allegedly pointed out by a conservative tobacco worker who had 
also attended the meeting. 93 1 Harassing party and youth activists at the work place was not always an 
easyjob. When on the 1 Ith of August 1930 a group of policemen attempted to arrest a team of paper 
sellers who were just coming out from a warehouse, they prompted a vigorous reaction by the 
employees who intervened and freed those in custody. 932 In any case, due to the rise in what was 
referred to as 'employer terrorism', the District Committee cautioned Party cells in factories not to 
over-expose themselves: it was suggested, for example, that propaganda material and agitation (in 
cases where oppression at the work place was intense) should be carried forward not by the members 
that work there, but by members from other factories. 933 
A tobacco worker mentioned that employers would point to the 'trouble-makers' in the factory and 
the police would have them arrested: "they would gather our colleagues and physically abuse 
them ... other [would be sentenced to] 5 years in prison, another 6 years, another in exile ... That was 
how it used to be. And we lost many good people in those days. " The Security Committees (which 
did not constitute a formal judicial body) would often substitute for Courts and pass sentences 
themselves. Many of those sentenced would manage, one way or another, to escape and continue to 
work for the party or the trade union underground. 934 
Special interest lies in the changes of attitude over time of the local bourgeois press in Kavala, as 
communists gradually became seen as the legitimate defendents of the community. In the early and 
mid-1920s, local newspapers wrote several columns asking for more measures to be taken by the 
930 Report of the Chief of Police to the Ministry of Interior 'On the Activities of Communism in Salonica. 
for the year 1930', p2, Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/107 
93 1 Neolaid 28/10/1932 
932 Rizospwtes 14/8/1930 
933 District Committee of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace to all party cells, March 1927, File 5, in Archive 
of KKE 
934 Interview of Ch Antikoulakes, in Oral Traditions of the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum of 
Kavala 
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state and the authorities against communism, and dismissed any calls against persecution of the 
labor movement as essentially 'communist claims'. By the early 193 Os, there were doubts in relation 
to the effectiveness of those measures. Hence, commenting on the recent growth in the communist 
vote in Kavala in October 1930, a local newspaper wrote: "it is proven therefore and beyond doubt 
that the harsh and oppressive measures, instead of eliminating it has reinforced communism! " By the 
mid-1930s, those doubts would be transformed into clear opposition, asking for the dissolution of 
the Security Committee and an end to its operations. The owner of Proina Nea wrote against this 
security body that "apart from communists it has been persecuting any citizen that may have 
opposed, one way or another, the choices of the governmental regime. -)M5 
Those who were sent into exile were organized in survival groups, forming communal funds and 
sharing resources with the less fortunate of the group. Only four months before the establishment of 
the Metaxas' regime, and with a growing demand for amnesty for political prisoners (also supported 
by the Liberal Party), there would still be some thirteen local unionist and communist leaders from 
Kavala in exile on the island of Folegandros, and another six on Sykinos. Among the latter was also 
the president of the Commerce Board of Kavala, by no means a communist, who nevertheless had 
declared himself in solidarity with the tobacco workers' strike. 936 The Liberal Party, although having 
pushed forward the Idionymon Bill in 1929, began to experience the consequences of this legislative 
impact on its own union leaders and supporters by their political opponents who were now no longer 
in opposition. In 1936, as part of their endorsement of the Popular Front policy they campaigned 
alongside the Communist Party for a General Amnesty. 937 
Communism in Kavala 
As we have seen so far, communist-led trade unionism was a dominant element in the 
development of the labor movement in Kavala. Equally significant was a communist presence and 
involvement in the local society. The Communist Party and the Communist Youth established social 
rituals and events, parallel to national or religious holidays that forged a unique -for Greece- 
emerging working-class tradition. That involved, for example, the International Day of Youth, the 
anniversary of the October Revolution (when red flags would appear all over the city), the 
935 Kifix 8/7/1928,21/10/1932, Proina Nea 30/5/1934 
936 See letters by exiles and Folegandros and Sykinos, published in Proina Nea 1/4/193 6 and 19/4/1936 937 proina Nea 15/5/193 6 
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anniversary of Lenin's death, the 'Tobacco Workers' Week' and of course May Day. 938 At the same 
time communists would 'boycott' national holidays: during the celebrations of Independence Day 
for example the "Kavala high school students refused to cheer at the nationalist speeches. ýM9 
The communists also took over popular traditional holidays, such as the carnival. A letter by a 
member of the Archeiomarxists (Trotskyists) mentioned with contempt that the "Stalinists" instead 
of fulfilling their "communist duty" and rejecting those social manifestations such as the carnival 
that "were born out of the capitalist system", they embraced them. "Here the Stalinists, (and 
specifically the Communist Youth) have officially organized a carnival festival in which many 
young people took part [and which] brought the world upside down until the early hours of the 
morning. -040 What is important in this report of course is not whether the carnival constituted a 
petty-bourgeois holiday or not, but the ability of the local Communist party to adopt popular 
holidays of the working class, incorporate the new symbols to the old ones and turn them to its 
advantage. 
These was further reinforced by a network of cultural and athletic associations with a wide range 
of activities. The clubs affiliated to the Labor Sport Association of Kavala included: 1) Kavalla 
Labor Star (EpyarIKOg AOT4p) with its sections (football, amateur football, music, boxing), 2) All- 
Thasos Sport QlavOaa=6 Zx6p) with its sections a) Theologou, 2 sections: football, professional 
and amateur, b) Limenaria, 2 sections: football, professional and amateur, 3) Labor Star Praviou, 
with its sections: football, professional and amateur, music, boxing, and 4) Labor Hope of 
Kavalla. 94 1 This network quickly spread in all neighborhoods and settlements and alarmed the 
authorities, which saw them -not without reason- as mediums of communist propaganda. 942 its 
appeal went far beyond communist workers or communist sympathizers; the network was embraced 
by wider strata of the local society. Characteristic were the favorable articles published by one of the 
most anti-communist papers Kirix, which nevertheless publicized and encouraged their activitieS. 943 
This ongoing process of forging a distinct working class identity was actively promoted by the 
Communist Party, sometimes utilizing somewhat crude examples of that distinction between 'us' 
938 RjZ0SPaSjeS 11/9/1928,16/11/1933, Kirk 1/2/1927 and 315/1927, Work Program of the District 
Committee of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace of KKE to all cells (August-October), p2, File 5, Archive of 
KKE 
939 Neoldia 7/4/1933 
940 Pali ton Takseon 3/3/1933 
941 Rizospastes 2/12/1928 
942 Report of the Chief of Police to the Ministry of Interior (1930), p8, File 173/107 Archive of E Venizelos 943 See for example Kirix 22/5/1928 and 8/7/1928 
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and 'them' in order to prove a point. For example, Rizospastes reported in 1929: "The day before 
yesterday we went to the prison on behalf of the Kavalla Workers Relief to give some provisions to 
our imprisoned comrades from Pravi. Our comrade said that the day before a number of honorable 
ladies of the bourgeoisie had come to visit them offering to the prisoners fruit and sweets. They also 
went to our prisoners while they were having a class and offered them sweets. But our comrades sent 
them back to where they came from and did not accept their vicious charity. This must be kept in 
mind to all workers who should not forget to aid our comrades who only from us do they expect 
bread and freedom. v1944 Nevertheless, the Party and the Youth were seen as having a respectable 
ethos. A young tobacco worker at the time mentioned in his interview that his "involvement with the 
social struggles" prevented him from "ending up a drug-addict, a drifter, a robber. , 945 A common 
element in Communist self-image. 
The Communist Party in Kavala also exhibited a special interest in getting women involved in 
trade union and Party activities. It encouraged the presence of women in executive organs, the 
formation of women's committees in the factories, the strengthening of women's educational clubs 
under the supervision of the Labor Center, and insisted in a mixed-gendered composition of 
unions. 946 
Especially important to the growth and momentum of the radical labor movement throughout the 
interwar period in Kavala was the vast pool of non-organized, party sympathizers who had 
supported the activities of the Communist Party, suffered suppression because of their political 
orientation, but never actually joined the Party. A tobacco worker who was involved in the radical 
labor movement following persistent questioning by the interviewer on the question whether his 
sister was also a member or not of the Communist Party, finally answered: "Look ... then it was not 
about being a member or not. Whoever wanted to take part did so on their own will, if they wished 
they followed, and when they did not wish to do so they did not make that choice. -), 941 
A rare reference by an active communist party member of the period in relation to inner-party 
discussions and the ability to express and exchange ideas is illuminating. The question addressed by 
the interviewer was as follows: "Mr. Stylides, was there tough guidance by the Party? Did they limit 
944 Rizospmles 6/1/1929 
945 Interview no24 of Stylides Dimitrios in Oral Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal 
Museum of Kavala 946 Work Program (January-March) of the District Committee of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace of KKE, 
V5, File5, in Archive of KKE 47 Interview no 2 of Ch Antikoulakes, and Interview no24 of Stylides Dimitrios in Oral Testimonies from 
the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal Museum of Kavala 
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you in expressing your opinions freely? " The interviewee answered: "Not at all. On the contrary, 
they were expecting us to have an opinion ... It was not as tough or dogmatic as that system of 
Stalin ... I'd swear to you that they never said to me once 
don't believe or do not go to church. ýM8 
By 1930, the local Party branch in Kavala reported to the Politburo that the party fractions among 
the tobacco workers were facing technical difficulties "due to the large size of their membershi P.,, 949 
Nevertheless, membership among tobacco workers fluctuated significantly due to the seasonal 
character of the occupation affecting some 2/3 of the total party strength creating problems of 
consistency in party work and functions of cells950. Some quantitative and qualitative elements were 
evident in the few surviving reports of the membership of the Kavala Branch. In the period between 
1927 and 1928 the total membership of the Communist Party in Kavala amounted to a minimum of 
84 and a maximum of 108 members. The composition was overwhelmingly working class: in 
December 1927 some 106 out of 108 were factory workers, of whom more than 2/3 were employed 
in the tobacco industry. 951 
Nevertheless, the Communist Party was also reported to have made a significant head-away in the 
surrounding countryside by the early 1930s. According to a police report this 'communist 
infiltration' in the villages in the wider Kavala area was carried forward mainly by teachers; this in 
combination with the ever increasing cost of living had led to a growth in their "tendency for 
anarchy. ý2952 The spread of communism in the countryside was quite important for its influence in 
the labor movement in Kavala, since a large proportion of the seasonal laborers that worked in 
tobacco for half the year came from neighboring villages. 
In addition, during the early 1930s the Communist Party's influence in the neighborhood 
associations grew to the degree that they became a target for the authorities. In April 1934 the 
Prefect of Kavala ordered all the Associations' records to be examined on suspicion that "they have 
been involved in activities irrelevant to their stated aims. " The associations whose role was 
significantly upgraded in early 1934 during the short period of the communist local authority 
949 Interview no24 of Stylides Dimitrios in Oral Testimonies from the Kavala Prefecture, Municipal 
Museum of Kavala Committee of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, 24/2/193 1, File 15, Archive of KKE 949 Report of the District Committee of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace to the Politburo, 1930, p4, File 10, 
Archive of KKE 
950 Report of the Kavala Organization to the Politburo, 17/5/1929, p 1, File 10, in Archive of KKE 951 Statistics for the District of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace (1927-1928), File 11, and Report of the 
Kavala Branch to the Politburo, 6/10/1928, p 1, File 10 Archive of KKE 952 Letter of the Prefect of Kavala to the Political Office of the Prime Minister 26/3/1932, File 173/111, and 
Report of the Police, Kavala 9/7/1928, File 173/87 in Archive of E Venizelos 
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administration in channeling the demands of the lower strata were seen as recruitment pools for the 
Communist Party. 953 
We need to note at this point that, contrary to other Party Organizations (such as Piraeus for 
instance), the Kavala organization did not face any serious threats from inner or intra-party disputes. 
Accordingly, the inner-party situation was discussed in party cells in Kavala throughout the month 
of June 1927. The vast majority of cells asked for the expulsion of the 'oppositions' leaders. 954 The 
Liquidarists; in Kavala coexisted with their former comrades within the communist-led KEK. In the 
1929 election for its executive committee they received 232 votes out of a total of 2325. The Left 
Block (KKE) received almost 90% or 2018 votes. 955 Furthermore, the District Committee of Eastern 
Macedonia and Thrace sided itself overwhelmingly in favor of the intervention made by the 
Communist International in 193 1.956 
As far as the Archeiomarxists were concerned, the verbal confrontation between them and the 
Communist Party went on for most of the second half of the interwar period. Accordingly, the 
Archeiomarxists characterized members of the Communist Party as agents of the secret police. One 
the other hand, it became a usual practice during the 1930s for Rizospastes to publish letters from 
957 former Archeiomarxists that denounced their old party and declared their support for KKE. The 
anti-communist party attitude of the Archeiomarxists reached levels of obsession, denouncing every 
move that the 'Stalinists' made as traitorous and reformist. The Kavala Protocol, for example was 
viewed by the Archeiomarxists as follows: "They exploited a movement that broke out 
spontaneously and channeled it in a reformist path. For the communists, in this case, the Stalinists 
have been traitors. 058 
However, the Archeiomarxists never posed a real threat to the hegemony of the communist party 
among the tobacco workers in Kavala. In the 1936 election, they received just 71 votes, while the 
communist party secured some 5,62 1.959 The main reason for their short-lived presence in Kavala, 
apart from the clear dominance of the communist party, was their extremist views on political 
action. For example, they denounced the attempts by the communist-led unions to coordinate the 
953 Proina Nea 2114/193 4 
954 Achtida of Kavala to the Politburo, 11/7/1927 and 13MI927, File 5, in archive of KKE 955 Rizospastes 6/4/1929 
956 Decision of the District Bureau of the Organization for Eastern Macedonia and Thrace of KKE, 
24/VI93 1, pl, Filel5, Archive of KKE 
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strike effort with the reformist unions, they depreciated any labor victory that was won by the 
communist-led unions in an attempt to undermine them, and they ultimately failed to establish any 
strong connections with the community. 960 
Naturally, the Communist Party suffered from the oppression experienced by the broader labor 
movement. In 1927 the District Committee of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace pointed out the 
possible consequences of the absence of an underground mechanism and of the technical means that 
would aid the Party in dealing with state oppression. The executive organs of the Party were facing 
serious obstructions to their function: the Kavala organization was deprived even of its 3rd substitute 
secretary, all were in hiding from the authorities or had been sent in exile. Holding meetings in 
union offices was becoming unthinkable. Communist-led unions responded by organizing violent 
attacks against the police who were always present around the union buildings. Despite the cost of 
several injuries, the Party reported that this tactic helped to "regain workers' confidence in the 
,, 961 Communist Party" and contributed in "raising their moral. 
In order to find safe haven from the frequent raids by the police in houses that were suspected for 
being utilized for communist meetings, the Kavala Party organization occasionally transferred its 
meetings into the countryside. Such a meeting was discovered, for example, by the army conducting 
sweeps of the area on 12"' of June of 1928. It involved the heads of all party and youth cells. Rifle 
shots and even grenades were used by the army in an attempt to prevent them from escaping causing 
the injury of one female tobacco worker. In the end three of those that attended that meeting were 
arrested and sent to exile the next day. 962 The impact of suppression would be countered more 
effectively by the end of the 1920s, creating worker groups of self-defense. 963 
The use of the so-called 'communist danger' as an excuse for oppressive measures was 
condemned by part of the local press. ý Tachydromos wrote in 1932: "There was no communist 
danger up to August 1928. You created it in order to utilize it as a bogy man for the people and to 
excuse the violence and terrorism upon which you have established yourselves. , 964 
960 pali on TakSeon 11/11/1933 
961 Report of the District Committee of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace to the Politburo, 7/11/1927, ppl-2, 
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962 Report by Fessopoulos G, 4h Army Core to the Ministry of the Army, General Staff Headquarters, 
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Although the state did not ban communism or the communist press, with the passing of the 
Idionymon Law it did ban its content, preventing Rizospastes from circulating, on the grounds that 
its content was "outrageous". During the 1930s the transportation and distribution of Rizospastes 
would be carried forward through underground means. However, secret police who had infiltrated 
the ranks of the local party manage to obstruct its circulation once again in 1933. The infiltrator was 
discovered and the distribution of Rizospastes was soon back on track. 965 
Trials of communists were viewed by the Communist Party in the same way as rallies and public 
meetings: a platform to promote the positions of the Party and uplift it in the eyes of the workers. 
Accordingly, thousands of workers were reportedly mobilized for such events. 966 The same amount 
of public attention was raised when the sentenced union or party activists were sent into exile. In his 
biographical note, a student at the time mentioned: "even primary school children would gather at 
the rail tracks and yell to those sent in exile: you may go away, but we grow [to take your place]. -)967 
One of the most 'famous' trials in Kavala was the one that took place in April and May 1932. 
Following a statement by the Kavala Prosecutor that there was widespread communist propaganda 
taking place in the city's high school, some 23 students and another 12 citizens were put on trial 
under the Idionymon Law. Relatives of students who were arrested and allegedly physically abused 
by the authorities accused them of trying to "communistify everything. " The trial attracted a great 
deal of interest from the public which attended the trial in large numbers. The local press talked 
about a city "that was deeply moved. " The accused were defended by lawyers of the Workers' 
Relief who came over from Athens as well as other neighboring cities. One of them mentioned 
characteristically in his closing speech: "The organization's journal that is free to circulate nation 
wide is banned here. The same goes for Rizospastes. It seems that the lower executive organs here 
preceded legislative power. The result: the frequent trials in breacif of the Idionymon Law. But the 
more you hit iron, the more it becomes steel. s5968 
When the trial was over and sentences were passed Tachydromos wrote: "This trial, which 
attracted the interest of public opinion for two days in a row, proved that when the belief of citizens 
in their liberties is shattered they turn to ways of wining back this most precious right of theirs. " It 
965 KiriX 1/10/1929, Report on the situation of the underground mechanism of the Communist Organization in Kavala, September 1933, File 18, Archive of KKE 9" Report of the District Committee for Eastern Macedonia and Thrace on May Day, p 1,5/5/193 0, File 14, 
Archive of KKE 
967 Biographical Note of B Megkisoglou, in File 'Forms of Militants', M-0, in Archive of the Center for the 
Study of the History of National Resistance (KMMA) 
968 Tachydromos 28/4/1932,29/4/1932,18/5/1932,19/5/1932 
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also talked about a "dictatorial" and "bankrupf' government, which literally ridiculed itself by 
accusing and sentencing a number of what were no more than high school students for "conspiring 
to overthrow the social regime". 969 
It is also important at this point to outline certain aspects of anti-communism, as an ideology and 
practice that was advocated by various agents, such as the church and the press. In that respect 
especially significant is the role that the Church acquired throughout the interwar period in Kavala. 
That role manifested itself in various ways. Church involvement in politics was apparent, for 
example, through its particular support for a candidate. For example, in a letter to the Head of the 
Church, General Pagkalos (later dictator) asked for his support for the Venizelist Candidate. 970 But 
perhaps more importantly, the Church was utilized by the State and the Authorities "to keep an eye 
for any anti-patriotic movement, any propaganda activity" as well as "any communist propaganda", 
and generally anything that they may have considered to be a 'threat' and report it back to the 
authorities. 971 The relationship between the Church and the Military grew stronger during the 
interwar period, and the former received assistance in various ways from the latter in order to carry 
forward its work as an informer on all subversive activity, national (i. e. activities of ethnic 
minorities) or political (mainly communist activities). 972 It is indicative perhaps, that the newly 
formed General State Security agency utilized military, police and administration authorities as well 
as the Church. 973 
The authorities also utilized the Church as an 'educational' means to combat communism. General 
Pagkalos, President of the 'Republic' in 1926 took the initiative in forming a 'National Union of 
Social Reforming' drawing the clergy as well as intellectuals in the 'moral' battle against communist 
propaganda, through the press, public lectures etc. In 1934 there would be an additional effort 
through the establishment of the 'Company of Hellenism' with identical aims and objectives. 974 
969 Tachydromos 20/5/1932,21/5/1932, Kirix 19/5/1932 
970 Telegram of General Pagkalos to the Honorable Mitropolite of Pravi, Kavala, 13/12/1923, in Archive of 
the Holy Mitropolis Eleutheropoleos 1909-1957, ABE 72/EKKL 1.01, File 50, General Archives of the 
State in Kavala 
971 Document 22, Archive of the Holy Mitropolis Eleutheropoleos 1909-1957, ABE 72/EKKL 1.01, File 
50, General Archives of the State in Kavala 
972 See Headquarters of the General Security of the State to all Mitropolites of Macedonia, 15/4/1926. 
Archive, of the Holy Mitropolis Eleutheropoleos 1909-1957, ABE 72/EKKL 1.01, File 50, General 
Archives of the State in Kavala 
973 Archive of the Holy Mitropolis Eleutheropoleos 1909-1957, ABE 72/EKKL 1.01, File 52, General 
Archives of the State in Kavala 
974 Archive of the Holy Mitropolis Eleutheropoleos 1909-1957, ABE 72/EKKL 1.01, File 52, General 
Archives of the State in Kavala 
231 
Several references to such efforts can be found at the archive of the Bishop of the Kavala Prefecture, 
which since the early 1920s had been increasingly a focus for the State's actions against such 
subversive activities. 
At the same time, and throughout the period concerned, extensive anti-communist articles 
appeared in the local press throughout the interwar period. These stressed the anti-religion aspect of 
communist ideology, utilizing populist language and examples. Communism was portrayed as the 
religion of 'Anti-Christ', with its own holy icons ("the worker-slave that breaks his chains"), its own 
martyrs, its own priests (i. e. the communist party), and its own god, i. e. Lenin. Communists were 
portrayed as burning holy icons in order to make wood "and bake their coffee"975 Communist 
women were labeled as immoral and examples were cited whereby one communist married his 
daughter, teenage girls enjoyed free love, and women were used communally. 976 
They portrayed communism as a product of naivety and immaturity, appealing mainly to the 
"inexperienced ages, that tend to revolt and rather altruistic and enthusiastic. " The appeal of 
communist ideology to young people did not go unnoticed. An election report mentioned "I shall 
never forget the preaching of the communist youth outside the electoral booths ... Four young 
communists turning the world upside down, and next to them some thirty delegates from other 
parties just stared at them, giving you the impression that they were left admiring the attitude of 
those comrades ... Their 
influence among the youth of the bourgeois class is colossal. " 977 
They attributed any sort of disaster or misfortune to a communist conspiracy. On the occasion of a 
fire that broke out in the city center in 193 1, local newspaper Kirix wrote that "it was clearly an act 
committed by the Communists, who aimed to take advantage of the existing misery and social 
insecurity, and via this arson, to create a climate of anarchy in our working class town. "978 There 
were frequent references to the 'communist finger', 'agents of Moscow', to conspiracies that aimed 
at armed insurrections, and they even pointed to articles in the foreign press that claimed that the 
communists were aiming to create a new world war. 979 
In addition they argued against the mixture of politics and trade unionism as harmful to the latter. 
The progress of the working class would come about as a product of "class cooperation and not class 
975 Kirix 6/l/193 1, Kirix 1/2/1927 Kirix 7/12/1926 
976 Proia 1928, File 43/2,11istorical and Literature Archive of Kavala, Kirix 7/12/1926 
977 Kirix 23/4/1930 and 19/5/1933 
978 Kirix 24/5/1931 
979 Kirix 27/7/1929 and 28/7/1929 
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struggle. "')80 And of course communists were presented as anti-Greek, either through undermining 
the peace and social cohesion of the nation or campaigning for the autonomy of Macedonia and 
trying to break up the Greek State. 981 
Finally, Anti-communism also manifested itself in organized rallies, which however did not have 
much success. Nevertheless, a number of ultra-right, nationalist organizations were formed, such as 
the 'Anti-communist Association' in 1929 and the Tobacco Worker branch of EEE (National Union 
982 Hellas) in 1932. 
It should be mentioned, however, that at the same time, a number of communist-friendly articles 
begun to appear in the non-communist press, especially towards the mid-thirties. For example, 
Tachydromos published a series of articles in 1932 on the success of the 5-year plan in the Soviet 
Union entitled "Russia and the future of the world- the humanitarian and social ideals", whereas 
Proina Nea stressed that "in a epoch when the entire world is going through a period of 
backwardness, the Soviet Union is experiencing progress. , 983 In many cases what was not achieved 
directly through politics was realized indirectly though Soviet art. There were positive articles on 
Soviet cinema, such as Eisenstein's' classic 'Battleship Potemkin! Soviet films were frequently 
shown in cinemas in Kavala; there were reprints of passages from the works of Maxim Gorky. 984 
Nevertheless, despite oppression and anti-communism the upward path of the Communist Party 
was not halted, and by 1934 it was seriously threatening to win a majority in the local elections and 
take over the city council. Pre-election campaigns in Kavala were not much different than any other 
place in the country, accompanied by frequent harassment, arrests and convictions of communist 
party activists. Tachydromos reported, for example, that during the 1932 pre-election period the 
police arrested 8 persons from within the electoral kiosk on the grounds that "they were possessing 
communist brochures. " This was by no means an isolated incident. 985 
Nevertheless, the 1934 local elections were the most polarized in Kavala, since both Liberal and 
Populist parties, fearing the election of a communist mayor, decided to back a single candidate: 
"This danger united two politically opposite worlds, because only this unity could save us from the 
980 Kirix 27/5/1926 and 13/1/1927 
981 Kirix 7/12/1926 
982 Rizospastes 3/3/1925, Kirix 1/10/1929 and 17/11/1932 9: 3 Tachydromos 30/6/1932 andin/i932, Proina Nea 1/11/1933 94 Kirix 24/9/1927 and 26/6/1929 
985 Tachydromos 22/9/1932, Kirix 21/4/1929 
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-986 hazard of Kavala of the noble and democratic ideals becoming ruled by anarchy and bolshevism 
The 'bourgeois' local press called for the voters to choose between the "bourgeois and communist 
candidate", whereas the communist press was asking them to make a choice between them and the 
"parasites, the commerce men along with all the bourgeois parties and their lackeys. , 987 
The attempt of Miospasles to present this electoral battle as one between the workers and the 
capitalists was reinforced by the actual social composition of the two opposing candidate lists. 
Accordingly, the electoral ticket of coalition of the 'National Parties' consisted of 28 persons, out of 
whom four were Tobacco Factory owners, another four were large businessmen, two were land 
owners, and none was of working class background. In contrast, the electoral ticket of the United 
Front (KKE) consisted in the vast majority of tobacco workers, with three of them serving in 
exile. 988 Nevertheless, the Communist Party candidate won the elections receiving more than 50% of 
the vote, reaching its highest electoral turnout in the city in the period concerned: 
Graph 6: Electoral results in the Kavala Prefecture for Parliament and Congress (1926-1936) 989 
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The first session ofthe 'red council' of Kavalla was open to the public and was attended by workers 
whose turnout was overwhelming, The reporter of the local paper 7ý7chydromos noted: "we did not 
realize when the majority councilors had arrived. Due to their workers' appearance it was not possible 
to determine who they were. It was only when they actually took their seats that we realized who they 
were. "991 The proposal to issue a 200,000 Drs sum for poverty and unemployment benefits (in 
addition to the initial sum of 100,000 already issued) was not initially accepted by two votes. The 
communist majority in the council had already been reduced to a minority through the arrest of 2 red 
councilors who were sent into exile and prison. In the end a sum of 150,000 Drs was approved. In the 
following days the Kavalla city council affiliated to the Anti-fascist Congress, proceeded to the issue 
of an order to introduce free health care for individuals who were not able to at-ford it, and embarked 
on setting up a register of the poor in order to issue the benefit, or provide them with medical care 
992 etc . 
The interest of the formerly anti-communist press in the newly elected Mayor is illuminating. The 
reporter of Kirix wrote his impression of the Mayor: "I have to admit once more that the first time I 
met him he seemed to be a rather common man. However, when I talked to him for a second and third 
time... I was persuaded that he is worth 100 of his predecessors in relation to his education and 
perception. 093 
In the following weeks the authorities proceeded to undermine the red city council, harassing a 
number of councilors, arresting others, or having them expelled from their work in the factories. 994 
Less than two months after his election in office, the Mayor Partsalides and the red councilors were 
990 Cited in Kim, Mchydromos, and Rizospayles 
99 1 Mchydromos 6/4/1934 
992 Rizospasles 7/4/1934,13/4/1934,19/4/1934,20/4/1934 
993 Kirix 12/3/1934 
994 Rizospasles 20/4/1934,4/6/1934 
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put on trial for the violation of the Idionymon Law. The Mayor utilized the court floor in order to 
praise the role of the Communist Party and the work of the Red Council. While the trial was held, the 
majority of trade unions in Kavala went on strike. Among the prosecution witnesses, apart from army 
and police officers were also a number of conservative union leaders. 995 In the end, the court found 5 
city councilors guilty, but dropped the charges against the Mayor. What was not achieved through the 
justice system, however, was carried through by a decision of the Prefect that was never published on 
996 the grounds that it was 'confidential'. 
The communist mayor of Kavalla was ultimately 'temporarily' relieved of his duties for a three 
month-period. On the 26a' of July the communist mayor of the neighboring tobacco worker city of 
Serres was also relieved of his duties. Rizospastes reviewed the mayors' work while in office: repairs 
in roads and sewage system in working class neighborhoods, increases in the wages of construction 
workers and engineers, more than doubling the number of children eating from the student ration 
program (part of which came out of the salaries paid to the mayor and the secretary general of the city 
council), organization of children's country side camping areas/activities. In addition, according to 
Tachydromos the Red Council established the pay for apprentices in various occupations and 
upgraded significantly the role of the neighborhood committees in terms of their say on various issues 
such as medical care and the distribution of benefits. 997 The Red Mayor himself, in a symbolic gesture, 
deposited his mayoral salary towards the welfare expenses of the city council and joined the food 
rationing program along with his fellow tobacco workers. 998 
On the Vt of September the authorities announced that the mayor of Kavalla was to be exiled. On 
the 5h of the same month there was a general strike in Kavalla that reached almost 100%. That same 
day the decision to exile the mayor was cancelled. Finally on the 9"' the mayor was secretly exiled to 
Gaudos Island, where he joined the 'survival collective' - he reporte d the island to be "a true 
grave . ". 999 Further arrests of communist city councilors under the Idionymon Law took place, and the 
head of the Venizelist ticket was eventually appointed Mayor by the authorities. The majority of the 
red councilors who were arrested were kept in prison through the Metaxas' dictatorship. Four of them 
995 Proina Nea 25/4/1934 
996 Tachydromos 26/4/193 4 and 15/6/1934, also Proina Nea 11/4/1934 
997 Tachy&omos 3/411934 and Rizospastes 20/4/1934 
998 Vyzikas 1 (1994) p88 
"9 Rizospastes 16/6/1934,27/6/1934 and 1/10/1934 
236 
were handed over to the Axis occupiers and were eventually executed in 1944 in reprisal for guerrilla 
activity. 1000 
Conclusion 
The first important element we touched upon in this chapter was that of the character of the 
industry itself. Tobacco processing was rather complex and required mostly skilled labor. This gave 
workers the potential to control the labor market. The insecurity that derived from the industry's 
seasonal character meant trends of unemployment contributed towards stronger labor unity and early 
struggles, which secured them unprecedented wages and benefits. So, by the time that the 
Confederation of Labor and Socialist Labor Party were established, the Kavala trade union 
movement had already developed a heritage of radicalism and labor militancy. It had won union 
rights, including the regulation of employment and protection of their members, - which further 
reinforced the role of unions. 
The multinational character of the labor movement in Kavala, in combination with a prosperous 
growing industry, meant that the refugee influx, which was widely used as reserve labor in all other 
places nationwide, was quickly incorporated into the existing movement. Ethnic cleavages did not 
exist as in other places, and political differentiation and control was not achieved over the refugees 
as a separate block, either electorally or politically. The participation of women in the labor process 
as well in trade union activity was also important in preventing further gender cleavages within the 
ranks of the labor force. 
Even political cleavages were not as straight forward as in other places. First of all, Kavala was 
not split into two opposing political camps, a local manifestation of the schism between Venizelists; 
and Populists, but into three. From as early as 1926, the Communists presented a serious political 
force, receiving as much as a quarter of the vote inside the city of Kavala. The membership of the 
labor movement, up to the midl920s, although not having a communist ma ority, was largely led by 
the communists who controlled the Tobacco Workers' Federation from the very beginning. We have 
seen that the authorities, in collaboration with the army and sections of the conservative workers' 
unions, attempted through a series of means and interventions to dispatch non-communist unions 
1000 Pegios G (1984) p87 
237 
and create a separate Federation. This took place within the framework of a nationwide process to 
re-incorporate the labor movement, which began in 1925 and was achieved in 1927-8. 
The 1928 strike was characterized by both competition and cooperation between the two opposing 
labor camps. However, the dynamic and influence of the communist-led unions, as opposed to the 
relatively passive character and the policy of scuttle partly imposed on the conservative-led unions 
by their commitment to keep within (or hesitation to break out of) the framework of legality, became 
obvious even to the Mlitary that was closely watching the progress of the strike. The limitations 
deriving from their unwillingness or inability to pursue militant action were becoming ever more 
apparent to workers, especially those not affiliated to a particular ideological camp. This worked to 
the advantage of the communist unions, which did not hesitate to expose the conservatives' 
weaknesses in public. 
The growing involvement of the military and the authorities with the labor movement created 
serious obstacles to the normal functions of the communist unions. Conservative unions were 
granted protection, whereas communist unions were either outlawed, or had their executive members 
prosecuted, put in prison or sent into exile. The communists attempted to combat the growing 
feeling of defeatism that begun to seriously affect workers by creating physical confrontations with 
the authorities. This tactic, despite the fact that it led to several injuries, was reported as successful 
since it contributed significantly to uplifting the spirit of communist-friendly workers. 
We then examined various aspects of the 1927-1933 tobacco crisis. We pointed out the reasons 
that were put forward to explain the crisis, namely the vulnerability of an industry based on exports 
to fluctuating international demand and the relatively high costs of production. It is important to note 
that the tobacco crisis was not solely due to the 1929 crisis that contributed to the decline of the 
tobacco exports, but had started some two years before. The consequences of the crisis on 
employment and loss of income was tremendous. All efforts by the state to deal with the problem, 
either through the introduction of a rationing system or a program of voluntary exodus and 
agricultural settlement, had little results. 
Growing problems produced the 1933 strike that was led by the illegal communist-led tobacco 
workers' union. The success of the strike was immense. The official representatives of the state were 
forced to sign a protocol with the leadership of a union that officially did not exist, effectively 
recognizing it as representative of the workers. This precipitated a reaction by the Kavala Public 
Prosecutor who demanded a series of oppressive measures. Union leaders were arrested and exiled, 
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causing even further unrest among the city's laboring population. By now, even representatives of 
bourgeois parties and press were publicly stating their dissatisfaction and outrage about the way the 
state was handling the labor issue in Kavala. When the reunification of the labor movement was 
finally achieved in 1935-1936, there were very few left in the city who did not welcome this 
particular course of events. 
Finally, we explored the development of communism in Kavala. We began by examining the 
various ways through which the Communist Party had successfully incorporated local labor and 
social traditions, either adopting them or altering them to fit a new and emerging radical working- 
class tradition. We also examined the various methods of incorporation that were utilized by the 
authorities and other social agencies, through oppression and anti-communist propaganda. Those 
tactics had some effects in disrupting the normal functions of Party cells, but the Party managed to 
partially adapt by setting up an underground mechanism. Over time, anti-communist propaganda 
was shown to be less effective than the active example of communist politics and behavior at the 
work place. Eventually, even the press began to be sympathetic to communist activists, asking for an 
end to state oppression. Extensive use of force by the authorities, which extended far beyond the 
narrow scope of communist trade unionists and party activists into wider sections of the local 
society, alienated many politically apathetic or even conservative workers. They increasingly began 
to see in the communists' anti-fascist rhetoric and anti-authority activity a force of progress. 
Communism in Kavala reached its electoral peak in 1934, when the communist candidate was 
elected in office against a common candidate of 'bourgeois' parties, receiving more than 50% of the 
vote. The 'red' city council managed to push forward certain welfare reforms but was seriously 
undermined by the authorities, who in the end put several councilors on trial on the basis of the 
Idionymon. The 'red' majority in the council was, accordingly diminished. However, by that time, 
pro-communist feeling in Kavala was well established, reaching people of all occupations and of 
varied ideological beliefs. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This chapter will reflect on the case studies and illuminate broader issues raised in the Thesis. We 
have examined two working class communities, Kokkinia and Kavala and we have attempted to 
identify the factors that favored or inhibited the growth of communist politics in the interwar period. 
Accordingly, we have assessed a number of arguments presented in the existing Communist Party- 
related literature regarding the growth of radicalism. Those included widely held and accepted 
suppositions about living and working conditions, the existence of a landless proletariat and the size 
of factories. Based on those criteria, one could easily come to the conclusion that both Kokkinia and 
Kavala provided case-studies favorable to the growth of communist politics. After all, Kokkinia 
comprised a labor force that presented an unprecedented high proportion of manual laborers by 
Greek standards. Kavala, on the other hand was one of the main industrial centers of northern 
Greece with an unusually high ratio of workers per employer. Yet, communism in those two 
localities, however favorable the conditions, did not have the same impact or growth in the course of 
the interwar period. 
Graph 8: A comparative development of the electoral strength of KKE in % (1926-1936) 
National Elections for Parliament 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
--*-- Natioml Vote I 
m Kokkiiia 
Kavala (pref) 
Kavala (city) 
By the end of the period, communism in Kokkinia scored almost double the national average in 
number of votes (10.7% compared to 5.8%). Moreover, at the same time, the communist vote in 
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Kavala was as much as four times higher at a Prefecture level (23.5%) and 9-10 times higher in the 
city of Kavala itself (50.4%). Since all the prerequisites of working class radicalism mentioned 
above were present in both cases, why the striking difference in communist support? 
Despite the important role played by the working class in both Kokkinia and Kavala, the two cases 
were characterized by important differences. One factor that varied in the two case studies was that 
of 'ethnic' cleavages. The refugees in Kokkinia constituted a labor force that was viewed as 
'foreign' or even 'hostile' by native workers. From the very beginning, various factors were in place 
to reinforce the segregation of reftigees. Their settlement in distinct satellite communities meant that 
the initial opportunity to integrate thern. in the existing native communities was lost. Geographical 
segregation contributed to an emerging 'ghetto' mentality among the refugees that was further 
enhanced by cultural differences and mentalities. To the inward-looking attitude of refugees was 
added the hostility of natives (mainly supporters of the Populists), which often translated into violent 
confrontations with numerous casualties. 
These cleavages were widely exploited by the employers, who sought to manipulate the 
differences between the various ethnic groups in order to prevent united action by the work force on 
the factory floor. Separate trade unions emerged based on ethnic lines, further hindering common 
action by the organized labor movement. In addition, refugees were used, initially at least, as a 
reserve labor force that admittedly caused a decline in wages and a worsening of working 
conditions. Overcoming those cleavages proved an important obstacle both for the organized labor 
movement as well as the Communist Party. 
Contrary to the experience of the working class in Kokkinia/Piraeus, the workers of Kavala had a 
tradition of multiculturalism and were familiar with living, working and fighting alongside ethnic 
'others' in labor struggles. When the refugees arrived in Kavala at the beginning of the 1920s, the 
local trade union movement already had more than three decades of experience in transcending 
ethnic and religious differences and working together in common cross-ethnic unions. Accordingly, 
the refugees' integration into the existing labor movement was a much smoother and straight 
forward process than was the case of the Kokkinia workers in Piraeus. Refugees in Kavala were 
quickly absorbed in the tobacco industry and joined the existing unions. The few ethnic-based 
unions that were established rapidly withered away and by the end of the 1920s the only refugee 
association that remained was controlled by the Communist Party. 
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Of course, there was an additional factor that contributed to the more effective integration of the 
refugees in Kavala than in Kokkinia, which should not be underestimated. When the refugees 
arrived in Kavala, the local tobacco industry was going through a boom and the influx of an extra 
labor force was absorbed without any serious side effects in wages or labor conditions. In Piraeus, 
however, the case was different. Although a number of new industries quickly emerged in order to 
provide employment, the influx of reftigees was just too great to be absorbed by them. 
Another differentiating element in the labor tradition that shaped the development of radical 
politics in the two case studies was the local context. In Piraeus, the social-democratic and pro- 
Venizelist influences in the organized labor movement had strong roots and preceded historically the 
formation of the Greek Communist Party. Many of the leading figures of the ideological currents 
mentioned above (i. e. social-democratic and pro-Venizelist) played an active role in the formation of 
both the General Confederation of Greek Labor and of the Communist Party itself. In the case of the 
latter they adhered to SEKE's first social-democratic leadership, and although most of them found 
themselves outside Party ranks by 1924 they continued to exercise significant influence in the trade 
union movement in Piraeus for several years. 
The existence of strong patronage relations and links between union leaders and state or ruling 
party officials reinforced the tendency that dominated many sections of the working class in Piraeus 
to seek compromise rather than confrontation with the authorities as a means of achieving their 
goals. The situation did not change until the very end of the period concerned (1935-1936), when it 
became increasingly apparent to more and more workers that the tactics of their leaders had had little 
result, and they began to look for more militant or radical solutions to their issues. 
In Kavala by contrast, the organized labor movement was well known for its militancy and its 
radical politics even before the formation of the Communist Party. The successful adaptation of 
local communist politics to the past labor tradition in Kavala meant that the hegemony of 
, communist-led unions was well established from early on. Reformist and conservative unions kept 
operating within the framework of the communist-controlled Tobacco Workers' Federation (KOE) 
until state intervention in 1927 encouraged them to form a separate Federation. This process 
however was not without strong opposition from within non-communist unions, and for a long 
period of time non-communists cooperated closely together with communists in strikes and other 
labor mobilizations. The hegemony of the communist-led trade unions was re-confirmed after the 
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1933 strike, when the state officials were forced to come to terms with the communists, although 
officially their union no longer existed having already been dissolved by the courts. 
In general, the factors of political incorporation that applied in Kokkinia were more numerous and 
complex than in Kavala. In Kokkinia, the dichotomy between exploiters and exploited was blurred 
by the existence of specific channels that allowed refugees partial political participation and power 
depending on the clientage ties. This was achieved through the formation of refugee associations and 
an emerging elite of the so-called refugee fathers that worked to mediate popular and individual 
demands to the state, the authorities and the Refugee Settlement Commission. These agents of 
refugee representation kept close links with the Liberal Party throughout the interwar period, and 
many of them were placed from early on in key posts of power, in financial institutions, the 
Parliament or Senate and various governmental posts. 
In addition, the refugees were successfully incorporated into the politics of the National Schism on 
the side of the Venizelists. Many refugees of course genuinely supported Venizelos' Liberal Party 
due to personal liking or strong republican beliefs. Nevertheless, various factors contributed into the 
forging of a 'block' mentality among the refugees that made it difficult for alternative radical 
politics to infiltrate the 'Venizelist forts, ' as the refugee settlements were known. Such factors 
included a widespread belief that refugees were threatened by the eventuality of a future Populist 
government. This belief was enhanced by widespread verbal and physical attacks by Populist 
supporters, press and officials. It was perhaps the only obvious alternative for the refugees to seek 
patronage and protection behind the Venizelist Party, to which they had attributed their salvation 
once before in 1922. 
In contrast, in Kavala the division between exploiters and exploited was much clearer. Whereas in 
Kokkinia, in many cases the employer of the refugee workforce was one of their compatriots to 
whom they may also have had kinship ties, in Kavala the employer was typically a wealthy local or 
foreign capitalist to whom they had no attachment of any sort apart from their employer-employee 
relationship. Moreover, Kavala did not experience the political cleavages manifest in the National 
Schism in the same way as in other parts of Greece, including Piraeus. In Kavala, three political 
forces dominated and competed with each other on the political scene rather than two. The 
Communist Party was a noticeable political adversary and challenger to the two main parties, 
mastering from the early and mid-1920s almost one quarter of the city's electoral preferences. 
Political patronage was also much weaker in Kavala. Although the city was considered as a 
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Venizelist stronghold, the first Club of the Liberal Party was formed as late as 1934! 1001 Hence, there 
was organizational space for the Communist Party for almost the entire interwar period. 
Another difference between Kokkinia and Kavala was the extent and impact of internal strife in 
the Communist Party in each locality. We have seen that the Piraeus Party organization suffered 
repeatedly from inner party disputes, causing disappointment, bitterness and disillusionment among 
many of its members and creating serious obstacles to the fulfillment of its goals. This was partly 
due to the labor traditions discussed above and the influence exercised by a number of ex-party 
members in local unions and labor centers. Piraeus also presented the largest concentration of 
supporters for the 'Opposition' that was formed in 1927 (i. e. the 'Liquidarists). When they broke 
from the party they took a number of trade unions with them in which they held executive positions 
(we should not forget that the majority of the 'Opposition' were high ranking members in the 
Piraeus Organization and well known trade unionists). The other rival group, the Archeiomarxists 
also had some influence in Piraeus, although this rapidly disintegrated in the early 1930s. 
By contrast, the Kavala Party organization was relatively free of internal strife. The few members 
who adhered to the politics of the 'Opposition' were quickly marginalized or expelled from party 
ranks, in what was a much smoother process. These individuals, however, did not form separate 
unions, as in Piraeus, but continued to operate as trade unionists in the communist-led Tobacco 
Federation (KOE). In many fields of activity, Communist Party members and members of the 
'Opposition' worked alongside each other for most of the interwar period. The Archeiomarxist 
organization was almost non-existent and apart from issuing occasional condemnations of 'Stalinist' 
politics, it never posed any real threat to the hegemony of the Communist Party in Kavala. 
Important differences between the two case studies can also be traced in the nature of community 
politics. In Kokkinia, community politics was largely orientated towards reproducing social and 
cultural elements of the past and creating a sense of continuity based on popular memory. They 
developed mainly around ethnic lines and places of origin rather than class. Social and solidarity 
bonds among refugees based on their identity as workers, and not primarily as refugees, began to 
develop from the 1930s, when it became clear that there was no possibility of ever returning back to 
their homes. As a result, they increasingly started thinking of themselves as members of the social 
class to which they had belonged since 1923-1924. 
lool Eleutheros Kirix 5/3/1934 
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In Kavala, the role of the trade unions in the social life and community politics of the city had 
strong roots. It dominated spheres of social activity such as leisure, sports and even education. This 
was largely due to the fact that there was a single dominant industry, that of tobacco processing, and 
inevitably, perhaps, all aspects of life in Kavala depended heavily on what went on in the tobacco 
warehouses. Also, due to the nature of the industry, which involved widespread chronic 
unemployment and job insecurity, strong self-help and occupational solidarity networks emerged. 
These were manifested in formal supporý such as unemployment and welfare benefits, as well as 
informal financial support to young tobacco workers who did their military service, and to trade 
unionists who were imprisoned or exiled. It may be argued that Kavala presented the first example 
in Greece of what can be characterized as a working class culture. 
An additional element that can be drawn from the graph presenting the development of electoral 
support in the two localities is that they both witnessed significant growth in the early 1930s. This 
rise in the communist vote also coincided with a general increase in communist support nationwide. 
However, the reasons behind this development were primarily specific to each locality concerned. 
Accordingly, in Kokkinia it had primarily to do with the signing of the 1930 Greco-Turkish Treaty 
between Venizelos and Kemal and its impact upon the refugees. This put an end to any hopes of 
refugees returning back to their homelands and accelerated their integration into the local political 
and labor movement. It also meant their partial disappointment with the Liberal Party and Venizelos 
himself whose status as patron of the refugees and ability to champion their demands was 
increasingly questioned. It was only following this episode when political support begun to shift 
slowly but steadily from the Liberals towards the Communists. 
In Kavala, however, the decisive factor behind the growth of communist support had little to do 
with these developments. Rather, it came down to two principal factors. The first was the impact of 
the decline in tobacco exports, which began to seriously affect employment and wages from as early 
as 1927. The crisis was further deepened by the 1929 international crisis. It was not until 1933 that 
the industry began to show signs of improvement. This deterioration was accompanied by 
widespread mobilizations of tobacco workers, most notably in 1928 and 1933, which exposed the 
inability of conservative unions to pursue militant action and ultimately elevated the communist-led 
trade unions into the hegemonic force in the city's labor movement. The 1931 intervention of the 
Comintern had little or no impact in either of the localities' communist movements. Apart from the 
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issuing of an overwhelming declaration of support, very little changed on the ground in terms of 
day-to-day communist activity in the community and the workplace. 
The variables'between the two cases that have been discussed above should not allow us to lose 
sight of their common features. One common feature that was evident in both localities was 
suppression and its effects. In Kokkinia and Kavala, state persecution caused serious disruptions in 
the, short and long term functions of the Party. The state placed obstacles on the Party's, electoral 
campaigns and obstructed the circulation of the Party paper, occasionally banning it. Individual 
members were frequently harassed, leading Party figures were imprisoned or exiled, and police 
presence was constant outside unions or rallies. However, state suppression in the long run produced 
the opposite effects than those intended. 
Firstly, communists were members of the community themselves and solidarity bonds extended to 
include them as well. Their constant harassment by the authorities did not leave their neighbors or 
fellow workers apathetic. Increasingly, the victimization of communists by the authorities. to an 
extent elevated them in the consciousness of their fellow workers as champions of workers' issues. 
The authorities themselves contributed to this outcome, first, by equating almost any sort of worker 
protest with communist activity. Workers who went on strike or pursued militant action were 
automatically branded communists. Hence, they contributed by identifying communism in popular 
consciousness with a broader working class radicalism. Fiery speeches in the court floor and militant 
actions such as the freeing of fellow workers who were arrested also played a part in this 
development. 
Second, the state used indiscriminate violence against ever widening sections of society, 
democratic individuals, even supporters of the ruling party. The impact of this was recorded in the 
local press in both Kokkinia and Kavala. Although until the mid-1930s this reproduced the image of 
communists as trouble-makers and conspirators, it began to appear more sympathetic towards party 
activists under persecution and to adhere to the Communist Party's call for an anti-fascist, anti- 
authoritarian Popular Front of all democratic forces. The same newspapers, which in the 1920s had 
called for more measures to be taken against the communists, in the 1930s appealed for a halt to 
state violence against communists and their release from prison and return from exile. This marked a 
shift, not total, but nevertheless noticeable, in the popular image of the communist as a bearer of 
progress. 
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Another common feature evident in the growth of communism in the two localities was the basis 
and reasons for communist support. Individuals who adhered to communist politics typically did not 
do so because they subscribed to the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. Ideological work in the party 
was to say the least limited, with lessons in Marxism carried forward usually by university students 
or secondary school teachers, who did not necessarily have extensive knowledge of the subject but 
who could at least read and write. It may be argued that Soviet culture, through literature and 
cinematography had a greater impact on a wider audience than the occasional ideological analyses in 
the Party press. Nevertheless, individuals adhered to communist politics because of communists' 
attitudes in the workplace and in the community. 
Communists further cultivated attitudes that were founded on a sense of working class values. 
These portrayed the workers as honest, hard-working and moral individuals who fought against the 
injustices imposed on them by the authorities, the state and the employer, who were in turn seen as 
immoral because they sought to profit from the misery of workers. Communist candidates for 
Parliament or the local council were not much different from the average worker. They were of 
working class background themselves, suffering the same fate of hardship. This was in marked 
contrast to the candidates of other political forces. And nowhere was this more obvious than in 
Kavala during the 1934 mayoral elections, when the Communist Party ticket was comprised mainly 
of tobacco workers, whereas the united bourgeois party ticket included tobacco factory owners. 
These images of communists contributed significantly to counteract the negative images put forward 
by anticommunist forces, as it appeared in the Press or other means. This constituted what we may 
call a classic 'class' confrontation over community identity, value and priorities that was rather 
exceptional for Greek standards. 
In addition, there are a number of issues that concern the Communist Party itself. The importance 
of Party sympathizers who were activists or 'party-influenced, ' in the growth of communism in the 
community and workplace was vital. Largely ignored by the literature, they constituted a reserve of 
sympathetic activists who in many cases carried forward the bulk of party work. Hence, any attempt 
to explain the growth of the communist party solely based on a measurement of its membership is 
bound to be misleading. The Greek Communist Party during the interwar period may indeed appear 
as a "sect" if one fails to measure the actual extent of its influence. This can be realized only be 
moving away from a somewhat sterile reproduction of official party statistics, and towards a closer 
look at how communist influence was translated on the ground, at a community, neighborhood level. 
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The two case studies further expanded on claims put forward in the chapters that dealt with the 
Communist Party, concerning the view of a direct line between the leadership and Party members at 
grass root level. We have seen that local party organizations were characterized by a certain degree 
of autonomy of action. This was due in part to objective factors, i. e. the lack of effective lines of 
communication caused by widespread persecution and periods of illegality that meant that on 
occasion the Party view was transmitted to its destination too late, or even sometimes not at all. 
There were, however, subjective factors, such in the case of the Kavala organization refusing to 
comply with the Politburo's plan for the 1928 strike. In that case, the balance of sense of obligation 
and local economic and social factors weighed in favor of the local labor struggle rather than the 
party line. This of course was less obvious in Kokkinia, a district of Piraeus that geographically was 
much closer to the center of decision-making and hence felt the effects of party policy more 
intensively than other places. But even in the case of the refugees in Kokkinia, the party line had to 
be adapted many times in order to make sense to refugees, to address their needs and worries. 
Developments in the Soviet Union and the international movement had little impact on local 
communist politics. Lack of information and the precedence of more pressing local issues left little 
room for the average communist party member or sympathizer to elaborate on the international 
situation and to be affected in any way. The Third Period language of 'social fascism' may have 
been adopted but that did not mean a huge departure from the previous characterization used by the 
Communist Party to label the social democrats as 'social-chafiedes' [collaborators of the police - 
which, as we have seen, was not always far from the truth]. In the case of Kavala, we have even seen 
that despite the use of harsh rhetoric, communists and reformists did collaborate at a grass root level 
in strikes and other labor mobilizations. This was not the case in Piraeus, where the rivalry between 
communists and social democrats was deeply rooted and dated back to the very formation of the 
GSEE and KKE. Even the adoption of the Macedonian Question policy had little effect in the 
localities examined. In Kokkinia it was never an issue as it had nothing to do with the refugee 
problems. And in Kavala, located in the very center of the Macedonia districts, the Communist 
Party, just a year and a half after the adaptation of the slogan in late 1924, had an impressive 
electoral performance, receiving more than a quarter of the votes in the 1926 national elections. 
Finally, in relation to assumptions widely held in the existing literature regarding the growth of 
communism in interwar Greece, some conclusions can be drawn. The equation factory + worker + 
living and working conditions + lack of ties with the land = communism appears problematic. As far 
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as the claim that lack of ties with land was a prerequisite for radicalism is concerned, the Kavala 
tobacco workers pose the best case for counterargument. As we have seen, a large number of 
tobacco workers in Kavala not only came from the countryside in search for employment, but 
returned to do agricultural work each year during the period when tobacco processing ceased. In this 
case not only did tobacco workers of peasant background not become agents of conservatism, they 
also contributed greatly to the export of communism to the countryside. 
Harsh living conditions may have contributed to an extent to the rise of communism in Kavala, 
however, in Kokkinia the results were quite the opposite. In Kokkinia, disaster and the sudden loss 
of status and proletarianization that were brought about by the refugee situation did not produce 
tendencies towards radicalism (as expected by the authorities at the time) but apathy. The existence 
of a large concentration of workers also did not automatically produce a background for communist 
growth. As we have seen this depended also on a series of interwoven factors, such as ethnic and 
political cleavages and various responses developed locally by the party in order to deal with them, 
in some cases more successfully than others. So, when 'classic' factors for the radicalization of the 
masses, such as poor living and working conditions, did not bring about the 'expected' results, local 
Communists begun to seek other ways to achieve this. By the mid-1930s, some ten years after the 
arrival of the refugees in Kokkinia, the Communist Party had partially managed to achieve this aim. 
By examining a variety of interviews and testimonies made by Communist Party members, 
activists and trade unionists, we have also managed to put forward a series of additional 'routes to 
communism'. These had to do with what we may call 'subjective' reasons rather than 'objective' 
ones, such as poverty or class. They had to do with the personal experience of communist politics as 
they manifested themselves at the work place or community. The self-sacrifice of communists, their 
continuous persecution by what was progressively seen as an unjust oppressive state, their 
identification with progress by ever increasing sections of society, became catalytic factors for the 
attraction and recruitment of new members. It is important to note the weight of the above values 
that communists appear to represent, because they largely came to replace the vacuum left by the 
lack of Marxist-Leninist education, as a form of radical working class ideology or ethos. 
To conclude, this doctoral study aimed to underline the importance of examining the development 
of communist politics at a grass-root, community level, as opposed to an overview of developments 
based entirely at the Party leadership level or at the level of the international communist movement 
The examination of the interplay between formal party politics and what communists did in the 
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community has constituted a valuable analytical tool in dealing with the growth of Communist Party 
politics among the working class. It encourages the researcher to depart from an interpretation of 
communist growth solely based on objective conditions, such as the growth of industry or a decline 
in living conditions and wages. The focus is rather on process as that evolved through the interaction 
of various factors of labor incorporation and emancipation. 
This interaction is not one-sided. Although the state is capable of drawing from a variety of 
resources, such as legislation, clientism and active oppression, the communists and the organized 
labor movement they operate in also have the capacity, in various degrees, to adapt and respond to 
them. Within that context, there are cases when communists manage to forge new sets of identity 
and values that become increasingly hegemonic at the community level, as the Kavala case 
demonstrates. Or, indeed, communists may create enclaves of radicalism, which although not yet 
hegemonic, serve as an influential platform for the promotion of communist politics and ideas, as 
signaled in the case of Kokkinia. 
International and national Communist politics provide a backdrop against which local labor 
struggles and local Communist initiatives take place. But on their own, they are not sufficient to 
explain local dynamics, notably the divergent experiences of Communists in different localities. This 
comparative analysis of two local experiences has shown that local social structure, in which ethnic 
patterns are a crucial factor, combined with local political traditions, are critical in explaining the 
varied experiences of Communist activists operating in different milieus. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Indices of Industrial Growth Rates (1928=100)1002 
Year Gross Output (1930 
prices) 
Gross Output (1930 
prices-ex. Electricity) 
Net Output (ex. 
Electricity) 
1921 n. a. 62.1 60.4 
1922 n. a. 65.5 64 
1923 n. a. 64.6 66 
1924 n. a. 75.9 83.4 
1925 83.6 84.5 89.7 
1926 81.9 83.4 86.1 
1927 92.5 92.1 92.8 
1928 100 100 100 
1929 104.3 102.9 102.1 
1930 109.5 103.2 104.4 
1931 112.1 103.3 105.4 
1932 107.8 97.7 100.6 
1933 120.6 111 112 
1934 138.5 128.1 133.5 
1935 139.3 127.1 131.6 
1936 149.6 134.9 138.9 
Appendix 2: New Industrial Firms Established (1921-1929) 1003 
Year No. of New Firms Horsepower 
1921 56 1,821 
1922 46 371 
1923 41 1,217 
1924 107 2,518 
1925 132 4,624 
1926 124 3,145 
1927 214 6,105 
1928 192 6,540 
1929 62 3,215 
1002 Sources: Oikonomiki Epefiris 1939, Elliniki BiomLrania 1931 
1003 Source: Oikonomiki Epetiris 193 7 
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Appendix 3ý 111114 Anti-licro images of the two representatives of the 'National Schism' 
On the left To some a 'hero, a savior, a prophet, a Father of the Nation'... to some a dangerous figure to whom 
the entrustment of the country's fortune would be a fatal mistake. The particular picture illustrates the Royalist 
view-point of Venizelos's insistence of allying with the forces of Entente (the name written on the horse's 
back), which they considered a 'betting on the wrong horse'. 
On the Righv To some a God-sent King, a sweet Father, and living image of the Nation. This picture, however, 
illustrates the King as seen from the eyes of an anti-royalist: performing dangerous acrobatics concerning the 
issue of Greece's attitude towards World War 1. 
1004 Source- Islorika, 12/12/2000, pp32 &33 
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Appendix 4: Comparative trade union density in 7 countries for the years 1920 and 19281005 
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Appendix 5i Electoral Strength of the KKE (1926-1936)1 006 
a Greece 
0 Britain 
0 U. S. A 
[]Canada 
M Australia 
0 Germany 
0 Sweden 
Date No of 
Votes 
% of 
Votes 
mps 
Elected 
Electoral 
System 
November 7,192, 41,982 4.38 10 Proportional 
August 19,1928 14,325 1.41_ - Non-proportional 
September 26,19 58,223 4.97 10 Proportional 
March 5,1933 52,958 4.64 - Non-pro )ortional 
June 9,1935 98,699 9.59 - Non-proportional 
January 26,1936 73,411 - 5.76 15 Proportional 
1005 Sources for Greeceý (; eniki Stalisliki Yj, )iresia lis Ellados for the years 1920 and 1928ý Jecchinis Ch 
(1984), Benaroya A (1975), KKE (1974a), KKE (1974b). Note that numbers of unionization may vary from 
account to account. That is because unionization levels were calculated according to estimates of the data 
published by various 'official' sources of the labor movement (GSEE, KKE, etc), while attempting to take 
under consideration the number of double-registering (i. e. union members who have been counted twice 
because they belonged to their union as well as their town local Labor Center), and the fact that some 
estimates may have been 'over-stated' for propaganda purposes. The amount of unionization for Greece in 
1928 is estimated in relation to the number of wage earners (and not industrial workers alone). For the other 
countries see Bain GS& Price R (1980) 
1 W6 Source: Statistiki ton Bouleutikon Eklogon 1928,1933,1936 
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1920 1928 
Appendix 6: Electoral Strength of the KKE in Selected Areas (in %)1007 
Area 1926 1936 Area 1926 1936 
Evros 16.01 7.22 Kozani - 6.59 
Kavala 14.90 23.83 Kilkis - 8.88 
Larisa, 14.86 17.70 Athens 3.73 7.31 
Rodopi 10.82 9.70 Piraeus 3.79 6.49 
Lesvos 5.37 14.20 Messinia 0.4 2.69 
Serres 3.65 11.77 Ioannina 2.86 5.43 
Salonica 10.82 9.7 1 
Appendix 7: Rizospastes Circulation 1928-19361008 
Year Circulation Year Circulation 
1928-9 4,250 1933 (December) 7,000 
1930 1,666 1936 10,000 
1933 (January) 2,600 Average 
Circulation of 
I Special Issues 1009 
20,000-25,000 
Appendix 8: Membership of OKNE (Organization of the Communist Youth of Greece)'010 
Year Membership Year Membership Year Membership 
1918 600 1924 700 1927 700 
1922 300 1925 600 1928 1,886 
1923 400 1926 300 1932 1,500 
11936 -- 
ý15,000 
1007 Source: Elefantis AG (1976), p336 
1008 Sources: Moskof K (1987) p466 & Elefantis AG (1999) p333 
1009 Such as, for example, the May Day, New Year, and October Revolution Anniversary Issues 
1010 Source: Moskof K (1987) p473 
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Appendix 9: Party organization before and after 1924 
1011 
Party organization pre-I 924 
Congress 
(Nationtal Council) 
I 
Central Contmitte (Bur-eau. ) 
Sections Clubs 
(15+members) (less than 15 members) 
Party organization po st- 1924 
Congress 
I 
Centrz attitte (Polilbureau) 
District Committees 
Ackddes Cily Committees 
. own+surrounding 
)untry- ide cells) 
ommittees 
Cells 
(Athens, Piraeus, 
Salonica) 
I 
Cens 
(Factory cells, Neighbourhood cells, ftactions) 
1011 The schema is derived from: Rizospastes, 18/5/1919; 11,12,13/4/1927 
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Appendix 10 : Index of Congresses and Administrative Organs of KKE'012 
Founding Congress of SEKE 
(17-23 November 1918) 
Central Committee: N Dimitratos, A Arvanites, D Ligdopoulos, S Kokkinos, M Sideres 
Auditing Committee: S Komiotis, Benaroya A, G Pispinis 
Party Secretary: N Dimitratos 
I" National Council of SEKE Central Committee: P Dimitratos, S Kokkinos, A Arvanites, 
(18-23 May 1919) A Tsalavoutas 
Auditing Committee: A Benaroya, G Pispinis, F Petrouska 
Party Secretary: P Dimitratos 
2'a Coneress of SEKE Central Committee: N Dimitratos, G Doumas, G Kordatos, 
(5-12 April 1920) M Sideres, P Dimitratos (deputy members: D Ligdopoulos, N 
Damigos) 
Auditing Committee: A Benaroya, A Arvanites, S Komiotis, 
G Lagoudakes 
Party Secretary: G Kordatos 
l't SEKE Conference Central Committee: G Georgiades, G Petsopoulos, A 
(22 February 1922) Sideres, G Xordatos, G Papanikolaou, G Lagoudakes, M 
Sideres 
Party Secretary: G Kordatos 
l't Extraordinary Coneress of SEKE Central Committee: G Lagoudakes, G Kordatos, Th 
(20 October 1922) Maggos, N Sargologos, D Diamogiannis 
Auditing Committee: A Benaroya, E Staurides, M 
Giatsopoulos 
National Council: M Oikonomou, L Chatzistaurou, D 
Adamides, G Georgiades, Z Ventoura 
Party Secretary: N Sargologos 
Electoral Coneress Central Committee: S Maximos, Th Apostolides, E 
(24 October 1923) Staurides, Ch Tzallas 
Auditing Committee: M Giatsopoulos, L Chatzistaurou 
National Council: T Moufides, N Sargologos, D Adamides, 
G Siantos, F Tzoulati 
Party Secretary: Th Apostolides 
3"d Extraordinary Coneress of KKE Central Committee: Th Apostolides S Maximos P 
(26 November-3 December 1924) , , Poutiopoulos, N Euaggelopoulos, N Nikolaides, K Sklavos, S 
Defferes 
Party Secretary: P Pouliopoulos 
4'h Coneress of KKE Central Committee: A Chaitas, G Siantos, K Theos, A 
(10-15 December 1928) Christodoulides, D Piliotes, K Eutichiades, K Karagiannes, D 
Paparrigas, V Asikes, G Kolozo& G Ioannides, I Tsatsakos, G 
Fragkopoulos, Stamelakos 
Politbureau: A Chaitas, K Eutichiades, G Siantos, K Theos, 
D Piliotes, D Paparrigas, G Karagiannes 
Party Secretary: A Chaitas 
Intervention or the Comintern Politbureau: N Zachariades, G loannides, S Sklavainas, G 
(November 193 1) Michailides, V Nefeloudes, G Konstandinides, L Striggos 
5"' Coneress of KKE Central Committee: S Anastasiades, V Ververes, N 
(March 1934) Zachariades, G Zeugos, G loannides, G Michaelides, V 
Nefeloudes, M Porfirogenes, P Rousos, G Siantos, M 
I Sinakos, G Skafidas, S Sklavainas, L Striggos, M Tirimos 
1012 y vyE (1974a); KKE (1974b); KKE (1975a); KKE (1975b) 
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Politbureau: N Zachariades, V Nefeloudes, S Sklavainas, G 
Michaelides, G Ioannides, D Partsalides (Deputies: G Siantos, 
M Sinakos) 
Party Secretary: N Zachariades 
6th Con2ress of KKE Central Committee: S Anastasiades, V Ververes, P 
(December 1935) Damaskopoulos, N Zachariades, G Zeugos, G loannides, P 
Karagkitses-Simos, D Matheses, G Michailides, M 
Nfichelides, S Moschos, V Nefeloudes, D Partsalides, N 
Ploumpides, M Porfirogenes, P Rousos, G Siantos, M 
Sinakos, D Sitokonstantinou, G Skafidas, S Sklavenas, Ch 
Chatzivasiliou 
Politbureau: N Zachariades, V Nefeloudes, S Sklavainas, G 
Michailides, G Siantos, G Ioannides, D Partsalides 
Party Secretary: N Zachariades 
Appendix 11: Chronological Development of the Left Opposition and other organizations outside the 
Communist Party in Interwar Greece. 1013 
1918 The foundation of SEKE (Socialist Labour Party of Greece) 
1920 The fraction of SEKE that was orientated towards the Yd International (Ligdopoulos, 
Tzoulati, Piliotis) establish the group 'Communist Union' (Kommounisliki Enosis) 
Their journal 'Communism' (Kommounismos) is published 
October V* Second Congress of SEKE - The Balkan Communist Federation is established. 
1921 September The 'Communist Union' is dissolved. 
The first nucleus that will later on constitute the base of the establishment ofArxeion 
is formed within the ranks of SEKE (by Tzoulati, Sarantides, Dedouses, and others) 
1922 August The aftermath of the Asia Minor Catastrophe - The Federation of 'Old Soldiers' is 
founded. Its journal 'Old Soldier' is published. 
1923 May I't The 'Archival-Marxist' (Arxeion) organization is establisýed 
Another group, formed by the expelled from the Party Seitanides, publishes the 
jourml 'To the Masses' (Pros fis Mazes) 
Autumn The 'Communist Union of Greece' (Kommounisliki Enosis Ellados) is established 
(split from SEKE). Its founding members constituted E Papanastasiou, S 
Arvanitakes, A Papachristou, N Alexakis. The weekly paper 'Communist Platform' 
(Kommounistikon Vima) is published. 
1924 (November - The 'Communist Union of Greece' is dissolved. Its grass-root members re-join 
December) SEKE. The leaders of the Union remain outside. 
1926 Pouliopoulos resigns from Party Secretary 
The fraction of Arreion named 'Third Situation' (Trid Kalastasi) is created by K 
Ginivosis, Maras, Papagiannes, L Mproumas, Kazares and others. 
1927 Maximos, Chainoglou and Sklavos resign from KKE's Politbureau during the 
Party's Yd Regular Congress. 
June 15'h Pouliopoulos and Giatsopoulos publish the Letter towards the members of KKE. 
I They establish the organization 'New Beginning' (Areo Ksekinima) 
1013 Sources: Syriggas Nikos Archive, ELIA 
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1928 The journal Spartakos is published (from the 5'b issue onwards it is becomes the 
'organ of the Opposition to KKE'. 
The 'wide' Plenum of the CC of KKE decides the expulsion of the Liquidarists and 
the Centrists from the Party. 
In the 4h Party Congress Maximos, Sklavos, Chainoglou, Chatzistaurou, 
Papanikolaou, Nikolaides and Polichronakes are expelled from the Party. 
1929 The 'firactionist struggle without principles' take place in KKE. 
November A new fractionist group develops in Arreion, consisting of Soulis, Vrixoropoulos, 
Michos and others. 
1930 (28/9-2/10) 1" National Congress of Arxeion, with 'selective' participation of representatives 
from across the country (45 in total). Suggestions for the drawing up of a 
constitution. The proceedings attended representatives of the International Left 
Opposition (Molinier and Mill), who also come in contact with the Spartakos group. 
The fortnightly newspaper 'Class Struggle' (Pali ton Tahseon) is published as the 
October 28t" organ of the 'Communist Organization of Bolsheviks -Leninists (Archical- 
Marxists), Left Opposition' (Kommounistiki Organosi Mpolsevikon -Leniniston 
(Arxeiomarxistwn) Aristeri Antipoliteusi) -abbreviation: KOMLEA. 
Open letter to the members of the Spartakos Group is published in 'Class Struggle' 
aiming to the unification of the two groups. 
December 6'h KOMLEA participates in the local elections of Salonica. The groups 'Spartakos' 
and 'Fractionists' supported the KKE candidate. The results were: KKE (2,614), 
December 21'4 KOMLEA (384) 
1931 May 10h Ist nal Convention of the 'Communist Unitary Group-Left Opposition 
(Kommounisliki Enouki Omada-Aristerj Antipoliteusi) KEO considers itself 
opposition of the KKE within the framework of the International Left Opposition 
(established by Soulas, Raptes, Skopelites, Sklavounos, Mpezantakos etc) 
Deltion is published as the monthly journal of KEO 
June Daylos ('Torch') is published as a weekly journal of KOMLEA 
August Open Letter to the Left Opposition in Greece by the Bureau of the International Left 
October 21t Opposition calling all parties of the Left Opposition in Greece to unite (or be 
incorporated to KOMLEA) 
1932 February 2d National Convention of KEO. It decided the unification of the group with 
Spartakos. The disagreeing minority established the 'Leninist Opposition to KKE' 
(Leninistiki Antipoliteusi tou KKE) or LAKKE (Raptis, Soulas, the Stinas group, etc) 
I" National Congress of KOMLEA_ It elects a Politbureau (P Giotopoulos, P 
March Kavvidas, G Theothoratos, P Adronis, H Besilas, G Vitsores, A Sakkos) and a CC 
(A Papadopoulos, L Karliaftes, V Deutereos, T Kapetanakis, Th Tzanavaras, M 
Kapetanakes, P Giotopoulos, P Kavvidas, G Theothoratos, P Adronis, H Besilas, G 
Vitsores, A Sakkos). Party Secretary is elected D Giotopoulos. 
The 'Communist Flag' (H Simea tou Kommounismou) is published by LAKKE 
June 26th Id National Convention of Spartakos 
29/8-1/9 Stinas is expelled from KKE (he would join KOMLEA on 1/9/1933) 
September 
1933 Asimides is expelled from KKE and forms a extra-party group with Kanstandinides 
and Pakos 
September 28'h The Bureau of the International Left Opposition announces that 'comrade Witte 
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lGiotopoulos] had violated the Bolshevik principles' 
November 2 nd National Convention of the Opposition of KKE (Sl)arlakos) 
1934 March KOMLEA splits. One part, with Vitsores is recognized as the official national 
section of the International Communist Union. It initially publishes the 'Archival- 
Marxist' (Arxeiomarxisli) and later on the 'Bolshevik' (BoZvheviko. v). The other part, 
with Giotopoulos continues to publish the 'Class Struggle' paper. 
July 2 nd National Congress of the KOMLEA-Greek Section of the International 
Communist Union. (abbreviated: ETKDE) 
August 22 nd Unifying Convention amongst the groups ýparlakos and 'Lemnist Union' 
(Leninisliki 1,. 'nosi), former LAKKE. The groups achieved unification (with also a 
section of the group 'New International') and established the 'Organization of 
Communists Internationalists of Greece' (Organom Kommounislon Dielliflisfoll 
October 15'h 1,31ados) - -abbreviate& OKDE. 
The newspaper 'Pioneer Worker' (Ergaliki I)rotol)oria) was published by OKDE 
1935 February I" Convention of the 'Organization of Bolshevik s-Leni m sts' (ETKDE). The newly 
elected Bureau consisted of G Vitsores, A Stinas and K Anastasiades. 
November The Organization of Marxists-Leninists of Greece is renamed to 'Communist 
International Union of Greece' (Kommounisliki Diethnisliki Enom Alladas)- 
abbreviated: KDEE. It stops the publication of 'Bolshevik' and begins the 
publication of 'New Epoch' (Nea Eý)ochi) 
1936 January The 'Marxist Platform' (Alarxisliko Vima) is published by the group 'Left Fraction 
ofKKE' (Arisferi [arataksi lou KKE-) 
KDEE publishes the newspaper 'Workers' Front' (ArgatikoAlelopo) 
January 26"' In the parliamentary elections OKDE and KDEE run together under the name 
'Communist Internationalist Front' (Kommounisfiko Diethnisliko Melol)o). They 
receive 126 votes in Athens and 239 in Salonica. 
May KDEE splits. S Stinas, G Vitsores and the majority of the CC expel the minority (A 
Sakkos, K Anastasiades, Ch Anastasiades, D Vourtsoukes, V Varikas, F 
Anastasiades, G Voules, L Karliaftes and G Theodaratos) which establish the 'New 
Way' group (Neos Dromos) 
Appendix 12: Membership in extra-KKE organizations during the inter-war period (1918-1936)1014 
Eil 
U2 
113 
114 
Z5 
m 06 "1 
1014 Sources. cards with biographical data, Partsi and 2, in Syriggas Nikos Archive, File], ELIA 
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The sample was based on the examination of 102 biographical notes of members (or former members) 
of organ i zati ons/parti es that existed outside the Communist Party. The chart is indicative to the extension 
of membership floating in the time-frame concerned: Only 17 individuals actually remained members of a 
single organization, whcreas another 35 had been members of two. On the contrary, some 50 individuals 
(out of 102), neariv half the sample, had joined at least three different organizations (out of which 32 had 
joined three, 12 had joined four, four had joined five, and two had joined six! ). 
1015 
Appendix 13 ý Average years of membership in extra-KKE organizations in the inter-war penod (1918-1936)1 
016 
MI Year 
M2 Years 
03 Years 
1: 14 Years 
05 Years 
13 6 Years 
07 or more 
Therefore we see that 49% of the average stay in an organization was no more than 2 years. Another 
32% of the sample had an average membership duration of 3-5 years, whereas the respective percentage 
for a membership duration more than 6 years was just 19%. 
"'15 It should also be taken into account that several individuals were, in the course of the inter-war period, 
either expelled (such as in the case of Dervos D, expelled in 1933 from Spartakos, or Kaukalas G -1934- 
from OKDF), or they voluntarily quit politics, ending their political involvement all together (such as in the 
case of Sapounas S- 1930). 
")"' Sourcesý cards with biographical data, Partst and 2, in Syriggas Nikos Archive, Filel, ELIA 
260 
Appendix 14: Temporary settlements of Piraeus (wooden) 
1017 
Settlement Houses Rooms Total Rooms Number of persons housed 
Families Persons 
Lipasmata 20 ISO 150 170 605 
Anastaseos 30 Various 500 510 1,990 
Tampouria 134 32 2,010 2,060 9,300 
P Kokkinia 131 - 614 614 2,500 
Tzitzifies - - 297 300 1,250 
Total 3,571 3, 15,645 
Appendix 15: Semi-permanent settlements 
1018 
Settlement Construction Houses Houses Total No of persons housed 
(1) (2) Houses Rooms Families Persons 
N Kokkinia Wooden 275 2 550 - 760 4,500 
Drapetsona Cement 20 14 280 280 280 1,230 
Appendix 16: Voting patterns in selected refugee areas (1926-1936) 
1019 
Area/Election 1926 1928 1932 1933 1936 
Party L P C LI PI C LI PI L P LI P 
Byron 93 2.6 1.6 97.4 2 0.7 83.1 8.8 6.1 3.2 15.8 10.5 76.9 14.1 7.9 
Kaisariani 5.2 1.5 1.5 98.5 1.2 0.3 88 5.4 5.5 9 8.5 12 83 8.5 7.6 
Nea, Ionia 3.7 1.8 1.9 98.1 1.2 0.5 86.3 6.8 6.1 ý6 11.3 12.4 83.6 9.7 6.2 
Nea Kokkinia 4.8 1.7 1.5 98 1.1 0.7 86.7 4.7 6.8 74.4 14.3 11.2 79.5 8.3 10.7 
Capital 3.8 41.8 3.8 63.7 33.3 2.2 54.5 38.2 6.5 46.1 44.3 9 48.4 40.9 7.5 
Total (nationwide) 6.6 141.7 14.4 63.5 33 2.4 52.7 35.4 5 45.1 45.9 6.1 44.3 47.8 5.9 
1017 Report of the Ministry of Hygiene, Welfare and 
(Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/132) 
10's Report of the Ministry of Hygiene, Welfare and 
(Archive of E Venizelos, File 173/132) 
1019 Cited in Maurogenes Papaggelopoulou (1999) p122 
Precaution (Engineer Athanasiades) 14/10/1928, 
Precaution (Engineer Athanasiades) 14/10/1928, 
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Appendix 17: Elections 16/1/1936 in Kokkinia 1020 
Station Total Liberals Radicals Populists Democratic 
Alert 
Kanello- 
Poulos 
Kondyles Metaxas KKE 
IA 733 589 33 12 22 12 - 64 
733 589 - 12 22 12 33 - 64 
'- 
724 530 50 18 20 22 - 3 77 
4'1ý 
- 
726 555 39 10 17 7 - 3 87 
5'1ý 586 466 21 13 9 5 - 3 63 
584 453 20 24 12 4 - 3 67 
272 184 30 9 10 8 - 2 21 
- 
272 184 - - 10 3 30 3 21 
1911ý 726 555 - 10 17 11 39 3 87 
1020 Acropolis 27/1/1936 
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